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» * . • • » . 

* t 


Introduction ^^^^ ^" 

Book I ^ 

Book II ^^ 

Book III 
Book IV 

Book V ^^^ 

, J 505 




de Fiiii- 


The de FhnliHS Bonoram el Mahrum is a treatise ^ 
on tile theory of Ethics . It expounds and criticizes 
the three ethical systems most prominent in Cicero's 
day, the Epicurean, tlie Stoic and that of the Aca- 
demy under Antiochus. The most elaborate of 
Cicero's philosophical writings, it has had fewer 
readers than his less technical essays on moral sub- 
jects. But it isof importance to the student of philo- 
sophy as the only systematic account surviving 
from antiquity of those rules of life whicli divided 
the allegiance of thoughtful men during the cen- 
turies when the old religions had lost tlieir hold and 
Christianity had not yet emerged. And the topics 
that it handles can never lose their interest. 

The title 'About the Ends of Goods and Evils' ^^'.'"'."/^ 
requires explanation. It was Aristotle who put tlie "■' — '- 

ethical problem in the form of the question. What UJ-t'. 
is the TeAos or End, the supreme aim of man's en- 
deavourj in the attainment of which his Good or 
Well-being lies? For Aristotle, Telvf connoted not 
only 'aim,' but completion'; and he found the 
answer to his question in the complete development 
and right exercise of the faculties of man's nature, 
and particularly of the distinctively human faculty 
of Reason. The life of the Intellect was the Best, 
the Chief Good; and lesser Goods were Means to 
the attainment of this End. Thus was introduced 
the notion of an ascending scale of Goods, and this 
affected the interpretation of the term Te los . Telo» 
came to be understood as denoting not so much the 
end or aim of endeavour as the end or extreme 


point of a series, the topmost good. To this was 
naturally opposed an extreme of minus value, the 
topmost, or rather bottommost, evil. The expres- 
sions TcAos dyaOiav, tIAos KaKiov, End of Goods, of 
Evils,' do not occur in extant Greek (though Dio- 
genes has T€\tKa KaKoi, final evils *), but they are 
attested by Cicero's translation ^»w honorum et malo- 
rum. As a title for his book he throws this phrase 
into the plural, meaning different views as to the 
Chief Good and Evil.' Hence in title and to some 
extent in method, the de Finihus may be compared 
with such modem works as Martineau's Types of 
Ethical Theory and Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, 

'cero as a Cicero belongs to a type not unknown in English 

nter on life, that of the statesman who is also a student and a 
•tlosophy, writer. From his youth he aspired to play a part in 
public affairs, and the first step towards this ambition 
was to learn to speak. He approached Greek philo- 
sophy as part of a liberal education for a political 
career, and he looked on it as supplying themes for 
practice in oratory. But his real interest in it went 
deeper; the study of it formed his mind and hu- 
manized his character, and he loved it to the end of 
his life. 

In his youth he heard the heads of the three chief 
Schools of Athens, Phaedrus the Epicurean, Diodo- 
tus the Stoic, and Philo the Academic, who had 
come to Rome' to escape the disturbances of the 
Mithradatic War. When already launched in public 
life, he withdrew, at the age of 27 (79 b.c), to devote 
two more years to philosophy and rhetoric. Six 
months were spent at Athens, and the introduction 
to de Finibus Book V gives a brilliant picture of his 

• • • 



student life there with his friends. No passage 
more vividly displays what Athens and her memories 
meant to the cultivated Roman. At Athens Cicero 
attended the lectures of the Epicurean Zeno and the 
Academic Antiochus. Passing on to Rhodes to 
work under the leading professors of rhetoric, he 
there met Posidonius, the most renowned Stoic of 
the day. He returned to Rome to plunge into his 
career as advocate and statesman; but his Letters 
show him continuing his studies in his intervals of 
leisure. For many years the Stoic Diodotus was an 
inmate of his house. 

Under the Triumvirate, as his influence in politics 
waned, Cicero turned more and more to literature. 
His earliest essay in rhetoric, the de Inventione , had 
appeared before he was twenty-five ; but his first 
considerable works on rhetoric and on political 
science, the de Oratore, de RepubUca, and de Legibus, 
were written after his return from exile in 57. The 
opening pages of de Finibus Book III give a glimpse 
of his studies at this period. In 51 he went as 
Governor to Cilicia ; and he -wrote no more until the 
defeat of Pompey at Pharsalus had destroyed his 
hopes for the Republic. 

After his reconciliation with Caesar and return to 
Rome in the autumn of 46, Cicero resumed writing 
on rhetoric . In February 45 came the death of his 
beloved daughter Tullia, followed soon after by the 
final downfall of the Pompeians at Munda. Crushed 
by public and private sorrow, he shut himself up in 
one of his country houses and sought distraction in 
unremitting literary work. He conceived the idea, 
as he implies in the preface to de Finibus, of render- 
ing a. last siervice to his counti-y by bringing the 




9f ^e treasures of Greek thought within the reach of the 

"*' Roman public. Both his Academica and de Finibus 

were compiled in the following summer ; the latter 

was probably presented to Brutus^ to whom it is 

dedicated^ on his visit to Cicero in August 45 (ad 

Att. XIII, 44). Seven months later Brutus was one 

[of the assassins of Caesar. In the autumn of 44 

\ Cicero flung himself again into the arena with his 

/attack on Antony, which led to his proscription and 

I death in December 43. 

Excepting the de Oratore, de RepuhUca and de 
LegibuSy the whole of Cicero's most important 
odo/ writings on philosophy and rhetoric belong to 
7sition, 46-44 B.C. and were achieved within two years. 
Such a mass of work so rapidly produced could 
hardly be original, and in fact it made no claim to 
be so. It was designed as a sort of encyclopaedia 
of philosoph y for Roman readers. Cicero's plan was 
to take each chief department of thought in turn, 
and present the theories of the leading schools upon 
it, appending to each theory the criticisms of its 
opponents. Nor had his work that degree of inde- 
pendence which consists in assimilating the thought 
of others and recasting it in the mould of the writer's 
own mind. He merely chose some recent hand-book 
on each side of the question under consideration, 
and reproduced it in Latin, encasing passages of 
continuous exposition in a frame of dialogue, and 
adding illustrations from Roman history and poetry. 
He puts the* matter frankly in a letter to Atticus 
(XII, 52): "You will say, ^What is your method in 
such compositions ? ' They are mere transcripts, and 
cost comparatively little labour; I only supply the 
words, of which I have a copious flow." In de Finibtis 



(I, 6) he rates his work a Httle higher, not without 
justice, and claims to be the critic as well as the 
interpreter of his authorities. 

This method of writing was consonant with Cicero's Cicero's 
own position in philosophy. Since his early studies ^*(^<^^*« 
under Philo he had been a professed adherent of the 
New Academy, and as such maintained a sceptical \ ^ 
attitude on questions of knowledge. On morals he f' 
was more positive ; though without a logical basis for \ . 
his principles, he accepted the verdict of tb^ common \ 
moral conscience of his age and county. Epicure- 
anism^-lie^abhorred as demoralizing The Stoics 
rep^ed himNijy their harshness anja narrowness, but. 
Sracted him by their strict morality and lofty the- 
ology. His competence for th^^task of interpreting 
Greek thought to Rome v^as of a qualified order. 
He had read much, and h^ heard the chief teachers 
of the day. But with yl^arning and enthusiasm he 
combined neither depth of insight nor scientific 
precision. Yet his^s^rvices to philosophy must not 
b^^^i^errated. Jrfe introduced a novel style of ex- 
positiSiT^CDpious, eloquent, impartial and urbane; 
and he created a philosophical terminology in Latin 
which has passed into the languages of modem 

The de Finibtcs consists of three separate dialogues. Contents of 
each dealing with one of the chief ethical systems ^® Finibus. 
of the day. The exponents of each system, and the 
minor interlocutors, are friends of Cicero's younger 
days, all of whom were dead when he wrote ; brief 
notes upon them will be found in the Index. The 
rdle of critic Cicero takes himself throughout. 

The first dialogue occupies Books I and II ; in the 



former the Ethics. of Epicurus are expounded, and 
in the latter refuted from the Stoic standpoint. The 
scene is laid at Cicero's villa in the neighbourhood 
of Cumae, on the lovely coast a little north of 
Naples. The spokesman of Epicureanism is L. Man- 
lius Torquatus, a reference to whose praetorship 
(II, 74) fixes the date of the conversation at 50 b.c, 
shortly after Cicero* s return from his province of 
Cilicia. A minor part is given to the youthful 
C. Valerius Triarius. 

In the second dialogue the Stoic ethics are ex- 
pounded (in Book III) by M. Cato, and criticized (in 
Book IV) from the standpoint of Antiochus by 
Cicero. Cicero has run down to his place at Tuscu- 
lum, fifteen miles from town, for a brief September 
holiday, while the Games are on at Rome ; and he 
meets Cato at the neighbouring villa of Lucullus, 
whose orphan son is Cato's ward. A law passed by 
Pompey in 52 b.c. is spoken of (IV, l) as Hew, so 
the date falls in that year; Cicero went to Cilicia 
in 51. 

The third dialogue (Book V) goes back to a much 
earlier period in Cicero's life. Its date is 79 and its 
scene Athens, where Cicero and his friends are 
eagerly attending lectures on philosophy. The posi- 
tion of the Old Academy" of Antiochus is main- 
tained by M. Pupius Piso Calpumianus, and after- 
wards criticized by Cicero from the Stoic point of 
view ; the last word remains with Piso. The others 
present are Cicero's brother and cousin, and his 
friend and correspondent Titus Pomponious Atticus, 
a convinced Epicurean, who had retired to Athens 
from the civil disorders at Rome, and did not return 
for over twenty years, 


In Book I the exposition of Epicureanism pro- Cicero's 
bably comes from some compendium of the school, j'**p-^*-'j? ^ 
which seems to have summarized (l) Epicurus' s essay 
On the Telos, (2) a resum6 of the points at issue 
between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics (reproduced I, 
65 ff), and (s) some Epicurean work on Friendship 
(I, 65-70). 

The Stoic arguments against Epicurus in Book II 
Cicero derived very likely from Antiochus ; but in the 
criticism of Epicurus there is doubtless more of 
Cicero's own thought than anywhere else in the 

The authority for Stoicism relied on in Book III 
was most probably Diogenes of Babylon, who is 
referred to by name at III, 33 and 49. 

In Books IV and V Cicero appears to have followed 

Alexander the Great died in 323 and Aristotle in Post-Aristo 
322 B.C. Both Epicurus and Zeno, the founder of *pl^P j^^ 
Stoicism, began to teach at Athens about twenty years 
later. The date marks a new era in Greek thought 
and Greek life. Speculative energy had exhausted 
itself; the schools of Plato and Aristotle showed 
little vigour after the death of their founders. En- 
lightenment had undermined religion, yet the philo- 
sophers seemed to agree about nothing except that 
things are not what they appear; and the plain 
man's mistrust of their conclusions was raised into a 
system of Scepticism by Pyrrho. Meanwhile the 
outer order too had changed. For Plato and Aris- 
totle the good life could only be lived in a free 
city-state, like the little independent Greek cities 
\irhich they knew ; but these had now fallen under 

• • • 




the empire of Macedon, and the barrier between 
Greek and barbarian was giving way. The wars of 
-Alexander's successors rendered all things insecure ; 
exile, slavery, violent death were possibilities with 
which every man must lay his account. 

Epicureanism and Stoicism, however antagonistic, 
have certain common features corresponding to the 
needs of the period. Philosophy was systematized, 
and fell into three recognized departments. Logic, 
Physics and Ethics ; and for both schools the third 
department stood first in importance. Both schools 
offered dogma, not speculation ; a way of life for man 
as man, not as Greek citizen. Both abandoned 
idealism, saw no reality save matter, and accepted 
sense experience as knowledge. Both studied the 
world of nature only in order to understand the 
position of man. Both looked for a happiness 
secure from fortune's changes'; and found it in peace 
of mind, undisturbed by fear and desire. But here 
the rival teachers diverged : Epicurus sought peace 
in the liberation of man's will from nature's law, 
Zeno in submission to it;^ and in their conceptions 
of nature they differed profoundly. 

nirean- Formal Logic Epicurus dismissed as useless, but 
onic ^^ raised the problem of knowledge under the 
heading of Canonic. The Carum or measuring-rod, 
the. criterion of truth, is furnished by the sensations 
and by the irdOr) or feelings of pleasure and pain. 
Epicurus' s recognition of the latter as qualities of 
any state of consciousness and as distinct from the 
sensations of sight, hearing, etc., marks a notable 

* Et mihi res non me rebus suhiungere conor, says Horace 
of his lapses from Stoicism into Cyrenaicism. 



advance in psychology. The sensations and the 
feelings determine our judgment and volition 
respectively, and they are all true,' i.e., real data 
of experience. So are the irpo\ri\l/€is, or precon- 
ceptions' by which we recognize each fresh sensa- 
tion, i.e., our general concepts; for these are accu- 
mulations of past sensations. It is in vTro\rj\l/€is, 
opinions,' i.e., judgments about sensations, that 'j 
/error can occur. Opinions are true only when con- \ 
I firmed, or, in the case of those relating to imper- 
ceptible objects (e.g. the Void), when not contra- 
dicted by actual sensations. Thus Epicurus adum- ' 
brated, however crudely, a logic of inductive ' 

His Natural Philosophy is touched on in de Finibus, Epicurean 
I, c. vi. It is fully set out in the great poem of ^^J^sics, 
Cicero's contemporary, Lucretius, who preaches his 
master's doctrine with religious fervour as a gospel 
of deliverance for the spirit of man. Epicurus adopt- 
ed the Atomic theory of Democritus, according to 
which the primary realities are an infinite number of 
tiny particles of matter, indivisible and indestructi-» 
ble, moving by their own weight through an infinite 
expanse of empty space or Void. Our perishable 
world and all that it contains consists of temporary 
clusters of these atoms interspersed with void. In- 
numerable other worlds beside are constantly form- 
ing and dissolving. This universe goes on of itself: 
there are gods, but they take no part in its guidance ; 
they live a life of untroubled bliss in the empty spaces 
between the worlds. The human soul like every- 
thing else is material; it consists of atoms of the 
smallest and most mobile sort, enclosed by the 
coarser atoms of the body, and dissipated when the 



body is dissolved by death. Death therefore means 

Thus man was relieved from the superstitions that 
preyed upon his happiness, — fear of the gods and 
fear of punishment after death. But a worse tyranny 
remained if all that happens is caused by inexorable 
fate. Here comes in the doctrine of the Swerve, 
which Cicero derides, but which is essential to the 
system. Democritus had taught that the heavier 
atoms fell faster through the void than the lighter 
ones, and so overtook them. Aristotle corrected the 
error ; and Epicurus turned the correction to account. 
He gave his atoms a uniform vertical velocity, but 
supposed them to collide by casually making a slight 
sideway movement. This was the minimum hypo- 
thesis that he could think of to account for the 
formation of things; and it served his purpose by 
destroying the conception of a fixed order in Nature. 
The capacity to swerve is shared by the atoms that 
compose the human soul ; hence it accounts for the 
action of the will, which Epicurus regards as entirely 
undetermined. In this fortuitous universe man is 
free to make his own happiness. 
epicurean In Ethics Epicurus based himself on Aristippus, 

the pupil of Socrates and founder of the School of 
Cyrene. With Aristippus he held that pleasure is the 
only good, the sole constituent of man's well-being. 
Aristippus had drawn the practical inference that 
the right thing to do is to enjoy each pleasure of the 
moment as it offers. His rule of conduct is summed 
up by Horace's Carpe diem. But this naif hedonism 
was so modified by Epicurus as to become in his hands 
an entirely different theory. Its principal tenets are: 
that the goodness of pleasure is a matter of direct 



intuition^ and is attested by natural instinct^ as seen 
in the actions of infants and animals ; that all men's 
conduct does as a matter of fact aim at pleasure ; that 
the proper aim is to secure the greatest l)alance of 
pleasure over pain in the aggregate; that absence 
of pain is the greatest pleasure, which can only be 
varied, not augmented, by active gratification of the 
sense ; that pleasure of the mind is based on pleasure 
of the body, yet that mental pleasure may far sur- 
pass bodily in miEignitude, including as it does with 
the consciousness of present gratification the memory 
of past and the hope of future pleasure ; that un- 
natural and unnecessary' desires and emotions are a 
chief source of unhappiness; and that Prudence, 
Temperance or self-control, and the other recognized 
virtues are therefore essential to obtain a life of 
the greatest pleasure, though at the same time the 
virtues are of no value save as conducive to pleasure. 

This original, and in some respects paradoxical, 
development of hedonism gave no countenance to the 
voluptuary. On the contrary Epicurus both preached 
and practised the simple life, and the cultivation of 
the ordinary virtues, though under utilitarian sanc- 
tions which led him to extreme unorthodoxy in some 
particulars. Especially, he denied any absolute 
validity to Justice and to Law, and inculcated absten.- 
tion from the active duties of citizenship. To Friend- 
ship he attached the highest value; and the School 
that he founded in his Garden in a suburb of Athens, 
and endowed by will, was as much a society of 
friends as a college of students. It still survived 
arid kept the birthday of its founder in Cicero's time. 

Epicurus is the forerunner of the English Utilita- 
rians ; but he differs from them in making no attempt 


^^1 to con 

^^B happit 

^^P others 

^r is agaj 


to combine hedonism witli altruisni. 'The greatest 
happiness of tlie greatest number ' is a. formula that 
counterpart in antiquity. The problem that 
when the claims of self conflict with those of 
others was not explicitly raised by Epicurus. But it 
against the egoism of his Ethics at least as much 
as against its hedonistic basis that Cicero's criticisms 
are really directed. 

The Stoics paid mucli attention to Logic. In this 
department they included with Dialectic, which they 
developed on the lines laid down by Aristotle, 
Grammar, Rhetoric, and the doctrine of the Criterion. 
The last was their treatment of the problem of know- 
ledge. Like Epicurus they were purely empirical, 
but unlike him they conceded t« the Sceptics that 
sensations are sometimes misleading. Vet true sensa- 
tions, they maintainedjare distinguishable &om false ; 
they have a clearness' which compels tlie assent' 
of the mind and makes it comprehend ' or grasp 
the presentation as a true picture of the CKtemal 
object. Such a comprehensible presentation,' 
KaTaKiprriKii ^vrairta., is the criterion of truth ; it is 
a presentation that arises from an object actually 
present, in conformity with that object, stamped on 
the mind like the impress of a seal, and such as 
could not arise from an object not actually present.' 
So their much-debated formula was elaborated in 
reply to Sceptical critics. If asked how it happens 
that false sensations do occur — e.g., that a straight 
stick half under water looks crooked — the Stoics 
replied that error only arises from inattention ; care- 
fill observation will detect the absence of one or 
other of the notes of ' clearness.' I'lie Wise Man 


never assents' to an incomprehensible presenta- 

In contradiction to Epicurus^ the Stoics taught Stoic 
that the universe is guided by, and in the last resort Physics, 
is, God. The sole first cause is a divine Mind, which 
realizes itself periodically in the world-process. But 
this belief they expressed in terms uncompromisingly 
materialistic Only the corporeal exists, for only the 
corporeal can act and be acted upon. Mind there- 
fore is matter in its subtlest form; it is Fire or 
Breath (spirit) or Aether. The primal fiery Spirit 
creates out of itself the material world that we know, 
and itself persists within the world as its heat, its 
tension,' its soul ; it is the cause of all movement, 
and the source of life in all animate creatures, whose 
souls are detached particles of the world-soul. 

The notion of Fire as the primary substance the 
Stoics derived from Heracleitus. Of the process of 
<*reation they offered an elaborate account, a sort of 
imaginary physics or chemistry, operating with the 
hot and cold, dry and moist, the four elements of 
fire, air, earth and water, and other conceptions of 
previous physicists, which came to them chiefly 
through the Peripatetics. 

The world-process they conceived as going on 
according to a fixed law or formula {\dyo<i)^ effect 
following cause in undeviating sequence. This law 
they regarded impersonally as Fate, or personally as 
divine Providence ; they even spoke of the Deity as 
being himself the Logos of creation. Evidences of 
design they found in the beauty of the ordered 
world and in its adaptation to the use and comfort 
of man. Apparent evil is but the necessary imperfec- 
tion of the parts as parts ; the whole is perfectly gooc 




As this world had a beginning, so it will have an 
end ill lime; it is moving on towards » universal 
coiitUKTittio», in which all things «ill return to the 
primal Vin from which they sprang. But only for 
a moment will unity be restored. The causes that 
opcnted before must opcrati- again; once more the 
creative |iroc«ss will begin, and all things will recur 
cjtaclly as they have occurred already. So existence 
goes on, repeating itself in an unending series of 
identical cycles. 

Such rigorous determinism would seem to leave no 
room for human freedom or for moral choice. \ et the 
Stoics-BUUBbuiMd- that though man's acts like all 
other e vents are fore-ordained, his will is free. Obey the 
divine ordinance in any case he must, but iFrests with 
him to do so willingly or with reluctance. To under- 
stand the world in which he finds himself^ and to sub- 
mit his will thereto — herein man's well-being lies. 

On this foundation they reared an elaborate stnic- 
tuje of Ethics. Their formula for conduct was To 
live in accordance with nature.' To interpret this, 
they appealed, bke Epicurus, to instinct, but with a 
different result. According to the Stoics, not plea- 
sure but self-preservation and things conducive to it 
are the objects at which infants and animals aim. 
Such objects are primary in the order of nature'; 
and these objects and others springing out of them, 
viz., all that pertains to the safety and the fiill deve- 
lopment of man's nature, constitute the proper aim 
of human action. The instinct to seek these objects 
is replaced in the adult by deliberate intention; as 
his reason matures, be learns (if unperverted) to 
understand the plan of nature and to find his happi- 
ness in willing conformity with it. 'I1iis tightness of 


understanding and of will (the Stoics did not separate 
the two, since for them the mind is one) is Wisdom 
or Virtue, which is the only good ; their wrongness is 
Folly or Vice, the only evil. Not that we are to ignore 
external things: on the contrary, it is in choosing 
among them as Nature intends that Virtue is exercised. 
But the attainment of the natural obj ects is immaterial ; 
it is the effort to attain them alone that counts. 

This nice adjustment of the claims of Faith and 
Works was formulated in a series of technicalities. 
A scale of values was laid down, and on it a scheme 
of conduct was built up. Virtue alone is good' 
and to be sought,' Vice alone ^evil' and ^to be 
-shunned'; all else is ^indifferent.' But of things 
indifferent some, being in accordance with nature, 
are promoted ' or preferred ' (Trporyy/Acva), as 
having worth ' (a^ta), and these are * to be 
chosen'; others, being contrary to nature, are de- 
promoted ' {aTTiyjrporjyfjLeva) as having unworth ' 
(aTTo^ta, negative value), and these are ^to be re- 
jected'; while other things again are absolutely 
indifferent,' and supply no motive for action. To 
aim at securing things promoted,' or avoiding 
their opposites is an appropriate act * {KaOrJKov) : 
this is what the young and uncomipted do by in- 
stinct. When the same aim is taken by the rational 
adult with full knowledge of nature's plan and 
deliberate intent to conform with it, then the 

appropriate act ' is perfect,' and is a right 
action ' or ^ success ' {KaTopOmfm)} Intention, not 

* Cicero inevitably obscures the point in rendering KadrjKov 
by officium. To say that fungi officio, * to do one's duty,* 
is not rectefacere makes the doctrine sound more paradox 
cal than it really was. 



achievement, constitutes success. Tfee only failure,* 
'error* or sin* (the term afxdp'rnfm includes all 
these notions) is the conduct of the rational being 
who ignores and violates nature. 

In identifying the Good w^ith Virtue and in inter- 
preting Virtue by the conception of Nature, the 
Stoics were following their forerunners the Cynics ; 
but they parted company with the Cynics in finding 
a place in their scheme for Goods in the ordinary 
sense. For though they place pleasure among 
things absolutely indifferent,* their examples of 
things promoted * — life, health, wealth, etc. — are 
pretty much the usual objects of man*s endeavour. 
Hence, whereas the Cynics, construing the natu- 
ral * as the primitive or unsophisticated, had run 
counter to convention and even to decency, the 
Stoics in the practical rules deduced from their 
/ principles agreed in the main with current morality, 
I and included the recognized duties to the family 
\ and the state. 

But their first principles themselves they enunci- 
ated m a form that was violently paradoxical. Virtue 
\being a state _ofjnward-rightgpusness they T^garded 
as something absolute. Either a man has attained to 
1% ^Tien he i^ at' once completely wise, good and 
happy, and remains so whatever pain, sorrow, or 
misfortune may befall him ; or he has not attained to 
it, in which case, whatever progress he has made 
towards it, he is still foolish, wicked and miserable. 
So stated, the ideal was felt to be beyond man's 
reach. Chrysippus, the third head of the school, 
confessed that he had never known a Wise Man. 
Criticism forced the later Stoics to compromise. 
The Wise Man remained as a type and an ensample ; 


but positive value was conceded to moral progress, 
and 'appropriate acts' tended to usurp the place 
that strictly belonged to right acts/ 


The last system to engage Cicero's attention, that The 
of his contemporary Antiochus, is of much less in- Academy, 
terest than the two older traditions with which he 
ranges it. 

Within a century of the death of its founder Plato, 
the Academy underwent a complete transformation. 
Arcesilas, its head in the middle of the third cen- 
tury B.C., adopted the scepticism that had been 
established as a philosophical system by Pyrrho two 
generations before, and denied the possibility of 
knowledge. He was accordingly spoken of as the 
founder of a Second or New Academy. His work 
was carried further a century afterwards by Car- 
neades. Both these acute thinkers devoted them- 
selves to combating the dogmas of the Stoics. 
Arcesilas assailed their theory of knowledge; and 
Cameades riddled their natural theology with shafts 
that have served for most subsequent polemic of the 
kind. On the basis of philosophic doubt, the New 
Academy developed in Ethics a theory of reasoned 
probability as a sufficient guide for life. 

The extreme scepticism of Cameades led to a 
reaction. Philo, who was his next successor but 
one, and who afterwards became Cicero's teacher at 
Rome, reverted to a more positive standpoint. Doing 
violence to the facts, he declared that the teaching 
of the Academy had never changed since Plato, and 
that Arcesilas and Cameades, though attacking the 
Criterion of the Stoics, had not meant to deny all 
possibility of knowledge. The Stoic comprehen* 


sion ' was impossible^ but yet there was a clearness* 
about some impressions that gives a conviction of 
their truth. 

The next head^ Antiochus, went beyond this 
ambiguous position^ and abandoned scepticism alto- 
gether. Contradicting Philo, he maintained that 
the true tradition of Plato had been lost, and pro- 
fessed to recover it, calling his school the *01d 
Academy.' But his reading of the history of philo- 
sophy was hardly more accurate than Philo*s. He 
asserted that the teachings of the older Academics 
and Peripatetics and of the Stoics were, in Ethics 
at all events, substantially the same, and that Zeno 
had borrowed his tenets from his predecessors, 
merely concealing the theft by his novel termin- 

The latter thesis is argued in de Finibus, Book IV, 
while Book V gives Antioclius*s version of the ^ Old 
Academic and Peripatetic ' Ethics, which he himself 
professed. His doctrine is that Virtue is sufficient 
for happiness, but that in the highest degree of 
happiness bodily and external goods also form a part. 
The Stoics will not call these latter ^ goods,' but 
only things promoted'; yet really they attach no 
less importance to them. 

Antiochus could only maintain his position by 
ignoring nice distinctions. The Ethics of Aris- 
totle in particular seem to have fallen into complete 
oblivion. Aristotle's cardinal doctrines are, that 
well-being consists not in the state of virtue but in 
the active exercise of all human excellences, and 
particularly of man's highest gift of rational con- 
templation ; and that though for this a modicum of 
external goods is needed, these are but indispensable 


conditions^ and in no way constituent parts^ of the 
Chief Good. 

The fact is that philosophy in Cicero's day had 
lost all precision as well as originality. It must be 
admitted that de Finibus declines in interest when it 
comes to deal with contemporary thought. Not only 
does the plan of the work necessitate some repetition 
in Book V of arguments already rehearsed in Book IV ; 
but Antiochus's perversion of preceding systems 
impairs alike the criticism of the Stoics and the 
presentation of his own ethical doctrine. 

The text of this edition is founded on that of The Text. 
Madvig^ whose representatives have kindly per- 
mitted use to be made of the latest edition of his 
de Finibus y dated 1876. Madvig first established 
the text of the book; and it is from no lack of 
appreciation for his Herculean labours that I have 
ventured here and there to modify his results, 
whether by adopting conjectures suggested in his 
notes, or by preferring MSS. readings rejected by 
him, or conjectures made by other scholars and in 
one or two places by myself. In supplementing 
Madvig's work I have derived much help from the 
Teubner text of C. W. F. Miiller, 1904. Madvig's 
punctuation I have altered throughout, both to con- 
form it with English usage and also occasionally to 
suggest a different connection of thought. 

Departures from Madvig' s text (referred to as The criHca 
Mdv.) are noted at the foot of the page. So also ^o*^^* 
are MSS. variants of importance for the sense ; 
in such places the readings of the three best MSS. 
and of the inferior group are usually given. But no 
attempt is made to present a complete picture of 



the state of the MSS., for which the student must 
go to Madvig. 

^SS. The best MSS. of de Finibus are : A, Palatinus I, 

11th c, which ends soon after the beginning of 
Book IV; B, Palatinus II ; and E, Erlangensis, 1 5th c. 
These three form one family, within which B and E 
are more closely related. The other MSS. known 
to Madvig form a second family, inferior in general 
to the former, though, as Miiller points out, not to 
be entirely dispensed with. Both families according 
to Madvig descend from a late and already consider- 
ably corrupted archetype. 

Ions, The earliest edition is believed to have been 

printed at Cologne in 1467. Madvig' s great com- 
mentary (Copenhagen, 1839, 1869, 1876) supersedes 
all its predecessors. There is a small annotated 
edition, largely based upon Madvig, by W. M. L. 
Hutchinson (London, 1909). 

islations. English translations are those of Samuel Parker 
{Tullys Five Books de Finibus, or Concerning the Last 
Objects of Desire and Aversion, done into English by 
S, P., Gent, revised . , . by Jeremy Collier, M.A,, 
London, 1702; page-heading, TuUy of Moral Ends; 
a 2nd edition published by Bliss, Oxford, 1812); of 
Guthrie (London, 1 744) ; of Yonge (in Bohn*s series, 
1 848) ; and of J. S. Reid (Cambridge, 1 883, now out 
of print). The first of these, and the German version 
of Kirchmann in the Philosophische Bibliothek (l 868), 
I have consulted occasionally, the former with plea- 
sure, but neither with much profit. 

s of The fullest treatment in English of the subjects 

rence. dealt with in de Finibus will be found in Zeller's 
Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics and Eclectics, Zeller's 
monumental work requires supplementing especially 


in regard to Stoicism. Recent books of value are 
Arnold's Roman Stoicism, Hicks' s Stoic and Epicurean, 
and Bevan's Stoics and Sceptics, Reid's edition of 
Academica is a mine of information about Cicero's 
philosophical work. For the sources, a selection for 
beginners is Adam's Texts to Illustrate Greek Philo- 
sophy after Aristotle, 

I must express my gratitude to my friend Miss 
W. M. L. Hutchinson for reading the proofs of my 
translation and doing much to improve it. Nor can 
I forget my debt to the late Dr James Adam, whose 
lectures on de Finibus first aroused my interest in 
ethical theory. 

H. R. 






On p. 22, note y for Democritus read Epicurus. 







1 I. Non eram nescius^ Brute, cum quae summis in- 
geniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco ser- 
mone tractavissent ea Latinis litteris mandaremus^ 
fore ut hie noster labor in varias reprehensiones in- 
curreret. Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admo- 
dum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. 
Quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt si remissius 
agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam 
ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et hi 
quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Lati- 
nas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle 
consumere. Postremo aliquos futuros suspicor qui me 
ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit 

2 elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 
Contra quos omnes dicendum breviter existimo. 
Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus 
satis responsum est eo libro quo a nobis philosophic 
defensa et collaudata est cum esset accusata et 
vituperata ab Hortensio. Qui liber cum et tibi pro-' 
batus videretur et iis quos ego posse iudicare arbi- 
trarer, plura suscepi, veritus ne movere hominum 
studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si 

*This book was called Horiensius^ and formed an intro- 
duction to Cicero's philosophical writings. Fragments only 
are extant. 




1 I. My dear Brutus, — ^The following essay, I am Preface :choi< 
well aware, attempting as it does to present in a Latin defended^ 
dress subjects that philosophers of consummate 

ability and profound leartiyrig have already handled 
in Greek, is sure to encounter criticism from different 
quarters. Certain persons, aHd:^'those not without 
some pretension to letters, disa:pprdve of the study 
of philosophy altogether. Others "do not so greatly 
object to it provided it be followed in dilettante 
fashion ; but they do not think it ought to Wga^e so 
large an amount of one's interest and attention. '■ A 
third class, learned in Greek literature and contemp- 
tuous of Latin, will say that they prefer to spend their 
time in reading Greek. Lastly, I suspect there will 
be some who will wish to divert me to other fields of 
authorship, asserting that this kind of composition, 
though a graceful recreation, is beneath the dignity 

2 of my character and position. To all of these objec- 
tions I suppose I ought to make some brief reply. The Philosophy 

• j« • » X. r t-•^ i_i_'jjt deserving of 

indiscriminate censure of philosophy has indeed been study," 
sufficiently answered already in the book* which I 
wrote in praise of that study, in order to defend it 
against a bitter attack that had been made upon it 
by Hortensius. The favourable reception which that 
volume appeared to obtain from yourself and from 
others whom I considered competent judges en- 
couraged me to embark upon further undertakings ; 
for I did not wish to be thought incapable of sus- 
taining the interest that I had succeeded in arousing. 
b2 S 


maxime hoc placeat, moderatius tamen id volunt fieri^ 
diflicilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo 
quod semel admissum coerceri reprimique non potest ; 
ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis qui omnino 
avocent a .philosophia^ quam his qui rebus infinitis 
modum constituant in reque eo meliore quo maior sit 

3 medioeritatem desiderent. r.Sive*enim ad sapientiam 
perveniri potest^ non paranda nobis solum ea sed 
fhienda etiam est; ^^ive hoe difficile est, tamen nee 
modus est ullus . investigandi veri nisi in veneris, et 
quaerendi defetigatio turpis est cum id quod quae- 
ritur sif pulchemmum. Etenim si delectamur cum 
scribiir\us,*quis est tarn invidus qui ab eo nos abducat? 
Sin laboramus, quis est qui alienae modum statuat 

!•. fndustriae? Nam ut Terentianus Chremes non in- 

• humanus, qui novum vicinum non vult 

Fodere aut arare aut aliquid ferre denique — 
(non enim ilium ab industria sed ab illiberali labore 
deterret), sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime 
nobis iniucundus labor. 

4 II. lis igitur est difficilius satisfacere qui se Latina 
scripta dicunt contemnere. In quibus hoc primum 
est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non 
delectet eos sermo patrius, cum iidem fabellas Latinas 
ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. 
Quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, 
qui Enni Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvi spemat aut 

'^Terence, Jleau fan fimommenos, i. i. 17. 

BOOK I. i-ii 

The second class of critics, who, however much they and of 
approve of philosophy, nevertheless would rather t^o'^^sh stud: 
have it less eagerly prosecuted, are asking for a 
restraint that it is not easy to practise. The study 
is one that when once taken up admits of no restriction 
or control. In fact, the attitude of the former class, 
who attempt to dissuade us from philosophy alto- 
gether, seems almost less unreasonable than that of 
those who would set limits to what is essentially un- 
limited, and expect us to stop half-way in a study 

3 that increases in value the further it proceeds. If 
Wisdom be attainable, let us not only win but enjoy 
it ; or f f attainment be difficult, still there is no end 
to the search for truth, other than its discovery. It 
were base to flag in the pursuit, when the object pur- 
sued is so supremely lovely. Indeed if we like writing, 
who would be so churlish as to debar us from it ? Or 
if we find it a labour, who is to set limits to another 
man's exertions ? No doubt it is kind of Chremes 
in Terence's play to urge his new neighbour 

Neither to dig nor plough nor burdens bear*: 
for it is not industry in general, but toil of a menial 
kind, from which he would deter him ; but only a 
busybody would take exception to an occupation 
which, like mine, is a labour of love. 

4 II. A more difficult task therefore is to deal with Justification of 
the objection of those who profess a contempt for philosophy int^c 
L#atin writings as such. What astonishes me first of all ^**"** 
about them is this, — why should they dislike their 

native language for serious and important subjects, 
when they are quite willing to read Latin plays trans- 
lated word for word from the Greek ? Who has such 
a hatred, one might almost say, for the very name of 
Roman, as to despise and reject the Medea of Ennius 


reiciat quod se iisdem Euripidis fabulis delectari 
dicat^ Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, in- 
quit, potius Caecili aut Andriam Terenti quam ut- 

5 ramque Menandri legam ? A quibus tantum dissentio 
ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, 
tamen male conversam Atili mihi legendam putem, 
de quo Licinius ferreum scriptorem/ venim opinor 
scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. Rudem enim 
esse omnino in nostris poetis aut inertissimae segnitiae 
est aut fastidi delicatissimi. Mihi quidem null! satis 
eruditi videntur quibus nostra ignota sunt. An 

Utinam ne in nemore — 
nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae^ 
autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata 

6 sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? Quid si 
nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemer 
ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque no- 
strum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungi- 
mus? quid habent cur Graeca anteponant iis quae 
et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversade Graecis ? 
Nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos 
quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant quam 
legendi sunt. Quid enim est a Chrysippo praeter- 
missum in Stoicis ? Legimus tamen Diogenem, An- 

*The opening of Ennius*s Medea Exsuly cp. Euripides, 
Medea ^f, 


BOOK I. ii 

or the AnUope of Pacuvius, and give as his reason that 
though he eiyoysthe corresponding plays of Euripides 
he cannot endure books written in Latin ? What, he 
cries, am I to read The Young Comrades of Caecilius, or 
Terence's Maid of Andros, when I might be reading 

5 the same two comedies of Menander? With this sort 
of person I disagree so strongly, that, admitting the 
Electra of Sophocles to be a masterpiece, I yet think 
Atilius's poor translation of it worth my while to 
read. An iron writer,' Licinius called him ; still, 
in my opinion, a writer all the same, and therefore 
deserving to be read. For to be entirely unversed 
in our own poets argues either the extreme of mental 
inactivity or else a refinement of taste carried to the 
point of excess. To my mind no one can be styled 
a well-read man who does not know our native 
literature. If we read 

Would that in forest glades — ^ 
just as readily as the same passage in the Greek/ 
shall we object to having Plato's discourses on 
morality and happiness set before the reader in 

6 Latin ? And supposing that for our part we do not 
fill the office of a mere translator, but, while preserv- 
ing the doctrines of our chosen authorities, add 
thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement : 
what ground have these objectors for ranking the 
writings of Greece above compositions that are at 
once brilliant in style and not mere translations from 
Greek originals? Perhaps they will rejoin that the 
subject has been dealt with by the Greeks already. But 
then what reason have they for reading the multitude 
of Greek authors either that one has to read ? Take 
Stoicism: what aspect of it has Chrysippus left 
untouched? Yet we read Diogenes, Antipater, 



tipatrum^ Mnesarchum^ Panaetium^ multos alios^ in 
primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. Quid? 
Theophrastus mediocriteme delectat cum tractat 
locos abAristotele ante tractates? Quid? Epicureinum 
desistunt de iisdem^ de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum 
est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere ? Quodsi 
Graeci leguntur a Graecis^ iisdem de rebus alia ratione 
compositis^ quid est cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 

7 III. Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem 
aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas^ 
male^ credo^ mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum 
cognitionem divina ilia ingenia transferrem. Sed id 
neque feci adhuc nee mihi tamen ne faciam inter- 
dictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam^ si videbitur^ 
transferam^ et maxime ab iis quos modo nominavi^ 
cum incident ut id apte fieri possit; ut ab Homero 
Ennius^ Afranius a Menandro solet. Nee vero, ut 
noster Lucilius^ recusabo quo minus omnes mea 
legant. Utinam esset ille Persius ! Scipio vero et 
Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille indicium 
reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et 
Siculis scribere. Facete is quidem^ sicut alia^; sed 
neque tam docti tum erant ad quorum indicium 
elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas 

8 summa appareat^ doctrina mediocris. Ego autem 
quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te, ne Graecis qui- 

^ alia Mdv. ; alias MSS. 

^Lucilius, the satirist, 148-103 B.C., avowed that he wrote 
for the moderately learned like Laelius, not for great 
scholars like Persius : * Persium non euro legere, Laelium 
Decimum volo* (Cic. de Or. 2.25). In the next sentence 
here Cicero seems to refer to some other passage of 
Lucilius, in which he put his claims still lower and pro- 
fessed to write for illiterate provincials, not for cultured 
noblemen like Scipio Africanus Minor and P. Rutilius Rufus. 


BOOK I. ii-iii 

Mnesarchus^ Panaetius^ and many others, not least 
our friend Posidonius. Again^ Theophrastus handles 
topics j)reviously treated by Aristotle, yet he gives 
us no small pleasure all the same. Nor do the Epi- 
cureans cease from writing as the spirit moves them 
on the same questions on which Epicurus and the 
ancients wrote. If Greek writers find Greek readers 
when presenting the same subjects in a different 
setting, why should not Romans be read by Romans ? 
III. Yet even supposing I gave a direct trans- 
lation of Plato or Aristotle, exactly as our poets 
have done with the plays, would it not, pray, be 
a patriotic service to introduce those transcendent 
intellects to the acquaintance of my fellow-country- 
men ? As a matter of fact, however, this has not been 
my procedure hitherto, though I do not feel I am de- 
barred from adopting it. Indeed I expressly reserve 
the right of borrowing certain passages, if I think 
fit, and particularly from the philosophers just men- 
tioned, when an appropriate occasion offers for so 
doing; just as Ennius regularly borrows from Homer, 
and Afranius from Menander. Nor yet shall I object, 
like our Lucilius,* to all the world's reading what I 
write. I only wish his Persius were alive to-day! 
and still more Scipio and Rutilius, in fear of wliose 
criticism Lucilius protests that he writes for the 
public of Tarentum, Consentia and Sicily. Here of 
course, as elsewhere, he is not to be taken too 
seriously. As a matter of fact, there were not such 
learned critics in his day, to tax his best efforts ; and 
also his writings are in a lighter vein: they show 
consummate wit, but no great erudition. I, however, 
need not be afraid of any reader, if I am so bold 
as to dedicate my book to you, who rival even 


dem cedentem in philosophia^ audeam scribere? 
Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus 
gratissimo mihi libro quern ad me de virtute inisisti. 
Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire ut abhorreant 
a Latinis^ quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et 
horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. 
Quibus ego assentior^ dum modo de iisdem rebus ne 
Graecos quidem legendos putent. Res vero bonas 
verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas quis non 
legal ? Nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a 
9 Scaevola est praetore salutatus Athenis Albucius. 
Quem quidem locum cum multa venustate et omni 
sale idem Lucilius^ apud quem praeclare Scaevola : 


Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque 

Municipem Ponti, Tritanni, centurionum, 
Praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signife- 

Maluisti dici ; Graece ergo praetor Athenis, 
Id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto : 
Xaipc,* inquam, ^Tite!' Lictores, turma omnis 

cohorsque ^ : 
Xaipc, Tite!* Hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc 


^cohorsque Manutius, Mdv.; chorusque^ MSS. 

BOOK 1. iii 

the Greeks as a philosopher. Still, you yourself 
challenged me to the venture, by dedicating to me 
your delightful essay On Virtue, But I have no 
doubt that the reason why some people take a 
dislike to Latin literature is that they have happened 
to meet with certain illiterate and uncouth produc- 
tions which are bad Greek books in worse Latin' 
versions. I have no quarrel with these persons, 
provided that they also refuse to read the Greek 
writers on the same subjects. But given a noble 
theme, and a refined, dignified and graceful style, 
who would not read a Latin book ? Unless it be some 
one ambitious to be styled a Greek out-and-out, as 
9 Albucius was greeted by Scaevola when the latter 
was praetor at Athens. I am again referring to 
Lucilius, who relates the anecdote with much neat- 
ness and point ; he puts the following excellent lines 
into the mouth of Scaevola: 

" You vow*d, Albucius, that to suit ye 
*Twas as a Greek we must repute ye ; 
^ Roman' and Sabine' being names 
Your man of ton and taste disclaims ! 
You jscom'd to own your native town, — 
Which bore such captains of renown 
As Pontius and Tritannius bold. 
Who in the van Rome's ensigns hold. 
And so, at Athens when I lay. 
And your respects you came to pay. 
My worship, humouring your freak. 
Gave you good-morrow straight in Greek, 
With ' Ckaire, Titus ! * ' Chaire/ bawl 
Guards, aides-de-camps, javelin-men and all ! 
— Hence comes it that Albucius hates me. 
Hence as his bitterest foe he rates me." 



10 Sed iure Mucius. Ego autem mirari satis non^ queo^ 
unde hoc sit tarn insolens domesticarum rerum fasti- 
dium. Non est omnino hie docendi locus^ sed ita 
sentio et saepe disserui^ Latinam linguam non mode 
non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem 
etiam esse quam Graecam. Quando enim nobis^ vel 
dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poetis^ postea quidem 
quam fuit quern imitarentur^ uUus orationis vel 
copiosae vel elegantis omatus defuit? 

IV. Ego vero, quoniam ^ forensibus opens, laboribus, 
periculis non deseruisse mihi videor praesidium in 
quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, 
quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare ut 
sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, 
nee cum istis tanto opere pugnare qui Graeca legere 
malint, modo legant ilia ipsa, ne simulent, et iis 
servire qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas 

1 1 habent, illas non magno opere desiderent. Qui 
autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aequi esse debent, 
quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini e 
nostris, et scribentur fortasse plura si vita suppetet ; 
et tamen qui diligenter haec quae de philosophia 
litteris mandamus legere assueverit, iudicabit nulla 
ad legendum his esse potiora. «Quid est enim in 

' mirari satis non Mdv. (satis mirari non Or.); mirari non 
^quoniam Mdv., cum, MSS. 


BOOK I. iii-iv 

10 Mucius's sarcasm was however deserved. But for 
my part I can never cease wondering what can be 
the origin of the exaggerated contempt for home pro- 
ducts that is now fashionable. It would of course 
be out of place to attempt to prove it here, but in my 
opinion, as I have often argued, the Latin language, 
so far from having a poor vocabulary, as is commonly 
supposed, is actually richer than the Greek. Wlien 
have we, that is to say when have our competent 
orators or poets, at all events since they have had 
models to copy, ever lacked any of the resources 
either of the florid or the chaste style ? 

IV. In my own case, just as I trust I have done The task not 
my duty, amidst the arduous labours and perils of a dignity of a 
public career, at the post to which the Roman people statesman. 
appointed me, so it is assuredly incumbent on me 
also to use my best endeavours, with such zeal, 
enthusiasm and energy as I possess, to promote the 
advancement of learning among my fellow-country- 
men. Nor need I be greatly concerned to join issue 
with people who prefer to read Greek, provided that 
they actually do read it and do not merely pretend 
to do so. It is my business to serve those who 
desire to enjoy both literatures, or who, if books in 
their own language are available, do not feel any 

1 1 great need of Greek ones. Those again who would 
rather have me write on other subjects may fairly 
be indulgent to one who has written much already 
— in fact no one of our nation more — and who per- 
haps will write still more if his life be prolonged. 
And even were it not so, anyone who has made a 
practice of studying my philosophical writings will 
pronounce that none of them are better worth read- supreme imp* 
ing than the present treatise. For what problem tance of ethic 


vita tanto opere quaerendum quam cum omnia in 
philosophia^ turn id quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit 
finisj quid extremum^ quid ultimum quo sint omnia 
bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda; 
quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expeten- 
dis^ quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? Qua de re 
cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio^ quis alie- 
num putet eius esse dignitatis quam mihi quisque 
tribuat, quid in omni munere vitae optimum et 

12 verissimum sit exquirere? An, partus ancillae 
sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter prineipes 
civitatis, P. Scaevolam Maniumque Manilium, ab 
iisque M. Brutus dissentiet (quod et aeutum genus 
est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta 
reliquaque eiusdem generis et legimus libenter et 
legemus) ; haec quae vitam omnem continent 
neglegentur? Nam ut sint ilia vendibiliora, haec 
uberiora certe sunt. Quamquam id quidem licebit 
iis existimare qui legerint. Nos autem hanc omnem 
quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere 
a nobis explicatam esse his litteris^ arbitramur, in 
quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis 
probaretur sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae 
disciplinis diceretur persecuti sumus. 

13 V. Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat 

'^littetis: Mdv. with others conjectures libris, 

BOOK I. iv-v 

does life offer so important as all the topics of 
philosophy^ and especially the question raised in 
these volumes — What is the End, the final and \ Or/^J. * i 
ultimate aim, which gives the standard for all prin- \ ^ \ 
ciples of right living and of good conduct? What \ , j^ 
does Nature pursue as the thing supremely desirable, J v.'/^*^ 
what does she avoid as the ultimate evil? It is 
a subject on which the most learned philosophers 
disagree profoundly; who then can think it de- 
rogatory to such esteem as each may assign^ to 
me, to investigate what is the highest good and the 
truest rule in every relationship of life ? Are we to 
have our leading statesmen debating such topics as 
whether the offspring of a female slave is to be con- 
sidered as belonging to the party who has hired her, 
Publius Scaevola and Manius Manilius upholding 
one opinion and Marcus Brutus the contrary (not but 
what such discussions raise nice points of law, as 
well as being of practical importance for the business 
of life ; and we read and shall continue to read with 
pleasure the treatises in question and others of the 
same nature) ; and shall these questions which cover 
the entire range of conduct be neglected ? Legal 
handbooks no ^oubt command a readier sale, but 
philosophy is unquestionably richer in interest. 
However, this is a point that may be left to the 
reader to decide. In the present work we believe 
we have given a more or less exhaustive exposition 
of the whole subject of the Ends of Goods and 
Evils. The book is intended to contain so far as 
possible a complete account, not only of the views 
that we ourselves accept, but also of the doctrines 
enunciated by all the different schools of philosophy. 
V. To begin with what is easiest, let us first pass 



in medium Epicuri ratio^ quae plerisque notissima 
est; quam a nobis sic intelleges expositam, ut ab 
ipsis qui earn diseiplinam probant non soleat aecura- 
tius explicari. Verum enim invenire volumus, non 
tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. 

Accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato^ homine 
omni doctrina erudito^ defensa est Epicuri sententia 
de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, 
in primis gravis et doctus adulescens^ ei disputationi 

1 4 interesset. Nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi 
causa uterque venisset^ pauca primo inter nos de 
litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium; 
deinde Torquatus, Quoniam nacti te," inquit^ 

sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam quid sit quod 
Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere 
faciunt qui ab eo dissentiunt^ sed certe non probes^ 
eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maxi- 
misque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et* 
omnia tradidisse quae pertinerent ad bene beateque 
vivendum ; sed existimo te, sicut ncfttrum Triarium, 
minus ab eo delectari quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, 
Theophrasti orationis omamenta neglexerit. Nam 
illud quidem adduci vix possum^ ut ea quae senserit 

15 ille tibi non vera videantur." Vide quantum^'' in- 

quam^ fallare, Torquate. Oratio me istius philo- 

sophi non ofFendit ; nam et complectitur verbis quod 

vult et dicit plane quod intellegam; et tamen ego 

a philosopho^ si afierat eloquentiam^ non asperner^ si 


in review the system of Epicurus^ which to most introduction t< 
men is the best knoMm of any. Our exposition of it, ^2*Ethirao/^ 
as you shall see, will be as accurate as any usually Epicurus: 
given even by the professed adherents of his school, scene of the 
For our object is to discover the truth, not to refute <^*°8ue. 
an opponent. 

An elaborate defence of the hedonistic theory 
of Epicurus was once delivered by Lucius Tor- 
quatus, a scholar of consummate erudition; to him 
I replied, and Gains Triarius, a youth of remark- 
able learning and seriousness of character, assisted at 

14 the discussion. Both of these gentlemen had called 
to pay me their respects at my place at Cumae. We 
first exchanged a few remarks about literature, of 
which both were enthusiastic students. Then Tor- 
quatus said. As we have for once found you at 
leisure, I am resolved to hear the reason why you 
regard my master Epicurus, not indeed with hatred, 
as do most of those who do not share his views, but 
at all events with disapproval. I myself consider him 
as the one person who has discerned the truth, and 
who has delivered men from the gravest errors and 
imparted to them all there is to know about right 
conduct and happiness. The fact is, I think that you 
are like our friend Triarius, and dislike Epicurus be- 
cause he has neglected the graces of style that you 
find in your Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. For 
I can scarcely bring myself to believe that you think 

5 his opinions untrue." Let me assure you, Tor- 
quatus,'' said I, that you are entirely mistaken. 
With your master's style I have no fault to find. 
He expresses his meaning adequately, and gives me 
a plain intelligible statement. Not that I despise 
eloquence in a philosopher if he has it to ofier, but 
c 17 


non habeat^ non admodum flagitem. Re mihi non 
aeque satisfacit^^ et quidem locispluribus. Sed quot 

homines, tot sententiae*; falli igitur possumus." 

Quamobrem tandem," inquit, non satisfacit? te 

enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille 

16 bene noris." "Nisi mihi Phaedrum," inquam, 

mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque 
audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem 
probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae 
sunt; atque eos quos nominavi cum Attico nostro 
frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ille quidem utrum- 
que, Phaedrum autem etianu amaret; cotidieque 
inter nos ea quae audiebamus conferebamus, neque 
erat umquam controversia quid ego intellegerem, sed 
quid probarem." 

17 VI. Quid igitur est?" inquit; audire enim 

cupio quid non probes." Principio," inquam, '^in 

physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est 

alienus. Democritea dicit, perpauca mutans, sed ita 

ut ea quae corrigere vult mihi quidem depravare 

videatur. Ille atomos quas appellat, id est corpora 

individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito inani, 

in quo nihil nee summum nee infimum nee medium 

nee intimum^ nee extremum sit, ita ferri ut con- 

cursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur 

'^satisfacit Mdv. as below; MSS, here satisfecit, 
■ intimum Jonas, Muller ; ultimum Mdv. with MSS. 

» Terence, Phormio 454. 

BOOK I. v-vi 

I should not greatly insist on it if he has not. But 
his matter I do not find so satisfactory, and that in 
more points than one. However, many men. many 
minds ' *: so it is possible that I am mistaken.*' What 
is it, pray,*' he said, to which you take exception? 
For I recognize you as a just critic, provided you 

trines are." Oh," said I, 

6 really know what his doctrines 
"l know the whole of Epicurus's opinions well 
enough, — unless you think that Phaedrus or Zeno 
did not tell me the truth. I have heard both of them 
lecture, though to be sure they convinced me of 
nothing but their own devotion to the system. In- 
deed I regularly attended those professors, in com- 
pany with our friend Atticus, who for his part had an 
admiration for them both, and a positive affection for 
Phaedrus. Every day we used to discuss together in 
private what we had heard at lecture, and there was 
never any dispute as to what I could understand ; 
the question was, what I could accept as true." 

7 VI. * Well then, what w the point ?" said he ; I Cicero states 
should very much like to know what it is that you Epwurusf 
disagree with." ^Let me begin," I replied, ' with phii^"hySs 
the subject of Natural Philosophy, which is Epicurus*s either not new 
particular boast. Here, in the first place, he is entirely °^ ^^^ *"*®' 
second-hand. His doctrines are those of Democritus, 

with a very few modifications. And as for the latter, 
where he attempts to improve upon his original, in 
my opinion he only succeeds in making things worse. 
Democritus believes in certain things which he terms 
atoms,' that is, bodies so solid as to , be indivisible, 
moving about in a vacuum of infinite extent, which 
has neither top, bottom nor middle, neither centre nor 
circumference. The motion of these atoms is such 
that they collide and so cohere together ; and from 
c2 19 


ea quae sini> quaeque cemantur omnia; eumque 
motum atomorum nullo a principio sed ex aetemo 

18 tempore intellegi convenire. Epicurus autem^ in 
quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. Quam- 
quam utriusque cum multa non probo^ tum illud in 
primis^ quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda 
sint, unum quae materia sit ex qua quaeque res 
efficiatur, alterum quae vis sit quae quidque efficiat, 
de materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi 
reliquerunt. Sed hoc commune vitium ; illae Epicuri 
propriae ruinae : censet enim eadem ilia individua et 
solida corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam » 
hunc naturalem esse omnium corporum motum; 

1 9 deinde ibidem homo acutus, cum illud occurreret, si 
omnia deorsum e regione ferrentur et, ut dixi, ad 
lineam, numquam fore ut atomus altera alteram 
posset attingere, itaque attulit rem commenticiam : 
declinare dixit atomum perpaulum, quo nihil posset 
fieri minus ; ita effici complexiones et copulationes et 
adhaesiones atomorum inter se, ex quo efficeretur 
mundus omnesque partes mundi quaeque in eo 
essent. Quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum 
ne efficit quidem^ quod vult. Nam et ipsa declinatio 
ad libidinem fingitur (ait enim declinare atomum 
sine causa, quo nihil turpius physico quam fieri quid- 

* quidevi inserted by odd. 

BOOK I. vi 

this process result the whole of the things that exist 
and that we see. Moreover, this movement of the 
atoms must not be conceived as starting from a be- 
ginning, but as having gone on from all eternity. 

18 Epicurus for his part, where he follows Democritus, 
makes no serious blunders. Still, there is a great 
deal in each of them with which I do not agree, and 
especially this: in the study of Nature there are two"^^ 
questions to be asked, first, what is the matter out 
of which each thing is made, second, what is the force 
by which it is made ; now Democritus and Epicurus 
have discussed the question of matter, but they have 
not considered the question of force or the efficient 
cause. But this is a defect shared by both ; I now 
come to the lapses peculiar to Epicurus. H e believes 
that these same indivisible solid bodies are borne by 
their own weight perpendicularly downward, which 

1 9 he holds is the natural motion of all bodies; but then 
in the very same breath, being sharp enough to 
recollect that if they all travelled downwards in 
a straight line, and, as I said, perpendicularly, no one 
atom would ever be able to overtake any other atom, 
he consequently introduced an idea of his own inven- 
tion : he said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve, 
— the smallest divergence possible ; and so are pro- 
duced entanglements and combinations and cohe- 
sions of atoms with atoms, which result in the creation 
of the world and all its parts, and of all that in them 
is. Now not only is the whole of this affair a piece 
of childish fancy, but it does not even achieve the 
result that its author desires. The swerving is itself 
an arbitrary fiction; for Epicurus says the atoms 
swerve without a cause, — yet this is the capital 
offence in a natural philosopher, to speak of some- 



quam sine causa dicere), et ilium motum naturalem 

omnium ponderum, ut ipse eonstituit, e regione in- 

' feriorem locum petentium, sine causa eripuit atomis ; 

nee tamen id cuius causa haec finxerat assecutus est. 

20 Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt^ nullae umquam 
cohaerescent ; sive aliae declinabunt, aliae suo nutu 
recte ferentur, primum erit hoc quasi provincias 
atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur, de- 
inde eadem ilia atomorum (in quo etiam Democritus 
haeret) turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum 
efficere non poterit. Ne illud quidem physici, credere 
aliquid esse minimum; quod profecto numquam 
putavisset si a Polyaeno familiari suo geometrica 
discere maluisset quam ilium etiam ipsum dedocere. 
Sol Democrito magnus videtur, quippe homini erudito 
in geometriaque perfecto ; huic pedalis fortasse : tan- 
tum enim esse censet quantus videtur, vel paulo aut 

21 maiorem aut minorem. Ita quae mutat ea corrumpit, 
quae sequitur sunt tota Democriti, atomi, inane, 
imagines, quae €l8^o\a nominant, quorum incursione 
non solum videamus sed etiam cogitemus; infinitio 
ipsa, quam direipiav vocant, tota ab illo est, tum in- 
numerabiles mundi qui et oriantur et intereant 

a f>eiBOcritus explained sight as being caused by the 
impact on the eye of films or husks which are continually 
being thrown off from the surface of objects. These 
* images,' penetrating to the mind through the pores of the 
body^ also caused mental impressions 


BOOK I. vi 
Lhitii; taking place uncaused. Tlieti alsu he gratuit- 
ously deprives the atoms of what heliiiuself dedured 
to be the natural motion of all heavy bodies, namely, 
movement in a straight line downwards, and yet he 
does not attain the object for the sake of which tliis 

20 fiction was devised. For, if all the atoms swerve, 
none will ever come to cohere togetlier ; or if some 
swerve while others travel in a straight linf, at 
their own will and pleasure, in the first place this 
will be tantamount to assigning to the atoms their 
different spheres of authority, some to travel straight 
and some sideways ; while secondly (and this is a 
weak point with Democritus also) this riotous 
hurly-burly of atoms could not possibly result in the 
ordered beauty of the world we know. Again, it is 
unworthy of a natural philosopher to deny the infinite 
divisibility of matter ; an error that assuredly Epi- 
curus would have avoided, if he had been willing to 
let his friend Polyaenus teach him geometry instead 
of making Polyaenus himself unlearn it. Democritus, 
being an educated man and well versed in geo- 
metry, thinks the sun is of vast size ; Epicurus con- 
siders it perhaps a foot in diameter, for he pro- 
nounces it to be exactly as large as it appears, or a 

n little larger or smaller. Thus where Epicurus alters ' 
the doctrines of Democritus, he alters them for the [ 
worse; while for those ideas which he adopts, tlie 
credit belongs entirely to Democritus, — the atoms, 
the void, the images,* or as they call them, eidnla, 
whose impact is the cause not only of vision but also 
of thought; the very conception of infinite space, 
apeiria as they term it, is entirely derived from 
Democritus; and again the countless numbers of 
worlds that come into existence and ^ass out of 


cotidie. Quae etsi mihi nuUo modo probantur, 
tamen Democritum^ laudatum a ceteris^ ab hoc^ qui 
eum unum secutus esset, noUem vituperatum. 

22 VII. " lam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est 
quaerendi ac disserendi, quae XoyiKrj dicitur, iste 
vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nu- 
dus est. Tollit definitiones ; nihil de dividendo ac 
partiendo docet; non quomodo efficiatur concluda- 
turque ratio tradit; non qua via captiosa solvantur, 
ambigua distinguantur ostendit; indicia rerum in 
sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero 
probatum sit, sublatum esse omne indicium veri et 
falsi putat. . . . 

23 ... Confirmat autem illud vel maxime quod ipsa 
natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem 
et dolorem. Ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fu- 
giamus refert omnia. Quod quamquam Aristippi est 
a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen 
eiusmodi esse iudico ut nihil homine videatur indi- 
gnius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et 
conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. Ac fieri potest 
ut errem; sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Tor- 
quatum qui hoc primus cognomen in venit^ aut torquem 
ilium hosti detraxisse ut aliquam ex eo perciperet 
corpore voluptatem aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu 

' invenit B, E ; invenerit A and inf. MSS. 

* In Greek Logic Siaipeffis, the method of defining a species 
by dividing and subdividing a genus: cp. Bk. II. § 26. 

'>The interpretation is here uncertain, and probably more 
than one sentence has been lost. 

24 * 

BOOK I. vi-vii 

existence every day. For my jown part I reject 
these doctrines altogether; but still I could wish 
that Democritus^ whom every one else applauds^ had 
not been vilified by Epicurus who took him as his sole 

12 VII. Turn next to the second division of philo- Formal Logic 
sophy^ the department of Method and of Dialectic^ g^er; 
which is termed Logike, Of the whole armour of 
Logic your founder, as it seems to me^ is absolutely 
destitute. He does away with Definition ; he lias no 
doctrine of Division or Partition*; he gives no rules 
for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference^ and imparts 
no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detect- 
ing Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of^ 
reality he places in sensation; once let the senses • 
accept as true something that is false^ and every ; 
possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to 
him to be immediately destroyed. . . . 

IS ...^He lays the very greatest stress upon that Ws Ethical 
which, as he declares. Nature herself decrees and contrary°to 
sanctions, that is the feelings of pleasure and pain. n^t^aim^soiSy 
These he maintains lie at the root of every act of Pleasure; 
choice and of avoidance. This is the doctrine of 
Aristippus, and it i$ Upheld more cogently and more 
frankly by the Cyrenaics; but nevertheless it is 
in my judgment a doctrine in the last degree un- 
worthy of the dignity of man. Nature, in my opinion 
at all events, has created and endowed us for higher 
ends. I may possibly be mistaken ; but I am abso- 
lutely convinced that the Torquatus who first won 
that surname did not wrest the famous necklet from 
his foe in the hope of getting from it any physical 
enjoyment, nor did he fight the battle of the Veseris 
against the Latins in his third consulship for the sake 



conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem. Quod 
vero secuii percussit^ filium^ privavisse se etiam vi- 
detur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque 
amori praetulerit ins maiestatis atque imperi. 

24 Quid ? T. ^ Torquatus, is qui consul cum Cn. Octavio 
fuit, cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit quern 
in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat, ut eum, 
Macedonum legatis accusantibus quod pecunias prae- 
torem in provincia cepisse arguerent, causam apud se 
dicere iuberet, reque ex utraque parte audita pro- 
nuntiaret eum non talem videri fuisse in imperio 
quales eius maiores fuissent, et in conspeetum suum 
venire vetuit, numquid tibi videtur de voluptatibus 
suis cogitavisse? Sed ut omittam pericula, labores^ 
dolorem etiam quem optimus quisque pro patria et 
pro suis suseipit^ ut non modo nullam captet sed 
etiam praetereat omnes voluptates, dolores denique 
quosvis suscipere malit quam deserere ullam offici 
partem^ ad ea quae hoc non minus declarant sed vi- 

25 dentur leviora veniamus. Quid tibi, Torquate, quid 
huic Triario litterae, quid historiae cognitioque rerum, 
quid poetarum evolutio, quid tanta tot versuum me- 
moriavoluptatisafFert? Necmihi illud dixeris: Haec 
enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant ilia Torquatis. 
Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metro- 
dorus aut quisquam eorum qui aut saperet aliquid 


^peraissit Mdv ,; percussertt MSS. 
*'' T, edd. from Li v. epit. 54 ; L, MSS. 

BOOK I. vu 

of pleasure. Indeed in sentencing his son to be be- 
headed^ it would seem that he actually deprived 
himself of a great deal of pleasure ; for he sacrificed 
his natural instincts of paternal affection to the 
claims of state and of his military office. 

1 4 Then, think of the Titus Torquatus who was consul 

with Gnaeus Octavius; when he dealt so sternly 
with the son who had passed out of his paternal con- 
trol through his adoption by Decius Silanus — when 
he summoned him into his presence to answer to the 
charge preferred against him by a deputation from 
Macedonia, of accepting bribes while praetor in that 
province — when, afler hearing both sides of the case, 
he gave judgment that he found his son guilty of 
having conducted himself in office in a manner un- 
worthy of his ancestry, and banished him for ever 
from his sight, — think you he had any regard for his 
own pleasure? But I pass over the dangers, the 
toils, the actual pain that all good men endure for 
country and for friends, not only not seeking plea- 
sure, but actually renouncing pleasures altogether, 
and preferring to undergo every sort of pain rather 
than be false to any portion of their duty. Let us 
turn to matters seemingly less important, but equally 

5 conclusive. What actual pleasure do you, Torquatus, 
or does Triarius here, derive from literature, from 
history and learning, from turning the pages of the 
poets and committing vast quantities of verse to 
memory? Do not tell me that these pursuits are. in 
themselves a pleasure to you, and that so were the 
deeds I mentioned to the Torquati. That line of 
defence was never taken by Epicurus or Metrodorus, 
nor by any one of them if he possessed any intelli- 
gence or had mastered the doctrines of your schoeL 


aut ista didicisset. Et quod quaeritur saepe cur tam 
multi sint Epicure!^ sunt aliae quoque causae^ sed 
multitudinem haec ma^ime allicit quod ita putant 
dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa 
» per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. Homines optimi 
non intellegunt totam rationem everti si ita res se 
habeat. Nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus niliil 
referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per 
se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille 
vult, expetenda. 
26 ' Haec igitur Epicuri non probo/' inquam. De ce- 
tero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instru- 
ctior (est eiiim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non 
satis politus iis artibus quas qui tenent eruditi appel- 
lantur), aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Quamquam 
te quidem video minime esse deterritum." 

Vni. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut ilium provo- 
carem quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter 
arridens : Tu quidem/' inquit, to tum Epicurum 
paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. Quid ei 
reliquisti nisi te, quoquo modo loqueretur, intelle- 
gere quid diceret? Aliena dixit in physicis, nee ea 
ipsa quae tibi probarentur. Si qua in iis corrigere 
voluit, deteriora fecit. Disserendi artem nullam 
habuit. Voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, 

primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque 

BOOK I. vii-viii 

Again^ as to the question oflen asked^ why so many 
men are Epicureans, though it is not the only reason^ 
the thing that most attracts the crowd is the belief that 
Epicurus declares right conduct and moral worth to 
be intrinsically and of themselves delightful^ which 
means productive of pleasure. These worthy people 
do not realize that^ if this is true, it upsets the 
theory altogether. If it were admitted that goodness 
is spontaneously and intrinsically pleasant, even 
without any reference to bodily feeling, then virtue 
would be desirable for its own sake, and so also would 
knowledge; but this Epicurus by no means allows. 

'These then," said I, are the doctrines of Epi- and lastly, he 
cunis that I cannot accept. For the rest, I could le^mfng. 
desire that he himself had been better equipped 
with learning (since even you must recognize that 
he is deficient in that liberal culture which confers 
on its possessor the title of an educated man) or at 
all events that he had not deterred others from study. 
Although I am aware that he has not succeeded in 
deterring you." 

VIII. I had spoken rather with the intention of Triarius rema 
drawing out Torquatus than of delivering a discourse mikes oS°Ep 
of my own. But Triarius interposed, with a smile : <^"^"' ^^ °* 

f^^TiT I. !-• n n J T? • philosopher 

Why, you have practically expelled Epicurus at aii. 
altogether from the philosophic choir. What have 
you left to him except that, whatever his style may 
be, you find his meaning intelligible ? His doctrines 
in Natural Philosophy were second-hand, and in your 
opinion unsound at that ; and his attempts to improve 
on his authority only made things worse. Dialectic 
he had none. His identification of the Chief Good 
with pleasure in the first place was in itself an 
error, and secondly this also was not original ; for it 



alienuin ; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. Addi- 
27 disti ad extremum, etiam indoetum fuisse." Fieri/' 
inquam^ Triari, nuUo pacto potest ut non dicas quid 
non probes eius a quo dissentias. Quid enim me 
prohiberet Epieureum esse, si probarem quae ille 
dieeret? cum praesertim ilia perdiseere ludus esset. 
Quamobrem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones 
non sunt vituperandae ; maledicta, eontumeliae, tum 
iraeundae^ contentiones eoneertationesque in dispu- 
tando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri 
2 8 Solent. ' ' Tum Torquatus : ^ Prorsus/ * inquit, assefltior ; 
neque enim disputari sine repreliensione, nee cum 
iracundia aut pertinacia recte disputari potest. Sed 
ad haec, nisi molestum est, habeo quae velim." An 
me," inquam, nisi te audire vellem, censes haec di- 
cturum fuisse ? " Utrum igitur percurri omnem Epi- 
curi disciplinam placet, an de una voluptate quaeri, de 
qua omne certamen est?" Tuo vero id quidem," 
inquam, arbitratu. " Sic faciam igitur," inquit : 
unam rem explicabo eamque maximam ; de physicis 
alias ; et quidem tibi et declinationem istam atomo- 
rum et magnitudinem solis probabo, et Democriti 
errata ab Epicuro reprehensa et correcta permulta. 
Nunc dicam de voluptate, nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen 
quae te ipsum probaturum esse confidam." Certe," 

* iraamdae Mdv. ; iracundiae MSS. 



n said before, and said better, by Aristippus. 
lo crown all you added that Epieurus was a persun 

27 of no education." "Well, Triarius," I rejoined, 
"when one disagrees with a man, it is essential to 
say what it is that one objects to in his views. What 
should prevent me from being an Epicurean, if I 
accepted the doctrines of Epicurus? especially as 
the system is an exceedingly easy one to master. 
You must not find fault with members of opposing 
schools for criticizing each other's opinions; tliough 
I always feel that insult and abuse, or ill-tempered 
wrangling and bitter, obstinate controversy are 

W beneath the dignity of philosophy," I am quite of Tort 
your mind," said Torguatus; it is impossible to de- Epic 
bate without criticizing, but it is equally impossible '''''*' 
to debate properly with ill-temper or obstinacy. But 
I have something I should like to say in reply toal! 
this, if it will not weary you." "Do you suppose," 
said I, " that I should have said what 1 have, unless 
I wanted to hear you ? " Then would you like me 
to make a rapid review of the whole of Epicurus's 
system, or to discuss the single topic of pleasure, 
which is the one main subject of dispute?" Oh," discmsinii 
I said, that must be for you to decide." Very ^""'^ 
well then," said he, this is what I will do, I will 
expound a single topic, and that the most important. 
Natural Philosophy we will postpone ; though I will 
undertake to prove to you both your swerve of the 
atoms and size of the sun, and also that very many errors 
of Democritus were criticized and corrected by Epi- 
curus. But on the present occasion I will speak about 
pleasure ; not that I have anything original to con- 
tribute, yet I am confident that what i say will com- 
mand even your acceptance." " Be assured," I said, 


inquam^ pertinax non ero tibique^ si mihi probabis 
29 ea quae dices, libenter assentiar." Probabo/' inquit, 
modo ista sis aequitate quam ostendis. Sed uti 
oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interro- 
gari." Ut placet," inquam. Turn dicere exorsus est. 
IX. Primum igitur," inquit, sic agam ut ipsi 
auctori huius disciplinae placet : constituam quid et 
quale sit id de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos 
arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. Quaeri- 
mus igitur quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, 
quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse 
ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. 
Hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum 
bonum esse vult summumque malum dolorem ; idque 
SO instituit docere sic : Omne animal simul atque natum 
sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo 
bono, dolorem aspemari ut summum malum et quan- 
tum possit a se repellere ; idque facere nondum de- 
pravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudi- 
cante. Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque 
disputatione quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fii- 
giendus dolor sit. Sentiri haec^ putat, ut calere 
ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce, quorum nihil 
oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum 
satis esse admonere. (Interesse enim inter argumen- 
tum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem 
animadversionem atque admonitionem : altera occulta 

* haec A ; hoc Mdv. with other MSS. 

BOOK I. viii-ix 

that I shall not be obstinate^ but will gladly own 
myself convinced if you can prove your case to my 

19 satisfaction.'* I shall do so," he rejoined, provided 
you are as £ur-minded as you promise. But I prefer 
to employ continuous discourse rather than question 
and answer." As you please," said I. So he began. 
IX. I will start then," he said, ' in the manner 
approved by the author of the system himself, by 
settling what is the essence and quality of the thing 
that is the object of our inquiry ; not that I suppose 
you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the 
logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, pleasure th« 
then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as pro^dbJ^Uie 
all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature universal instii 
as to be the End to which all other things are shun pain. 
means, while it is not itself a means to anything 
else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure ; pleasure he \ 
holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. I 

50 This he sets out to prove as follows : Every animal, / 
as soon as it is bom, seeks for pleasure, and delights/ 
in it as the Chief Grood, while it recoils from pain as 
the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This 
it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the 
prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest 
verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any neces- \\ 
sity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure | 
is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, ! 
he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire i 
is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which ' 
things need be proved by elaborate argument : it is 
enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there 
is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic ' 
proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: ' 
the former is the method for discovering abstruse l 
D S3 


quaedain et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompts et 
aperta indicari.^) Etcnim quoniam detraptis de Iio- 
mine sensilms reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut 
ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. Ea 
quid pevcipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut 

S 1 fugiat aliquid, praeler voluptatem et dolorem ? Sunt 
autem quidam e nostris qui haec subtiliua velint 
traderCi et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid 
malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione 
intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse ex- 
petendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. 
Itaque aiunt banc quasi naturalem atque insitam in 
animis nostris inesse notionem ut altemni esse appe- 
tendum,altcnim aspernandum scnliamus. Alii autem, 
quibus ego assentior, cum a philosopliis compluribus 
permulta dicantur cur nee voluptas in bonis sit nu- 
meranda nee in malis dolor, non existimant oportere 
njmium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum 
et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de 
voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. 

Sa X. " Sed ut perspiciatis unde omnis iste natus error 
sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, 
totam rem aperiam, eaque ipsa quae ab illo inventore 
veritatis et quasi artliitecto beatae vitae dicta sunt 
explicabo. Nemo enim ipsam voluptatem quia 
voluptas sit aspernatur aut odit aut fiigit, sed quia 
conaequuntur raagni dolores eos qui ratione volupta- 
tem sequi nesciunt. Neque porro quisquam est qui do- 
•indicari inf. MS.; iudicari UAv. with other MSS, 

BOOK I. ix-x 

and recondite truths^ the latter for indicating facts 
that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of 
sensation^ and nothing remains; it follows that^ 
Nature herself is the judge of tl\^t which is in accord- 
ance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature 
perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure 
and pain^ to guide her actions of desire and o) 

51 avoidance? Some members of our school however 
would refine upon this doctrine ; these say that it is 
not enough for the judgment of good and evil to 
rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in 
and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself , 
to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect 
and the reason. Accordingly they declare that 
the perception that the one is to be sought after and 
the other avoided is a natural and imiate idea of the 
mind. Others again^ with whom I agree, observing 
that a great many philosophers do advance a vast 
array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be 
counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that 
we had better not be too confident of our case ; in 
their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argu- 
ment, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the 
nature of pleasure and pain. 

2 X. But I must explain to you how all this mistaken But this instin 

• jr u^»i jiiT • is qualified by 

idea oi reprobating pleasure and extolling pam arose, calculation: m 
To do so, I will give you a complete account of the ^f^f^urpiu 
system, and expound the actual teachings of the of pleasure ove 
great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of ^ 
human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids \ 
pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because j 
those who do not know how to pursue pleasure / 
rationally encounter consequences that are extremel]^ 
painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or 
d2 35 


lorem ipsum quia dolor sit amet^ consectetur^ adipisci 
velit^ sed qu ia nonnumquam eiusmodi tempora incidunt 
ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat volupta- 
tem. Ut enim ad* minima veniam^ quis nostrum 
exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit laboriosam^ 
nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? Quis 
autem vel eum iure reprehenderit qui in ea voluptate 
velit esse quam nihil molestiae consequatur^ vel ilium 
qui dolorem eum fugiat quo voluptas nulla pariatur? 

33 At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos 
ducimus qui blanditiis praesentium voluptatum dele- 
niti atque corrupti quos dolores et quas molestias 
excepturi sint occaecati cupiditate non provident, 
similique sunt in culpa qui ofiicia deserunt mollitia 
animi, id est laborum et dolorum fuga. Et hanun 
quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. Nam 
libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio 
cumque nihil impedit quo minus id quod maxime 
placeat facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda 
est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem 
quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessita^ 
tibus saepe eveniet ut et voluptates repudiandae sint 
et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum 
hie tenetur a sapiente delectus ut aut reiciendis 
voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis 
doloribus asperiores repellat. 

34 Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est 
cur verear ne ad eam non possim accommodare 
Torquatos nostros ? quos tu paulo ante cum me- 
moriter tum etiam erga nos amice et benevole 



pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it ^ 
is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur / 
in which toil and pain can procure him some great ^ 
pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever 
undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to ob- 
tain some advantage from it ? But who has any righ^ 
to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a plea- j 
sure that has no annoying consequences, or one who J 
avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure ? On 
the other hand, we denounce with righteous indigna- 
tion and dislike men who are so beguiled and demora- 
lized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so 
blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain 
and trouble that are bound to ensue ; and equal blame 
belongs to those who fail in their duty through 
weakness of will, which is the same as saying through 
shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are per- 
fectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, 
when our power of choice is untrammelled and when 
nothing prevents our being able to do what we like 
best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every 
pain avoided. But in certain circumstances and 
owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of 
business it will frequently occur that pleasures have 
to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wis^ 
man therefore always holds in these matters to thisV 
principle of selection : he rejects pleasures to secure j 
other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains tj/ 
avoid worse pains. 

^ This being the theory 1 hold, why need I be afraid This explains 
of not being able to reconcile it with the case of the eStiy^'dtei?-^"" 
the Torquati my ancestors ? Your references to them tercsted. 
just now were historically correct, and also showed 
your kind and friendly feeling towards myself; but 


collegisti ; nee me tamen laudandis maioribus meis 
comipisti nee segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. 
Quorum facta quemadmodum, quaeso^ interpretans ? 
Sicine eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum 
fecisse aut in liberos atque in sanguinem suum tam 
crudeles fuisse^ nihil ut de utilitatibus^ nihil ut de 
commodis suis cogitarent? At id ne ferae quidem 
faciunt^ ut ita ruant itaque turbent ut earum motus 
et impetus quo pertineant non intellegamus ; tu tam 
egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa? 

35 Quae fuerit causa mox videro ; interea hoc tenebo, si 
ob aliquam causam ista^ quae sine dubio praeclara 
sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis per se ipsam causam non 
fuisse. — Torquem detraxit hosti. — Et quidem se texit 
ne interiret — At magnum periculum adiit. — In oculis 
quidem exercitus. — Quid ex eo est consecutus? — 
Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu 
degendae praesidia firmissima. — Filium morte multa- 
vit. — Si sine causa, noUem me ab eo ortum, tam 
importuno tamque crudeli ; sin ut dolore suo sanciret 
militaris imperi disciplinam exercitumque in gravis- 
simo bello animadversionis metu contineret, saluti 
prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam. 

36 Atque haec ratio late patet. In quo enim maxima 

consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui 

studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris 


all the same I am not to be bribed by your flattery 
of my family, and you will not find me a less resolute 
opponent. Tell me, pray, what explanation do you 
put upon their actions ? Do you really believe that 
they charged an armed enemy, or treated their 
children, their own flesh and blood, so cruelly, with- 
out a thought for their own interest or advantage ? 
Why, even wild animals do not act in that way; 
they do not run amok so blindly that we cannot dis- 
cern any purpose in their movements and their on- 
slaughts. Can you then suppose that those heroic 
men performed their famous deeds without any 

15 motive at all? What their motive was, I will con- 
sider in a moment : for the present I will confidently 
assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubt- 
edly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of 
virtue in and for itself. — He wrested the necklet 
from his foe. — Yes, and saved himself from death. — 
But he braved great danger. — Yes, before the eyes 
of an army. — What did he get by it? — Honour and 
esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life. 
— He sentenced his own son to death. — If from no 
motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone 
so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by> 
inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority 
as a commander, and to tighten the reins of| 
discipline during a very serious war by holding] 
over his army the fear of punishment, then hisl 
action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow^ 

36 citizens, upon which he knew his own depended 
And this is a principle of wide application. 
People of your school, and especially yourself, who 
are so diligent a student of history, have found a 
favourite field for the display of your eloquence in 


commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento 
aliquo sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis^ id 
totum evertitur eo delectu rerum quern modo dixi 
constitutor ut aut voluptates omittantur maiorum 
voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores susci- 
piantur maiorum dolorum efFugiendorum gratia. 
37 XI. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus 
et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum est. Erit enim iam 
de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius 
disserendi locus. Nunc autem explicabo voluptas 
ipsa quae qualisque sit^ ut tollatur error omnis 
imperitonim intellegaturque ea quae voluptaria, 
delicata^ mollis habeatur disciplina quam gravis, 
quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim banc 
solam sequimur quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam 
movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, 
sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus quae per- 
cipitur omni dolore detracto. Nam quoniam, cum 
privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis 
molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id quo gaudemus 
voluptas est (ut omne quo ofFendimur dolor), doloris 
omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. Ut enim, 
cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa 
detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, 

sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit 

BOOK I. x-xi 

recalling the stories of brave and famous men of old^ 
and in praising their actions^ not on utilitarian 
grounds, but on account of the splendour of abstract 
moral worth. But all of this falls to the ground if the 
principle of selection that I have just mentioned be 
established^ — the principle of forgoing pleasures for 
the purpose of getting greater pleasures, and en- 
during pains for the sake of escaping greater pains. 

XI. But enough has been said at this stage about The highest 
the glorious exploits and achievements of the heroes i^^Ssen^* df**' 
of renown. The tendency of all of the virtues to pain. 
produce pleasure is a topic that will be treated in its 
own place later on. At present I shall proceed to 
expound the essence and the quality of pleasure it- 
self, and shall endeavour to remove the misconcep- 
tions of ignorance and to make you realize how 
serious, how temperate, how austere is the school 
that is supposed to be sensual, lax and luxurious. 
The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone whiclv 
affects our physical being with a definite delightful \ 
feeling, — a positively agreeable perception of the \ 
senses ; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure accord- j 
ing to us is that which is experienced as a result of/ 
the complete removal of pain. When we are released 
from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipa- 
tion and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of 
gratification. But everything that causes gratification 
is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance 
is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain 
has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, 
when hunger and thirst are banished by food and 
drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness 
brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, 
the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its 



38 voluptatis. Itaque non placuit Epicnro medium esse 
quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim 
ipsum quod quibusdam medium videretur^ cum omni 
dolorc careret, non modo voluptatem esse verum 
ctiam summam voluptatem. Quisquis enim sentit 
qucmadmodum sit aiFectus, eum necesse est aut in 
voluptate esse aut in dolore. Omnis autem privatione 
doloriH putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem^ 
ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit^ augeri 

39 amplificarique non possit. At etiam Athenis, ut a 
ptttre Hudiebam^ facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, 
st^itua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta 
nianUj quae manus significet ilium in hac esse 
rogatiuncula delectatum : Numquidnam manus tua, 
sic ttlfccta qucmadmodum afFecta nunc est, deside- 
rat?' — * Nihil sane.* — 'At si voluptas esset bonum, 
dcsidorart^t* — 'ita credo.* — 'Non est igitur volu- 
ptas bonum/ Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater 
aiebtit si loqui posset Conclusum est enim contra 
C>'rcnaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. Nam si 
ea wla \\^luptas esset quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut 
itii dictuu« et ad eos oum suavitate aAlueret et illabe- 
rt^tur» ncc n\anu$ esse ccaiteiita posset nee ulla pars 
v^ouUate dolivri^^ siixe iucundo motu voluptatis. Sin 
autem suuuiv» w^uptas est. ut Epicuro placet,, nihil 
Uv?i)erex prtmum tiUi reete. Chrysippe, concessnm est. 

BOOK I. xi 

38 place. Epicurus consequently maintained that there 
is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling inter- 
mediate between pleasure and pain; for the state 
supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being 
characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is it- 
self, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure 
of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his 
condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure 
or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus 
considers to be the limit and highest point of 
pleasure ; beyond this point pleasure may vary in 

39 kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree. Yet at 
Athens, so my father used to tell me when he wanted 
to air his wit at the expense of the Stoics, in the 
Ceramicus there is actually a statue of Chrysippus 
seated and holding out one hand, the gesture being 
intended to indicate the delight which he used to 
take in the following little syllogism: Does your 
hand want anything, while it is in its present condi- 
tion?' Answer: No, nothing.' — But if pleasure were 
a good, it would want pleasure.' — Yes, I suppose it 
would.' — Therefore pleasure is not a good.' An argu- 
ment, as my father declared, which not even a statue 
would employ, if a statue could speak ; because though 
it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, 
it does not touch Epicurus. For if the only kind of 
pleasure were that which so to speak tickles the 
senses, an influence permeating them with a feeling 
of delight, neither the hand nor any other member 
could be satisfied with the absence of pain unaccom- 
panied by an agreeable and active sensation of 
pleasure. Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest 
pleasure be to feel no pain, Chrysippus* s interlocutor, 
though justified in making his first admission, that 




nihil desiderare manum cum ita esset afFecta, secun- 
dum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse 
desideraturam. Idcirco enim non desideraret quia 
quod dolore caret id in voluptate est. 

40 XII. " Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem 
ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus ali- 
quem magnis^ multis^ perpetuis fruentem et animo 
et corpore voluptatibus, nullo dolore nee impediente 
nee impendente ; quem tandem hoc statu praestabili- 
orem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? In- 
esse enim necesse est in eo qui ita sit affectus et 
firmitatem animi nee mortem nee dolorem timentis, 
quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, 
in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem 

41 celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. Ad ea 
cunx accedit ut neque divinum numen horreat nee 
praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque 
assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est quod hue 
possit, quo melius sit/ accedere ? Statue contra ali- 
quem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus 
quanti in hominem maximi cad ere possunt, nulla spe 
proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea 
neque praesenti nee exspectata voluptate; quid eo 
miserius dici aut fingi potest ? Quod si vita doloribus 
referta maxime fiigienda est, summum profecto 
malum est vivere cum dolore ; cui sententiae consen- 
taneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate 
vivere. Nee enim habet nostra mens quidquam ubi 

' quo melius sit Miiller ; quod melius sit Mdv. with MSS. 

BOOK I. xi-xii 

his hand in that condition wanted nothing, was not 
justified in his second admission, that if pleasure were 
a good, his hand would have wanted it. And the 

reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is, I — ^' 

that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure, 
to XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the Pleasure prov 
ultimate good will most readily appear from the by^extreme*^ 
following illustration. Let us imagine a man living <^ascs of happ 

, , f, _ ^ ness and mise 

in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid 
pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed 
either by the presence or by the prospect of pain : 
what possible state of existence could we describe as 
being more excellent or more desirable? One so 
situated must possess in the first place a strength of 
mind that is proof against all fear of (death or of 
pain; he will know that death means complete un- 
consciousness, and that pain is generally light if long 
and short if strong, so that its intensity is compen- 
sated by brief duration and its continuance by 
H diminishing severity. Let such a man moreovei 
have no dread of any supernatural power; let him 
never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, 
but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollec- 
tion, — and his lot will be one which will not admit 
of further improvement. Suppose on the other hand 
a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental 
and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. 
Grant him no prospect of ultimate relief in view; 
let him neither have nor hope to have a gleam of 
pleasure. Can one describe or imagine a more piti- 
able state? If then a life full of pain is the thing 
most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is 
the highest evil ; and this position implies that a life 
of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind 



consistat tamquam in extreme, omnesque et metus et 
aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nee praeterea 
est res ulla quae sua natura aut soUicitare possit aut 

42 ' Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino 
rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a volu- 
ptate aut a dolore. Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum 
est omnes rectas res atque laudabiles eo referri ut 
cum voluptate vivatur. Quoniam autem id est vel 
summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum (quod 
Graeci rkXos nominant) quod ipsum nullam ad aliam 
rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est 
summum eSse bonum iucunde vivere. 

XIII. Id qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore 
nominis capti quid natura postulet non intellegunt, 
errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, libera- 
buntur. Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque 
virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut 
laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur ? Ut enim 
medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonae 
valetudinis causa probamus, et gubernatoris ars, quia 
bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte 
laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, 
non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur 
quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et compa- 

43 randae voluptatis. (Quam autem ego dicam volu- 

a i.e. pain of body : dolorem here has its strict sense, 

BOOK I. xii-xiii 

possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as 
final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back\ 
to pain*; there is no other thing besides pain which I 
is of its own nature capable of causing either anxietjp?* 
or distress. 

Ij2 Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives Pleasure and 

of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct ^S^ ^^ 
generally. This being so, it clearly follows that y»^ sole stan- 
actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a | 
means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But L 
that which is not itself a means to anything else, but/ ( 
to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term ^ 
the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. Iz 
must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to 
live agreeably. 

XIII. Those who place the Chief Good in virtue The Virtues iw 
alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and ^?^"b^^^i 
do not understand the true demands of nature. If means to Plea 
they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be . — -^ 
delivered from the grossest error. Your school 
dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; 
but were they not productive of pleasure, who would 
deem them either praiseworthy or desirable ? We 
esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as 
a science but for its conduciveness to health ; the art 
of navigation is commended for its practical and not 
its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for 
sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, 
which must be considered as the art of living, Yisdom; 
if it effected no result would not be desired ; but as ) 
it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer thsLZ 

'3 procures and produces pleasure. (The meaning that 
I attach to pleasure must by this time be clear to 
you, and you must not be biased against my argu- 



ptatem iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur 
oratio mea.) Nam cum ignoratione renim bonarum 
et malarum maxime hominum vita vexetur^ ob eum- 
que errorem et voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur 
et durissimis animi doloribus torqueantur^ sapientia 
est adhibenda^ quae et tenroribus cupiditatibusque 
detraetis et omnium falsarum opinionum temeritate 
derepta eertissimam se nobis ducem praebeat ad 
voluptatem. Sapientia enim est una quae maesti- 
tiam pellat ex animis^ quae nos exhorrescere metu 
non sinat ; qua praeceptrice in tranquillitate vivi 
potest^ omnium cupiditatum ardore restincto. Cupi- 
ditates enim sunt insatiabiles^ quae non modo singtdos 
homines sed universas familias evertunt^ totam etiam 

44 labefactant saepe rem publicam. Ex cupiditatibus 
odia^ discidia^ discordiae^ seditiones^ bella nascuntur. 
Nee eae se foris solum iactant nee tantum in alios 
caeco impetu incurrunt^ sed intus etiam in AninrMg 
inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant ; ex quo 
vitam amarissimam necesse est efBci^ ut sapiens so- 
lum, amputata drcumcisaque inanitate omni et errore^ 
naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et 

45 sine metu vivere. Quae est enim aut utilior aut ad 
bene vivendum aptior partitio quam ilia qua est usus 
Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum 
quae essent et naturales et necessariae, alterum quae 
naturales essent nee tamen necessariae, tertium quae 
nee naturales nee necessariae; quarum ea ratio est 
ut necessariae nee opera multa nee impensa explean- 
tur ; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea 


ir (^rtraiest picjisures, anu i 
lel pain of mind. Hence j 
m, to rid us of our feaxsj 
al! our errors and pre/ 

BOOK I. xiii 
ment owing to the discreditable associations of the 
term,} The gre"irt disturbing factor in man's life is \ 
ignorance of; feooQ ar»J evil ; mistaken ideas about J 
these frequentlyT-ob us of our greatest pie» 
torment us with the most c] 
we need the aid of Wisdom, 1 
and appetites, to root out al! t 
judices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the 
attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish 
sorrow from our hearts and protect us from alarm 
and apprehension.; put yourself to school with her, 
and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing 
flames of desire. For the desires are lncapable\ 
of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but ) 
whole families, nay often shake the very foundations/ 

4-I. of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, 
quarrelling and strife, of sedition and of war. Nor 
do thej' only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their 
blind onslaughts solely against others; even when 
prisoned within the heart tliey quarrel and fall out 
among themselves; and this cannot but render the 
whole of life embittered. Hence only the 
Man, who prunes away all the rank growth c 
and error, can possibly live untroubled by si 

+5 by fear, content within the bounds that nature has 
get, Notliing could be more instructive, more help- 
ful to right living, than Epieurus's doctrine as ts 
the different classes of the desires. One kind he\ 
classified as both natural and necessary, a second asl 
natural without being necessaiy, and a third asi 
neither natural nor necessary; the principle pf 
classiti cation being that the necessary desires are 
gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural 
desires also require but little, since nature's own 

renaer ine 

the Wise ^ 
h of vanity J 


quod ipsa natiira divitias qnibus contenta sit et para- 
biles et teruiinatas habet; iiiaDiuiO autcm cupidi- 
tatum nee iiiodcis utlus nee Riiis inveniri potest. 

^.fi XIV. Quod si vitatn omnem perttirbari videmus 
erroreet inscientta,sapientianique esse solam quae nos 
a libidinuin impetu et a formidinum terrore viiidicet et 
ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnes 
monstrct vias quae ad quictem et tranquil I itatem 
ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam 
propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam pro- 
pter inolestias esse fugiendam ? 

4'T Ea<lemque ratione ne temperantiam quldem pro- 

pter se expeteiidam esse dicen;ius, se<l quia pacem 
animis aiFerat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet 
ac leniat. Temperantia est enim quae in rebus 
aut expetendis aut (ugiendis ut rationem sequamur 
monet. Nee enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum 
non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo 
quod sit iudicntum. Plerique autem, quod tenere 
atque servare id quod ipsi st&tuerunt non possunt. 
victi et dfbilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt 
se libidinibus constringendos nee quid eventurura 
sit provident, ob eamque causani propter voluptatem 
et parvam et non necessarian! et quae vel iiliter 
pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore, 
turn in morbus graves, turn in damiia, turn in dede- 
cora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque 

■1-8 poenis obligantur. Qui autem ita frui voluni; volu- 
ptatibus ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et 

' initni) hollow, vain, unreal, as the opposite or ' natural ' 
(cf. gijandBk. TT- g j6), means 'based on afalseideaof 

what la good or necessary': nl SI {rUr imOviiiur) oCrt ^wKai 

Diogenes Ijierliiis lo. i^q. 


BOOK I. xiii-xiv 

riches^ which suffice to content her^ are both easily 
procured and limited in amount ; but for the imagin- 
ary* desires no bound or limit can be discovered. 

p6 XIV. If then we observe that ignorance and error \ . 
reduce the whole of life to confusion, while Wisdom 1 
alone is able to protect us from the onslaughts of / 
appetite and the menaces of fear, teaching us to /I 
bear even the affronts of fortune with moderation, / / 
and showing usi" all the paths that lead to calmness / / 
and to peace, why should we hesitate to avow that / / 
Wisdom is to be desired for the sake of the pleasures^/ 
it brings and Folly to be avoided because of its 
icjurious consequences ? 

1-7 * The same principle will lead us to pronounce that Temperance; 
Temperance also is not desirable for its own sake,\ 
but because it bestows peace of mind, and soothes ] 
the heart with a tranquillizing sense of harmony. / 
For it is temperance that warns us to be guided bj/ 
reason in what we desire and avoid. Nor is it enough 
to judge what it is right to do or to leave undone^ 
we also need to abide by our judgment. Most mem 
however lack tenacity of purpose; their resolution \ 
weakens and succumbs as soon as the fair form of ) 
pleasure meets their gaze, and they surrender them/ 
selves prisoners to their passions, failing to fores< 
the inevitable result. Thus for the sake of a pleasur^ 
at once small in amount and unnecessary, and one' 
which they might have .procured by other means oi 
even denied themselves altogether without pain, th< 
incur serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace, 
and not infrequently become liable to the penalties 

48 of the law and of the courts of justice. Those on 
the other hand who are resolved so to enjoy their 
pleasures as to avoid all painful consequences there- 
e2 51 


iudicium relinent ne voluptate victi faciant 
id quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii voluptatem 
maximam adipiscuntiir praetermittenda voluptate. 
lideni etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur nCj si id 
iiuu facjaiit, incidanL in maiorem. Ex quo intelle- 
gilur nee intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam, 
teniperantiamque expetendam non, quia voluptates 
fugiat sed quia maiores consequatur. 

XV. Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. Nam 
neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum 
per se ipsa alHcit, ncc patientia nee assiduitas nee 
vigiliae nee ipsa quae landatur indiistria, ne fortitudo 
quidem, sed ista sequimur ut sine cura metuque vi- 
vaniiis animunique et corpus quantum efficere possi- 
mus molestia liberemus. Ut enira mortis metu 
omnis qiiietae vitae status perturbalur, et ut suc- 
cumbere doloribus eosqiie huniili animo imbecilloque 
ferre misenim est, ob eamque debilitateni animi 
multi parentes, niuiti amicos, nonnulli patriam, 
plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic 
robuatus animus et excclsus omni est liber cura et 
angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui afFecti 
sunt in eadem causa sunt qua antequuni nati, et ad 
dolores ita paralus est ut meminerit maximos morte 
finiri, parvos molta habere intervalla requietis, me- 
diocriom nos ease dominos, ut si tolerabiles sint 
feranius, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non 
placeat, tamqiiam e theatro exeamus, Quibua rebus 

BOOK 1. xiv XV 
from, and who retain their facultv of judgment and 
avoid being seduced by pleasure into courses that 
they perceive to be wrong, reap the very highest 
pleasure by forgoing pleasure. Similarly also they 
often voluntarily endure pain, to avoid incur- 
ring greater pain by not doing so. This clearly 
proves that Intemperance is not undesirable for its 
own sake, while Temperance is desirable not because 
it renounces pleasures, but because it procures 
greater pleasures. 
!) XV. " The same account will tie found to hold good 
of Courage. The perfonnance of labours, the endu- 
rance of pains, are not in themselves attractive, nor 
are patience, industry, watchfulness, nor yet that 
much lauded virtue, perseverance, nor even couragOv 
but we aim at these virtues in order to live without 1 
anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be frep/ 
from pain of niind and body. The fear of death 
plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, 
and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and 
feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused 
many men to betray their parents or their friends, 
some their country, and very many utterly to ruin 
themselves. So on the other hand a strong and 
lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. 
It makes light of death, for the dead are only as 
they were before they were bom. It is schooled to 
encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great , 
severity are ended by death, and slight ones have 
frequent intervals of respite ; while those of medium / 
intensity lie within our own control : we can l>ea^'^ 
the m if they are endurable, or if they are not, we 
y serenely quit life's ttieatre, when the play has 
I to please us. These considerations prove 



q ui»' 

intellegitur nee timiditateni ignaviamque vitupeTiari' 
nee fortitudiiiem patieiitiamque laudari suo nomine, 
sed illas reici quia dolorem pariant, has optari qui»' 
i-oluptatcm. *^^ 

J XVI. "lustitiarestat.utdeoitinivirtulesitdict 
sed similia fere dici possunt. Ut cnim sapientii 
teniperantiam, fortitudinein copulatas esse docui ci 
voluptate ut ab ea nullu modo nee divelli nee dis- 
trahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae noil 
modo numquam nocet cutquam, sed contra semper 
aliqiiid impertit' cum sua vi atque natura, quod 
tranquillet animos, turn spe nihil earum rerum de- 
futiirum quas natura non depravata drstdeiet. Et" 
quemadmodum temeritas et libido ct ignaWa semper 
animum excruciant et semper sollieitant turbulen- 
taeque sunt, sic iinE£oWtas_si^ cuius in mente con- 
sedit, hoc ipso quod adest turbiilenta est; si vero 
molitu quidpiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, num- 
quam tamen id confidet fore semper occuitum. 
Plerumque improboruni facta prime suspicio inse- 
quitur, dein sermo atque fama, turn accusator, turn 
iudex ; multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicave- 
\ 51 runt. Quod si qui satis sibi contra horoinum con- 
scientiam saepti esse et mutiiti videntur, deorum 
tamen horrent, casque ipsas sollicitu dines quibus 
eorum aiiimi noctesque diesque eiceduntur a dis im- 
mortalibus supplici causa importari putant Quae 
nutem tanta ex improbia factis ad minuendas vitae 

' impertit supplied by MQIIeri Mdv. marks lacuna. 
- Et inserted by Mdv. 

'iwprvbitiis si sappViQil by Mdv. (cj). improbori,m, ii„. 
probe, improbis, iiBprobitalem below). 

HOOK I. Nv-xvi 

that timidity and cowurdtce are not biamed, t 
courage and endurance praised, on tlieir 
account; the former are rejected because they 
bring pain, the latter coveted because they produt 

[) XVI, It remains to speak of Justice, to complete juaiicp m 
the list of the virtues ; but tliis admits of practically ^*' "" ""*"' 

the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Tern- ^^M 

perance and Courage I have shown to be so closely ^^H 

linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be ^^H 

severed or sundered from it. The same must be ^^H 

deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only doesk ^^H 

Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the con- ^^H 

trary it always brings some benefit, partly owing tof ^^H 

its essentially tranquillizing influence upon the mind, ^^H 

partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never- ^^H 

failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature ^^H 

really needs. And just as Rashness, Licence and ^^H 

Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awaken trouble ^^H 

and discord, so Unrighteousnefis, when firmly, rooted ^^H 

in .tli e hear t, causes restlessness by tlie mere fact of ^^| 

its presence; and if once it has found expression in ^^H 

some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, | ^^H 

yet^tcan never feel assured tliatitwill alwa ys rpmnjn^ .1 ^^^^ 

undetected. 'rheTiSnni consequences of crime are, ^^^H 

fitbl suspiLilUfJ, next gossip and rumour, then comes ^^^H 

the accuser, then the judge ; many wrongdoers have ^^H 

even turned evidence against themselve3,as happened ^^H 

1 in your consulship. And even if any think them^ ^^H 

selves well fenced and fortified against detection by \ ^^H 

their fellow-men, they still dread the eye of heaven, / ^^H 

and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day/ ^^^| 

^Bnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to ^^^| 

^fkish them. iJut what can wickedness contribute ^^^| 

^V - — — -— ^^1 

moleiftias accessio potest tieri, quanta ad augendas 
cum conscientia factor um turn poena legum Mlioque 
eivium? Et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae 
modus est neque honoris neque iinperi nee libidinLim 
nee epulurum nee reliquamm eupiditatum, quas nulla 
praeda umquam improbe parta minuit. potiusque in- 
fluRimat, ut coercendi magis quatn dedocendi esse 

52 videantur. Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad 
iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem. Neque liomiiii infanti 
ttut iinpotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nee facile 
cfficcre possit quod conetur nee obtinere si efTecerit, 
et opes vel fortunae vet ingeni liberalititi magis con- 
veniurt, qua qui utuntur bene vole ntiani sibi con- 
ciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, 
curitatein; praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa 

fiS peccandi: .quae enim cupiditates a naturn profici- 
Gcuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria ; quae autem 
inancs sunt, iis parendum nun est, nihil enim de- 
stderabile concupiscunt ; pi usque in ipsa iniuria detri- 
roenti est quam in iis rebus cmolumenti quae pariuiitut 
iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit 
per sc ipsam optabileni, sed quia iucunditatis vel 
plurinium afferat Nam diligi et carum esse iucun- 
dum est propterea quia tutioreni vitam etvoluptaluia^ 
plcniurem efficlt. Itaque non ob ea solum incom- 
moila quae eveniunt iniprobis fiigiendam improbita- 
teni putAmus, sed multo etiam magis quod, 

H Muller; tvluplalem Mdv. «III. 




towards lessening the annoyances of lifcj i 
surate with its effect in increasing them, owing to\ 
the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of j 
the law andfhe"hatfedof one's"fellows? Yet never- | 
tKelesTBome-sfterrtsrduTge wiihoutilifiit their avarice, 
ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and 
those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never 
dimmish but rather must inflame the more ; inso- 
much that tliej appear proper subjects for restraint 

52 rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, 
therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason 
to justice, equity and honesty. For one without 
eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, 
since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his 
designs, or to make good his success when once 
achieved. On the other hand, for the rich and 
clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, 
and liberality wins tliem affection and good will, the 
surest means to a life of peace; especially as there 

53 really is no motive for transgressing r since the 
desires that spring from nature are easily gratidcd 
without doing any man wrong, while those that are 
imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their 
affections upon nothing that is really wanted ; while 
there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself thafK. 
there is profit in tiie gains it brings. Hence Justice ^ 
also caimot correctly be said to be desirable in and I 
for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive/ 
of gratification. For esteem and affection are grati- 
fying, because they render life safer and fuller of 
pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is 
to be avoided not simply on account of the dis- 

C? that result from being unrighteous, but 
nore because when it dwells in a man's 


1 respirare, nuiii- 

animo versatur, numquani sinit e 
quam ncquiescere. 

I ' Quod si ne ipsarum guidem virtutuni laus, in qua 
maxime ceterortun philosophorum exultat oratio, re- 
perire exitum potest nisi dirigatur ad voluptatem, 
voluptas autem est sola quae nos vocet ad se et alticiat 
suapte natura, non potest esse dubiuni quin id sit 
summumatqueextremumbonoruni omnium, lieatequc 
vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere. 

I XVil. ' Huic certae stabilique senttntiae quae sint 
coniunctaenpUcabobrevi. Nullusinipsis error est fini- 
bus bonorum et malorum, id est in voluptate aut in 
dolore,sediiiiisrebuspec(.'ant cum e quibus haec etiici~ 
fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus (itaque 
coiicedo quod modo dicebas, cadere causasi qui e nostm 
aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, scd 
imperitos); quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis volu- 
ptas animi et molestiam dolor aiferat, eorum tamen 
utrumque et ortum esse e corpore et ad corpus referri ; 
nee ob earn causam non multo maiores esse et voluptates 
et dolores animi quam corporis. Nam corpore nihil nisi 
praesens et quod adest sentire possumus, animo au- 
tem et praeterita et futum. Ut cnim aeque doleamus 
[animo],' cum corpore dolemus, fieri tamen perniagna 
accessio potest si aliquodae ternumetinfuiitumimpen- 

■ [aaima] brHcketed by Mdv. 

a This chap ler appears to bean uniiileiligeiit Iranscripl of 
a siiiumary of the Epicurean answers lo Ihe tonayving 
Cyreiiaic criticisms: (i) pleasure is sometimes rejected, 
owing; to menial perversion, (ij all pleasure is not bodiiy, 
(3) bodily pleasures are strong^er than mental ones, (4) 
absence of pain is nol pleasure, {5) memory and nnticipation 
of pleasure are nol real pleasures. 

^ See £25 above 

ROOK 1. xvi-xvii 
sart it tifvur suffers him to breathe freely 
^moment's rest. 

' If then even the glory of the Virtues, on whicli 
all the o tiler philosophers love to expatiate s)T\ 
eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless \ 
it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only j 
thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it I 
cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme | 
and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing 
else than a life of pleasure. 
.5j XVII. ""The doctrine thus firmly established has Mental pleasun 
forol lanes which 1 will briefly expound, (l) The Ends Spoif bodily; 
of Goods and Evils themselves, that is. pleasure and ^"^"/u^,^"" 
pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong '"V|y^^"' 
is- in not knowing what things are productive of 
pleasure and pain. (2) Again, we aver that mental 
pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and 
therefore I allow your contention'' that any Epicureans 
who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and 
1 am aware that many do, though not those who can 
speak with authority); but although men do experi- 
ence mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental 
pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert 
f^%-'"^^ of and are based upon bodily sensations. 
tV ^^ "Maintain that this does not preclude 
■ f P'^tsures and pains from being much more 

intense than those of the body;since the body can feel 
on y what is present to it at the moment, whereas the 
mind 13 also cosni?.ant of the past and of the fiiture. 
for granting, that pain of body ia equally painful, 
''^ .?'"',^^"aation of pain can be enormously increased 
i^ J^ '"^ ti»Jit some evil of unlimited magnitude 
nd aan,tion t:l»reat«ns to befaU us hereafter. 




Here malum nobis opinemur. Quod idemlicettratisferre 
in voluptatcm, ut ea maior sit si nihil tale metuamus, 
66 lam iiliid quidem perspicuum est, maximam animi 
aut voluplatem aut molestiam plus aut ad beatam aut 
ad miseram vitam afferre momenti quam eonim 
utrumvis si aeque diu sit in corpore. Non placet 
autem detracts, voluptate aegritudincm statim conse- 
qui, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte succcsserit ; 
at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis dolorilius, 
etiamsi voluptas ea quae sensum moveat nulla suc- 
cesserit; eoque iiitellegi potest quanta voluptas sit 
r non dolere. Sed ut iis bonis erigimur quae expecta.- 
mus, sic laetjimur iis quae recordamur. Stulti autem 
malorun] memoria torquentur; sapientes bona prae- 
terita grata recovdatione renovata delectant. Est 
autem situm in nobis ut et adversa quasi perpetua 
oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ae suaviter 
meminerimus. Sed cum ea quae praeterierunt acri 
animo et attento intuemur, turn fit ut aegritudo se- 
quatur si ilia mala sint, si bona, laetitia. 

XVIII. O praectaram beate vii'endi et apertam et 
simplicem et direetam viam ! Cum enim certe nihil 
homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et 
molestia perfruique raasimis et animi et corporis 
voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur 
quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id quod propositum 
est summum bonum consequamur ? Claniat Epicurus 
is quern vos iiimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, 
non posse iucunde vivi nisi sapienter, lioneste iuste- 
que vivatur, nee sapienter, faoneste, iuste nisi iucunde. 

BOOK L sWi-K^iii 
tiK isme consideration may be transferred to pies- 
sure: a pleasure is ^eater if not accornpanted by any 

36 apprebenaon of evil. Tiiis therefore clearly ap- 
pears, that intense mental pleasure or distress con- 
tributes more to our happiness or miserj- than a 
bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. (■() But ■we 
do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn un- 
easiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens 
to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other 
hand one is glad to lose a pain even though do active 
sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that 
serves to show how great a pleasure is 

57 absence of pain, (j) But just as we are elated by 
the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted 
by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the 
remembrance of former evils; to wise men memory 
is a pleasure — by it they renew tlie goods of the past. 
We have the power if we will both to obliterate 
our misfortunes by a sort of permanent forgetfulness 
and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories 
of our successes. But when we concentrate our mental 

vision closefy on the events of the past, thi 
or jctadness ensues according as these were evil or good. 
XVIII. ' Here is indeed a royal road to happiness 
- — open, simple, and direct! For clearly man can 
have no greater good than complete freedom from 
pain and sorrow coupled with the enjoyment of the 
highest bodily and mental pleasures. Notice then 
how the theory embraces every possible enhancement 
of life, every aid to the attainment of that Chief 
Good which is our object. Epicurus, the man whom 
jrou denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no 
ti live pleasantly without living wisely, bono ur- 
f and justly, and no one wisely, honourably and 


I Neque enim civitas in seditioiie beuta ease potest nee 
in discordia dominorum domus ; quo minus animus a 
se ipse dissidens sccumque discordans gustare partem 
ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. Atqui 
pugnantibus ct coiitrariis studils consiliisque semper 
ut^ns nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilU potest. 

I Quod si corporis griivioribus morbis vitae iucusditas 
impeditur, quanto magis aiiimi morbis impediri 
Animi autem morbi sunt cupiditutes 
nanes divitiarum,gloriae, dominationis, 
libidinosarum etiam voluptatuni. Acccdunt aegritu- 
dines, moieatiae, niaerores, qui exedunt aiiimos con- 
ficiiintque curis lioniinum non intellegentiuro nihil 
dolendum esse aninio quod sit a dolore corporis prae- 
senti fiiturove seiunctum. Nee veroquisquani stultus 
non horum morboram aliquo laborat; nemo igitur 

1 stultus ' non miser. Accedit etiam mors, quae 
quasi saxum Tantalo semper impendet ; turn super- 
stitio, qua qui est inibutus quietus esSe numquam 
potest, Fraeterea bona praeterita non ineminerunt, 
pracsentibus non fruuntur; futura modo exspectant, 
quae quia eerta esse non possuiit, conficiuntur et an- 
gore et metu ; maximeque cruciantur cum sero sen- 
tiunt frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperiis 
aut opibus aut gloriae. Nullas enim consequuntur 
voluptates quarum potiendi spe inHammati multos 

I labores magnosque ^usceperunt. Ecce autem aliimi- 
nutiet angusti. aut omnia semper desperantes,aut ma- 


-, MuUer 

:l Mdv. 

■I MSS, 


BOOK I. xviii 

S8 justly without living pleasantly. For n city rent liy 
faction cannot prosper, nor a house whose masters ^^ 
arc at strii'e; much less then can ii mind divided M 
against itself and filled with inward discord taste any 
particle of pure and liberal pleasure. But one who i.^ 
perpetually swayed by conflicting and incompatible 
counsels and desires can know no peace or calm. 

>9 Why, if the pleasantness of life is diminished by 
the more serious bodily diseases, how much more 
must it be diminished by the diseases of the mind '. 
Butextravagantandiniaginarydesires,for riches, fame, 
power, and also for licentious pleasures, are nothing 
but mental diseases. Then, too, there are grief, 
trouble and sorrow, which gnaw the heart and con- 
sume it with anxiety, if men fail to reahze that the 
mind need feel no pain unconnected with some pain 
ef body, present or to come. Yet there is no foolish 
man but is afflicted by some one of these diseases; 
tlierefore there is no foolish man that is not unhappy. 

iO Moreover, there is death, the stone of Tantalus ever 
hanging over men's heads; and superstition, that 
poisons and destroys all peace of mind. Besides, they 
do not recollect their past-nor enjoy theii' present 
blessings; they only look forward to those of the 
future, and as these are of necessity uncertain, they 
are consumed with agony and terror; and the climax 
of their torment is when they perceive too late that 
all their dreams of wealth or station, power or fame, 
have come to nothing. For they never attain any of 
the pleasures, the hope of which inspired them to 

}1 undergo all their arduous toils. Or look again at 

others, petty, narrow-minded men, or confirmed pes- 

simists,orspiteful,envious, ill-tempered creatures, un* 

sociable, abusive, eailtankerous ; others again enslaved 


levoli, invidi, difficiles, lucifugi, maledici, morosi,' alii 
autem etiara amakiriis levitatibus dediti, alii petu- 
lantes, alii audaceSj protervi, iidem iiitemperantes et 
ignavi, numquam in sententia permanentes, quas ob 
causas in eorum vita nulla est intercapedo moleatiae. 
Igitur neque stultomtn quisqunm beatus neque sapi- 
entium non beatus, Multoque hoc melius nos verius- 
que quam Stoici. Illi enim negant esse bonum quid- 
quam nisi nescio quam illam umbram quod appellant 
Iiunestum, non tam solido quam splendido nomine ; 
virtutem autem nixam hoc honesto nullam requirere 
voluptatem atque ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse 
con ten tarn. 

62 XIX. Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non 
modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus 
nobis. Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus 
inducitur ; tiiiltus habet cupiditates ; tieglegit mortem ; 
de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit; non 
dubitat, si ita melius sit, migrare de vita. His rebus 
instructus semper est in voiuptate. Neque enim 
terapus est ullum quo non plus voluptatum habeat 
quam dolonim. Nam et praeterita grate meminit 
et praesentibus ita politur ut animadvertat quanta 
sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex' futuris, 
sed expectat ilia, fruitur praesentibus ; ab iisque vitiis 
quae paulo ante collegi abest plurinium, et cum stul- 
torum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afficitur vo- 
iuptate. Dolores autem si qui incurrunt, numquam 
vim tantam habent ut non plus babeat sapiens quod 

63 gaudeat quam quod angatur, OptJme vero Epicurus, 
quod 'exiguam' dixit 'fortunam intervenire sapientt. 

I Mdv. wilhMSS. ^M 

BOOK I. xviii-xix 
to the follies of love, impudent or reckless, wanton, 
lieaclstronfl and yet irresolute, always changing tlieir 
minds. Such tailings render their lives one unbroken 
round of misery. The conclusion is that no foohsh 
man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be 
happT. This is ii truth that we establish tar more 
conclusively than do the Stoics. For they maintain 
that nothing is good save that vngue phantom which 
they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than 
substantial; and say that Virtue resting on thisi 
Moral Worth has no need of pleasure, but is herself, 
her own sufficient happiness. 

62 XIX. At the same time this Stoic doctrine 

stated in a form which we do not object to, and in- 
deed ourselves endorse. For Epicurus thus represents 
the Wise Man as always happy: his desires are kept 
within bounds; death he disregards; he has a true 
conception, untainted by fear, of the Divine nature; 
if it be expedient to depart from life, he does not 
hesitate to do so. Thus equipped he enjoys per- 
petual pleasure, for there is no moment when the 
pleasures he experiences do not outbalance the 
pains; since he remembers the past with delight, 
grasps the present with a full realization of its 
pleasantness, and does not rely upon the future ; 
be looks forward to it, but liuds his true enjoyment 
in the present. Also he is entirely free from the 
vices that 1 instanced a few moments ago, and he 
derives no inconsiderable pleasure from comparing 
his own existence with the hfe of the foolish. More- 
over, any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are 
never so severe but that he has more cause forglad- 

»3 ncss than for sorrow. Again, it is a fine saying of j 
Epicurus that 'the Wise Man is but little interfered ' 
V 65 

Ths WlH Mu 

maximasque ah eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius 
et ratioiie adntinistrari ; neque inaiorem voluptatem 
ex infinito tempoiT aetatis pcrcipi posse qunm ex lioc 
percipiatur quod videamus esse fuiitum.' In disle- 
ctica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nee ad 
melius vivendum nee ad eommodius disserendum 
vim. In physicis plurimum posuit. Ea scientia et 
vertrorum vis et natura orationis et consequentium 
repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici ; omnium autein 
rerum natura cagnita levamur saperstitione.liberamur 
mortis metu, non conturbamur i^oratione rerum, e 
etiam morati melius erimus eum didicerimus quid 
natura desideret. Turn vero, si stabilera scientiam 
rerum tenebimus, aervata ilia quae quasi delapsa de 
caelo est ad cognitionem omnium regula, ad quam 
omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur, numquam ullius 
64 oratione vieti sententia desistemus. Nisi autem 
rerum natura perspecta erit, nuUo modo poterimus 
cia defendere. Quidquid porro animo 
omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes 
veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique po- 
terit aliquid cogiiosci et percipi. Quos qui tollunt 
et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ii remotis sensibus ne 

«Epicurus discarded the orliiodox Logic (cp. 9 ai), but 
ntUcked some of ils problems in the light of his Natural 
Philosaphy: e,g. denying necessity in Nature, be denied 
the Law of the Excluded Middle {Academica I. 97, and see 
W. M. L. Uulchinson, de Finibus a. 234). The 'criterion' or 
lest of truth he treated under the head of ■ Canonic ' (iciuib', 
ngula, a measuring -rod). Being based on his theory of 
sensation (§ zi), 'Canonic* was ranged under 'Physic' 
(Diogenes Laerlius, lO. 30). It made the senses infallible, 
and the sole source of knowledge; and it gave rules for 
testing the validity of inference from sensation, which are 
a crude adumbration of a Logic of Induction. 


lom and ^^H 

)uld be ^^M 

with by fortune : the great concerns of life, the 
that matter, are controlled by his own wisdom a 
. reason'; and that no greater pleasure could 
derived from a hfe of infinite duration than is acttially 
afforded by this existence which we know to be 
finite." Logic, on which your scliool lays such stress. Logic i» bwIbbi 
he held to be of no effect either as a guide to conduct based on «o» 
or as an aid to thought. Natural Philosophy he L^'cMontor' 
deemed all-important. Tliis science^ explains to us EJji^'^^^gJ 
the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and »s removing tbi 
the law of consistency and contradiction ; secondly, happiness, 
a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves 
us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of 
death, and shields us against tlie disturbing effects 
of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of 
terrifying apprehensions ; lastly, to learn what na- 
ture's real requirements are improves the mond 
character also. Besides, it is only by 6rmly grasping 
a well-established scientific system, observing tlie 
Rule or Canon that has fallen as it were from heaven 
to afford us a knowledge of the universe — only by 
making that Canon the test of all our judgments, that 
we can hope alwaj's to stand fast in our belief, un- 
fit shaken by the eloquence of any man. On the other 
hand, without a full understanding of the world of 
nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our 
sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presenta- 
tion has its origin in sensation ; so that no knowledge 
or perception is possible, unless all sensations are 
true, as the theory of Epicurus teaches that they 

S Those who deny the validity of sensation and 
that nothing can be perceived, having excluded 
f! 67 

id ipsum quidem expedire possunt quod disserunt. 
Praeterea sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur om- 
nis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum. " 
Sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitui' contra mortis 
timorem et constantia contra metiim religionis et 
sedatjo animi, omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione 
Kublata, et moderatio, natura cupiditatum generi- 
busque earum explicatis, et, ut modo docai, cogni- 
tionis regula et ludicio ab eodein illo constitute veri 
a falso distinctio traditur. 

6.'> XX. Restat locus huic disputationi vel n 
necessarius, de amicitia, quam sj volupta^ 
sit bonum alfirmatis nuUam omnino fore; de qua 
Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum quas ad 
beate vivenduni sapientia coraparaverit niliit esse 
maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. Nee 
• vero hoc oratioiie solum sed multo magis vita et 
factis et moribus comprobavit. Quod quam magnum 
sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tarn 
multis tamque variis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, 
tria viK amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem 
pervenias profectus a Theseo. At vero Epicurus una 
in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quun- 
taque amoris conspiratione consenlientes tenuit ami- 
corum greges! qtiod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. 
Sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non ne- 

66 cesse est. Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris 
de amicitia disputatum. Alii, cum eas voluptates 

HOOK I. xix-KX 
the evidence of tlie senses, are iiiiabli? even to ex- 
pound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing 
knowledge and science the; alralish all possibility of 
rational life and action. Tims Natural Philosophy 
supplies courage to face the fear of death ; resolution 
to resist the terrors of religion ; peace of mind, for 
it removes all ignorance of the mysteries of nature; 
self-control, for it explains llie nature of the desires 
and distiDguishes their diiferent kinds ; and, as 
I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Know- 
ledge, which Epicunis also establishedjgives a method 
of discerning truth from falsehood. 

55 XX. "There remains a topic that is pre-eminently Friends^ 
germane to this discussion, I mean the subject of imoiki i 
Friendship, Your school maintains that if pleasure b£I^o[ 
be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist, uiiitiy 
Now Epicuriis's pronouncement about iriendship is 
that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has 
devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none 
more delightful than this. Nor did he only com- 
mend this doctrine by his eloquence, hut far more ■ 
by the example of his life and conduct. How great a 
thing such friendship is, is shown by the mythical 
stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the re- 
motest ages, and, copious and varied as they are, you 
will barely find in them three paii-s of friends, beginning 
witli Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus 
in a single house and that a small one maintained a 
whole company of friends, united by the closest 
sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the 
Epicurean school. But to return to our subject, for 

36 there is no need of personal instances : I notice Three 
that the topic of friendship has been treated by ^""'' 
Epicureans in three ways, (l) Some have denied 


quae ad amieos pertinerent negarent ease per se ip- 
sa3 tain ex]ietendas quam nostras expeteremus, quo 
loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, 
tucntur tameii eum locum seque facile, ut milii vide- 
tur, expedinnt. Ut enini virtotes, de quibus ante 
dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate 
discedere. Nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis 
insidiamm et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet ami- 
citias comparare, quibus partis conlirmatur animus et 
a spe pariendaruiij voluptalum seiungi non potest. 

fi7 Atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur 
voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelis- 
simae sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam 
amicis quam sibi ; quibus non solum praesentibus 
fruuntur sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac po- 
ster! temporis. Quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia 
firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere pos- 
sumus neque vera ipsam amicitiam tucri nisi aeque 
amieos et nosmet ipsosdiI{gamu£,tdcircD et hoc ipsum 
eflicitur in amicitia etamicitia cum voluptate connecti- 
tur. Nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque 

68 nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. Quocirca eodem 
modo sapiens eritaffectusergaamieum quoin seipsum, 
quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, 
eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. Quae- 
que de virtutibus dicta sunt, queraadmodum eae 
semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia 
dicenda stmt. Praectare enim Epicurus Ills paene ver- 
bis: Eadem,' inquit, sententia conlirmavit a 
ne quod aut seroipitemum aut diuturnum timeret n 

^^Rat I 


»t pleasures affecting our friends are in them- 
selves to be desired b; us in tlie sflnie degree as we 
desire our own pleasures. 'Ihis doctrine is thought 
by some critics to undermine the foundations of friend- 
ship; however, its supporters defend their position, 
and in my opinion have no difficulty in making good 
their case. They argue that friendship can no more 
be sundered from pleasure than can the virtues, 
which we have discussed already. A solitary, friend- 
less hfe must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. 
Hence reason itself advises tJie acquisition of 
friends; their possession gives confidence, and a 

67 firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just 
as hatred, jealousy and contempt are hindrances to 
pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy pre- 
server and also creator of pleasure alike for our 
friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment 
ill the present, and it inspires us with hopes for the 
near and distant future. Thus it is not possible to 
secure uninterrupted gratification in life without 
friendship, nor yet to preseire friendship itself un- 
less we love our friends as much as ourselves. Hence 
this unselfishneBS does oecur in friendship, while also 
friendship is closely linked with pleasure. For we 
rejoice in our friends' joy as much as in our own, 

8 and are equally pained by their sorrows. Therefore 
the Wise Man will feel exactly the same towards his 
friend as he does towards himself, and will exert 
himself as much for his friend's pleasure as he would 
for his own. All that has been said about the essen- 
tial connexion of the virtues with pleasure must be 
repeated about friendship. Epicurus well said (I 
give almost his exact words): 'The same creed that 
has given us courage to overcome all fear of ever- 




.nnoij quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae 

9 praesidium esse firmissimum.' Sunt autem quidam 
Epicurei timidiores pauIo contra vestra conviria sed 
tamen satis acutij qui verentur ne, si amicitjam pro- 
pter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota 
amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primes 
congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum insti- 
tuendarum vo!untates fieri propter voluptatenij cum 
autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, turn 
araorem efflorescere tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit 
utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos 
amentur. Etenim si loca, si faua, si urbes, si gym- 
nasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra exer- 
cendi aut venandi, consuetudine adamare snieiaus, 
quanto id in hominiim consuetudine facilius fieri 

3 poterit' et iustius? Sunt autem qui dicant foedus 
esse quoddam sapientimn ut ne mitms amicos quam 
se ipsos diligant. Quod et posse fieri intellegimus 
et saepe evenire^ videmus, et perspiciium est nihil ad 
iucuiide vivendumreperiri posse quod coniuiictione tali 
sit aptius. 

Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non 
impediri rationem aniicitiae si suramum bononi in 
voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino 
amicitiae non posse reperiri. 

I XXI. Quapropter si ea quae dixi sole ipso illu- 
striora et clariora sunt, si omnia liausta^ e fonte 
naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem 


n Md' 

vilh MSS. 
dixi bracketed by Mdv. 


BOOK I. xx-xxi 
lasting or long-enduring evil hereafter, has discerned 

fig that friendship is our strongest safeguard in this 
present term of life.' — (2)Other Epicureans though by 
no means lacking in insight are a little less courage- 
ous in defying the opprobrious criticisms of the 
Academy. They fear that if we hold friendship to 
be desirable only for the pleasure that it affords to 
ourselves, it will be thought that it is crippled alto- 
gether. They therefore say that the first advances 
and overtures, and the original inclination to form an 
attachment, are prompted by the desire for pleasure, 
but that when the progress of intercourse has led to 
intimacy, the relationship blossoms into an affection 
strong enough to make ns love our friends for their 
own sake, even though no practical advantage accrues 
from their friendship. Does not familiarity endear to 
us localities, temples, cities, gymnasia and playing- 
pounds, horses and hounds, games and field-sports? 
Then how much more natural and reasonable that it 
should have the same result in the case of our inter- 

70 course with our fellow-men !^3) The third view is 
that wise men have made a sort of compact to love 
their friends no less than themselves. We can under- 
stand the possibility of this, and indeed we often see 
it happen. Clearly no more effective means to happi- 
ness could be found than such an alliance. 

All these considerations go to prove not only that 
the rationale of friendship is not impaired by the 
identification of the Chief Good with pleasure, but 
also that without this no foundation for friendsliip 
whatsoever can be found. 

n XXI. If then the theory I have set forth is Pcton 

clearer and more luminous than daylight itself; ifgreaiVai^vt 
it is derived entirely from Nature's source; if my manwnii. 

sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris 
testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiac paene 
loquuntur, magistra nc duce nature, nihil esse pro- 
sperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperuin nisi dolorem, 
de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupts, 
nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus qui hac 
exaudita quasi voce naturae sie earn firrae graviterque 
comprehenderit ut omnes bene sanos in viain placa- 
tae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceretf 
Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est 
quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit nisi quae beatae 
72 vitae disciplinam iuvaret. An ille tempus aut in 
poetis evolvMidis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore 
facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas 
omnisque puerilis est deltctatio, aut se, ut Plato, in 
musicia, geometria, numeris, astris contereret, quae 
et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt et si 
essent vera nihil afferrent quo iucundius, id est quo 
melius viveremus ; — eas ergo artes persequeretur, 
Vivendi artem tantam tamque operosum et perinde 
fructuosam relinqueret? Non ergo Epicurus ineru- 
ditus, sed ii indocti qui quae pueros non didicisse 
turpe est ea putant usque ad senectuteni esse di- 
scenda." Quae cum dixisset, ExpHcavi," inquit, 
sententiam meam et eo quidem consilio, tuum 
iudicium ut cognoscerem, quae mihi facultas, ut id 
> arbitratu facerera, ante hoc tempos numquam 

est data." 


BOOK I. xxi 

whole discourse relies throughout for confirmation 
on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the 
senses; if lisping infants^ nay even dumb animals^ 
prompted by Nature's teaching, almost find voice to 
proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no 
hardship but pain — and their judgment in these 
matters is neither sophisticated nor biased — ought 
we not to feel the -greatest gratitude to him who 
listened to this utterance of Nature's voice, and 
grasped its import so firmly and so fully that he has 
guided all sane-minded men into the paths of peace 
and happiness, calmness and repose? You are 
pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is 
that he refused to consider any education worth the 
name that did not help to school us in happiness. 
72 Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius 
and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing 
solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? 
Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and 
geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting 
from false premises cannot be true, and which more- 
over if they were true would contribute nothing to 
• make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? 
Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect 
the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so 
fruitful, the art of living? No! Epicurus was not 
uneducated : the real philistines are those who ask 
us to go on studying till old age the subjects that 
we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in 
boyhood/' Thus concluding, he added: I have 
explained my own view, but solely with the object 
of learning what your verdict is. I have never 
hitherto had a satisfactory opportunity of hearing 







1 I. Hie cum uter^uiiejiie intueretur sesegue ad audi- 
endum significarent paratos^ Primum/* inquam^ 

deprecor ne me ta mquam philosophum putetis 
seholam vobis aliquam explieaturum^ quod ne in ipsis 
quidem philosophis magno opere umquam probavi. 
Quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure 
dici potest, quidquam tale fecit? Eorum erat iste 
mos qui turn sophistae nominabantur ; quorum e 
numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in con- 
ventu poscere quaestionem,' id est iubere dicere 
qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium, dice- 
rem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum 

2 ad nostros philosophos esset. Sed et ilium quem no- 
minavi et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi 
potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando 
atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones 
quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea quae ii respondissent 
si quid videretur diceret. Qui mos cum a posteriori- 
bus non esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit insti- 
tuitque ut ii qui se audire vellent non de se quaere- 
rent sed ipsi dicerent quid sentirent; quod cum 
dixissent, ille contra. Sed eum qui audiebant quoad , 

poterant defend ebant sententiam suam ; apud ceteros 

78 ^^ 



. Upon this they both looked at me, and signified Rnfutiii 
ir readiness to hearme. Sol began: "First of all, I ^^ c^ 
5 of you not to imagine tliat I am going to deliver «plying 
you a formal lecture, like a professional philosopher, piopoies 
That is a procedure which even in the case of philo- l^'JJ 
sophers I have never very much approved, Socrates, mc 
who is entitled to be styled the father of philosophy, 
never did anything of the sort. It was the method of 
his contemporaries the Sophists, as they were called. 
It was one of the Sophists, Gurgias of Leontini, who 
first ventured in an assembly to invite a question,' 
that is, to ask anyone to state what subject he desired 
to hear discussed. A bold undertaking, indeed, I 
should call it a piece of effrontery, had not this cus- 
2 torn later on passed over into our own school. But 
we see that Socrates made fun of the aforesaid 
Gorgias and the rest of the Sophists also, as we 
can learn from Plato. His own way was to ques- 
tion liis interlocutors and by a process of cross- 
examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might 
express his own views by way of r^oinder to their 
answers. This practice was abandoned by liis suc- 
cessors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who 
made it a rule that those who wished to hear him 
should not him questions but should state their 
own opinions ; and when they liad done so he argued 
against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did 

r defend their own position, with the rest of 
hers the student who has put a question 

autem pliilosophos qui quaesivit aliquid tacet; quod 
(jiiidein iam fit etiani in Aeadeniin. I Ubi enim is qui 
audire viilt ita dixit; Voluptas niihi videtur esse 
summuni bonuni," perpetua oratione contra disputa- 
tur, ut facile intellegi possit eos qui aliquid sibi videri 
dicant non ipsos in ea sententia esse sed audire velle 

3 contraria. Noa commodius agimus. Non enim 
solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret sed ctiam cur. 
Ego autem arbitror, quaniquam admodum delectatus 
sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum 
in rebus singulis insistas et intellegaa quid quisque 
concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi 
quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. Cum enim fertur 
quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa euiusquemodi 
rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil reprehendas,^ nus- 
quam oration em rapidam coerceas. 

Omnis autem in quaerendo quae via quadam et 
ratione liahetur oratio praeseribere primum debet, ut 
quibusdam in formulis: ea aea aqetub, ut inter quos 
disseritur conveniat quid sit id de quo disseratur. 

i II. Hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone proliavit Epi- 
curus sensitque in omni disputatione id fieri oportere. 
Sed quod proximum fuit non vidit. Negat enim 
definiri rem placere, sine quo fieri interdum non 

' reprekendas Mdv. with B ; Other MSS. apprekendas. 
^Phaedrus 237 B. 

BOOK II. i-ii 

is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays tlie cus- 
tom ill the Academy too. The would-lM; learner says, 
for example, The Cliief Good in my opinion is 
pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a 
formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that 
those who say they are of a certain opinion do not 
actually hold the Tiew they profess, but want to hear 

3 what ean be argued against it. We are adopting a 
more profitable mode of procedure, for Torquatus has 
not only told us his own opinion but also 
for holding it. Still, for my part, though 1 enjoyed his. 
long discourse very mucli, I believe all the same that 
it is better to stop at point after point, and make out 
what each person is willing to admit and what he 
denies, and then to draw such inferences as one 
desires from these admissions and so arr 
conclusion. When the exposition goes rushing on 
like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along 
with it a vast amount of miscellaneous material, but 
there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from 
the flood; there is no point at which one can stem 
the torrent of oratory. 

However, in philosophical investigation a metho- Epicuio*, neg- 
dical and systematic discourse must always begin by [^Jf^oMimmdei 
formulating a preamble like that which occurs in '>" ""'E^,^ 
certain forms of process at law, 'This shall be the ■pleasure'; 
point at issue'; so that the parties to the debate 
may be agreed as to what the subject is about which 

!■ they are debating. II. This rule is laid down by 
Plato in the Phaednis," and it was approved by 
Epicurus, who realized that it ought to be followed 
in every discussion. But he failed to see what this 
involved. For he says that he does not hold with 
giving a definition of the thing in question; yet 
□ 81 

potest ut inter eos qui ambigunt conveniat quid 
id de quo agatur; velut in hoc ipso de quo nunc di^ 
putamus. Quaerimus enim finem bonorum; possUI 

sne hoc scire quale sit, nisi contulerimus inter 
D fmem bonorum djxeriinus, quid finis, quid etif 
1-5 sit ipsum bonum ? Atqui haec patefactio quasi rcrum 
opertarum, cum quid quidque sit aperitur, definitio 
£st; qua tu etiani imprudens utebare nonnuiuquaiu. 
Nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive estremum sive ulti- 
m definiebas id esse quo omnia quae recte fierent 
referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur. Prae- 
clare hoc quidem. Bunum ipsum etiam quid esset 
fortasse si opus fuisset definisses aut quod esset natura 
appetendum, aut quod prodesset, aut quod iuvaret, 
aut quod liberet modo. Nunc idem, nisi molestuni 
est, quoniam tibi non onmino displicet definire et id 
s cum vis, vetim definias quid sit voluptas, de quo 
iiis haec quaestio est." Quis, quaeso," inquit, 
est qui quid sit voluptas uesciat aut qui quo magis 
intellegat definitionem aliquanj desideret?" Me 
ipsum esse dicerem," inquam, "nisi mihi videref^ 
habere bene cognitam voluptatcm et satis ill 
ceptam animo atque comprensam. Nunc autem dii 
ipsum Epicurum nescire et in eo nutare, eumque qui 
crebro dicat diligenter oportere exprimi quae *is 




without this it is sometimes impossible for the dis- 
putants to agree what the subject under discussion 
is ; as, for esample, in the case of the very question 
we are now debating. We are trying to discover the 
End of Goods ; but how can we possibly know what the 
nature of this is, without comparing notes as to what 
we mean, in the phrase ' End of Goods,' by the term 

5 End' and also by the term Gcwid' itself? Now this 
process of disclosiiig latent meiuiuigs, of revealing 
what a particular thing is, is the process of definition ; 
and you yourself now and then unconsciously em- 
ployed it. For you repeatedly defined this very 
conception of the End or final or ultimate aim as 

that to which all right actions are a means while it 
is not itself a means to anything else.' Excellent so 
far. Very likely had occasion arisen you would 
have defined the Good itself, either as the naturally 
desirable,' or the beneficial,' or the delightful,' or 
just that whicli we like.' Well then, if you don't 
mind, as you do not entirely disapprove of definition, 
and indeed practise it when it suits your purpose, I 
should be glad if you would now define pleasure, the 
thing which is the subject of the whole of our pre- 

6 sent inquiry." Dear me," cried Torquatus, 'who 
is there who does not know what pleasure is ? Who 
needs a definition to assist him to understand 
it?" I should say that 1 myself was such a per- 
son," I replied, "did I not beUeve that as a matter 
of fact 1 do fully understand the nature of pleasure, 
and possess a well-founded conception and compre- 
hension of it. As it is, I venture to assert that 
Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is, 
but is in two minds about it. He is always harping 

isity of carefully sifting out the meaning 



subiecta sit vocibus, non intellegere interdunn quid 
sonet haec vox voluptiktis, id est quae res huic voci 

[11. Turn illeridens: Hoc vero," inquit, opti- 
m, ut is qui finein reruni expetendaruni volupta- 
tem esse dicat, id extremum, id ultimuin bonorum, 
id ipsum quid et quale sit nesciat!" Atqui," in- 
quauij aut Epicurus quid sit voluptaR aut omnes 
mortales qui ubique sunt neseiunt." ''Quonam,'' 
inquit, modo?" Quia voluptatem banc esse sen- 
tiunt onuies quam sensus accipiens movetur ct iucun- 
7 ditate quadam perfunditur." Quid ergo? istam 
voluptatem," inquit, Epicurus ignorat?" Non 
semper," inquam ; nam interdum nimis etiam 
novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem 
se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter 
illud quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et 
obsceiia voluptate capiatur. An haec ab eo non di- 
cuntur?" Quasi vero me pudeat," inquit, isto- 
n aut non possim quemadmodum ea dicantur 
ostendere!" 'Ego vero nondubito," inquam, quin 
facile possis, nee est quod te pudeat sapienti assentiri 
qui se unus. quod sciam, sapientem proUteri sit ausus. 
m Metrudonim non puto ipsum professum, sed, 
n appellarctur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum bene- 


Liid yet he occa- ^^^| 
is the import of ^^H 

s the tiling that ^^| 

underlying the terms we employ, i 
sionally fails to understand whiit 
the word 'pleasure/ that is, what ; 
underlies the word." 

III. I'orquatus laughed. Come, that is a good vEi. pleasure 
joke," he said, ' that the author of the doctrine «n'^'an^i'ab^ 
that pleasure is the End of things desirable, the '«"«of P^in. 
final and ultimate Good, should actually not know distinci [lom' 
what maimer of thing pleasure itself is ! " " Well," P'='^'"=- 
I replied, either Epicurus does not know what 
pleasure is, or the rest of mankind all the world o' 
do not." How 80?" he asked. Because the 
universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation 
actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffus- 
7 ing over it a certain agreea.ble feeling." Wliat 
then?" he replied; does not Epicurus recognixe 
pleasure in your sense?" ' Not always," said I; 
now and then, 1 admit, he is only too well ac- 
quainted with it ; for he solemnly avows that he 
cannot even understand what Good there can be or 
where it can be found, apart from that which is 
derived from food and drink, the delight of the ei 
and the grosser forms of gratification. Do I mis- 
represent his words ? " ' Just as if I were ashamed 
of all that," he cried, " or unable to explai 
in which it is spoken ! " " Oh," said I, " I haven't 
the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And 
you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the 
opinions of a Wise Man — who stands alone, so far 
as 1 am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself 
that title. For I do not suppose that MetrodoruG 
himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did 
not care to refuse the compliment wher 
was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the 


um noluisse; septem autem illi non suo sed popu- 
8 lorum suflragio omnium nominati sunt Venim hoc 
loco sumo verbis his eandem certe vim voluptatia 
Epicunim nosse quam ceteros. Omnes enim iucun- 
dum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece 7)Sov^v, 
Latine voluptatem vocant." "Quid est igitur," in- 
quitj quod requiras?" Dicam," iiiquam, etqui- 
dem discendi causa niagis quam quo te aut Epicunim 
repreasum velim." Ego qooque," inqoit, didi- 

im libentius si quid attuleris quam te reprende- 

I.'' Tenesne igitur," inquani, Hieronymus 
Rhodius quid dicat esse summum bonum, quo putet 

nia referri oportere?" Teneo," inquit, linem 
illi videri nihil dotere." Quid? idem iste," in- 
) quam, de voluptate quid sentit?" Negat esse 

ti," inquit, propter se expetendam." Aliud 
igitur esse ceiiset gaudere, aliud non dolere." Et 
quidem," inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo 
ante docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis 
amotio." Non dolere," inquam, "istud quam vim 
habeat postea videro ; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, 
aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pcrtinax fueris, con- 
3edas necesse est." Atqui reperies," inqnit, 
lioc quidetn pertinacem ; dici enim nihil potest 

ius." Estne, quaeso," inquam, sitienti 



Seven Wise Meii of old received their appellation 
not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrages 
fi of mankind. StiU, for the present 1 take it for 
granted that in the utterance in question Epicurus 
undoubtedly recognizes the same meaning of plea> 
sure' as everybody else. Every one uses the Greek 
word kedonr and the Latin votiiptas to mean an agree- 
able and exhilarating stimulation of the sense." 

Well then," he asked, what more do you want f " 

I will tell you," I said, though more for the sake 
of ascertaining the truth than from any desire to 
criticize yourself or Epicurus." I also," he replied, 

would much rather learn aiij^hing you may have 
to contribute, than criticize your views," Do you 
remember, then," I said, what Hieronymus of 
Rhodes pronounces to be the Chief Good, tlie stan- 
dard as he conceives it to which all other things 
should be referred ? " I remember," said he, that 
he considers the End to be freedom from pain," 

Well," said I, what is the same philosopher's 
9 view about pleasure ? " He thinks that pleasure 
is not desirable in itself." Then in his opinion to 
feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling 
pain ? " Yes," he said, and there he is seriously 
mistaken, since, as 1 have just shown, the complete 
removal of pain is the limit of the increase of 
pleasure." " Oh," I said, as for the formula 

freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning 
later on ; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate 
you are bound to admit that freedom from pain ' 
does not mean the same as 'pleasure.'" "Well, 
but on this point you will find me obstinate," said 
he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." 
" ftay," said I, " when a man is thirsty, is there any 

bendo voluptas ? " Quis istud possit," inqiiit, 
negnre ? ' ' Eademne quae restincta siti ? ' ' Immo 
alio genere. Restincta enim sitis stabilitatem 
voluptatis liabet, ilia autem voluptas ipsius restin- 
ctionis ill niotu est," "Cur igitur," inquani, res 

10 taiii dissimiles eodem nomine appellas?" Quid 
paulo ante," inquit, dixerim nonne meministij cum 
omnis dolor detraetus esset, variitri, non augeri volu- 
ptatem ? " Memini vero," inquam ; scd tu istuc 
dixti bene Latin e, parum plane. Van etas enim 
Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in dis- 
paribus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertiir in multa 
dlsporia : varium poenia, varia oratio, varii mores, 
varia fortunn, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, rum 
percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimiles efE- 
cientibus voiuptates. Earn si varietatem diceres, iu- 
tellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intelleffo ; ista 
varietas quae sit non satis perspioio, quod uis cum 
dolore careamus turn in summa voluptate nos esse, 
cum autem vescamur lis rebus quae dulcem motum 
afferant sensibus, tarn esse in motu voluptatem, quae^ 
facial varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illara 
non dolendi voluptatem, quara cur voluptatem ap- 
pelles nescio." 

1 1 IV. An potest," inquit ille,' "quidquam esse 


BOOK II. iii-iv 
pltasnre in the act of drinking ? " " That is unde- 
niable," he answered. ' Is it the same pleasure as 
the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst ? " 
"No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the 
pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a stainc ' 
pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is 
a kinetic' pleasure." Why then," 1 asked, do 
you call two such different things by the same 
) name?" Do you not remember." he replied, 

' what I said just now, that when all pain has been 
removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be 
increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I remember," 
said I ; but though your language was quite correct 
in form, your meaning was far from clear. Varia- 
tion ' is a good Latin term ; we use it strictly of 
different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to 
a number of things that differ : we speak of a varied 
poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied 
fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when 
it is derived from a number of unlike things pro- 
ducing milike feelings of pleasure. If this were the 
variation you spoke of, I could understand the term, 
just as I understand it even without your speaking 
of it. But I cannot quite grasp what you mean by 

variation' when you say that when we are free from 
pain we experience tlic highest pleasure, and that 
when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant 
activity of the senses, we then experience an active 
or kinetic ' pleasure that causes a variation of our 
pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former 
pleasure that consists in absence of pain — although 
why you should call this pleasure' I cannot make 

1 IV. "Well," he asked, "can anything be more 


s quam nihil dolere?" Immo sit sane nihil 
melius," inquam, "(nondum enim id qnaero), nuiupro- 
pterea idem voluptas est quod, ut ita dicam, indolen- 
tia?" Plane idem," inquit, et maxima quidem, 
qua fieri nulla maior potest." Quid dubitas igitur," 
iiiquam, summo bono a te ita constitute ut id totum 
in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id 
12 defendere? Quid enim necesse est, 'tamquam 
meretricem in matronanim coetum, sic voluptatem 
in virtutum concilium adducere? Invidiosuni nomen 
est, infame, suspectum. Itaque hoc frequenter dici 
solet a vobis, non inteiiegere nos quam dicat Epicurus 
voluptatem. Quod quidem mihi si quando dictum 
est (est autem dictum non parum saepe), etsi satis 
clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo 
subirasci. Egone non intellego, quid sit I'lSoinj 
Graece, Latine 'voluptas'? utram tandem linguam 
nescio^ Deinde qui fit, ut ego nesciam, seiant 
omnes quicumqtie Epicurei esse voluerint ? Quod 
vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse 
eum qui futurus sit philosophus scire litteras. Itaque 
ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt^ Cincinnatum 
ilium ut dictator esset, sic vos de pagis omnibus 
colligitis bonos iilos quidem viros sed certe t 


. BOOK !I. iv 
pleasant than freedom from pain ?" Still," I Thfreiii» 
replied, ' granting there is nothing better (that I[^d«iSndir 
point 1 waive for tlie moment), surely it does not ^JopyJ 
therefore follow that what I may call the negation ^raMUi"^ b) 
of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" "Absolutely ,'"J^^"'", 
the same," said lie, indeed the negation of pain is 
a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure 
possible," If then," said I, according to your 
account the Chief Good consists entirely in feeling 
no pain, why do you not keep to this without waver- 
ing? Wily do you not fiimly maintain this concep- 
12 tion of the Good and no other? What need is there 
to introduce so aliandoned a character as Mistress 
Pleasure into the company of those respectable ladies 
the Virtues? Her veiy name is suspeet, and lies 
under a cloud of disrepute — so mtfth so that you 
Epicureans are fond of telling us that we do not 
understand what Epicurus njeans by pleasure. 1 
am a reasonably good-tempered disputant, but for 
my own part when I hear this assertion (and I 
have encountered it fairly often), I am sometimes 
inclined to be a little irritated. Do I not understand 
the meaning of the Greek word kedone, the Latin 
voluplas? Pray which of these two languages is 
it that I am not acquainted with ? Moreover how 
comes it that 1 do not know what the word means, 
while all and sundry who have elected to be Epicu- 
reans do? As for that, your sect argues very 
plausibly that there is no need for the aspirant to 
philosophy to be a scholar at all. And you are as 
good as your word. Our ancestors brought old Cin- 
cinnatu.s from tlie plough to be dicbitor. You ran- 
sack the country villages for your assemblage of 
doubtless respectable but certainly not very learned 

1 8 eruditos. Ergo illi intellegunt quid Epicurus dicnt, 
egonon intellego? Ut sciasme intellegere, primum 
idem esse dico ' voluptatem/ quod ille -qSovi'iv. Et 
quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco 
et quod idem valeat ; hie nihil fuit quod quaereremiis. 
Nullum iiiveniri verbum potest quod magis idem 
declarct Latine quod Ciraeccj quam declarat vo1u- 
ptas.' Huic verbo omnes qui ubique sunt qui Latine 
Gciunt duas res subiciunt, laetitiani in animo, coiu- 
motionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore. Nam et 
ille apud Trabeam 'voluptatem anirai nimiam' lae- 
titiam dicit, eandem quam ille Caecilianus quia omni- 
bus laetitiis laetum ' esse se narrat. Sed hoc interest, 
quod voluptas ' dicitur etiam in animo (vitiosa res, ut 
Stoici putant, qui earn sic definiunt : sublationem 
animi sine ratione opinnntis se magno bono frui'), 
i non dicitur laetitia' nee 'gaudium' in corpore. In 
eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more 
ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem 
moveat iucunditas. Haiic quoque iucunditatem,' 
si vis, transfer in animum ('iuvare' enim in utroque 
dicitur ex eoque iucundum'), modo intellegas inter 
ilium qui dicat 

Tanta laetitia auctus sum ut nihil constet," 

'esse Mdv. bracketa, but cp. II 77, 

'ul nihil nms/tl . 

Ill : 

inf. MSS. ui mthi non n 

9. I (where he also refers to th 
Caecilius Slatlu^i): it appears to II 

4. 35 and ad Fam. », 

lowing phrase from 
run ■ effo voluplalL-m 


BOOK 11. iv 

IS adherents. Well, if these gentlemen can under- 
stand what Epicurus means, eaniiot If I will prove 
to you that I do. In the first place, I mean the 
same by pleasure ' as he does by kedaiie. One often 
has some trouble to discover a Latin word that shall 
be the precise equivalent of a Greek one ; but in 
this case no search was necessary. No instance can 
be found of a Latin word that more exactly con- 
veys the same meaning as the corresponding Greek 
word than does the word voliiplas. Every person in 
the world who knows Latin attaches to this word 
two ideas — that of gladness of mind, and that of a 
deliglitftil excitation of agreeable feeling in the 
body. On the one hand there is the character in 
Trabea who speaks of «tcesaive pleasure of the 
mind,'" meaning gladness, the same feeling as is in- 
tended by the person in Caecilius who describes him- 
self as being glad with every sort of gladness.' But 
there is this difference, that the word pleasure' can 
denote a mental as well as a bodily feeling (the 
former a vicious emotion, iu the opinion of the Stoics, 
whodefineitas elationof the mind under an irrational 
conviction that it is eiyoying some great good'), 
whereas joy' and gladness' are not used of bodily 

1 4 sensation. However pleasure according to the 
usage of all who speak good Latin consists in the 
enjoyment of a delightful stimulation of one of the 
senses. The term delight" also you may apply if 
you like to the mind ('to delight' is said of both 
mind and body, and from it the adjective delight- 
ful ' is derived), so long as you understand that 
between the man who says 

LSo full am I of gladness 
That I am all confusion. 


et e 

Nunc denium mihi animus a; 
quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, 
esse ilium medium : 

Quamquani haec inter nos nuper iiotitia admodum est, 
qui nee laeteturnecangatur; itenique inter eum qui 
potiatur corporis eitpetitis voluplatibus et eum qui 
excrucietur sumiais doloribus esse eum qui utroque 

> V. Satiane igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an 
sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine doceu- 
dus? Et tanien vide iie, si ego non intellegam quid 
Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece ut videor luculenter 
sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius qui ita loquatur ut non 
intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprensione 
fitj si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, cogno- 
mento qui irKintiyoi perhibetur,' quia de natura 
aimis obscure menioravit," aut cum renmi obscuritas, 
non verborum, facit ul non intellegatur oratio, qualis 
est ill Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, 
nee non vult si possit plane et aperte loqui, nee de 
re obseura, ut pliysiei, aut artificiosa, ut mathemattci, 
sed de illustri et taeili et iam in vulgus pervagata 
loquitur. Quumquam non negatis nos intellegere 
quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat; e quo efiic-itur 

"The first quQlalion is from an unknown comic wriler; 
(he second from CaeciUus Slalius, who makes a 'heavy 
I'alher' say ' Nunc enim dcmum mihi animus ardel, nunc 
meum cor ciimulaltir ira ' (quoted in full by Cicero fire Cnel. 
37)j Ihe third is from Terence. Heariloalim.,]. i, c(. IS3 
above : Chremes' mild interest in his new neighbour, Ihe 
Self-Tonnentor, is rather oddly instanced asan illustration 
of the neutral slate of emotion intermediate between mental 


1" The que 

is possibly from Luc 

■^ BOOK II. iv-v 

and liim who says 

Now, now my soul with anger burns, 
one of whom is transported witli gladness and the 
other tormented with painful emotion, there is the 
intermediate state : 

Though our acquaintances! lip is but quite recent," 
where the speaker feels neither gladness nor sor- 
row ; and that similarly between tlie enjoyment of 
the most desirable bodily pleasures and the endurance 
of the most excruciating pains there is the neutral 
state devoid of either. 

j V. "VVell.areyousatisfiedthatlhavegraspedthe 
meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in 
the use of either Greek or Latin ? And even supposing 
that 1 do not understand what Epicurus says, still I 
believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, 
so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such 
unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on 
two grounds : it may be deliberately adopted, as in 
the case of Heraclitus, 

^^ The surname of the Obscure who bore, 

^K So dark his philosophic lore , 

■W the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of 
the subject and not of the style — an instance of 
this is Plato's Timaeui. But Epicurus, in my opinion, 
has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly 
if he can, nor is He discussing a recondite subject 
like natural pliilosophy, nor a technical subject such 
as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one 
that is generally familiar already. And yet you 
Epicureans do not deny that we understand what 
pleasure t'*, but what he means by it; which proves 


not! ut nos noil iiitellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, 
sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum ncglegat. 

1 6 Si enim idem dicit quod Hieronymus, qui censet 
summum bonum esse sine uHa molestia vivere, cur 
mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitutem dotoris, 
ut ille fjicit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem 
voluptatem putat adiungeiidam earn quae sit in motu 
(sic enim appellat banc dulcein, iu motu,' illam 
nihil dolentis, 'in stabilitate Oi quid tendit? cum 
efflcere non possit ut cuiquam qui ipse sibi notus sit, 
hoc est qui suam naturam secisumque perspeserit, 
vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. Hoc 
est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex 
aniniis cognitiones verborum quibus imbuti sumus. 
Quis est enim qui non videat haec esse in natura 
rerum tria? unum cum in voluptate sumus, alterum 
cum in dolore, tertium hoc in quo nunc equidem 
sum, credo item vos, nee in dolore nee in voluptate ; 
ut in voluptate sit qui epuletur, in dolore qui tor- 
queatur: tu autem uiter haec tantam multitudi- 
nem hominum interiectam non vides nee laetantium 

17 nee dolentium?" Non prorsus," inquit, omnesque 
qui sine dolore sint in voluptate, et ea quidem sum- 
ma, esse dico." " Ergo in eadem voluptate eum qui 

BOOK ir. V 

not that we do not understand the real meaning of 
the word, but thut Epicurus is speaking an idiom of 

1 6 his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. For if Abseooo o/ p»i 
he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that «/le bdh«en 
the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, pi"»suro md 
why does he insist on using tlie term pleasure, and 

not ratlier freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, 

who understands his own meaning ? Whereas if his 
view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure 
(for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling 
it 'kinetic' iu contrast with the pleasure of freedom 
from pain, which is static ' pleasure), what is he 
really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince 
any person who knows Aimse(/'^— anyone who has 
studied his own nature and sensations — that freedom 
from pain is the same thing as pleasure. To identify 
them, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses ; it 
is uprooting from our minds the knowledge of the 
meaning of words imbedded in them. Who is not 
aware that the world of experience contains these 
three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of 
pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, 
which is my own condition and doubtless also yours 
at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure 
^^^jid pain f Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating I 
^^^ good dinner, pain that of one being broken c 
^^■lie rack ; but do you really not see that inter- I 
^Htoediate between tliose two extremes lies a vast ] 
multitude of persons who are feeling neitlier gratifi' , 

17 cation nor pain?" "l certainly do not," said he ; 
" I maintain that all who are without pain are 
enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest 

Kof pleasure." "Then you think that a man 
, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for 


alteri misceat mulsum ipse non sitiens, et eum qui 
illud sitiens bibjif?" 

VI. Turn ille : Fiiiem, liiquit, interrogandi, si 
videtur; quod quidem ego a. priiicipio ita me malle 
dixeram, lioc ipsum providens, dialecticas captiones." 

Rhetorice igitur," inquam, nos mavis quam diale- 
etice disputare?" "Quasi vero," inquit, perpetua 
oratio rhetoruni solum, non etiam philosophorum sit." 

Zenonis est," iiiquum, hoe Stolci; omnem vim 
loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam 
esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni 
similem essediecbat, quod latius loquerentur rhelorea, 
dialectici autem conipressius. Obsequar igitur voliin- 
tati tuae dicamque si potero rhetorice, sed hac rhe- 
torica philosophorum, non nostra ilia forensi, quam 
necesse est, eum popuhiriter loquatur, esse iiiterdum 
i paulo hebetiorem. Sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, 
contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et 
perspieiendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et 
iudicandi quale quidque sit et ratione ac via dispu- 
tandi, ruit iji dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nefifl 
eu quae docere vult ulla arte distinguit; ut liaec ipsa ' 
quae modo loquebamm*. Summum a vobis bonum 
voluptas dicitur. Aperiendum est igitur quid sit 




IlPther, feels the same pleasure as the tlursty man 
bo drinks it?" 
' VI. At this Torqiiatus exclaimed ; A truce to ques- Torsnaius 
bn and answer, if you do not tnind. I told you iher qusti 
from the beginning that I preferred continuous eJ^t'^M'S 
speeches. I foresaw exactly what would happen; I 
knew we should come to logic-chopping and quib- 
bling." Then," said I, would you sooner we 
adopted the rhetorical and not the dialectical mode 
of debate?" "Why," he cried, "just as if continuous 
discourse were proper for orators only, and not for 
philosophers as well!" That is the view of Zeno 
the Stoic," I rejoined ; he used to say that the 
faculty of speech in general falls into two depart- 
ments, as Aristotle had already laid down; and that 
Rhetoric was like the palm of the hand, Dialectic 
like the closed fist; because rhetoricians employ an 

Bpansive style, and dialecticians one that is more 
mpressed. So I will defer to your wish, and will 
eak if I can in the rhetorical manner, but with the 
etoric of the philosophers, not with the sort which 
we use in the law-courts. The latter being addressed 
tothe public ear must necessarily sometimes beahttle 
18 lacking in subtlety. Epicurus however, Torquatus, Epicunaiho 
in his contempt for dialectic, which comprises at once j^flnd'oii 
the entire science of discerning tlie essence of sure piiu ' 
tilings, of judging their qualities, and of conducting * '"'"" v 
a systematic and logical argument, — Epicurus, 1 say, 
makes havoc of his exposition. He entirely fails, 
my opinion at all events, to impart scientific precision 
to the doctrines he desires to convey. Take f 
example the particular tenet that we have just b 
[fliscussing. The Chief Good is pleasu 
Well then. you must explai 

C tails, m ^_ 

precision ^^H 

Take for ^^H 

just been ^^^ 

you Epi- ^^1 

: pleasure ^H 

99 ^M 

voluptas ; aliter enim explicari quod qiiaeritur 
non potest. Quani si explicavisset, non t 
taret; aut enim eaui voluptatein tueretur quam 
AristippoSj id est qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde 
movetiir, quoni ettam pecudes si loqui possent apel- 
lorent voluptatem; aut, si magis placeret suo 1 
loqui quam ut 

Omnes Danai atque Mycenenses, 
Attica pubes, 
reliquique Graeci qui hoc anapaesto titantur, 
nun dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud 
Aristippeum fontemneret ; aut, si uteumque probaret, 
ut probat, coiiiungeret doloris vacuitatem cum volu- 
|l9 ptate et duobus ultimis iiteretur. Multi enim ct 
magni pliilosophi haec ultima bonorum iuncta fece- 
ruut; ut Aristoteles^ virtutis osum cum vitae perfe- 
ctae prosperitate coniunxit, Callipho adiunxit ad 
honestatem voluptatem, Diddorus ad eandcm hone- 
statem addidit vacuitatem doloris. Idem fecisset 
Epicurus, si sententiam banc, quae nunc Hieronymi 
est, coniunxisset cum Aristippi vetcre sententia. Il!i 
enim inter se dissentiunt ; propterea singulis finibus 
utuntur, et, cum uterque Graeee egregie loquatur, nee 
Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in 
voluptate ponit non dolere, neque Hieronymus, qui 
^ „/ Aris/fMes; inf. MSS. ut Arisloleles , 


HOOK li. ^^ 

e it is impossible to make clear the sub- 
ject under investigalion. Had Epicurus cleared up 
the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen 
into such coiifusion. £itber be would have upheld 
pleasure in the sune sense as Aristippus, that is, an 
agreeable and deliglitful excitation of the sense, which 

I what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would 
11 pleasure; or, if ho' preferred to use an idiom of 
i owHj instead of spe^ir^ the language of the 
Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, 
Scions of Athens,' 
d the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, 
might have confined the name of plcjisgre to this 
state of freedom from pain, and despised picture as 
Aristippus understands it ; or else, if he approv^ of 
both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, iJien .he 
ought to combine together pleasure and abserict' of 
19 pain, and profess tfpo ultimate Goods. Many fli.j^" ' 
tinguished philosophers have as a matter of fact thus 
interpreted the ultimate Good as composite. For 
instance, Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue 
with well-being lasting throughout a complete life- 
time; Callipho united pleasure with moral worth; 
Diodorus to moral worth added freedom from pain. 
Epicurus would have followed their example, had he 
coupled the view we are discussing, which as it is 
belongs to Hieronynius, with the old doctrine of 
Aristippus. For there is a real difference of opinion 
between them, and accordingly each sets up his own 
separate End; and as both speak unimpeachable 
£reek, Aristippus, who calls pleasure the Chief 
not count absence of pain as pleasure, 
Hieronymus, who makes the Chief Good 


suminuin bonum statuit non dolere, voluptatis nominel 
umquam utitur pro ilia mdolentia, quippe qui n 
expetendis quidem rebus numeret voluptatem. 
I 20 VII. Duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba I 
solum putes. Unum est sireB_ ijolore esse, alteram j 
cum Toluptate ; vos ex bis.-tiun dlssimilibus rebus n 
modo nomen unum (itan) id facilius paterer), sed 
etiam rem unara ,es d'uabus facere conamini, quod I 
fieri nullo modo poiest. Hie, qui utrumque probat, 
ambobus debuit!uti, sicut facit re neque tamen divi- 
dit verbis; Cum enim earn ipsam voluptatem quam 
eodeiii nomine omnes appellaraus laudnt locis pluri- 
.□ulj.a^idet dicere ne suspicari quidem se uUum bonum. 
'^iilnctum ab illo Aristippco genere voluptatis; atr I 
que ibi hoc dicit ubi omnis eius est oratio de summa ' 
bono. In alio vero libro, in quo breviter compre- 
hensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracuta edidisse 
sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi 
profectp, Torquate, sunt (quis enim vestrum non edi- i 
dicit Epicuri Kvpia^ &I^as, id est quasi maxime ratas, 
quia gravi.ssimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter ' 
enuntiatae sententiae ?) animadverte igitur, rectene | 
;1 banc sententiam interpreter : ' Si ea quae sunt , 
efficientia voluptatum liberarent eos deo- 1 
I et mortis et doloris metu docerentquc qui ^ 


ipt does ^^H 

at ^1 

absence of pain, never employs the name plea 
to denote this negation of pain, and in fact d 
not reckon pleasure among things desirable a 

} Vn. For you must not suppose it is merely a ButuEifeba 
verbal distinction ■ the things themselves are differ- J^^^J^ 
ent. To be without pain is one thing, to feel on*; to[(ii 
pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine dcicD^^wn- 
these quite dissimilar feelings — not merely under a ^'^^^^ j( 
single name (for that I could more easily tolerate), be «mioiuiiiwi 
but as actually being a single thing, instead of really 
two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, 
approving Iwth sorts of pleasure, ought to have re- 
cognized both sorts ; as he really does in fact, 
though he does not distinguish them in words. In 
a number of passages where he is commending that 
real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, 
he goes so far as to say that be cannot even imagine 
any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the 
kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language 
that he holds in the discourse dealing solely with 
the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is an- 
other tre.itise containing his most important doc- 
trines in a compendious form, in which we are 
told he ottered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here 
he writes the following words, with which you, 
Torquatus, are of course fanailiar (for every good 
Epicurean has got by heart the master's Kuriai Doxai 
or Autlioritative Doctrines, since these brief aphor- 
isms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy 
for happiness). So I wUl ask you kindly to notice 

I whether I translate this maxim correctly ; If the 
things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver 
them from the fear of the gods and of death and 
pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their 

CBSent fines cupiditatum, niliil haberemus quod re- 
prehenderemus,' cum undique complerentur vnlupta.- 
tibus nee haberent ulla ex parte aUquid aut dolens 
aut aegmm, id est autem malum.'" 

Hoc loco tenereseTmrmsnonpotuit. "Obseero," 
iiiquit] Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus?" (quod mihi 
quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem 
audire Torquatum). At ille iion perttmuit saneque 
fidenter: Istis quidem ipsis verbis," tnquit; sed 
quid sentiat nou videtis." Si alia sentit," inquatn, 
alia loquitur, numquam intellegam quid seiitiat ; 
sed plane dicit quod intellegit. Idque si ita dicit, 
non esse reprendendos luxuriosos si sapientes sint, 
dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat non reprendendos 
parricidas si nee cupidi sint nee dcos metuant nee 
mortem nee dolorem. Et tamen quid attinet Iuku- 
riosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos qui, 
cum luxuriose viverent, a aummo philosopho non re- 
prenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent? 
[ 22 Sed tanien nonne reprenderes. Epicure, luxuriosos 
ob earn ipsam causam quod ita viverent ut perse- 
querentur cuiusquemodi voluptates, cum esset prae- 
sertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere ? 
Atqui reperiemus asotos primum ita non religiosos 
ut edint de patella,' deinde ita mortem non ti- 
mentes ut iltud in ore babeant ex Hymnide : 

; yiiod reptehenilereinus 

■ Apparently proverbial for shameless g'Jultony. The 
fia/elia was ustd for offerings of food made to the house- 
hold ({ods. 

bA comedy by Caecilius Slalios, Iranslaled from the 
Greek of Menander. 

BOOK II, rii 
desires, we should have no reason to hlame them, 
since on every hand tliey would be abundantly sup- 
plied with pleasures, and on no side would be exposed 
to any pain or grief, which are the sole evil.*" 

At this point Triarius could contain himself no 
longer. Seriously now, Torquatus," he broke out, 
"does Epicurus really say that?" (For my own 
part, I believe that he knew it to be true, but 
wanted to hear Torquatus admit it.) Torquatus, 
nothing daunted, answered with complete assurance : 

Certainly, those are his very words. But you 
don't understand his meaning." ' Oh," I retorted, 

if he means one thing and says another, I never 
shall understand his meaning. But he does not; 
he states the case eleariy as he understands it. If 
his meaning is that sensualists are not to be blamed 
provided they are wise men, he is talking nonsense. 
He might as well say that parricides are not to be 
blamed provided they «re free from avarice arid 
from fear of the gods, of death and of pain. Even 
so, what is the point of granting the sensual any 
saving clause? Why imagine certain fictitious per- 
sons who, though living sensually, would not be 
blamed by the wisest of philosophers, at all events 
for their sensuality, and who avoided other faults ? 
22 All the same, Epicurus, would not you blame sen- 
sualists for the very reason that their one object in 
life is the pursuit of pleasure of any and every sort, 
especially as according to you the highest pleasure 
is to feel no pain ? Yet we shall find profligates in 
the first place so devoid of religious scruples that 
they will eat the food on the paten,' " and secondly 
so fearless of death as to be always quoting the lines 
from the HymnU^: 

Mihi sex menses satis sunt vitae : septimum Oreo 

lam doloris medicamenta ilia Epiciirea tamquam de 
narthecio plomcnt: Si gravis, brevis: si longus, 
levis.' Unum nescio, quomodo possit, si liiKurioBus 
sit, finitas cupiditates habere. 
1 VIII. Quid ergo attinet dicere: 'Nihil haberem 
quod rcprenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent?' 
Hoc est dicere ; Non reprenderem asotos si non 
essent asoti.' Isto modo ne improbos quidem si es- 
sent boni viri. Hie homo severus luxuriani ipsam 
per Be reprendendam non putat. Et herculc, Tor- 
quate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum volu- 
ptas est, rectissiTne non putat. Nolim enim mihi 
fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in raensam vomant et 
qui de convivlis auferantur crudique postridie se 
rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nee oceiden- 
tem umquam viderint nee orientem, qui consumptis 
patrimoniis egeant. Nemo nostrum istius generis 
asotos iucunde putat vivere. Mundos, elegantes, 
optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aueupio, venatione, 
bis omnibus exquisitis, vitantes eruditatem, quibus 
' vinum defiisum e pleno sit, t hirsizon ' (ut ait Luci- 
lius) cui nihil dum sit vis et SAceulus abstulerit,' ad- 

^hirsieon, hirsyphon or the like, MSS.; and for dum sit 
some have dempsit, dempseril. No plausible reconstruction 
has been auggresltid; but the reference seemi to be to the 
process of straining wine to remove the lees and get rid of 
vis, harshness of flavour. 

^Cf. I 840. 

BOOK II. vii-viii 
Enough for me six months of life, the seventh to 
Hell I pledge 1 
Or if they want an antidote to pain, out comes from 
their medicine-chest the great Epicurean panacea, 
Short if it's strong, light if it's long.'' Only one 
point I can't make out: how can a man at once be 
a sensualist and keep his desires within bounds? 
3 VIII. " What then is the point of saying ' I should 
have no fault to find with them if they kept their 
desires within bounds ' ? That is tantamount to 
saying 'l should not blame the profligate if they 
were not profligate.' On tliat principle you would 
not blame the dishonest either, if tiiey were upright 
men. Here is a rigid moralist, who tliinks that 
sensuality is not in itself blameworthy ! And I 
profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure 
is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in think- 
ing so. 1 had rather not draw disgusting pictures, 
as you are so fond of doing, of debauchees who are 
sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner- 
parties, and next day gorge themselves again before 
they have recovered from the effects of the night 
before ; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen 
either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their 
inheritance and sink into penury. None of us sup- 
poses that profligates of that description live plea- 
santly. No, but fastidious gourmets, with first-rate 
chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game, and all of 
the very best; careful of their digestion ; with 
Wine in flask 
Decanted from a new-hroach'd cask, . . . 
as Lucilius has it, 

I Wine of tang bereft, 

All harshness in the strainer left; 
■ : 


hibentes ludos et quae sequuntur, ilia quibiis detractis 
clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit Ixinuni; adsint 
etiam formosi pueri qui miiiiatreiit ; respondeat his 
vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, acdificium ; 
— iios ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate 
24 numquaui diserim. Ex quo efficitur noii ut voluptas 
ne sit voluptas, sed ut voluptas non sit sumnium 
bonum. Nee ille qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, 
post aotem Paiiaetium audierat, Laelius eo dictus est 
sapiens quod non intellegeret quid suavissimum essct 
(nee enim sequitur ut cui cor sapiat ei non sapiat 
palatus), sed quia parvi id dueeret. 

O lapathe, ut iactare nee es satis cognitus qui sis '. 
In quo Laelius clamores ct<h^i)$ ille solebat _*^| 
Edere, compellans gumias ex ordine nostros. ^^H 

Praeclare laelius, et recte o-ot^os, illudque vere : ^^ 

O Puhli, o giirges, Galloni, es homo raiser,' inquit. 
Cenasti in vita numquani bene, eura omnia in ista 
Consumis squilla atque acipensere cum decimano.' 

Is haee loquitur qui in voluptate nihil ponens negat 
eum bene cenare qui omnia ponat in voluptate; et 

a This passage of Luoilius is alluded to by Horace Sat. 
2. 1. 46, wliere it appears llial Gallonius was an auctioneer, 
notorious for having- inlroduced acipenser (sturgeon ?) to 
Roman tables. 

^r BOOK 11. viii 

fth the acponipaninient of dramatic perfor 

id their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from 

tiich Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not 

LOW what Good is; give them also beautiful boys 

wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian 
onzea, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting- 
om, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; 
at these live well or enjoy happiness I v 
low. The conclusion is, not that pleasure is not 
easure but that pleasure is not the Chief Good. 
le famous Laelius, who had been a pupil of Dio- 
■nes the Stoic In his youth and later of Panaetius, y,treaii» 
IS not called 'the Wise' because he was no judge "„0"^™°" 

good eating (for a wise mind is not necessarily hms; 


tamen non negat libenter uraquam cenasse Gallo- 
nium (mcntiretur enim), sed bene. Ita graviter et 
severe voluptatem secemit a bono. Es quo illud 
efficitur, qui bene ceuent omnes libenter cenare, qui 
libenter, non continue bene. Semper Laelius bene. 
25 Quid bene? Dicet Lucilius: 

sed cedo caput cenae : 

sennone bono, 
quid ex eo? 

;i quaeris, libenter; 

iebat t 

1 ad • 


1 ut animo quieto satiaret 
Recte ergo is negat uniiiuam 
, recte miserum, cum prae- 
sertim in eo omne studium consumeret. Quern 
libenter cenasse nemo negat. Cur igitur non bene? 
Quia quod bene, id recte, frugaliter, honeste ; ille 
porro prave,^ nequiter, turpiter cenabat ; non 
i^tur bene." Ncc lapathi suavitatcni acipenseri 
Gallon! Laelius anteponebat, sed suavitatem ipsani 
neglegebat; quod non faeeret si in voluptate sum- 
mum bonum poneret. 
) IX. Semovenda est igitur voluptas non solum ut 
recta sequamini sed etiatn ut loqui deceat fruga- 

'porro male prove MSS.; male Mdv. brackets. 
^bene inserted by Mdv. 

'— - -^ 


BOOK II. viii-ix 
say Gallonius never dined pleasantly (which would 
be untrue), but never well. So strict and severe is 
the distinction he draws between pleasure and good. 
The conclusion is that tliough all who dine well dine 
pleasantly, yet he who dines pleasantly does not 
necessarily dine well. Laelius always dined well. 
35 What does well' mean? Lucilius shall say: 

Well-cook 'd, well-season' d, 

ah, but now the principal dish t 

Of honest talk, 
and the result : 

a pleasant meal ; 
for he came to dinner tliat with mind at ease he 
niig'iit satisfy the wants of Nature. Laelius is 
right therefore in denying that Gallonius ever 
dined well, right in calling him unhappy, and that 
too althougli all his thoughts were centred on the 
pleasures of the table. No one will deny that he 
dined pleasantly. Then why not well"? Because 
weir implies rightly, respectably, worthily ; whereas 
Gallonius diued wrongly, disreputably, basely ; there- 
fore he did not dine welL It was not that I^elius 
thouglit his 'dinner of herbs' more palatable than 
Gallonius's sturgeon, but that he disregarded the 
pleasures of the palate altogether ; and this he could 
not have done, had he made the Chief Good consist .^ 

K.. "Consequently you are bound to discard plea- i 
, not merely if you are to guide your conduct I 
Ight, but even if you are to be able consistently to 
: the language (Of respectable people. Can we i 

liter. Possiunusne ergo in vita summum bonum di- 
cere quod ne in cena' quideni posse videamur? 
Quomodo autem philoaophiis loquitur ? Tria genera 
cupiditatura, naturales et necessariae, naturales et 
non necessariae, nee naturales nee necessariae.' 
Primum divisit ineleganter ; duo enim genera quae 
erant, fecit tria. Hctc est non dividere sed frangere. 
Qui haec didicerunt quae ille contemnit, sie solent ; 
Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes : 
naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae.' 
Confect.1 res esset. Vitiosum est enim in dividendo 
27 partem in genere numerare. Sed hoc sane conce- 
damus. Contemnit disserendi elegantiam ; confuse 
loquitur ; gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. 
Equideui illud ipsum non niniium probo et tantum 
patior, pbilosophum loqui de cupiditatibus liniendis. 
An potest cupiditas finiri ? Tollcnda est atque ex- 
trabenda radicitus. Quis est enim in quo sit cupi- 
ditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit ? Ergo et avams 
erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et 
luxuriosus, eoilcm modo. Qualis ista philusopliia est 
quae non interitum afferat pravitatis sed sit contenta 
mediocritate vitioi'uni? Quaniqiiam in hac divisione 
rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero. Ap- 
pellet baec desideria naturae; cupiditutis nomen 
servet alio, ut earn cum de avaritia, cum de intem- 

fl Thos. Benlley ; 



■ BOOK II. ix ■ 

Imssibly therefore rail a tiling the Chief Good with 
regard to livuig, w)ieii we feel we cannot call it so 
even in regard to dining ? But how sajs our philo- and man: 
sopher? The desires are of three kinds, natural ^||^j^"", 
and necessary, natural but not neeessary, neither S"'?".'' 
natural nor necessary.' To begin with, this is a misitadin 
clumsy division ; it makes three classes when there 
are really only two. This is not dividing but 
hacking in pieces. Thinkers trained in the si^ience 
which Epicurus despised usually put it thus: The 
desires are of two kinds, natural and imaginary*; 
natural desires again fall Into two subdivisions, 
necessary and not necessary.' That would have 
rounded it off properly. It is a fault in division to 

7 reckon a species as a genus. Still, do not let us 
stickle about form. Epicurus despises the niceties 
of dialectic ; he affects a careless style ; we must 
humour him in this, provided that his meaning is 
correct. But for my own part I eannotcordially approve, 
I inerely tolerate, a philosoplier who talks of setting 
bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to 
be kept within bounds? It ought to be destroyed, 
uprooted altogether. On your principle there is no 
form of desire whose possessor could not be morally 
approved. He will be a miser-^within limits ; an 
adulterer— in moderation ; a sensualist — to the I 
same extent. What sort of a philosophy is this, I 
that instead of dealing wickedness its death-bloi 
is satisfied with moderating- our vices? Albeit ij 
quite approve the substance of this classifi cation ; 
is the form of it to which I take exception. Let 
him speak of the first class as the needs of 
,' and keep the term desire ' for another 
in, to be put on trial for its life when he 


pernntia, cum de maximis vitiis loquetur tamquam 
capitis occuset. 

Sed haec quidem liberius ab eo dicuntur et 
saepius. Quod equidein non reprendo ; est eniin 
tanti pliilo3ophi tamque iiobilis audacter sua de- 
creta defendere. Sed tamen ex eo quod earn vol»- 
ptatem quam omnes {feiites hoc nomine appellant 
vidt'tur ample xari saepe vehementius, iii magnis 
interdom versatur angustjis, ut hominum conscientia 
remota nihil tam turpe sit quod voluptatis causa non 
videatur esse facturus. Delude ubi erubuit (vis 
enim est perraagna naturae), confugit illuc ut neget 
accedere quidquam posse ad voluptatem nihil dolen- 
tis. At iste non dolendi status non vocatur voluptas. 
Non laboro, inquit, de nomine. — Quid quod res alia 
tota est ? — Reperiam multos vel miiumerabiles potius 
non tam curiosos nee tam molestos quam voa estis, 
quibus quidquid velim facile persuadeam. — Quid 
ergo dubitamas quin, si non dolere voluptas sit 
sumnia, non esse in voluptate dolor sit maximus ? 
cur id non ita fit? — Quia dolori non voluptas con- 
trarla est sed doloris privatio. 

^oc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse 
voluptatem iltam, qua sublutu neget se intellegere 
omnino quid sit bonum (earn autem ita perscquitur : 
quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus, — cetera addit. 

BOOK II. ix-x 
comes tn deal with Avarice, Intemperance, and all 
the major vices. 

I "This classification of the desires is then a subject (2)wii 
on which Epicurus is fond of enlarging. Not that back q 
I find fault with him for that ; we expect so gi-eat and q^I^\ 
famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly. 
But he often seems unduly eager to approve of plea- 
sure in the common acceptation of the term, for this 
occasionally lands him in a very awkward position. < 
It conveys the impression that there is no action so 
base but that he would be ready to commit it for 
tlie sake of pleasure, provided he were guaranteed 
against detection. Afterwards, put to the blush by 
this conclusion (for the force of natural instinct after 
all is overwhelming), he turns for refuge to the 
assertion that nothing can enhance the pleasure of 
freedom from pain. Oh but,' we urge, your stalif 
condition of feeling no pain is not what is termed 
pleasure at all.' — I don't trouble about the name,' 
lie replies,— Well, but the thing itself is abso- 
lutely different.' — Oh, I can find Jiundreds and 
thousands of people less precise and tiresome than 
yourselves, who will be glad to accept as true any- 
thing I like to teach tlieiii.' — ' Then why do we not 
go a step further and argue that, if not to feel pain 
is the highest pleasure, therefore not to feel pleasure 
is the greatest pain ? Wliy does not this hold good ? ' 
— Because the opposite of pain is not pleasure but 
absence of pain.' 

) X. But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof n n- bi 
it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he „°„"f. 
declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and 
he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate; 
of tlie ears, and subjoins the other kind; 



quae Hi appellos, lionos praefandiis sit)— hoc igitui 
quod solum bonuiu severus et gravis pliilosophus no 
vit, idem 
quod earn 
|30 contraria 1 

in videt ne expetendum quidem esse, 
iluptjitem hoc codem auelore non desi- 
in dulore careamus ! Qunm liaec sunt 
Hie si definire, si dividere didicisset, si 
I, si denique consuetudiiiem verborum 
tcneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. Nunc 
vides quid fuciat. Quam nemo umquam voluptatem 
appellavit, appellat ; quae duo sunt, unum faeit, Hanc 
in motu voluptateni (sic enira has suaves et quasi 
dulces voluptates appellat) interdum ita extenuat ut 
M'. Curium putes loqui, interdum ita laiidat ut quid 
praeterea sit bonuni neget se posse ne suspicari qui- 
dem. Quae iam oratio non a pliiloaoplio aliquo sed a 
eensore opprimenda est ; non pst enim vitium in ora- 
tione solum sed etiam in moribus, Luyuriam non 
reprendit, modo sit vacua intinita cupiditate et timore. 
Hoe loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut qui asoti esse 
velint philosoptii ante Rant. 

A primo, ut opinor, animantium ortu pctitur origo 
summi boni. Siniul atque natum animal est, gaudet 
voluptate et earn appetit ut bonum, aspeniatur 
dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab 
iis animalilius quae nondum depravata sint ait opti- 
me iudicnri. Haec et tu ita posuisti et verba 

lug la 

BOOK n. X 

pleasure, which cannot he specified without an 
apology), — he fails, I say. to see that this, the sole 
Good with which our strict and serious philosopher 
is acquainted, is actually not even desirable, in- 
asmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of 
this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from 
?0 pain I How inconsistent this is ! If only Epicurus ti 
had studied Definition and Division, if he understood "I 
the meaning of Predication or even the customary "" 
uses of terms, lie would never have fallen into such a 
quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He 
»^Is a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that 
name before ; he confounds two things that are dis- 
tinct. The ' kinetic ' sort of pleasure (for so he 
terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured 
pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so 
disparages that you would tliink you were listening 
to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so 
extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of 
imagining what other good there can be. Now that 
is language that does not call for a philosopher to 
answer it, — it ought to be put down by the police. 
His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He 
does not censure proHigaey, provided it be free 
from unbridled desire, and ftom fear of conse- 
quences. Here he seems to be making a bid for 
disciples : the would-be roue need only turn philo- 

3 1 For the origin of the Chief Good he goes back, I Again, If 

understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as sctirepii^asure 
an animal is bom, it delights in pleasure and seeks it p^^ng' jj^ 
as a sood, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet Chiol Good. 

ETjpted are accoi-ding to him the best judges " "^^ 


vestra sunt. Quam multa vitiosa ! Summnm enim 
bonuin et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate 
diiudicabit, stnnte an movente ? qiioniam, si dis 
placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimiis. Si stante, hoc 
natura videlicet vult, salvaiji esse se, quod concedi- 
mus ; si movente, quod tamen didtis, nulla turpis 
voluptas erit quae praetemiittenda sit, et siniul non 
proHciscitur animal illud modo natum a sumnin vo- 

2 luptate, quae est a te posita in non dolendo. Nee 
tamen ai'guraentum hoc Epicurus a parvis petivit aut 
etiam a bestiis, quae putat esse speculu naturae, ut 
diceret ab iis duce natura banc voluptatem expeti 
nihil dolendi. Neque enim haec movere potest ap- 
petitum animi, nee ullum habet ictum quo pellat 
animmn status hie non dolendi (itaque in hoc eodem 
peccat Hieronymus), at ilie pellit qui perniuleet sen- 
sum voluptate. Itaque Epicurus semper iioc utitur 
ut probet voluptatem natura expeti, quod ea volu- 
ptas quae in motu sit et parvos ad se alliciat et bestias, 
non ilia stabilia in qua tantum inest nihil dolere. 
Qui igitur convenit ab alia voluptate dicerc naturam 
proticisci, in alia summum bonum ponere ? 

i XI. " Bestiarumvero nullum iudiciumputo.Quam- 
vis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse pos- 
sunt. Ut bacillum aliud est inflexom et incurvatum 
de industria, aliud ita natum, sic ferarum natura non 

^■^ BOOK II. x-xi 

pounded it and as it is expressed in the phraseology of 
your school. What a mass of fallacies ! Which kind 
of pleasure will it be that guides a mewling infant 
to distinguish between the Chief Good and Evil, 

static ' pleasure or kinetic ' ?— since we leam our 
language, heaven help us I from Epicurus. If the 

static ' kind, the natural instinct is clearly towards 
self-preservation, as we agree ; but if the 'kineticj' 
and this is what neverthuless you maintain, then no 
pleasure will be loo liase to be accepted ; and also 
our new-bom animal in this case does not find its 
earliest motive in the highest form of pleasure, since 
this on your showing consists in absence of pain. 

32 For this latter doctrine, however, Epicurus cannot 
have gone to children nor yet to animals, which ac- 
cording to liim give a true reflection of nature ; he 
could hardly say that natural instinct guides the 
young to desire tlie pleasure of freedom from pain, 
Tiiis cannot excite appetition; the static' condition 
of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies 
no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is 
wrong here) ; it is the positive sensation of pleasure 
and delight that fumislies a motive. Accordingly 
Epicurus's standing argument to prove that pleasure 
is naturally desired is that infants and animals are 
attracted by the kinetic ' sort of pleasure, not the 

static ' kind which consists merely in freedom from 
pain. Surely then it is inconsistent to say that 
natural instinct starts from one sort of pleasure, but 
that the Chief Good is found in another. 

33 XI. "As for the lower animals, I set no value on :„ 
their verdict. Their instincts may be wrong, although '■^^ 
we catmot say they are perverted. One stick has sm 
been bent and twisted on purpose, another has grown ^ 

est ilia, quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura 
sua. Nee ^ero «t voluptatem expetat natura iiiovet 
infantem, sed tantum lit se ipse diligat, ut integrum 
se salvumque velit. Omne enini animal, simul est 
tirtum/ et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit, du- 
asque quae maximae sunt in primis amplectitiir, ani- 
mum et corpus, deiiide utriusque partes. Nam sunt 
et in aiiimo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae 
cum ]eviter agnovit, tum discemere incipit, ut ea 
quae prima data sint natura appctat asperneturque 
34 contraria. In his primis naturalibus voluptas insit 
iiecne, magna quaestio est; nihil vero putare esse 
praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non 
ingeni motum, non integritatem corporis, non vale- 
tudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab 
isto capite fluere necesse est omnera rationem bono- 
rum et malorura. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli 
ea prima visa sunt quae paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata 
est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateti- 
corum ut iinem bonorutn dicerent secundum naturam 
vivere, id est virtute adbibita frui piimis a natura 
datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nbi volupta~ 
tem; Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. . . . ' His omnibus 
quos dixi consequent«3 sunt fines bonorum : Aristippo 
simplex voluptas; Stoicis consentire naturae, quod 
esse votunt e virtute, id est honeste vivere, quod ita 

' siatiil est ortnm a coiijectiire of Mdv., who prinia simitl 
\ct\ orlum esl with MSS. 

'Mdv. nmrks a lacuna. A sentence has been lost iudi- 
ing the ' primary objects of desire * of the philosophers 

BOOK II. xi 
crooked ; similarly the nature of wild animals, though 
not indeed corrupted by bad education, is corru])t of 
its own nature. Again in the infant the. iiaturaljn- ■ 
atinct is not to seek pleasure ; its instinct is me ycly 
to^Srspt^Fe^BCIsiilEipresetviRon and proteetjon. 
from injury, Every living creature, from the moment 
of birtliTToves itself and all its members ; primarUy 
this setf-regard embraces the two main divisions of 
mind and body, and subsequently the parts of each 
of these. Both mind and body have certain excel- 
lences; of these the young animal grows vaguely 
conscious, and later begins to discriminate, and to 
seek for the primary endowments of Nature and shun 
3+ their opposites. Whether the list of these primary i 
natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a f 
much debated question ; but to hold that it includes 
nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the.i 
senses,' nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor ] 
health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. 
And on one's view as to the objects of instinctive 
desire must depend one's whole theory of Goods and 
Evils. Polemo, and also, before him Aristotle, held that 
the primary objects were the ones 1 have just men- 
tioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy 
and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of 
Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to 
enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the 
accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue 
pleasure alone ; Diodorus freedom from pain. , . . 
In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their 
End of Goods logically follows ; with Aristippus 
it is pleasure pure and simple ; with the Stoics, 
harmony with Nature, which they interpret 
ing virtuous or morally good life, and further expl; 


inlerpretantur, vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum 

quae natura evenireiit, eligeotem ea quae essent 

35 secundum naturam reicientemque contraria. Ita tres 

sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel 
Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Cameadi tertius; tres in' 
quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, 
Calliphontis, Dioilori ; uiia simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, 
posita in decore tota, id est in honestatc. (Nam 
Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti.) Reliqui sibi 
constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut 
Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vaeuitas, Car- 
neadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum ; 
XII. Epicurus autem cum in prima commeiidatione 
voluptatem dixiaset, si earn quam Aristippus, idem 
tenere debuit ultimum bonorum quod Ule ; sin eam 
quam Hieronymus, fecisset idem ut voluptatem itlam 
Aristippi in prima commendatione poneret?' 

36 Nam quod ait sensibus tpsis iudicari voluptatem 
bonum esse, dolorem malum, plus tribuit sensibus 
quam nobis leges permittunt cum^ privatarum litium 
iudices sumus. Nihil enim possumus iudicare nisi 
quod est nosti-i iudici ; in quo frustra iudices soleiit, 
cum sejitentiam pronuntiant, addere : si quid mei 

^Aristipfii. . . ponerclPs6.i[Arislippi\. 


f. Mdv„ 

erted here by Mdv. > afler lill 

BOOK II. xi-xii 
this as meaning to live with an understanding of the 
natural course of events, selecting things that are in 
accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 

S.i Thus there are three Ends that do not include 
moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the 
second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of 
Cameades; three that comprise moral goodness to- 
gether with some additional element, those of Poli 
Callipho and Diodorus ; andone theory that is simple, 
of which Zeno was the author, and which is based 
entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As 
for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago 
been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus 
consistent, and made their final Ends agree with their 
first principles,— Aristippus holding tile End to be 
Pleasure, Hieronymas freedom from pain, Cameades 
the enjoyment of the primary natural objects, 
XII. WhercHS Epicurus, if in saying that pli 
was the primary object of attraction, he meant 
pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have gjj 
maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus ; fm 
or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his fa 
Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed ^'"x^.- 
himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of 
Aristippus, the primary attraction? 

S6 The fact is that when he says that the verdict of N'oi ihe 
the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and nHu - ' 
pain evil, he assigns more authority to the senses than ^^^ 
the law allows to us when we sit as judges in private Viii 
suits. We cannot decide any issue not within our 
jurisdiction ; and there is not really any point in the 
proviso which judges are fond of adding to their ver- 
dicts: 'if it be a matter within my jurisdiction,' for 
if it were not within their jurisdiction, the verdict 

oughl oc 

iudici est '; si enim noii fuit eoruni iudici, niliilo 
magis hoc non addito illud est iudicatutn. Quid 
iudicant' aensus? Dulce, amarum, leve, asperum, 
propCj longCj stare, niovere, quadratum, rotundum. 

37 Aequam' igitur pronuntiabit sententiaiu ratio, ad- 
hibita primiun divinarum liumanarumque rerum 
scientia, quae potest appellari rite sapientia, deinde 
adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium do- 
minas, tu voluptatum satellites et miiiistraa esse 
voluisti; quarum adeo omnium es sententia pro- 
nuntiabit primum de voluptate, nihil esse ei loci,, 
non modo ut sola ponatur in sununi boni sede quam 
quaerimus, sed ne illn quidem modo ut ad honesta- 
tem applicetur. De vacuitate doloris eadem sen- 

88 tentia erit. Reioietur etiani Carneades, uec ulla de 
summo bono ratio aut voluptatis non dolendive par- 
ticeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. Ita rehn- 
quet durts, de quibus etiam atque etiam consideret. 
Aut enim statuet nihil esse bonum nisi lionestum, 
nihil malum nisi turpe, cetera aut omiiino niliil 
habere momenti aut tantum ut nee expetenda nee 
fugieuda sed eligenda modo aut reicienda sint; aut 
^nteponet eam quam cum honestate ornatissimam, 
turn etiam ipsis initiis naturae et totius perfectione 
vitae locupletatam videbit, Quod eo liquidius faciet, 

'aequam Mdv., guuiu MSS. 

^^ HOOK II, xii 

Would be equally invalid were the proviso omitted. 
What does coiue under tlie verdict of the senses? 
Sweetness, sourness, smoothness, roughness, proxi- 
mity, distance ; whether an object is stationary or 

37 moving, square or round. A just decision can there- 
fore only be delivered by Reason, with the aid in 
the first place of that knowledge of things human 
and divine, which may rightly claim the title of 
Wisdom ; and secondly with the assistance of the 
Virtues, which Reason would have to be the mistresses 
of all thinjifs, but you considered as the handmaids 
and subordinates of the pleasures. After calling all 
of these into council, she will pronounce first us to 
Pleasure, that she has no claim, not merely to be 
enthroned alone in the seat of that Chief Good 
which we are seeking, but even to be admitted as 
the associate of Moral Worth. As regai'ds (reedom 

38 from pain her decision will be the same. For Car- 
neades will be put out of court, and no theory of 
the Chief Good will be approved that either includes 
pleasure or absence of pain, or does not include 
moral worth. Two views will thus be left. After , 
prolonged consideration of these, either her final 
verdict will be that jhere_i_s_no_QotMLljut_moral | 
worth and no E vil but moral baseness,, ajj other , 

THTngsj jeing eitKer~entu re1y uiiiihportant or oF so 
HttteTinportance that they are not~ff^3rable or to be 
avoided, but only to be selected or rejected ; or else \ 
she will prefer the theory which she will recognizee 
as including the" full beauty of moral worth, enriched 
l)y~tfre addition of the primary natural objects and 
of a life. coraDleteiJ (9. its. perieot-sp««H. ~Ka& her 

Cill lie all the clearer, if she can first of all 
her the dispute between these rival 


si perspexerit reriim inter eas verbonimne sit con- 

I 59 XIII. Huiuseg'o nunc auctoritatemsequens idem 
faciam. Quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones 
omnesque sententias simplices eorum in quibus nulla 
putabo, — primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque om- 
niuin, quos non est verituni in ea voluptate quae 
maxima dulcedine seiisuni tuuveret suiiimum bonum 

WiO ponere, contemnentes istam vacuitateiu doloris. Hi 
non vidertint, ut ad cursum equum, ad aranduni 
bovem, ad indagandum caoem, sic hominem ad duas 
res, at ait Aristoteles, ad intelleRendum et ad ' agen- 
dum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut 
tardara aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et 
ad procreandi voluptatein hoc divinuni animal ortum 
I esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. 
Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui earn voluptatem 
non modo Bummam sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes 
unam appellamus voluptatem. Aliter auteni vobis 
placet. Sed ille, ut dixi. vitiose. Nee enim figura 
corporis neo ratio excellens ingeni liumani significat 
ad unam hanc rem natum hominem ut frueretur 
voluptatibus. Nee vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui 
summum bonum est idem quod vos Interdum vel 
potius nimium saepe dicitis, nihil dolere. Non enim, 
si malum est dolor, cavere eo nialo satis est ad bene 

' at/ siippiifd bv Mdv. 

^V BOOK II. xii-xiJi 

theories is one of fact, or turns on verbal differences 

(9 XIII. "Guided by the autboritj of Reason I will 
now adopt a similar procedure niyself. As far as 
possible I will narrow the issue, and will assume 
that all those theories of the simple type, that in- 
clude no admixture of virtue, are to be eliminated 
from philosophy altogether. First among these 
comes the system of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic 
school in general, who did not shrink from finding 
their Chief Good in pleasure of the sort that excites 
the highest amount of actively agreeable sensation, 

K) and who despised your freedom from pain. They 
failed to sec that just as the hurse is designed by 
nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog 
for hunting, so man, as Aristotle obseiiv^Sris-borwibr. 
^w^ piiiTvigfgi tt'ou glit^ nd_action : he 
mortal God. The Cy renal cs~ held on the contrary 
that this godlike animal came into being, like some 
dull, hnlf-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjo y 
t be pleasure of procreation,^a view that 

H tlje climax of absurdity. So much in answer to Aris- 
tippus, who considers pleasure in the only 
which we all of us employ the term to be not merely 
the highest but the sole pleasure that exists. Your 
school holds a different view. However, as I said, 
Aristippus is wrong. Neither man's bodily c 
formation nor his surpassing mental faculty of reason 
indicates that he was bora for the sole purpose of en- 
joying pleasure. Nor yet can we listen to Hierony- 
mus, whose Chief Good is the same as is occasionally, 
or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves, 
I from pain. If pain is an evil, to be without 
s not enough to constitute the Good Life. 



vivendiim. Hoc dixerit potiiis Eiinius : 

Nimium boni est cui »ihjl est muli 
nos beatam vitam aon depulsione mali sed ftdeptione 
boni iudicemus, nee earn cessaiido, sive gatideiitena, 
ut Aristippus, sive non dolenteni, ut hie, sed agendo 
aliquid con sideran dove quaeramus. 

42 Quae possunt eadem contra Carneadeuni illud 
summuni bonum dici, quod is non tam ut probaret pro- 
talit. quain ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat oppo- 
neret ; id autem eiusmodi est ut additum ad virtutem 
auctoritatemvideaturhabiturumet expleturum cumu- 
late vitam beatam, de quo oninis haec quaestio est. 
Nam qui ad virtutem adlungunt vel voluptatem, quam 
unam virtus niiiiimi facit, vel vacuitatem doloris, quae 
etiamsi malo caret tamen non est siiramum bonum, 
accessione utunlur non ita probabili, nee tamen cur id 
tam parce tamque restricte faoiant intellego. Quasi 
enim emendum eis sit quod addant ad virtutem, pri- 
mum vilissimaa res addunt, deinde singulaa potius 
quam omnia quae prima natura approbavisset ea cum. 

43 honestate coniungerent. Quae quod' Aristoni et 
Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime 
valere et gravissime aegrotare niliil prorsus dicerent 
interesse, recte lam pridem contra eos desitum est 
disputari. Dum cnim in una virtute sic omnia esse 



BOOK II. xiit 
Ennius say if he likes that 
3 ill ;' 

!, of good 

but let us reckon happiness not hy the avoidance of 
evil but by the attainment of good. Let us seek it 
not in the idle acceptance whether of positive delights, 
like Aristippus, or of freedom from pain, like Hier- 


i, but in a life of action or of study. 

The same arguments can be urged against the Chief 
Good of Cameades, wliich he advanced less from a 
desire to prove it true than to use it as a weapon in 
his battle with the Stoics; though it is such that if 
added to Virtue it may be thought to be of import- 
ance and to be likely to augment the sum total of 
Happiness, which is the one subject of our inquiry. 
Whereas those who join with Virtue either pleat 
the one thing she values least, or freedom from pain, 
which even though it is devoid of evil yet is not the 
Chief Good, make a less satisfactory combination ; 
nor yet can I undci-stand why they go to work in so 
cautious and niggardly a fashion. You would think 
they had to purchase the commodity which is to be 
added to virtue. To begin with they 
cheapest things they can find to add, and then they 
each dole out one only, instead of coupling with moral 
13 worth all the things initially approved by Nature. 
Aristo and Pyirho thought all these things utterly 
worthless, and said, for example, that there was abso- 
lutely nothing to choose between the most perfect 
health and the most grievous sickness ; and conse- 
quently men have long ago quite rightly given up 
arguing against them. For in insisting upon the 
unique importance of virtue in such 




^I'unt ut earn renim selectione exspoliareiit,!) 

. II ec quo vita 
1 pridem 
lie est di 

quidquam aut uiide oriretur darent aut ubi niteretur, 

virtuteni ipsam quain amplexabantur sustuleruiit. 

Erillus aottni ad scientiam omnia 

quoddam bonuni vidit, sed iiec optir 

gubernari possit. Itaque hie ipse 

reiectus; post enim Clirysippum no 


XIV, Restatis igitur vos ; nam cum Academi 
eerta luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata 
cognitione certi id sequi volunt quodcumque veri 
I simile videatur. Cum Epicuru auteni hoc plus eat 
negoti quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus 
est, quodque et ipstr et amici eius et miilti postea de- 
fensores eius sententiae fueruiit, et nescio quomodo, 
is qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximani vim, 
populus cum iUis fadt. Quos nisi redarguinius, om- 
nis virtus, omue decus, omnis vera laus deserenda 
est. Ita cetei-orum sententiis scmotis, relinquitur 
non mihi eum Torquato sed virtiiti cum volaotaJie;^ 
certatio. Quam quidem cei'tationem homo et ueutus 
et diligens, Chrysippus, non contemnit, totumque 
discrimen summi boni in earuni comparatione posi- 
tum putat. Ego autem existimo, si honestum esse 
aliqutd ostendero quod sit ipsum sua vi propter seque 
expetenduni, iacere vestra omnia. Ituque eo quale 
sit breviter ut tempus postulat constitute, accedam 

roll it nt' any power of clioice amoag external things 
and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they 
destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. 
Again, ErOlus, in basing everything on knowledge, 
fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the 
greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide 
of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago 
been set aside ; since Chrysippus no one has even 
troubled to refute him. 

XIV, Accordingly your seliool remains ; for there 
is no coining to grips with the Acadi 
affii-m nothing positively, and despairing of a know- 
ledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take 
t+ apparent probability as their guide. Epicurus how- 
ever is a more troublesome opponent, because he is a 
combination of two different sorts of pleasure, and 
because besides himself and his friends there have 
been so many later champions of his theory, which 
somehow or other enlists the support of that least 
competent but most powerful adherent, the general 
public. Unless we refute these adversaries, all virtue, 
all honour, all true merit must be abandoned. Thus, 
when all the other systems have been discarded, 
there remains a duel in which ttie-^pmbatants are. 
not myself and Torquatus, but Virtue! an;! Pleasure. 
This contest is by no means ignored4»y«t> penetrating 
and so industrious a writer as Chrysiripus, who con- 
siders that the rivalry between pleasure and virtue is 
the cardinal issue in the whole question of the Chief 
Good. My own view is that, if I dan succeed in 
proving the existence of Moral Worth as a thing 
essentially and for itself desirable, you^ entire system 
at once collapses. Accordingly I wilt begin by de- 
fining, with such brevity as the occasion demands, 

Vi 'J«iS->- - ^°S 

forte d»- I 

omniit fua, Torquate. n 

Honestum igltur id iiiteliegimus quod tale est u 
detracts omni utilitate sine ullis praemiis finictibusvif 
per se ipsum possit Sure laudari. Quod quale 

1 tain definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potes 
(quamquam aliquantum potest) quam comuiuni om 

m iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atqiie factis,1 
qui pemiulta ob earn imam causa m faciunt quia 
decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum 
consecuturum cmolumentum vident. Homines 

Ti, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum 
a bestiis differunt quod rationem liabent a natura 
datam nientemque acrem et vigentem celer- 
rimeque multa simul agitantem et, ut ita dicam, 
sagacem, quae et causas reruin et consecutiones 
videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta con- 
iungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet om- 
nemque complectatur vitae conseqiientis statum. 
Eademque ratio fecit hominem homtnum appeten- 
tem cumque lis natura et sermone et usu con gruen- 
tem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum 
-serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde 

lium mortalium societate atque, ut ad Archytam 
scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit sed 
patriae, sed suis. ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur. 

^ BOOK n. xiv -,- ' , 

tile nature of Moral Worth ; aiid tlieu, I'oKluutiis, I 
will proceed to deal with each of your points, unless 
my memory should liappen to fail mc. 

■t.,5 ■' By Moral Worth then, we understand that Moral 
wl ^ch is'STsm-'h a nature thatj^tliougli devoid_pf all jn En 
utility, it can jusfly be corMuendcd in and for itself^'l^^i 
apart 'from any profit or reward. A formal definition and h. 
stieh"as"TTiive given may do something to indicate ™tfit\ 

its nature; but this is •n}ftTf i,', ]parljf fx plained hy the , 

general^ierdict.of mankind at large, and by tile aims 
and actions of all persons of high character. Good 
men do a great many things from which they antici- 
pate no advantage, solely fro™ the motive of pro- 
priety, _naoralitj;_Mid fright. For among the many 
points of diifference between man and the lower ani- 
mals, the greatest difference is that Nature has 
bestowed on man the gift of_Reasoij, of an active, 
vigorous intelligence, able to prosecute several trains 
of thought with great swiftness at the same time, 
and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the 
sequence of causes and effects, to draw analogies, 
combine things separate, connect the ftiture with 
the present, and survey the entire field of the sub- 
sequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that 
has inspired man with a relish for his kind; 
she has produced conformity of character, of lan- 
guage and of Iinbif ; she bus prompted the indi- . 
vi3nst;~EtaFting" from friendship and from family \ 
affection, to expand his interests, forming social 
ties first with his fellow- citizens and later with all 
mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in 
his letter to Archytas,'^ man was not born for self 
alone, but for country and for kmdred, claims that 
i6 leave but a small part of him for himself. Nature 

+6 Et quoiiiam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit ho- 
mjni veri videndi, quod facillime apparet cum vatrui 
curis etiam quid in caelo liat sa'ire avemus, his initiis 
inducti omniii vera diligimus, id est fidelia, simplicia, 
constantia, turn vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut frau- 
dem, periurium, malitiam, iniuriam. Eadejn ratio 
habet in se quiddum ajiiplum utque tuagniRcum, ad 
iinperanduni iiiagis quam ad parendum accommoda- 
tum, omnia humaiia iioii tolerabilla solum sed etiam 
levia ducens,altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, 
■il nemini eedens, semper invictum. Atque his tribus 
Reneribus honestoriun notatis, quartum sequitur et 
in eadem pulchritudine et aptuin ex illis tribus, in 
quo inest ordo et moderatio. Cuius similitudine 
perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate, transitum 
est ad honestateiTi dictorum atque factorura. Nam 
ex his tribus laudibus (juas ante dixi, et temeritatem 
reiormidat et non audet puiquam aut dicto protervo 
aut facto nocere, vereturque quidquam aut facere aut 
eloqui quod pannn virile videatur. 
■VS XV. Habes undique expletara et perfectam, Tor- 
quate, fomiam lionestalis, quae tota quattuor his vir- 
tutibus quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt conti- 
netiir. Hanc se tuus Epicurus omniiioigiioraredicit 
quam aut qualem esse velint ii qui honestate summum 

^P BOOK II. xiv-xv 

has also enffendercd in mankind the d fsirp gf m n- (i 
templatms triitli. This is most clearly manifested 
in our hours of leisure; when our minds are at 
ease we are eager to acquire knowledge even of 
the movements of the heavenly bodies. Thia 
primary instinct leads us on tu love aU truth as such, («] jni 
that is, all that is trustworthy, simple and consistent, 
;i)id to hate things insuicere, false and deceptive,, 
such as cheating, perjury, malice and injustice. 
I'urther, Reason possesses an intrinsic elenjent ofC3)C( 
di^iity and grandeur, suited rather to reqaire 
obedience than to render it, esteeming all the a 
dents of human fortunes not merely as endurable 
but also as unimportant ; a quality of loftiness and 
elevation, fearing nothing, submitting to no one, 

7 ever unsubdued. These three kinds of moral good- U) Temp«rui« 
ness being noted, there follows a fourth kind, 
possessed of equal beauty, and indeed combining ii 
itself the other three. This is the principle of order 
and of restraint From recognizing something 
analogous to this principle in the beauty and dignity 
of outward forms, we pass to beauty i: 
sphere of speech and conduct. Each of the three 
excellences mentioned before contributes something 
to this fourth one: it dreads rashness; it shrinks 
from injuring anyone by wanton word or deed; and 
it fears to do or say anything that may appear 

fl XV. There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed a 

plete account of Moral Worth, a whole of which these f™^°SS^ 
four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the "' 
parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is uttetly 
at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned 
to this Morality by those who make it the n 


i) lemperinc. 


boDum metinntur. Si enim ad honestatcm 

referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, nit 
aani sonai'e (his enim ipsis verbis utitur), 
neque intellege renecvideresubhancvocemhonestatis 
quae sit subicienda sententia. Ut enim consuetudo 
loquitur, id solum dicitur hoiiestum quod est popular 
fama gloriosum. Quod, iiiquit, quamquam voluptati- 
bus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur 
1.49 propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dis- 
.0? Philosophusnobilis, aquonon solum Graecia 
et Italia sed etiam omiiis barbaria commota est, 
honestum quid sit, si id non sit in voluptate, negat 
intellegere, nisi forte illud quod raultitudinis 
more laudetur. Ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse 
saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, turn esse non 
turpe cum id a multitudine laudetur quod sit ipsum 
per se rectum atque laudabile ; tamen non ob earn 
causam illud dici esse honestum quia laudetur a 
multis, sed quia tale sit ut, vel si ignorarent id ho- 
si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine 
esset specieque laudabile. Itaque idem natura victuSi 
eui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id quod a te 
etiam paulo ante dictum est, non posse iucunde vin 
nisi etiam honeste. Quid nunc honeste' dicit? 
idemne quod iucunde ' ? Ergo ita : non posse 

elsewhere no iranslalion can convey Ihe double 1 
ling of the word honestum, ' honourable," used a! 
i!Tisa\6r, ' lite moralty beautiful org'ood.' 


ir). 1 

BOOK 11. jiv 
of the Chief Good. For if Morality be tliestandarf 
to which all things are referredj while yet thej will 
not allow that pleasure forms any parb of it, he de- 1 
clares that they are utterine sounds devoid of sfr*^" 
(those are his actual words), and that he has no 
nation or perception whatever of any meaning 
that this term Morality cati have attached to it. In 
common parlance ' mgraT (honourable)' means 
mpr^ly tlipt whif-h rnnWrhlg.^Lin PTulnr psfi-Pin 
And popular esteensrsays Epicuf aB,-tliQugh often m 
its elf mure-fl grp'''' hip tlinn r£rtnji|_fnmi^i_nrplpii';iirei 

t9 yet iB-*l i»nii i nH simp l y ^ g ft mgnn s to pleasufeT Do 
you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is ? 
Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has 
spread not only over (ireece and Italy but through- 
out all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he can- 
not understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not\ 
consist in pleasure ; unless indeed it be that which \ 
wins the approval and applause of the multitude. 
For my part I hold that what is popular is often poai- | 
tively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only 
when the multitude happens to applaud somethuig 
that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which ■ 
even so is not called ' moral ' (honourable) because ' 
it is widely applauded, but because It is of such a ' 
nature that even if men were unaware of its eitist- . 
ence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of ' 
praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence ' 
Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of in- 
stinct to say in another passage what you also said 
just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly with- 

iO out also living morally (honourably). What does he 
mean by morally' now? The same as pleasantly'? 
If so, does it amount to saying that it is impfossible 

honeate vivi nisi honeste vivatiir? An nisi populnri 
famu? Sine ea iKitur tucunde negat posse se vivere^? 
Quid tiirpius quam sapientis vitam ex insipientiutn 
s<^rmone pendere ? Quid ergo hoc loco intellegit 
boiiestiini ? Certe nihil nisi quod possit ipsum prop- 
ter Be iure luudari. Nam si propter voluptatem, 
(juae est ista laus quae possit e inacelio peti ? Non 
is vir est ut, eum honeatatem eo loco Iiabeat ut sine 
eu iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum quod 
popuUre sit scntiat et sine co neget iucunde vivi 
posse, aut quidquam aliud honestum intellegat nisi 
quod sit rectum ipsuniquc per se, sua vi, sua sponte, 
sua natura laudabih'. 
I XVI. 'Ituque, Torquate, cum diceres elamare Epi- 
eurnm non posse iucunde vivi nisi honeste et sapi- 
enteret iuste viveivtur, tu ipse milii gloriari videbare. 
Tiutta vis inerut iu verbis propter earuin rerum quae 
signitieabanliir his verbis dignitatem, nt altior fieres.. 
ut interdum insisleres, ut nos intuens quasi testifica- 
rere Inudari honestatrui et iustitiaia aliquando ab 
Kpieura Qiuun te decebtit iis verbis uti quibus si 
philosoplii iiiMi uterentur. philosophia onmino non 
(.'gereuuis. Istorum enim verbonim amorer quae 
pemru appeUantur ab Epicuro, sapientiae. fortitudi- 
nis, institiae. temperantiae, praestantissimis ingeniis 

^fiKai/srvirrivildv. ^ fnsr Pivi OnUi : passe ^mtr ilSS, 

^ BOOK II. xv-xvi 

to live morally unless you — livt morally ? Orj unles 
you make public opinion your standard ? 
then that he cannot live pleasantly without tlie 
approval of public opinion ? But what can be baser 
than to make the conduct of the Wise Man depend 
upon thp^o asip of tRiTfooItBt^ What therefore does 
he understand by moral' in this passage ? Clearly, 
nothing but that which can be rightly praised for its 
own sake. For if it be praised as being a means to 
pleasure, what is there creditable about this ? You 
can get pleasure at the provision-dealer's. Ho,— 
Epicurus, who esteems Moral Worth so highly as to 
say that it is impossible to live pleasantly without it. 
is not the man to identify 'moral' (honourable) with 
popular' and mumtain that it is impossible to live 
pleasantly without popular esteem ; he cannot under- 
stand moral' to mean anything else than that 
which is right, — that which is in and for itself, 
independently, intrinsically, and of its own nature 

XVI. This, Torquatus, accounts for the glow of Si 
pride with which, as I noticed, you iiifomied us how ..g 
loudly Epicurus proclaims the impossibility of living f' 
pleasantly without living morally, wisely and justly. 
Your words derived potency from the grandeur of 
the things that they denoted ;youdrewyourself up to 
your full height, and kept stopping and lixing us with 
your gaze, and solemnly asseverating tliat Epicurus 
does occasionally commend morality and justice. 
Were those names never mentioned by philosophers 
we should have no use fo^hilosophy ; how well they 
sounded on your lips I Too seldom does Epicurus 
speak to us ofWisdom, Courage, Justice. Temperance. 
Yet it is the love that those great nanies inspire wliich 

homines se ad pliilosophiae studium contulerunt. 

,)2 Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobia sensus acerriinus, 
quibus sapientiam nan cemimua ; quam ilia ardentes 
amores encitaret sui, si videretur'! Cur tandem? an 
quod ita callida est ut optime possit architectari vo- 
luptates? Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc 
contritum vetustate proverbium : 'quicum in tene- 
bris'*? Hoc, dictum in una re, latissime patet, ut 

53 in omnibus factis re, non teste moveaniur. Sunt enim 
levia ct perinfirma quae dicebantur a te, animi con- 
seientia improbos esi-ruciari, turn etiam poenae timore 
qua aut afficiantur aut semper sint in metu ne affici- 
antur aliquando. Non oportet timidum aut imbecillo 
animo fiii|^ non bonuni ilium virum, qui quidquid 
fecerit ipse se cruciet omniaque formidet, sed omnia 
calHde referentem ad utilitatem, acutum, versutum, 
veteratorem, facile ut excogitet quomodo occulte, 

5* sine teste, sine ullo conscio fallat. An tu me de 
L. Tubulo putas dicere ? qui cum praetor quaestionem 
inter siearios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob 
rem iudjcandam ut anno pruximu P. Seaevola tribunus 
plebis ferret ad plebem, vellentne de ea re quaeri. 
Quo plebiscite decreta a senatu est consul! quaestio 
Cn. Caepioni; profectus in exsilium Tubulus statim 
nee respondere ausus ; erat enim res aperta. 

'si videretur Mdv. om. with A, B, E, but cp. Plato, 
Phaedr. 250 D. S^it yd/) Ti/ijy i^irTAnt -rHv 3id rou aiinaros 
fpXf^tiL ata6Tj<riun', ^ ^pdytj^it oCx opaTai.Seiifoi/i yiip &v ra.peT\tr 
Ipurrtt, tC Ti TQiaihov ^aurfli ^apyis riiaXov wapclxtro ilt 

^guicum in lenebiis micesXnt MSS. Cp. ,/« O/I 3. 77, cum 

tEnebris mices (sc. digitis). 


Eas lured the ablfKt of mankind to devote themselves 
53 to philosophical studies. The sense of sight, says 
Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes 
cannot behold Wisdom ; could we see her, what 
passionate love would she awaken ! And why is 
this so f Is it because of her supreme ability and 
cunning in the art of contriving pleasures ? Why is 
Justice commended ? What gave rise to the old 
familiar saying, ' Aman with whom you might play odd 
and even in the dark ' ? This proverb strictly applies 
to the particular cose of honesty, but it has this 
general application, that in all our conduct we should 
be influenced by the character of the action, not by 
yi the presence or absence of a witness. How weak 
and ineffectual are the deterrents you put forward, 
— -the torture of a guilty conscience, and 
fear of the punishment that offenders incur, < 
all events stand in continual dread of incurring ii 
end ! We must not picture our unprincipled man as 
a poor-spirited coward, tormenting himself about his 
past misdeeds, and afraid of everything ; but as 
shrewdly calculating profit in all he does, sharp, 
dexterous, a practised hand, fertile in devices for 
cheating in secret, without witness or accomplice. 
5-i Don't suppose I am speaking of a Lucius Tubulus, 
who when he sat as praetor to try charges of murder 
made so little concealment of taking bribes for his 
verdict that nest year the tribune of the plebs, 
Publius Scaevola, moved in the plebeian assembly for 
a special inquiry. The bill passed the plebs, and the 
senate commissioned the consul Gnaeus Caepio to 
hold the investigation; but Tubulus promptly left 
the country, and did not venture to stand his trial, 
so open was his guilt. 




XVII. ■"'Nonigiturdeimpi-obosedde' callido im- 
probo quaerimus, quatis Q. Pompeiiis in foedere Nu- 
raantino infitiando fuit, iiec vero omnia tiiuente sed 
prinium qui animi conscientiam non curet, quam 
scilicet eoiupiimere nihil est negoti. Is enim qui 
ocpultus et teetus dicitur, tantum abest ut se indicet, 
perficiet etiam ut dolere alterius improbe facto vi- 
deatur; quid est enim atiud esse versutum? 
i Meniiiii me adesse P. Sextilio Rufo cum is rem ad 

aiuicos ita deferret, se esse heredem Q. Fadio Gallo, 
cuius in testamento scriptum esset se ab eo rogatum ut 
omnis hereditas ad filiam perveniret. Id Sextilius 
factum negabat ; jxiterat autem impune ; quis enim 
redargueret ? Nemo nostrum credebat, eratque veri 
similtus huuc meutiri, cuius iuteresset, quam ilium, 
qui id se rogasse scripsisset quod debuisaet rogare. 
Addebat etiam se in legem Voeoniam iuratuni contra 
earn facere non audere, nisi aliter amicis videretur. 
Aderamus nos quidem adulesceiites, sed multi am* 
plissimi viri, quorum nemo censuit plus Fadiae dan- 
dum quam posset ad earn lege Voconia pervenire. 
Tenuit permagnam Sextilius liereditatem unde, si 
secutus esset eorum sentt^ntiam qui honesta et recta 
eniolumeiitis timnibus et cominodia anteponerent, 
' de inserted by Mdv. 

1 Presumably a reference to the customary oaih to main- 
tain the laws, taken on assuming an office of state. The 
Vocoaian law prohibitEil a woman from being* left heir to 
an estate. It was evaded by bequeathing the estate lo a 

end who had promised to hand it on to the intended 


b The Vol 

1 have allov 

passed to the ' here.s * proper, 
had been made to Kadia, or It 
get nothing. 

)r bequest 

V BOOK II. wii 

XVII "It id nut therefore a question uf a rascal Poieaay&- 
merely, but of a crafty rascal, like Quiutus Pompeius escape^Mm- 
wheii he disowned the treaty he had made with the ^°°'' ""^usii 
Numanttnes : nor yet of a timid, cowardly knave, fits some rishii 
but of one who to begin with is deaf to the voice of p^^fj^]^' "* 
conscience, which it is assuredly no difficult matter 
to stifle. The man we call stealthy iind secret, so 
far from betraying his own Ruilt, will actually make 
believe to be indignant at the knavery of aiiotlicr ; 
that ia what we mean by a cunning old hand. 

i I remember assisting at a consultation which 

Publius Sextilius Rufus held with his friend on the 
following matter. He Iiad been left heir to Quintus 
Fadius Gallus. Fadius's will contained a statement 
that he had requested Sextilius to allow the whole of 
the estate to pass to his daughter. Sextilius now de- 
nied the arrangement, as he could do with impunity, 
for there was no one to rebut him. Not one of us 
believed his denial ; it was more probable that he 
should be lying, as his imcket was concerned, than 
the testator, who had left it in writing that he had 
made a request which it had been his duty to make. 
Sextilius actually went on to say that, having sworn 
to maintain the Voeonian law,'' he would not venture 
to break it, unless his friends thought he ought to 
do so. I was only a young man, but many of the 
company were persons of high consideration ; and 
every one of these advised him not to give Fadla 
more than she was entitled to get under the Voeonian 
law. Sestilius kept a hand.'jome property, not a 
penny of which he would have touched had he 
followed the advice of those who placed honour and 
right above all considerations of profit and advantage. 
Do you therefore suppose that he was afterwards 

nummum niillum' attigisset. Num igitur eum postea 
censes anxio animo aut suUicito fuisse ? Nihil minus, 
contraque ilia hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus. 
Magiii enijn aestimabat pecuniam non modo non 
contra leges sed etiam legibus partam ; quae quidem 
vel cum pcriculo est quaerenda vobis ; est enim 
effectrix multarum et mognarum voluptatum. 

56 Ut igitur illis qui, recta et honesta quae sunt, ea 

statuunt per ae expeteiida, adeunda sunt saepe peri- 
cula decgris honestatisquc causa, sic vestrls, qui omnia 
voluptate metiuutur, pericula adeunda sunt ut adipi- 
seantur magnas voluptates. Si magna res, magna 
hereditas ag-ctur, cum pecunja voluptates pariantur 
plurimae, idem crit Epicuro veatro ' faciendum, si 
suum finem bonorum sequi volet, quod Scipioni, 
magna gloria proposita si Hannibalem in Africam 
retraxisset, Itaque quantum adiit periculum ! Ad 
honestatem enim ilium omnem conatum suum re- 
ferebat, non ad voluptatem. Sic vester sapiens, 
magno aliquo emolumento commotus, cum causa,' 

S? si opus erit, dimicabit. Occultum facinua esse po- 
tuerit, gaudebit ; deprehensus omnem poenam con- 
temiiet. Erit enim instructus ad mortem contemnen- 
dam, ad exiliura, ad ipsum etiani dolorem. Quern 
quidem vos cum improbis poenam proponitis impe- 
tibilem facitis, cum sapientem semper boni plus 
habere vultis tolerabilem. 

XVIII. " Sed finge non solum callidum eum qui ali- 

' nummum nullum ; some inf. MSS. ne nummum guidem 
'mm causa Mdv. marks as corrupt, and cortjeckires cum 

BOOK U. xviUxviii 
troubled by remorse ? Not a bit of it. On the con- 
trary, the inheritance made him a rich roan, and he 
was thoroughly pleased with himself in consequence. 
He thought he had scored heavily : he had won a 
fortune, not only by no illegal means, but actually 
by the aid of the law. And according to your school 
it is right to try to get money even at some risk ; 
for money procures many very delightful pleasures. 

56 Thereforejustas those who hold that things right 

and honourable are desirable for their own sake must 
often take risks in the cause of honour and morality, 
so Epicureans, who measure all Ihing.s by pleasure. 
may properly take risks in order to obtain consider- 
able pleasures. If a large sum of money or a great 
inheritance is at stake, inasmuch as money buys a 
vast number of pleasures, your Epicurus, if he wishes 
to attain his own End of Goods, will have to act 
as Scipio did, when he had the chance of winning 
great renown by enticing Hannibal back to Africa. 
To do so, he risked enormous dangers. For honour 
and not pleasure was the aim of that great enter- 
prise. Similarly, your Epicurean Wise Man, when 
stirred by the prospect of some considerable gain, 
will fight to the death, if need be, and with good 

51 reason. Do circumstances allow his crime to go 
undetected, so much the better ; but if found out, 
he will make light of every penalty. For he will 
have been schooled to make Ught of death, of exile, 
even of pain itself. The latter indeed you make 
out to be unendurable when you are enacting 
penalties for the wicked, but easy to bear when , 
you are maintaining that the WiSe Man will always ib 
eonainand a preponderance of Good. ^ 

XVIII. "But suppose that our evil-doer is not only " 

quid improbe tiaciat, verutn etiam- praepotetitem, ut 
M. Crassus fiiit, — qui tamen solebat oti suo bono,— 
uthodie est noBter Pompeius, cui recte fac i en ti gratia 
est habenda ; esse enim quam vellet iniquus poterat 
impune. Quam multa vero iniuste fieri possunt quae 

,'j8 nemo possit reprehendere ! Si te amicus tuusmoriens 
rogaverit ut hereditatem reddas suae filiae, nee us- 
quam id scrijiserit, ut scripsit Fadius, nee cuiquun 
dixerit, quid fades? Tu quidem reddes; ipse Epi- 
curus fortassc redderet; ut Sex. Peducaeus, Sex. F., 
is qui hunc nostrum reliquit effigiem et bumanitatis 
et probitntis suae (ilium, cum doctus, turn ommum 
vir optimus et iustissimus, cum sciret nemo eum ro- 
gatum a C, Plotio, equite Romano splendido, Nur- 
sino, ultro ad mulierem veiiit eique nihil opinanti viri 
mandatum exposuit hereditatemque reddidit. Sed 
ego ex te quaero, quoniam idem tu certe fecisses, 
nonne intellegas eo raaiorem vim esse naturae quod 
ipsi vos, qui omnia ad vestrum eommodum et ut ipsi 
dicitis ad voluptatein referatis, tamen ea faciatis e 
quibus appareat nun voluptateui ^'os sed oHieium se- 
qui, plusque rectam naturam quam rationem pravain 

59 valere? Si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte 
latere uspiam et velle atiquem imprudentem super 
earn assidere cuius more tibi «mulunieiituni futum sit, 

B BOOK II. Kviii 

**Wlever but also supremely iiuwerful, as was Marcus 
Crassus,^who however was mostly content to rely 
on his private resources; or like our friend Poinpeius 
atthepresent time, who deserves our gratitude for his 
upright conduct, since he might be as unjust as he 
liked with impunity. But how many unrighteous 
acts are possible which no one would be in a position 

i 8 to censure ! If a friend of yours requests you on his 
death-bed to hand over his estate to his daughter, 
without leaving his intention anywhere in writing, 
!is Tadiusdid, or speaking of it to anybody, what will 
you do ? You no doubt wiU hand over the money ; 
perhaps Epicurus himself would have done the same ; 
as did Sextus Peducaeus, son of Sextus, a scholar and 
a gentleman of scrupulous honour, who left behind 
him a son, our friend of to-day, to recall his father's 
culture and integrity. Ko one knew that a similar 
request bad been made to Sextus by a distinguished 
Roman knight named Gaius Plotius, of Nursia ; but 
Sextus of his own accord went to Plotius's widow, in- 
formed her, much to her surprise, of her husband's 
commission, and handed over the property to her. 
But the question 1 want to put to you is this : since 
you yourself would undoubtedly have done the sa: 
do you not see the force of natural instinct is all I 
the more firmly established by the fact that even yon l 
Epicureans, who profess to make your own interest ] 
and pleasure your sole standard, nevertheless perfor 
actions that prove you to be really aiming not at 'J 
pleasure but at duty ; prove, I say, that the natural 
impulse towards right is more powerful than corrupt 

.')9 reason ? Suppose, says Cameades, you should know 
that there is a viper lurking somewhere, and that 
some one, by whose death you stiuid to profit, is about 

improbe feceris nisi monueris ne asaidat. Sed im- 
punite tnmen ; scisse enim te quis coarguere possit ? 
Sed nimis multa. Perspicuum est eniin, nisi aequitas, 
fidcSj iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia haec 
ad utilitatem referantur, virum boniim non posse re- 
periri, deque Jiis rebus satis multa ill nostris de re 
publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio. 
) XIX. ' Transfer idem ad modestiam vel temiwran- 
tiam,quac est moderatto cupiditatum rationi obediens. 
Satiane ergo pudori consulat si quis sine teste libidini 
pareat? An est aliquid per se ipsum flagitiosum, 
etiamsi nulla comitetur infaijiia ? Quid ? fortes 
viri voluptatuinne calculis subductis proeliuin ineunt, 
sanguinem pro patria profundunt, an quodain aninii 
ardore atque impetu concitati ? U trum tandem 
censes, Torquate, Imperiosum ilium, si nostra verba 
Audiret, tuamne de se omtionem lilientius auditurum 
fuisse an meani, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse 
sua causa omiiiaque rei publicae, tu contra nihil nisi 
sua? Si vero id etiam explanare velles, apertiusque 


61 modo eum 

fecerit, si 

sertim vir 


ihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quo- 
n tandem laturum fuisse existimas? Esto; 
i its vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates 
im dicere quara voluptates, in tanto prae- 
<); num etiam eius collega P. Decius. 

^P BOOK 11. xviii-Kix 

to sit ilown on it uuawares : then you will do a 
wicked deed if you do not warn him not to sit down. 
But still your wickedness would go unpunished, for 
who could possibly prove that yoii knew ? How- 
ever, I labour the point unnecessarily. It is obvious 
that, if fair-dealing, honesty and justice have not their 
source in nature, and if all these things are only 
valuable for their utility, no good nian can anywhere 
be found. The subject is fully discussed by Laelius 
in my volumes On the Slate. 

3 XIX. Apply the same test to Temperanee or m 
Moderation, which means the control of the appetites '' ^ 
in obedience to the reason. * Suppose a, man yields to Coutige. 
vicious impulses in secret, — is that no offence against \ ^ 

purity? Ori«-itiioXt^e_that an act can be sinfiil in \ ' , 
itself, even-thougb-ao disgrace attehdsjt? And again, \ ■ ' 
does a brave soldier go into battle and shed his blood ' 
I'or his country upon a nice calculation of the balance 
of pleasures, or in liot blood and under the stimulus 
of impulse ? Come, Torquatus, if the great Ini- 
periosus were listening to our debate, which of our 
two speeches about himself would he have heard 
with greater satisfaction, yours or mine ? Me declar- 
ing that no deed of his was done for selfish ends, but 
all from motives of patriotism, or you maintaining 
that he acted solely for self ? And suppose you had 
wanted to make your meaning clearer, and had said 
more explicitly that all his actions were prompted by 
desire for pleasure, pray how do you imagine he 
>1 would have taken it? But grant your view; assume 
if you like that Torquatus acted for his own advan- 
tage (l would sooner put it in that way than say ' for 
his own pleasure,' especially in the case of so great 
a man), Yet what about his colleague Publius 

printeps iu ea f&niJlJH. consulatus, cum se ilevovenit 
ctequofidimsBO in median) acieniLatinorum irruebat, 
aliquid de voluptAtibus suia cogitabat? ubi ut earn 
caperet aiit quaiido? cum seiret cunfestim esse mori- 
cndum, eamque mortem ardentiore studio peteret 
quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat Quod 
quidem eius factum nisi esset iure laudatum, non 
esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo lilius, iieque porro 
es eo natus cum Pyn'ho bellum gerens consul cecidis- 
set in proelio seque e continenti genere tertiam 

62 victimam rei publicae praebuisset. Contineo me ab 
esemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est, Leouidas, 
Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor : ego si nostros 
coUigere coepero, perijciaro illud qiiidem ut se vir- 
tuti tradat coiistringeudam voluptas, sed dies me 
delieiet, et, ut A. Varius, qui est habitus iudex durior, 
dicere eonsessori tiolebat, cum datis testibus alii 
tamen citarentur: 'Aut hoc testium satis est aut 
iiescio quid satis sit,' sic a me satis datum est te- 
stium. Quid enim ? te ipsum, diguissimum niaiori- 
bus tuis, voluptasne induxit ut adulescentulus eripe- 
res P. Sullac consulatum ? Quern cum ad patrem 
tuum rettulisses, fortissimum vinim, quHlis ille vel 
consul vel civis cum semper, turn post consulatum 
fuit! Quo quidem auctore nos ipsi ea gessimus ut 
omnibus potius quam ipsis nobis consuluerimus. 

63 At quam pulchre dicere videbare, cum en altera. 

BOOK U. xix 
Decius, the first of his family to be consul ? When 
Decius vowed liimself to death, and setting spurs to 
his horse was eharging into the thickest of the Latin 
ranks, surely he had no thought of personal pleasure? 
Pleasure where to be enjoyed or when ? For he 
knew he must die in a moment, aye and he courted 
death with more passionate ardour than Epicurus 
would have us seek pleasure. Had not his exploit 
earned renown, it would not have been imitated by 
his son in his fourth consulship ; nor would the 
letter's son again, commanding as consul in the war 
with Pyrrhus, have also fallen in battle, third in suc- 
cession of his line to give himself a victim for the 

[>2 state. I refrain from further instances. The Greeks 
have but a modest liat, — Leonidas, Epaminondas, 
some three or four ; but were 1 to begin to cite the 
heroes of our race, I should doubtless succeed in 
making Pleasure yield herself prisoner to Virtue, but 
— daylight would fail before 1 had done. Aulus 
Varius, noted for his severity as a judge, used to say 
to his colleague on the bench, when after witnesses 
had been produced still further witnesses were 
called ; ' Either we have evidence enough already, 
or I do not know what evidence can be enough.' 
Well, I have cited witnesses enough, ^^'hy, you 
yourself, in every way a worthy scion of your stock, 
— was pleasure the inducement that led you, a mere 

■ youth, to wrest the consulship from Publius Sulla ? 
You won that office for your gallant father ; and what 
a consul he was! What a patriot, all his life long 
and more especially aCler his consulship ! It was 
with his support that I carried through an affair, 
which was for all men's interest rather than my o 

jS " But how well you thought you put your 

parte ponebascumulatum aliqueni plurimiset maximis 
voluptatibus nullo nee praeseiiti nee future dolore, 
ex altera autem cniciatibus maximis toto corpore 
nulla nee adiuncta nee sperata voluptate, et quaere- 
bas quis aut hoc miserior aut superiore illo beatior 
delude concludebas summum malum esse doloi 
sum mum bonum voluptatem I 

XX. " L. ThorJus Balbus fuit, Lanuvinus, qi 
meminisse tu non potes ; is ita vivebat ut nulla 
exquisita posset inveniri voluptas qua non abundi 
Erat et cupidus voluptatum et eius generis intelli 
gens et copiosus ; ita non superstitiosus ut ilia plurima 
in sua palria sacrificia et fana contemneret; ita non 
timidus ad mortem ut in acie sit ob rem publicam 
i interfectus. Cupiditates non Epicuri divisione fiuie- 
bat sed sua satietate. Habebat tamen nitionem 
valetudinis; utebatur iis exercitationibus ut ad 
cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo qui et 
suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquen- 
dum, vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. Cetera 
ilia adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus 
intellegere quid sit bonum. Aberat omnis dolor; 
qui si adesset, nee molliter ferret et tamen medicis 
pluK quam philosophis uteretur. Color egregius, In- 
tegra valetudo, sumina gratia'; vita deuique conferta 


, 01 Vergiaini. 

BOOK II. xix-xx 
when you pictured on the one hand a person loaded The voiuptn»r)> 
with an abundance of the most delightful pleasures f^pp^ 
and free from all pain whether present or in pros- ^ 
pectj and on the other one racked throughout liis 
frame by the most excruciating pains, unqualified by 
any pleasure or hope of pleasure ; then proceede3 to 
ask who could be more wretched than the tatter or 
more happy than the former ; and finally drew the 
conclusion that pain was the Chief Evil and pleasure 
the Chief Good I 

XX. Well, there was a certain Lucius Thorius of 
Lanuvium, whom you cannot remember ; he lived 
on the principle of enjoying in the fullest measure 
all the most exquisite pleasures that could possibly 
be found. His appetite for pleasures was only 
equalled by his taste and ingenuity in devising them. 
He was so devoid of superstition as to scoff at all the 
gacriftees and shrines for which his native place is 
famous; and so free from fear of death that he died 
64 in battle for his country. Epicurus's classification 
of the desires meant nothing to him ; he knew no 
limit but satiety. At the same time he was care- 
ful of his health : took sufheient exercise to come 
hungry and thirsty to table ; ate what was at once 
most appetizing and most digestible ; drank enough 
wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor 
did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence 
of which Epicurus declares that he cannot under- 
stand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at 
all ; had it come to him, he would have borne it 
with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor 
sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health 
i^»ida sound constitution. He was extremely popular. 
^^Kl short, his life was replete with pleasure of every 

r fi,') voluptatum omnium varietate. Hunc vos beatum.— 

ratio quidem vestra sic cogit; at ego quem huic 
anteponam non audeo dicere ; dicet pro me ipsa 
virtus, nee dubitabit isti vestro beato M- Reguluni 
anteponere, quem quidem, cum sua voluntatej nulla. 
vi coactus praeter lidem quam dederat hosti, ex 
patria Carthaginem revertisset, tum ipsum, cum 
tigiliis et fame cruciaretur, claniat virtiis beatiorem 
fiiisse quam potantem in rosa Thorium. Bella magna 
gesserat, bis consul fuerat, triunipharat, nee tamen 
sua ilia superiora tarn magna neque tam praeclara 
ducelrat quam ilium iiltimtim casum quem propter 
fidem constant iamque susceperat ; qui nobis misera- 
hilis videtur audientibus, illi perpetienti erat volu- 
ptarius. Non enim hilaritate nee lascivia nee risu 
aut ioco, comite levitatis, saepe etiam tristes firmi- 
\ 66 tate et constantia sunt lieati. Stuprata per vim 
Lucretia a regis filio testata cives se ipsa interemit. 
Hie dolor populi Romani duce et auctore Bruto causa 
civitati libertatis fuit, ob eiusque mulieris memoriam 
primo anno et vir et pater eius consul est factus. 
Tenuis L. Verginius unusque de 
anno post libertatem receptam virginem filiam 
manu oecidit potius quam ea Ap. Claudi libidini. 
tum erat cum^ suramo imperio, dedereti 

filiam SU^^H 
ibidini, q^^^l 


at least svmr ikim* n^mt» ymm to d» a*. Bat I 
place abam fc^ — I d» mat » ff t. Ib atf wk^m: 
Virtue bcncif ^aH 9eA 6r me. a^ ike «9 Mot 
hesiUte to n^ SbRm Bccdbs t^Kr Iba Ok 

tj|ili iillj liini) Ml», ai J— auMliI i illliw Ecpalat, 
of his own free «fl ^id aad^ no d^^fdoea except 
that m a pmHaae gii<ui to an tf o eT j ictuiuea &aM 
his natiTc had to C 

that vbcB be bad d 
tonuested vitb al 
caroo^ng on his cmmJi of rvse*. Bcgvlvs had faa^il 
great van, had tviee been cansal, had e el e b r ale d a 
trinin[ifa : j*t aD his earfier exploits be counled less 
givat and g fa wuw» than thmk final disaster , vhiefa be 
ebosc to undeig* foe the sake of hoooar and of 
lo3^t)* : > pitiahle end, aa it seems to ns who be«r 
of it, but full of pleasore foa- faim «ho endured >t 
Gaiety and tuerriment, langfater and jesting, those 
romnules of frivolitT, are not the <>n]}' sigiis of 
happiness : often in sadness those are happf whose 
fit) wills are strong and tme. Lucretia outraged b.v 
the royal prince called on her fellow-ciliiens lo 
witness her wrong and died by her own haiKJ. The 
indignation that this aroused in titc RoDian People, 
under the leadership and guidance of Brutus, wo» 
freedom for the state ; and in gratitude to Lucretia'a 
memory both her husband ajid her father were made 
consuls for the first year of the republic. Sixty years 
after our liberties had been won, Lucius Verginius, 
a poor man of humble station, killed his mitideii 
daughter with his own hand rather than surrender 
r to the lust of Appius Clnudiiis. who then held 
e highest power in the state. 


' 67 XXI. '■ Aut haec tibi, Torquate, sunt vituperanda 
aut putrocinium vohiptatis repudiandum. Quodauteni 
patrocinium aut quae ista causa est voluptatis quae 
nee testes uUos e claris viris nee laudatores poterit^ 
adhibere ? Ut enim nos ex aimalium monumentis 
testas exdtamus eos quorum omnis vita consumpta 
est in laboribus gloriosis, qui voluptatis nomen audire 
non possent, sic in vestris dispiitationibus historia 
muta est. Numquam audivi in Epicuri schola LycuT- 
gam, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epami- 
nondam nominari, qui in ore sunt celerorum pliiloso^, 
phorum omnium. Nunc vero, quoniam haec no*) 
etiam traetare coepimus, suppeditabit nobis Atticu»' 

68 noster e thesauris suis quos et quantos 
mehus est de his aliqoid quam tantis voluniinibus d« 
Tbemista loqui ? Sint ista Graecorum ; quamquara 
ab lis philosophiam et omnes ing'enuas disciplinas 
habemus ; sed tamen est aliquid quod nobis non 
liceat, liceat illis. Pugnant Stoici eum Peripateticis. 
Alteri negant quidquani esse bonum nisi quod ho» 
nestum sit, alteri plurimuni se et longe longeqae 
plurimiini tribuece honestati, sed tamen et in corpore 
et extra esse quaedam bona. Et certamen honestum 
et disputatio splendida '. Omnis est enim de virtutis 
dignitate contentio. At cum tuis cum diss eras, 
multa sunt audienda etiam de obscenis voluptatibus, 

69 de quibus ab Epicuro saepissime dicitur. Non potes 
ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et 


e historical and biographical m 

cellanksi' ^^^ 

BOOK 11. xxi 

67 XXI. Ritlier, Torquatus, you must reprobate Epfamsnbm 
these actions, or you must give up your championship J^" peaVSS 
of Pleasure. But what defence can Pleasure offer, of hatory. 
what case can you make out for her, when she will 
be able to produce no famous men as her witnesses 
or supporters ? On our side we cite in evidence 
from our records and our annals men who spent their 
whole lives in glorious toils, men who would not have 
borne to hear pleasure so mucli as named ; but 
in your discourses history is dumb. In the school of 

■Spicurus I never beard one mention of Lycurgus, 
Solon, MiltiadeS] Themistocles, Epaminondas, who 
DC always on the lips of tbe other philosophers. And 
bofw that we Romans too have begun to treat of these 
themes, what a marvellous roll of great men will our 
friend Atticus supply to us from his store-houses of 

68 learning!" Would it not be better to talk of these than 
^^^ to devote those bulky volumes to Th emista ? Let us 
^^■geave that sort of thing to the Greeks. True we owe 
^^■e ibem philosophy and all tlie liberal sciences : yet 
-^^^Wiere are topics not permitted to us, that are allow- 
^^^rt)le for them. Battle rages between the Stoics and 

the Peripatetics. One. school declares that nothing 
is good but Moral Worth, the other that, while it 
assigns the greatest, and by far the greatest, value 
to Morality, yet still some bodily and external things 
ate good. Here is an honourable quarrel, fought out 
in high debate ! For the whole dispute turns on the 
true worth of virtue. But when one argues with 
your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about 
even the grosser forms of pleasure ! Epifurus is 

69 always harping upon them ! Believe me then. Tor- it painu the 

Kitus, if you will but look within, and study your ha'^d^ld.'S 
n thoughts and inclinations, you cannot con- p'""""- 


tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris ; piidebit 
inquam, Ulius tabulae qiiam Cleanthes sane com^l 
mode verbis depingere solebat. lubebat 
aiidiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula 
voluptatem puleherrimo vestitu et omatii regali in 
solio sedentem ; praesto esse virtutcs nt ancillolas, 
quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum offidum duce- 
rent nisi ut voluptati ministrarent, et earn tantum ad 
aurem admonerent (si modo id pietura intellegi pos- 
set) ut caveret ne quid faceret imprudens quod offen- 
deret animos hominunij aut quidquam e quo orireti 
aliquis dolor. Nos quidem virtutes sic natae 
ut tibi serviremus ; aliud negoti nihil habemu 

D XXII. At negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestruni 
lumen est) quemquam qui honeste non vivat iucunde 
posse vivere. Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut 
neget; illud quaero, quid et qui in voluptate sum- 
mum bonum ponat consentaneuni sit dicere, Qi 
affers cur Tliorius, cur Chius Postumi 
nium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime 
xerit? Ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam^ 
reprendendam nisi plane fatui sint, id est nisi aut 
cnpiant aut metuant. Quaruni anibarum rerum cum 
niedicinam pollicelur, luxuriae liceiitiam pollicetur. 
His enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asoto- 

l rum vita quod reprcudat. Non igitur potestig volu- 
ptate omnia dirigentes aut tueri aut re tinere virtu tem. 
Nam iiec vir bonus ac iustus haberi debet qui n^i 

Mnf. MSS. have Posiumius cur Cliius. \ 
a coTTiiptioii, suspect ingr tliat three persons 
tneraled before cur emnium horum: perhaps 
(an epicure mcnlioned by X'arro and Pliny the Eldrrl, t 




BOOK II. xxi-xxii 
tinue to del'eiid the doctrines you profess. Yon 
will be put to tlie blush, I say, by tile picture that 
Cleanthes used to draw so cleverly in his lectures. 
He would tell liis audience to imagine a paint- 
ing representing Pleasure, decked as a queen, «nd 
gorgeously apparelled, seated on a throne ; nt lier 
side should stand the Virtues as her handmaids, 
who should make it their sole object and duty to 
minister to Pleasure, merely whispering in her ear 
the warning (provided this could be conveyed by the 
painter's art) to beware of unwittingly doing aught 
to offend' public opinion, or anything from which pain 
might result. As for us Virtues, we were born to 
be your slaves ; that is our one and only business.' 

70 XXn, "But, you will tell me, your great luminary inji 
Epicurus denies that anyone who does not live oX 
morally can live pleasantly. As if I cared what '^ 
Epicurus says or denies ! What I ask is, what is it | 
consistent for a man to say who places the Chief 
Good in pleasure? What reason can you give for 
thinking that Thorius, or Postumius of Chios, or the ', 
master of them all, Orata, did not live extremely 
pleasant lives ? Epicurus himself says that the life 

of sensualists is blameless, if they are not utter 
fools— for that is what his proviso, if tliey are free 
from fear and from desire," amounts to. And, as he 
offers an antidote for both desire and fear, he vir- 
tually offers free indulgence for sensuality. Eliminate 
those passions, he says, and he cannot find anything 

7 1 to blame in a life of proHigacy. Consequently you 
Epicureans, by taking pleasure as the sole guide, 
make it impossible for yourselves either to uphold 
or to retain virtue. For a man is not to be thought 
good and just who refrains from doing wrong to 


malum habeat abstinet se ab iniuria; m 

Nemo pius est qui pietatem — ; 
; putes quidquam esse verius. Nee 


metuit iustus est, et certe si metuere destiterit non 
erit; non metuet autem sive celnre poterit sive 
opibus magnis quidquid fecerit obtinere, certeque 
malet existimari vir bonus ut non sit, quam esse ut 
non putetur. Itaj quod certissimum est,' pro vera 
certaque iustitia siiuulationcm nobis iustitiae traditis 
praecipitisque quodam modo ut nostram-stabilem 
conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opi- 
nionem aucupemur. Quae dici eiidem de ceteris 
virtutibus possunt, quarum omnia fundamenta vos in 
voluptate tamquam in aqua ponitis. Quid enim ? 
fortenme possumus dicere eundem ilium Torqua- 
tum ? — delector enim, quamquam te non possum, 
ut ais, comimpere, delector, inquam, et familia vestra 
et nomine ; et hercule mllii vir optimus nostrique 
amantissimus, A. Torquatus, versatur ante octilos, 
cuius quantum studium et qnam insigne fuerit erga 
me temporibus illis quae nota sunt omnibus, scire 
necesse est utrumque vestrum ; quae mihi ipsi, qui 
volo et esse et haberi gratus, grata non essent nisi 
eum perspicerem mea causa mihi auiicum fuisse, non 
sua ; nisi hoc dieis, sua, quod interest omnium recte 
facere. Si id dicis, vicimus ; id enim volumus, id 

I Mdv. suspects 

«An unknown quolalion. 
^^ce ended with mclu coUt oi 
liCp. S 6j above. 

>e ""-^ 


avoid incurring harm ; 

I doubt yoii know the 

None is good, whose love of goodness — ;" 

believe me, nothing can be truer. As long as his 
motive is fear, he is not just, and assuredly as soon 
as he ceases to fear, he will not be just ; and lie will 
not feel fear, if he can conceal his wrong-doing, or is 
sufficientiy powerful to brazen it out ; and he will 
assuredly prefer the reputation without the reality 
of goodness to the reality without the reputation. So 
your school undoubtedly preaches the pretence of 
justice instead of the real and genuine thing. Its 
lesson amounts to this — we are to despise the trust- 
worthy voice of our own conscience, and to run after 
78 the f^lible imaginations of other men. The same 
applies in the case of the other virtues. Basing them 
entirely on pleasure you are laying their foundations 
in water. Wliy, take the great Torquatus again; 
can he really be called brave ?^for I delight, albeit 
my flattery, as you put it, is powerless to bribe 
you, I delight, I say, in your name and lineage; and 
indeed I have personal recollections of that distin- 
guished man. Aulus Torquatus, who was an affec- 
tionate friend of my own, and whose signal loyalty 
and devotion to me in circumstances that are within 
universal knowledge^ must be familiar to you both ; 
yet for my part, anxious as I am to feel and show a 
proper gratitude, I would not have thanked him for 
his friendship had I not known that it was dis- 
intereBted; unless you choose to say that it was for 
his own interest in the sense that it is to every 
man's interest to act rightly. If you do say so, we 
have won our case ; for our one principle, our one 
M 161 


73 contendimus, ut ofEcl fi-uctus ait ipaum ofScium. Hoc 

ille tuus non vult, omiiibusque ex rebus voluptatem 
quasi mercedem esigit. Sed ad ilium redeo ; si vo- 
luptatis L'ausa cum Gallo apud Aniciiem dcpugiiavit 
provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et co- 
gnomen iuduit ullam aliam ob causam nisi quod ei 
talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. 
lam si pudoFj si modestia, si pudicitia, si ano verbo 
temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coercebuntur, 
non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, 
quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet 
aut occultatione pruposita aut impunitate aut li- 

i Quid i illud, Torquate, quale tandem videtur, — te 

isto nomine ingenio gloria, quae facis, quae cogitas, 
quae contendis quo referas, cuius rei causa perficere 
quae conaris velis, quid optimum denique in vita 
iudiees, non audere in conventu dicere ? Quid enim 
mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in con- 
tionem ascenderis (est enim tibi edicendum quae sis 
observaturus in iure ijicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi 
erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices 
more maiorum), — quid mcrearis igitur ut dicas te in 
eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse 
teque nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa ? — 

BOOK II. xxii 

rS contention is, that duty is its own reward. This 
your great master does not allow ; he expects 
everything to pay — to yield its quota of plet 
But I return to old Torquatus. If it was to win 
pleasure that he accepted the Gallic warrior's chal- 
lenge to single combat on the banks of the Anio, 
and if he despoOed him and assumed liis necklet 
and the corresponding surname for any other reason 
than that he thought such deeds became a i 
do not consider him brave. Again, if modesty, self- 
control, chastity, if in a word Temperance is to 
depend for its sanction on the fear of punishment or 
of disgrace, and not to maintain itself by its c 
intrinsic sacrednt-ss, what form of adultery, ' 
lust will not break loose and run riot when it is 
assured of concealment, impunity or indulgence. 

74, Or what, pray, are we to think of the situation if ^0 nub 

you, Torquatus, bearing the name you do, and gifted g""* ■" 
and distinguished as you are, dare not profess before a , 
public audience tlie real object of all your actions, 1 
aims and endeavours, the motive that inspires you 
to accomplish your undertakings, what it is in short 
that you consider the greatest good in life? In re- 
turn for what payment or consideration, when not 
long hence you have attained to public office and 
come forward to address a meeting (for you will have 
to announce the rules that you propose to observe in 
administering justice, and very likely also, if you 
think good, you will follow the time-honoured custom 
of making some reference to your ancestors and to 
yourself), — for what consideration then would you con- 
sent to declare that you intend in office to guide your 
conduct solely by pleasure, and that pleasure has 
been your aim in every action of your life? — Do you 
M2 163 

All me,' inquis, ' taxa amentem putas ut apud 
imperitos isto modo loquar ? '^At tu eadem ista die 
in iudicio aut, si coronam times, die in senatu. Num- 
quam fades. Cur, nisi quod turpis oratio est ? Mene 
ergo et Triarium digiios existimas apud quos turpiter 

75 XXIII. Veruni esto : verbum ipsum voluptatia 
non habet dignitatem, nee nos fortasse intellegi- 
mus; hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos 
quam dicatis voluptatem. Rem videlicet difficilem 
et obscuram ! Individua cum dicitis et intermundia, 
quae nee sunt ulla nee possunt esse, intellegimus ; 
voluptas, quae passeribus nota est omnibus, a nobis 
intellegi non potest ? Quid si efficio ut fateare me 
non modo quid sit voluptas scire (est enim iucundus 
motus in sensu), sed etiam quid earn tu velis esse? 
Turn enim eam ipsam vis quam modo ego dixi, et 
nomen imponis in raotu ut sit et faciat aliquam varie- 
tatem, tum aliam quandam sumniam voluptatem cui 
addi nihil possit ; earn tum adesse cum dolor omnis 

76 absit ; eam stabilem appellas. Sit sane ista. voluptas. 
Die in quovis conventu te omnia facere ne doleas. 
Si ne hoc quidem satis ample, satis honeste dici 
putas, die te omnia et in isto magistratu et in omni 
vita utilitatie tuag causa facturum, nihil nisi quod 



take me for such au imbecile,' you exblaim, as < 
in that fashion before ignorant people?' — Well, 
the same profession in a law-court, or if you are 
of the public there, say it in the senate. You 
never do it. Why not, unless because sueh language 
is disgraceful? Then what a compliment to TwquiiliirLr^ 
and myself, to use it in our presence! ^ 

75 XXJII. ' But let us grant your position. Theactual 
word pleasure' has an undignified sound; and per- 
haps we do not understand its significance : you are 
always repeating that we do not understand what 
you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult 
or recondite notion! We understand you when you 
talk of indivisible atoms' and cosmic interspaces,' 
things that don't exist and never can exist; then is 
our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning 
of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow ? What 
if I force you to admit that I do know not only what 
pleasure really is (it is an ajjx eeable activit y ofthe 

jenseX b ut also what you meanby it f i-or at one 
moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just 
defined, and this you entitle ' kinetic ' pleasure, as 
producing a definite change of feeling, butat anotlier 
nioment you say it is quite a different feeling, which 
is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists 
merely in the complete absence of pain ; this you 

76 call ' static ' pleasure. Well, grant that pleasure is 
the latter sort of feeling. Profess in any public 
assembly that the motive of all your actions is the 
desire to avoid pain. If you feel that this too does 
not sound sufficiently dignified and respectable, say 
that you intend both in your present office and all 
your life long to act solely for the sake of your own 
advantage, — to do nothing but what will pay, nothing 


to talk ^^M 

afraid ^^^ 

expediat, nihil deuique nisi tua causa ; quetn cla- 
morem i^ontionis aut quam spem consutatus eius qui 
tibi pai-atissimus est iiituram putas ? Eamne rationem 
igitiir sequere* qua tecum ipse et cum tuis utare, pro- 
fiteri et in medium proferre non audeas ? At vero 
ilia quae Peripiatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi 
in ore sunt in iudiciis, in senatu. Oflicium, aequi- 
tatem, disnitatero, fidem, recta, honesta, digna im- 
perio, digna populo Romano, omnia perieula pro re 
publica, niori pro patria, — liaec cum loqueris, nos 
barones stuperaus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides. 
' Nam inter tsta tarn magnifica verba tamque praeclara 
non habet nllum voluptas locum, non modo ilia quam 
in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani, rustici, 
omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem 
vocaiit, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter 
vos nemo appellat voluptatem. XXIV, Vide igitur 
□e non debeas verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. Quod 
si vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres quo gravior vide- 
rere, non esses tui siniilis ; verba tu fingas, et ea dicas 
quae non sentias ? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sen- 
tentiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliain forensera, 
ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus Veritas occultetur ? 
Vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. Mihi quidem eae verae 
videntur opiniones quae lionestae, quae laudabiles, 
quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, 
^sequere A; most MSS. stquare. 

BOOK II. xxiii-xxiv 
in short that is not for your own interest ; imagine 
the uproar among the audience ! What would be- 
come of your chances of the consulship, which as it 
is seems to be a certainty for you in the near future ? 
Will you then adopt a rule of life which you can ap- 
peal to in private and among friends but which you 
dare not openly profess or parade in public ? All, 
but it is the vocabulary of the Pt^ripatetics and the 
Stoics that is always on your lips, in the law-courts 
and the senate. Duty, Faii'-dealuig, Moral Worth, 
Fidelity, Uprightness, Honour, the Dignity of office, 
the Dignity of the Roman People, Risk all for the 
state. Die for your Country, — when you talk in 
this style, we simpletons stand gaping in admiration, 
77 — and you no doubt laugh in your sleeve. For in that 
glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds 
no place, not only what your school calls kinetic ' 
pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, 
every one, I say, who can speak Latin, means hy 
pleasure, but not even this static ' pleasure, which 
no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all. 
XXIV. Well then, are you sure you have any right 
to employ our words with meanings of your own ? If 
you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, 
in order to look more important, that would be insin- 
cere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, 
and say what you do not think f Or are you to 
change your opinions like your clothes, and Lave one 
set for indoor wear and another when you walk 
abroad ? Outside, all show and pretence, but your 
genuine self concealed within ? Reflect, I beg of 
you, is this honest ? In my view those opinions are 
^■frne which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble 
^^Krwhich can be openly avowed in the senate and 
^B 167 


li coetu coiicilioque profitendae sint, ne 
id lion pudeat seiitire quod pudeat dicere. 

\ Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis 

amicus esse cuiquam quern nou ipsum amet propter 
ipsum ? Quid autem est aniare, e quo nonien du- 
ctum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem alRci quam 
maximis etiamsi ad se ex iis nihil redundet' ? Pro- 
dest, inquit, niihi eo esse animo. Immo videri for- 
tasse. Esse enim, nisi eris, non potes^; qui autem 
esse poteris nisi te amor ipse ceperit ? quod non 
subducta utilitatis ratione effici solet, sed ipsum a se 
oritur et sua sponte nascitur. At enini sequor 
utilitatem.' Manebit ergo amicitia tani diu quam 
diu sequetur otilitas, et, si utilitas constituet amici- 

) tiam, toilet eadeiQ. Sed quid ag-es tandem si utilitas 
a\) amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? Relinquesne? 
quae ista amicitia est ? Retinebia ? qui convenit ? 
quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expe- 
tenda vides. Ne in odium veniam si amicum de- 
stitero toeri.' Primiim cur ista res digna odio est 
nisi quod est turpis ? Quod si ne quo incommodo 
afficiare non relinques amicum, tanicn, ne sine fructu 
alligatus sis, ut moriatur optabis. Quid si non 
modo utUitatem tibi nuUam afferet, sed iacturae 

' redundet Mdv.; M5S. rcdcunt et, redeat et, redeal quid. 

■ For the suspicious words esse enim, nisi eris, non potea, 
which make the Following^ sentence tautological, Graser 
conjeclures esse enim, nisi videris, non prodest. '"It pays 
me (you say) to be a disinterested friend.' No, to seem so 
perhaps : it doesn't pay to be so without seeming so. But 


^P BOOK II. \xiv 

the popular assembly, and in every company 
gathermg, so tlutt one need not be ashamed Ui say 
what one is not ashamed to think. 

78 Again, how will fHendsliip be possibli 
can one man be another man's friend, if he does not , 
love him in and for himself? What is the meaning 
of to love ' — from which our word for friendship is 
derived — except to wish some one to receive the 
greatest possible benefits even though one gleans 
no advantage therefrom oneself? It pays me,' you 
say, 'to be a disinterested friend.' No, perhaps it 
pays you to seem so. Be so you cannot, unless you 
really are ; but how can you be a disinterested friend 
unless you feel genuine affection ? Yet affection 
does not commonly result from any calculation of 
expediency. It is a spontaneous growth ; it springs 
up of itself. But.' you will say, I am guided by 
expediency," Tlien your friendship will last just so 
long as it is attended by expediency. If expediency 

79 creates the feehng it will also destroy it. But what, 
pray, will you do, if, as often happens, expediency 
parts company with friendship ? Will you throw 
your friend over ? What sort of friendship is that ? 
Will you keep him ? How does that square with 
your principles ? You remember your pronounce- 
ment that friendship is desirable for the sake of 
expediency. 1 might become unpopular if I left 
a friend in the lurch.' Well, in the first place, why 
is such conduct unpopular, unless because it is base ? 
And if you refrain from deserting a friend because 
to do so will have inconvenient consequences, still 
you will long for his death to release you from an 
unprofitable tie. What if he not only brings you 
no advantage, but causes you to suffer loss of pro- 



rei familiaris erunt faciundae, labores suscipiendi, 
sdeundum vitae periculum f ne turn quidem te re- 
spicies et cogitabis sibi quemque iiatuni esse et suis 
voluptatibus ? Vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis 
pro amico, ut Pytliagoreus iile Siculo fecit tyranno, 
aut Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Oresten ut mo- 
riare pro amico, aut si esses Orestes, Pyladem refel- 
leres, te uidicares, et si id iion probares, quo minus 
ambo una necaremini non deprecarere* ? 

J XXV. Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; 
nihil enim arbitror magna laude dlgnum esse quod 
te praetermissurum credam aut mortis aut doloris 
metu. Non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae con- 
sentaneura sit, sed quid disciplinae. Ratio ista quam 
defendis, praecepta quae didicisti, quae probas, fun- 
ditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis earn Epicurus, ut 
facit, in caelum efFerat laudibus. At coluit ipse 
amicitias.' Quis, quaeso, ilium negat et bonum 
virirni et comem et hiimanum fuisse ? De ingenio 
eius in his disputation! bus, non de moribus quaeritur. 
Sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui raale- 
dictis insectantur eos a quibus de veritate dissenti- 
unt. Sed quamvis comls in amicis tuendis fuerit, 
tamenj si haec vera sunt (nihil enim affirmo), non 

I satis acutus fuit. At multis se probavit.' Et qui- 
dem iure fortasse ; sed tamen non gravissimum est 
testimonium multitudinis. In omni enim arte vel 

'deflrtcarereedd.;precaren Mdv. with the MSS. 

■ Phintias, plea ding for his friend Damoii before Dionysius, 
'tyrant' of Syracuse; Dionysius pardoned them both and 
beerged to become a third insucb afriendahip. Cf. 0^.3.45. 

6Cr. V. 63. Cicero refers to a scene in the DulorcsUs of 
Pacuvius, where Thoas King of the Tauri wished to kill 
■whichever of the two captives brought before him was 

J 70 

^H BOOK II. xxiv-xxv 

perty, to undergo toil and trouble, to risk your Ij 
Will you not even then take interest into account, and 
reflect that each man is born for himself and for his 
own pleasure ? Will you go bail with your life to a 
tyrant on behalf of a friend, as the famous Pytha- 
gorean' did to the Sicilian despot? or being Pylades'' 
will you say you are Orestes, so as to die in your 
friend's stead ? or supposing you were Orestes, 
would you say Pylades was lying and reveal your 
identity, and if they would not believe you, would 
you entreat Uiat you both might die together ? 

jO XXV. 'YeSjTorquatus, you personally would do all ^fJPJ 
these tilings ; for I do not believe there is any high or bciui 
Doble action which fear of pain or death could induce "™ 
you to forgo. But the question is not what conduct is 
consistent with your character, but what is consis- 
tent with your tenets. The system you uphold, 
the principles you have studied and accept, under- 
znine the very foundations of friendship, however 
much Epicurus may, as he does, praise friendship up 
to the skies. But,' you tell nie, Epicurus himself 
had many friends.' Wlio pray denies that Epicurus was 
a good man, and a kind and humane man ? In these 
discussions it is his intellect and not his character 
that is in question. Let us leave to the frivolous 
Greeks the wrong-headedhabitofattackingand abus- 
ing the persons whose views of truth they do not 
share. Epicurus may have been a kind and faithful 
friend ; but if what I say is true (for I do not dog- 

Bl matiae), he was not a very acute thinker. But he 
won many disciples.' Yes, and perhaps he deserved 
to do so ; but still the witness of the crowd does not 
carry much weight; for as in every art or study or 
of any kind, so in right conduct itself, 

studio vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtutc, optimum 
quidque rarissimum est Ac mihi quidem, quod et 
ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et fuerunt et 
hodie sunt et in amieitiis fideles et in omni vita con- 
stanles et graves iiec voluptate sed officio consilia 
moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et 
minor voluptatis. Ita enini vivunt quidam ut eorum 
vita refetlatur oratio. Atque ut ccteri dicere existi- 
maiitur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videiitur facere 
melius quam dicere. 

82 XXVI. " Sed haec nihil sane ad rem ; ilia videamus 
quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. E quibus unum 
mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, 
amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli ob eamque 
rem cglendam esse quod, cum' sine ea tuto et sine 
metu vivi non posset, ne iucunde quidem posset. 
Satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud humanius 
liorum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, 
quod sciara, primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, 
cum autem usus accessisset, turn Ipsum amari per se, 
etiam omissa spe voluptatis. Hoc etsi multis modis 
reprendi potest, tamen accipio quod dant; mihi enim 
satis est, ipsls non satis. Nam aliquaiido posse recte 
fieri dicunt, nulla exspectata nee quaesit« voluptate. 

83 Posuisti etiam dicere alios foedus quoddam inter a 

ted by Mdv. 

1 mter ji^^ 


^^ BOOK n. ssY-un 

sapreme escellence is estremely rare. And to my 
mind the fact that Epicurus himself was a good n 
and that many Epicureans both have been and to- 
day are loyal to their friends, consistent and high- 
principled throughout their lives, niling thei 
duct by duty and not by pleasure ,^-aIl this does but 
enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish 
that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons' 
lives and behaviour refute the principles they pro-. 
fess. Most men's words are thought to be bettert, 
than their deeds ; these people's deeds on the con-| 
trary seem to me better than their word? 

82 XXVI. " But this I admit is a digression. Let us The ii.t« Epi. 
return to what you said about friendship. In one of ot fTienibhip 
your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epi- *^ "" 
curus himselfj^that friendship cannot be divorced 
from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated 
for the reason that without it we cannot liv( 
and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live agree- 
ably. Enough has been said in answer to this already. 
You quoted another and a more humane dictum 
of the more modem Epicureans, which so far as I 
know was never uttered by the master himself This 
was to the effect that, although at the outset we 
desire a man's friendship for utilitarian reasons, yet 
when intimacy has grown up we love our friend for 
his own sake, even if all prospect of pleasure be left 
out of sight. It is possible to take exception to this 
position on several grounds ; still I welcome tiieir 
concession, as it is sufiicient for my case and not 
sufficient for theirs. For it amounts to saying 
that moral action is occasionally possible, — action 
prompted by no anticipation or desire of plei 

83 You further alleged that other thinkers speak of 


facere sapientes ut, quemadmodum sint in se ipsos 
animati, eodetn modo sint erga amicos ; id et fieri 
posse et saepe esse factum et ad volupta.tes percipi- 
endas maxime pertinere. Hoc foedus facefe si 
potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, mode- 
atiam, virtutes onines per se ipsas gratis diligant. An 
vero si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus 
amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit quae facial 
amicitiam ipsam s»a sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter 
se expetendam, dubium est quin lundos et insulas 

^ amieis anteponanius ? Licet hie rursus ea camme- 
mores quae optimis verbis ab Epicuivj de laude ami- 
citiae dicta sunt. Non quaero quid dicat, sed quid 
convenienter possit rationi et sententiae suae dicere. 
Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita.' Num igitur 
utiliorem tibi bunc Triariuni putas esse posse quam 
si tua sint Pubeolis granaria? Collige omnia quae 
soletis: Praesidium aniicorum.' Satis est tibi in 
te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis 
praesidi ; iam coutemni non poteris ; odium autem 
et invidiam facile vitabis : ad eas enim res ab Epi- 
curo praecepta dantur. £t tamen tantls vectigatibus 
ad liberal itatem utens, etiam sine liac Pyladea amici- 
tia multoruni te benevolentia praeclare tuebere et 

5 munies. At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, (juicum 
arcana, quicum occulta omnia ? Tecum optime, 
deinde etiam cum medtocri amico. Sed fac ista esse 

^^tee I 


: making a sort of mutual comp&<? 
to entertain the same sentiments towards their 
friends as they feel towards themselves ; this (you 
said) was possible, and in fact had often occurred ; 
and it was highly conducive to the attainment of 
pleasure. If men have succeeded in making this 
compact, let them make a further compact to love 
fair-dealing, self-control, and all the virtues, for their 
own sakes and without reward. If on the other 
hand we are to cultivate friendships for their results, 
for profit and utility ; if there is to be no affection to 
render friendship in and for itself, intrinsically and 
spontaneously, desirable ; can we doubt that we shall 
value land and house -property more than friends ? 

!4 It is no good your once again repeating Epicurus'a 
admirable remarks in praise of friendship. I am not 
asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can 
say consistently while holding the theory he pro- 
fesses. Friendship is originally sought after from 
motives of utility.' Well, but surely you don't reckon 
Triarius here a more valuable asset than the granaries 
at Puteoli would be if they belonged to you ? Cite 
all the stock Epicurean maxims. ' Friends are a pro- 
tection.' You can protect yourself; the laws will 
protect you ; ordinary friendships offer protection 
enough ; soon you will be too powerful to be des- 
pised ; moreover you will easily avoid hatred and 
envy, — Epicurus gives rules for doing so 1 And even 
otherwise, with so large an income to give away, you 
can dispense with the om nt' so t of friendship 
that we have in mind you w 1 ha e plenty of well- 

B5 wishers to defend you qu e ff e y. But a con- 
fidant, to share your gra e ougl or gay ' as the 
saying is, all your sec e and pn a affairs? Your 


non importuna ; quid ad utUitatem tantae pecimiae? 
Vides igitur, si amicitiain sua caritate metiare, nihil 
esse praes tan tins, sin emoliinieDto, siiminos familiari- 

I fructuosorum mercede superari. 

mes oportet, non mea 

tates praediorui 
Me igitur ipsum 

XXVII. Sed in rebus apertiii 
flumus. Perfecto eiiim et concluso neque virtutil 
neque amicitiis usqiiam locum esse si ad voluptatem 
omnia teferantur, niliil praeterea est magno opere 
dicendum. Ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur 
esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reli- 
Ij6 quani orationem tuam. Quoniam igitur omnis sum- 
ma philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque 
unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contu- 
leruntj beate autem vivere alii in aUo, 
luptate ponitis, item contra 
dolore, id prinjiim videamus, beate 
quale sit. Atque hoc dabitiSj ut opinor, si modo sit 
aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totiun poni in pote- 
state sapientis. Nam si amitti vita beata potest, 
beatrt esse non potest. Quis enim confidit semper 
sibi ilhid stabile et finniim pennansurum quod fragile 

tib^H I 

omnen. i^ 

e vestninl^^l 

bonorum g 


Qui autem diffidit perpetuitati 
timeat necesse est ne aliquando 

BOOK II. xxvi-ssvii 
best confidant is yourself; you may also confide in & 
friend of the average type. But granting that 
friendship lias the conveniences you mention, what 
are they compared with the advantages of such vast 
wealth ? You see then that although if you measure 
friendship by the test of its own charm it is unsur- 
passed in value, by the standard of profit the most 
afiectionate intimacy is outweighed by the rents of a 
valuable estate. So you must love me myself, not 
my possessions, if we are to be genuine friends, 

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon the obvious, khi 
For when it has been conclusively proved that 'f JJluatwanW 
pleasure is the sole standard there is no room left tappy, if plea- 
either for virtue or friendship, there is no great need cS^; ' ° 
to say anything fiirther. Still 1 do not want you to 
think I have failed to answer any of your points, so 
I will now say a few words more in reply to the 
B6 remainder of your discourse. The end and aim of 
every system of philosophy is the attainment of hap- 
piness; and desire for happiness is the sole motive 
that has led men to engage in this study. But 
different thinkers make happiness consist in different 
things. According to your school it consists in 
pleasure, and conversely misery consists solely in 
pain. Let us then begin by examining what sort of 
thing happiness as you conceive it is. You will grant, 
I suppose, that if there is such a thing as happiness, 
it is bound to be attainable in its entirety by the 
Wise Man. For if happiness once won can be lost, 
a happy life is impossible. Since who can feel 
confident of permanently and securely retaining a 
possession that is perishable and precarious ? yet 
one who is not sure of the permanence of his Goods, 
must inevitably fgar that a time may come when he 
N 177 

ainissis illis sit miser. Beatus autem esse in maxi- 

J marum rerum timore nemo potest. Nemo igitur 
esse beatus potest. Neque enim in aliqua parte sed 
in perpetuitate temporis vita beata dici ' solet, nee 
appellatur omnino vita nisi confecta atque absoluta, 
iiec potest quisquam alias beatus esse, alias miser ; 
qui enim existimabit posse se miserum esse, beatus 
non erit. Nam cum suscepta, seme! est beata vita, 
tarn permanet quam ipsa ilia effectrix bealae vitae 
sapientia, neque exspectat ultimum tempus aetatis, 
quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praeceptum a Soloue. 
At enim, quemaduiodum tute dicebas, negat Epi- 
curus ne diutumitatem quidem temporis ad beate 
vivendum aliquid afFeiTe, nee rainorem voluptatem 
percipi in brevitate temporis quam si iila sit sempi- 

) tema. Haec dJcutitur inconstantissime. Cum enim 
summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat inlinito 
tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finlto 
atque modico. Qui bonum orane in virtute ponit, 
is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione vlr- 
tutis: negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum 
diem ; qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam pu- 
tabit, qui sibi is conveniet si negabit voluptatem 
crescere longinquitnte ? Igitur ne dolorem quidem. 
An dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, volupta- 
tem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit ? Quid est 
igitur cur ita semper deum Epicurus beatum appel- 
let et aeternum ? Dempta enim aeternitate itiliilo 
beatior luppiter quam Epicurus; uterquc e 


r enim suni^H 

BOOK ri. xxvii 
Doay lose them and so be miserable. I 

1 can be happy who fears utter ruin. Therefore no 
one can be happy at all. For we usually speak of 
a life as a happy one not in reference to a part 
of it, but to the whole of a Hfetime ; indeed a life ' 
means a finished and complete life ; nor is it possible 
to l>e at one time happy and at another miserable, 
since he who thinks that he may be miserable, will 
not be happy. For when happiness has once been 
achieved, it is as permanent as Wisdom itself, which 
is the efficient cause of happiness ; it does not wait 
for the end of our mortal term, as Croesus in Hero- 
dotus's history was warned by Solon to do. 

It may be rejoined that Epicurus, as you your- ; 
self were saying, denies that long duration can i 
add anytfiing to happiness; he says that as much' 
pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if 

I pleasure were everlasting. In saying this lie is 
grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good 
in pleasure, and yet he says that no greater plei 
would result from a lifetime of endless duration than 
from a limited and moderate period. If a person 
finds the sole Good in Virtue, it is open to him to 
say that the happy life is consummated by the con- 
summation of Virtue ; for his position is that the 
Chief Good is not increased by lapse of time. But 
if one thinks that happiness is produced by pli 
how can he consistently deny that pleasure is in- 
creased by duration ? If it is not, pain is not either. 
Or if pain is worse the longer it lasts, is not pleasure 
rendered more desirable by continuance.' Epicurus 
always speaks of the Deity as happy and everlasting ; 
but on what ground ? Take away his everlasting 
life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of 
nS 179 


mo bono fruitur, id est volnpt&te. At enhn hic 

etiam dolorel' At eum nihili facit; ait enim se, 

) si uratur, Quam hoc suave '. ' dicturum. Qua igitur 
re a deo vincitur si aeternitate non vincitur ? In 
qua quid est boni praeter sumitiam voluptatem et 
earn sempitemam ? Quid ergo attiuet gloriose loqui 
nisi constanter loquare ? In voluptate corporis 
(addam. si vis, atiimi, dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e 
corpore) situm est vivere beate. Quid ? istam vo- 
luptatem perpetuam quis potest praestare sapienti ? 
Nam quibus rebus efficiuntur voluptates, eae non 
sunt in potestate sapientis. Non enim in ipsa sa- 
pientia positum est beatum esse, sed in lis rebus 
quas sapientia eomparat ad voluptatem. Totum 
autem id extemiim est, et quod externum, id in 
casu est. Ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam 
Epicurus ait exiguam intervenire sapienti. 

i XXVIII, ' Age,' inquies, ista parva sunt. Sapi- 
entem locupletat ipsa natura, cuius divitias Epicurus 
parabiJes esse docuit.' — Haec bene dicuntur, nee 
ego repugno ; sed inter sese pugnant. Negat 
enim tenuisstmo victu, id est contcmptissirais escis 
et potionibus, minorem voluptatem percipi quam 
rebus esquisitissimis ad epulandum. Huic ego, si 
negaret quidquam interesse ad beate vivendum quali 
uteretur victu, concederem; laudarem etiam; 

a I.e. 

n the brazen bull of Phalaiis, qf. V. 80, 85, 



them eigoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. 
Ah but,' you say, Epicurus is liable to pain as well.' 
Yes, but he thinks nothing of pain ; for he tells us 
that if he were being burnt to death* he would 

99 esclaim, ' How delightfiil this is I ' Wherein then 
is he inferior to God, except that God lives for e 
But what good has everlasting life to offer beside 
supreme and never-ending pleasure ? What then is 
the use of your high-fiowii language, if it be not 
consistent ? Physical pleasure (and I will add if you 
like mental pleasure, so long as this, as yoii hold, is 
understood to have its source in the body) consti- 
tutes happiness. Well, who can guarantee this 
pleasure for the Wise Man in perpetuity ? For the 
things that produce pleasure are not in the Wise 
Man's control; since happiness does not consist in 
wisdom itself, but in the means to pleasure which 
wisdom can procure. Butall the apparatus of plet 
is ekternal, and what is external must depend on 
chance. Consequently happiness becomes the slave 
of fortune ; yet Epicurus says that fortune inter- 
feres with the Wise Man but little! 

30 XXVIII. " 'Come,' you will say, 'these are trivial e. 
objections. The Wise Man is endowed with Nature's ^ 
own riches, and these, as Epicurus has shown, are «» 
easy of attainment.' This is excellently said, and I J, 
do not combat it; but Epicurus's own statements P' 
are at war with each other. He tells us that the 
simplest fare, that is, the meanest sorts of food and 
drink, afford no less pleasure than a banquet of the 
rarest delicacies. For my part, if he said that it 
Diade no diiference to happiness what sort of food 

t.e, I should agree, and what is more I should 
ud; for he would be telling the truth. I 


enini diceret, idque Socratem, qui voluptateiu nullo 
loco niimerat, audio dicentem, cibi tondimentum 
esse famem, potiouis sitim. Sed qui ad voluptatem 
omnia referens vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi 
ille Piso, lion audio, nee euni quod sentiat dicere 

91 existimo. Naturales divitias dixit parabiles esse 
quod parvo esset iiatura contenta. Certe, nisi volu- 
ptatem tanti aestimaretis. Non minor, inquit, volu- 
ptaspercipitur ex vilissimis rebus quara ex pretiosis- 
simis. Hoc est non raodo cor non habere aed ne 
palatum quidem. Qui enlm voluptatem ipsam con- 
temnunt, iis licet dicere se acipenserem maenae non 
antepoiiere ; cui ve 
est, huic omnia sei 

93 eaque die en da opti 
esto ; coiisequatur 
sed per me nihilo, si 
in nasturcio Olo quo 
Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis quae a Platone 
graviter vituperantur ; sit, inquam, tarn Tacilis guam 
vultis comparatio voluptatis; quiddedoloredieemus? 
cuius tantu tormeuta sunt ut in iis beata vita, si 
modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit. 
Ipse enim Mctrodorus, paene alter Epicunis, beatum 
esse describit liis fere verbis: cum corpus bene con- 
stitutum sit et sit exploratum ita futurum. An id 
esploratum cuiquam potest esse, quoniodo se hoc 
habituruui sit corpus non dico ad annum, sed ad 
veaperum ? Dolor igitur, id est summum malum. 

, non rationc sunt iudicanda, 
quae sunt suavissima. \"erum 
■oluptates non modo parvOj 
potest; sit voluptas non minor 
vesci Persas esse solitos 



BOOK II. xsviii 
will listen to Socrates, wiio holds pleasure of no 
account, when he says that the best sauce for food 
is hunger and the best fliivouring for drink thirst. 
But I will not listen to one who makes pleasure the 
sole standard, when while living like Gallonius be 
talks like Piso the Thrifty ; I refuse to believe in his 

91 sincerity. He said that natural wealth is easUy won, 
because nature is satisfied with little. Undoubtedly, 
— if only you Epicureans did not value pleasure so 
highly. As much pleasure, he says, is derived from 
the cheapest things as from the most costly. Dear 
me, his palate must be as dull as his wits. Persons 
who despise pleasure in itself are at liberty to say that 
they value a sturgeon no higher than a sprat ; but a 
man whose chief good consists jn pleasure is bound 
to judge everything by sensation, not by reason, and 
to call those things the best which are the pleasant- 

J2 est. However, let us grant his point: let him get 
the highest pleasures cheap, or for all I care for 
nothing, if he can; allow that there is as much 
pleasure to be found in the cress salad which accord- 
ing to Xenophon^ formed the staple diet of the 
Persians, as in the Syracusan banquets which Plato'' 
takes to task so severely; grant, I say, that pleasure 
is as easy to get as your school makes out; — but 
what are we to say of pain? Pain can inflict such 
tortures as to render happiness absolutely impossible, 
that is, if it be true that paui is the Chief Evil. 
Metrodorus himself, who was almost a second Epi- 
curus, describes happiness (I give almost his actual 
words) as 'sound health, and an assurance of its 
continuance.' Can anyone have an assurance of 
what his health will be, I don't say a year hence, 
but this evening? It follows that we can never be 


metuetur semper etiajnsi tion aderit ; iam enim adesse 
poterit. Qui potest iffitur habitare in beabi vita summi 

93 njali ijietus? Traditur, inquit, ab Epicure ratio ne- 
glegendi doloris, lani id ipsuni absurdum, maximum 
malum neglegi. Sed quae tandem ista ratio est? 

Maximus dolor,' ijiquit, brevis est.' Primum quid 
tu dicis breve? deinde dolorem queni ) 
Quid enim ? Summus dolor plures dies n 
potest? Vide ne etiam menses! Nisi forte eum 
dicis qui simul atque arripuit interficit. Quis istum 
dolorem timet ? lUum mallem levares quo optimum 
atque humanissimum virum, Cn. Octavium, M. F., 
familiarem meum, confici vidi, nee vero serael nee ad 
breve tempus sed et saepe et plane diu. Quos Ule, 
di immortales ! cum omiies artus ardere viderentur, 
cruciatus perferebat '. Nee tamen miser esse, quia 
suiumuni id malum not) erat, tantummodo laboriosus 
videbatur. At miser, si in fiagitiosa atque vitiosa vita 
afflueret voluptatibus. 

94 XXIX. Quod autem magnum doiorem brevem, 
longinquum levem esse dicitis, id nou tntellcgo quale 
sit. Video enim et magnos et cosdem bene longin- 
quos dolores ; quorum, alia toleratio est verior, qua 
uti VDS non potestis qui honestatem ipsam. per se 
non amatis. Fortitudini(> quaedam praecepta sunt 
ac paene leges, quae effeminari virum vetant in 
dolore. Quamobrem turpe putandum est, non dico 


BOOK II. KKViii-x: 
freefromtheappreheijsionofpain, which is the Chief 
Evil, even when it is absent, for at any moment it 
may be upon us. How then can life be happy when 

93 haunted by fear of the greatest Evil? Ah but,' he 
rejoins, Epicurus teaches a method for disregarding 
pain.' To begin with, the mere idea of disregard- 
ing that which is the greatest of evils is absurd. But 
what is this method, pray? The severest pain,' says 
he, 'is brief.' First of all, what do you mean by 
brief? and secondly, what do you mean by the 
severest pain? Why, cannot the most intense pain 
last for several days? You may find it last for 
months! Unless indeed you mean a seizure tliat 
instantaneously kills you. But no one is aA-aid of 
such a pain as that. I want you rather to alleviate 
such agony as I have seen afflicting my excellent 
and amiable friend, Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus ; 
and . that not once only or for a short time, but 
repeatedly and for very long periods. Great heavens, 
what torments he used to suffer! All his joints felt 
as if on Rre. And yet one did not think of him 
as miserable, because such pain was not the greatest 
evil, — ^only as afflicted. Mi.serahie he would have 
been if he had lived a life of profligacy and vice sur- 
rounded by every pleasure. 

9+ XXIX. As for your maxim that severe pain is 
short and prolonged pain light, I cannot make out what 
it may mean. For I see paius that are at ouce severe 
and considerably prolonged; and the truer way 
endure them is that other method, which you whi 
not love moral wortli for its own sake are not able 
to employ. Courage has its precepts and its rules, 
i of constraining force, that forbid a 
V womanish weakness in pain. Hence it must 



' to ^H 

ido . ^H 


dolere (nam id quidem est tnterdum necease), sed 
saxum illud Lemniuni ' clamore Philocteteo fiine- 

Quod eiulatu, questu, gemltu, fiemitibus 
Resonando mutum flebiles voces refert. 
Huic Epicurus praeceiitet, si potest, cui 


Sic Epicurus ; ' Philocteta, si gravis dolor, brevis.' * At 
iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. Si longus, 

95 levis; dat enim intervalla et relaxat.' Primum non 
saepe, deinde quae est ista relaxatio, cum et praeter- 
iti doloris menioria recens est et fiituri atque im- 
pendentis torquet timor? Moriatur, inquit. Fortasse 
id optimum, sed ubi illud: Plus semper voluptatis?' 
Si enim ila est, vide ne facinus facias cum mori 
Euadeas. Potius ergo ilia dicantur, turpe esse, viri 
non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. Nam 
ista vestra ; Si gravis, brevis ; si longus, levis' dictata 
sunt. Virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, for- 
titudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet. 

96 XXX. Audi, ne longe abeam, nioriens quid dicat 
Epicurus, ut iiitellegas facta eius cum dictis disere- 
pare: Epicurus Hermarcho S. Cum ageremus,' inquit, 

'£ inserted by Baiter. 

'5i (or sit) gravis dolor, brevis inf. MSS. ; si brevis dolor, 
U'nis A. B, E.— Mdv. ^Philocteta, st! Brevis dohir.' But cp, 

a Quoted probably from the Fhilocteles of Atti 


I considered a disgrace, I do not say to feel pain 
lat is sometimes inevitable), but that rock of 
mnos to outrage ' ' with the cries of a Philoctetes, 
t Ep 


Till the dumb stones utter a voice of weeping. 
Echoing his wails and plaints, his sighs and 

^t Epicurus soothe with his spells, if he can, the 
n whose 



I_ then, 

Veins and vitals, from the viper's fang 
Envenom' d, throb witli pangs of anguish dire. 
Thus Epicurus: Philocletes' If piin is severe, it is 
short.' Oh, but he has been languishing in his cave 
these ten years past. 'If it is long it m light: for 
it grants intervals of respite In the first place, 
few and far between and secondly, what 
the good of a respite embittered bj retent pain 
fresh in memory, and tormented by Jear of pain 
kpending in the future? Let liim die sajs Epicu- 
Perhaps that were the best tourse but what 
les of the maxim about a tonstant preponder- 
ofplea-sure'? If that be true, are you not guilty 
crime in advising him to end his life? Well 
then, let us rather tell him that it is base and un- 
ly to be enfeebled, crushed and overpowered by 
As for the formula of your sect. Short if 
strong, light if it's long,' it is a tag for copy- 
books. Virtue, magnanimity, endurance, courage, 
■it is these that have balm to assuage pain. 
XXX. "But I must not digress too far. Let me fi 
repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you JJ^'own^^' 
^e discrepancy between his practice and his prin- w— '--■— 
Iples : ' Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write 


vitae beatum et eundem supremiim diem, scribe- 
bamus haec. Tanti aderant vesicae et torminum 
morbi ut nihil ad eorum magnitiidinem posset acce- 
dere.' Miserum hominetii! Si dulor summum malum 
est, dici aliter noti potest. Sed audiamus ipsum. 

Compensabatur/ inquit, tamen cum Ills omnibus 
animi laetitia quam capiebam memoria rationum in- 
ventonjmque nostrorum. Sedtu, ut dignum est tua 
erga me et pliilosophiam voluntate ab aduleseentulo 
' 97 suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos.' Non ego 
iam Epaminondae, non Leonidae mortem huius 
morti antepono ; quorum alter cum vicisset Lacedae- 
monios apud Mantineam atque ipse gravi vulnere 
exanimari se videret, ut primum dispexit, quaesivit 
salvusne esset clipeus. Cum salvum esse tlentes sui 
respundisseiit, rogavit essentne fusi hostes. Cum id 
quoque ut cupiebat audivisset, evelli iussit earn qua 
erat transfixus hastam. Ita multo sanguine profuso 
in laetitia et victoria est mortuus. Leonidas autem, 
rex Lacedaemoniorum se in Thermopylis trecen- 
tosque eos quos eduxerat Sparta, cum esset proposita 
aut fuga turpis aut gloriosa mors, opposuit hostibus. 
Praeclarae uiortes sunt imperatoriae ; philosophi 
autem in suis lectulis plerum.que moriuntur. Refert 
tamen quomodo. Beatus sibi videtur esse moriens. 
Magna laus.^ Compensabatur,' inquit, cum sum- 
) mis doloribus laetitia,' Audio equidem pliilosophi 
vocem. Epicure ; sed quid tibi dicendum sit oblitus 
es. Primura enim, si vera sunt ea quorum recorda- 


these words,' he sajs, 'on the happiest, and the Isat, 
day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the 
bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost 
possible severity.' Unhappy creature '. If pain is 
the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But 
let us hear his own words. Yet nil iny sufferings," 
he continues, are counterbalanced by the joy which 

■ derive from remembering my theories and dis- 
Bveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from 
Our youth up you have displayed towards nayself 
nd towards philosophy, to protect the children of 

97 Metrodorus.' When I read this I rank the death- 
scene of Epicurus on a level with those of Epami- 
nondas and of Leonidas. Epaminondas had defeated 

_the Lacedemonians at Mantinea, and perceived him- 

lelf to be mortally wounded. As soon as he regained 

mess he inquired if his shield were safe. 

I weeping followers told him that it was. He 

■ere the enemy routed. Satisfied on this 

int also, he bade them pluck out the spear that 

lerced his side. A rush of blood followed, and so 

1 the hour of joy and victory he died. Leonidas, 

king of the Lacedemonians, had to choose between 

dishonourable Hight and a glorious death ; with the 

three hundred warriors that he had brought fi-om 

^^^Spsrta he confronted the foe at Thermopylae. It is 

^^nrlorious to fall when leading an army ; but philoso- 

^^^pbers mostly die in their beds. Still the manner of 

^^ their death makes a difference. Epicurus counts 

himself happy in his last moments, A11 honour to 

him. My joy,' he writes, counterbalances the 

98 a cverest pain." There, Epicurus, it is true, I hear 
of a philosopher; but you forget what you 

gically ought to say. In the first place, if tlie thing 

tione te gaudere dicis, hoc est si vera sui 
et invents, gaudere non potes ; nihil er 
quod ad corpus referas ; est autem a te semper 
ctum nee gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nee 
dolere. Praeteritis, inquit, gaudeo, Quihusnam 
praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes 
tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, 
memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum 
autem ad animuni, falsum est quod iiegas t 
nllum esse gaudium quod non referatur ad corpus. 
Cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas ? quid in 
istoegregio tuo officio et tantafide (sic enim existimo) 
ad corpus refers ? 

) XXXI. " Hue etiltuc,Torquate,vosversetis licet; 
nihil in hac praeclara epistola scriptum ab Epicuro 
congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. Ita 
redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius 
probitate ipsius ac moribus. Nam ista commendatio 
puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum 
officiorum in estremo spiritu conservatio indicat in- 
natam esse liomini probitatem gratuitam, non invita- 
tam voluptatibus nee praemiorummereedibusevoca- 
tam. Quod enim testimonium maius quaerimus, quae 
honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, 

) cum videamus tanta oflicia morientis ? Sed ut epi~ 
stulam laudandam arbitror earn quam raodo totidem 
fere verbis interpretatus sum, quamquum ea. < 
summa eius philosophia nullo niodo congruebat, 



' MSS, t 

St cdd. 

le prepos 

; Mdv. 


iiifur^uc I1<.\v. after Davis 

BOOK II. xsx-xxxi 
in the recollection of which you profess to find plea- 
sure, I mean jnur writings and your theories, are 
true, you cannot really he feeling pleasure. All 
feelings referable to the body are over for you ; yet 
you have always maintained that no one feels either 
pleasure or pain except on account of the body. He 
says I take pleasure in my past feelings." What 
past feelings ? If you mean bodily feelings, I notice 
that it is not the memory of hodily delights, but your 
philosophical theories, that counterbalance for you 
your present pains ; if mental feelings, your doctrine 
that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately 
referable to the body is an error. And secondly, 
why do you provide for the children of Metrodorus? 
What standard of bodily pleasure are you following 
in this signal act (for so I esteem it) of loyalty and 

) XXXI. '' Vea, Torquatus, you people may turn and 
twist as you like, but you will not find a line in this 
famous letter of Epicurus that is not inconsistent and 
incompatible with his teachings. Hence he is his 
own refutation ; his writings are disproved by the 
uprightness of his character. That provision for 
the care of the children, that loyalty to friend- 
ship and affection, that observance of these solemn i 
dutieswithhislatestbreathjprovethat there was innate 
in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by 
pleasure nor elicited by prices and rewards. Seeing 
so strong a sense of duty in a dying man, what clearer 
evidence do we want that morality and rectitude 

) are desirable for their own sakes ? But while I think 'j"[^'''"|l°J' 
that the letter I have just translated almost word (or ihe pos- 
for word is most admirable, although entirely incon- bta^ud '"h'! 
sistent with the general tenor of his philosophy, yet binbday. 


eiusdera testamentum non solum a philosophi gravi- 
tate sed etiam ab ipsius sententia iuHico discrepare. 
Scripsit enini et multis saepe verbis et breviter aper- 
teque in eo libro quern modo nominavi, mortem 
nihU ad nos pertinere ; quod enim dissolutum sit, id 
esse sine sensu; quod autem sine sensu sit, id nihil 
ad nos pertinere omnino.' Hoc ipsiiin elegantius 
poni meliusque potuit. Nam quod ita positum est, 
quod dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu,' id eiusmodi 

I est ut non satis plane dicat quid sit dissolutum. Sed 
tamen intellego quid velit. Quaere autem quid sit 
quod, cum dissolutione, id est morte sensus omnis ex- 
stinguatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino quod per- 
tineat ad nos, tamaecurate tamque diligenter caveat 
et sanciat ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes 
sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad 
diem agendum natalem suum quotinnis mense Game- 
Hone, itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae 
dent ad eorum epolas qui una secum phllosophati 

i sint, utet sui et Metrodori memoria colatur.' Haec 
ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et 
belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici 
praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare uUum esae 
cuiusquam diem natalem. Quid? idemne potest esse 
dies saepius qui serael fuit? Certe non potest. An 
eiusdemmodi? Ne id quidem, nisi multa onnorum 
intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem unde 

HOOK II. x\xi 
I eoiisider his will to bt quite out of harmony not 
only with the dignity of a philosopher but also with 
his own pronouncement. For. he repeatedly argued 
at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the 
book I have just mentioned, that death does not 
aKect us at all ; for a thing that has experienced dis- 
solution must be devoid of sensation ; and that which 
is devoid of sensation cannot affect us in any degree 
whatsoever,' The maxim such as it is might have 
been better and more neatly put. For the phrase, 
' what has experienced dissolution must be devoid of 
sensation,' does not make clear what it is that has 

01 experienced dissolution. However in spite of this 
1 understand the meaning intended. What I want 
to know is this : if all sensation is annihilated by dis- 
solution, that is, by death, and if nothing whatever 
that can affect us remains, why is it that he makes 
such precise and careful provision and stipulation 

that his heirs, Amynochiis and Timocrates, shall 
after consultation with Hermarchus assign a sufficient 
sum to celebrate his birthday every year in the 
month of Gamelion, and also on the twentieth day 
of every month shall assign a sum for a banquet to 
his fellow-studenta in philosophy, in order to keep 
alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus" ? 

02 That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a 
man iis you like, I cannot deny ; but what business 
has a philosopher, and especially a natural philoso- 
pherj which Epicurus. claims to be, to think that any 
day can be anybody's birthdaj' ? Why, can the 
identical day that has once occurred recur again and 
again ? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar 
day recur? This too is impossible, except afler an 
interval of many thousands of years, when all the 

o 193 

profeeta sint fiat ad unum tempus reversio. Nullus 
est igitur euiusqiiam dies natalis. At habetur.' Et 
ego id scilicet ne.sciebam I Scd ut sit, etiamne post 
mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is qui 
nobis quasi oraculum ediderlt lulijl post mortem ad 
nos perlinere? Haec non erant eius qui innumera- 
biles mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla 
esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset.' 
Num quid tale Democritus ? (L't alios omittam, hunc 

S appello quem ille unum secutus est.) Quod si dies 
notandus fuit, eumne potius quo natus, an eum quo 
sapiens factus est ? Non potuit,' inquies, fieri 
sapiens nisi natus esset.' Isto raodo ne si avia qui- 
dem eius nata non esset. Res tota, Torquate, non 
doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis cele- 
brari memoriam sui nominis. Quos quldem dies 
quemadmodum agatis et in quantam hominum face- 
torum urbaiiitatem incurratis, non dico ; nihil opus 
est litibus ; tantum dico magis fuisse vestrum agere 
Epicuri diem natalem quam illius testamento cavere 
ut agere tur. 

1 XXXII. Sed ut ad propositum revertamur (,de 
dolore enini cum diceremus, ad istani epistulam de- 
lati sum us), nunc totum illud concludi sic licet : Qui in 


is found in Plal 

mmensuiri peragravi 


heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return 
to the point from which they started.' It follows 
liiat there is no sueh thing as anybody's birthday. 
' All the same, people do keep birthdays.' Much 
obliged, I am sure, for the information ! But even 
granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be 
observed when he is dead ? And to provide for 
this by will — is this appropriate for a man who 
told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us 
after death ? Such a provision ill became one whose 
' intellect had r()anied ' over unnumbered worlds and 
realms of infinite space, unbounded and unending. 
Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To 
omit others, I cite the case of the philosopher who 

i was Epicurus's only master.) And if a special 
day was to be kept, did he do well to tHke the day 
on which he was bom, and not rather that on which 
he became a Wise Man ? You will object that he 
could not have become a Wise Man if he had not 
first of all been born. You might equally well say, 
if his grandmother had not been bom either. The 
entire notion of wishing one's name and memory to 
be celebrated by a banquet after one's death is alien 
to a man of learning. I won't refer to your mode of 
keeping these anniversaries, or to the ridicule you 
bring upon yourselves from persons with a sense of 
humour. We do not want to quarrel. I only remark 
that it was more your business to keep Epicurus's 
birthday than his business to provide by will for its 

t XXXn. "But to return to our subject {for we were u 

discussing the question of pain, when we digressed [j| 

to the letter of Epicurus). The whole matter may 

now be put In the following syllogism : A man un- 

u2 195 


o malo est, is turn cum in eo est non est beatuG ; 
sapiens autem semper beatus est et est aliquando in 
(lolore ; non est igittir sumnmm malum dolor. lam 
iliud quale tandem est, bona praeterita non elfluere 
Siipienti, mnla meminisse non oportcre? Primum in 
nostrane est pott-state quid meuiinerimus? Tliemi- 
stocles quidtm, cum ei Siiuonides an quis alius artem 
memoriae polliceretur, 'Oblivionis,' inquit, 'mnllein; 
nam memini etiam quae nolo, oblivisci non possum 
'• quae volo.' Ma^no hie iiigenio; sed res se tamen 
sic habet ut nimis imperiosi pliilosophi sit vetare 
meminisse. Vide ue isla sint Manliana vestra aut 
maiora etiam, si imperes quod faeere non possim. 
Quid si etiam iucunda memoria est praeteritorum 
malorum? ut proverbia nonnulla veriora sint quam 
vestra dogmata, Vulgo enim dicitur: lucundi acti 
labores' ; nee male Euripides (concludam, si potero, 
Latine; Graecum enim bunc versum nostis omnes): 

Suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria. 
Sed ad bona proeterita redeamus. Quae si a vobis 
talia dicerentur qualibus C. Marios uti poterat, ut 
expulsus, fgens, in palude demersus tropaeorum re- 
cordatione levaret dolorem siium, audirem et plane 
probarem. Nee enim absolri beata vita sapientfs 


BOOK II. xKxii 
ilCTgoiiig tlie supreme Evil is not for tbe time bein;; 
happy ; but tlie Wise Man is always happy, and some- 
times undergoes pain ; therefore pain is not the 
supreme Evil, And again, what is the sense of the 
maxim that the Wise Man will not let past blessings 
fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget 
past misfortunes? Toliegin with, have we the power 
to ehoose what we shall remember? Themistocles 
at all events, when Simonides or some one offered to 
teacb bim the art of memory, replied that he would 
prefer the art of forgetting; for I remember,' said 
he, even things 1 do not wish to remember, but I 
O.i cannot forget things I wish to forget.' Epieurus 
was a very able man ; but still the faet of the matter 
is that a philosopher who forbids iis to remember 
lays too heavy a charge upon us. Why, you are as 
great a martinet as your ancestor Manlius,' or 
greater, if you order me to do what is beyond 
my power. What if the memory of past evils be 
actually pleasant? proving certain proverbs truer 
than the tenets of your school. There is a popular 
saying to the effect that 'Toil is pleasant when 'tis 
over'; and Euripides well writes (l will attempt a 
verse translation: the Greek line is known to you 

Sweet is the memory of sorrows past. 

But let us return to the question of past blessings. 
[f your school meant by these the sort of successes 
that Gaius Marius could fall back on, enabling- him 
when a penniless exile^up to his chin in a swamp to 
lighten his sufferings by recollecting his former 
victories, I would listen to you, and would unreserv- 
edly assent. Indeed it would be impossible for the 

ne^ue ad exitum perduci potent, si prima quaeque 
bene ab eo coiisulta atque facta ipsius oblivione ob- 
I 106 rueiitur. Sed vobis voluptatimi pcrceptarum reeor- 
datio vitam beatam fa'cit, et quidem corpore percc- 
ptarum ; nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est omnes 
aniini voluptates esse e corporis societate. Corporis 
autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non 
Intel lego eiir Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma 
taiito opere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur 
se omiies secura abstulisse libidinum voluptates. Quod 
eniiu ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentirc poterat 
quaut duiii fruebatur, quomodo id mortuo potuit per- 
uianere? Fluit igitur voluptas coi-poris et prima 
quaeque avolat, saepiusque relinquit eausam paeni- 
teiidi quam recordandi. Itaqiie beatJor Africanus 
cum pati'ia illo modo loqucns : ^h 

Desine, Roma, tuos hostes — ^^M 

reliquaque praeclare : ^^M 

Nam tibi moenimenta mei peperere labores. ^^ 
Laboribus hie praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes volupt&ti- 
bus; et hie se ad ea revocat e quibus nihil umquam 
rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore. 
' XXXIII. Illud autem ipsum qui obtiiieri potest, 
quod dicitis omnes animi et voluptates et dolores ad 
corporis voluptates ac dolores pertinere? Nihilne 
te delectat umquam (video quicum loquar), te igitur, 

a III a work now lost. Tlip lines referred tn 
San' t^yor «bJ iijiippian «ai >il<r tpm-i. riprv lrxt6 
tal BX^in Tip™ U\vFrai. (ap, Alhen. 336a.) 

''Apparently from the Annals of Ennius. 

^V BOOK II. xx^ii xxxiii 

luppiness of the Wise Man to attain its final and 
ultimate perfectiou, if all his previous wise designs 
and achievements were to be erased from his memory. 

06 But with jou it is the recollection of pleasures 
enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be 
bodily pleasures, — for if it be any others, it ceases to 
be true that mental pleasures all arise from the 
connection of the mind with the body. Yet 
if bodily pleasure eve» when past can give 
delight, I do not see why Aristotle" should l>e so 
contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapaliis. The 
famous Syrian monarch boasts that he has taken 
with him all the sensual pleasures that he has 
enjoyed. How, asks Aristotle, could a. dead man 
continue to experience a feeling which even while 
alive he could only be conscious of so long as he was 
actually enjoying it? So that bodily pleasures are 
transient; each in turn evaporates, leaving cause for 
regrets more often than fur recollection. Accordingly 
Africanus must be counted happier than Sardanapa- 
lus, when he addresses his country with the words : 

Cease, Rome, thy foes — 
and the glorious conclusion : 

My toils have won thee battlements secure.'' 
His past toils are wliat he delights in, whereas you 
bid us dwell upon our past pleasures; he recalls e.t- 
periences that never had any connection with bodily 
enjoyment, but you never rise above the body. 

07 XXXIII, ' Again how can you possibly defend the ut 
dictum of your school, that all mental pleasures and ™ 
pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the '"' 

IjrF Do you, Torquatus (for I bethink me who it 
am addressing) — do you personally never experi- 

Torquate, ipsuni perse nihil deleotat? Ooiitto digni- 
talem, honestatcm, speciem ipsani virtutum, de qui- 
bus ante dictum est; haec leviora poniim: poeraa, 
oratianem ctmi aut scribis aut legis, cum omnium 
rBctonim,cum.regioniimconquiris liistoriam, signum. 
tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, vemitio, villa Luculli 
{nam si tuum dicerem, latebram habcres; iid corpus 
diceres pertinere)^ — sed ea quae dixi nd corpusne re- 
fers? an est aliquid quod te sua sponte delectet? 
Aut pertinacissimus fueris si perstiteris ad corpus ea 
quae dixi referre, aut deseruerls totain Epicuri volu- 
ptatem si negaveris. 
S ' Quod vero a te disputatum est maiores esse vo- 
luptates et dolores animi quam corporis, quia trium 
temporum particeps animus sit, eorpore autem prne- 
sentia solum sentiaiitur, qui id proliari^ potest ut is 
qui propter me aliquid gaudeat plus quam ego ipse 
gaudeat ? [Anirao voUiplas oritur propter voluptatem 
corporis, et maior est animi voluptas quam corporis; 
ita fit ut gratulator laetior sit quam is cui gratulatur.'] 
Sed duni efticere vultis beatum sapientcm eum masi- 
mas aninio voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus 
maiores quam eorpore, quid occurrat non videtis. 
Animi enim dolores quoque percipiet omnibus parti- 
lius maiores quam corporis. Ita miser sit aliquando 
neeesse est is quern vos beatum semper vultis esse; 

i id probari H ! quid id proh. E : quid prohari, giii 
■' irMSS. 

• —eratvlofiir rejected by edii. as a not 
explaining The simile in the form of «hich ibc . 
nduclio ad absurdum is expressed — bodv : mind :: hf^ 
person : sympathiiinp friend. 

^ BOOK II. \xKJii 

eiice delifflit in some tiling for its own sake? i 
pass over moral worth .and goodness, and the hi- 
Iruisic beauty of the virtues, of whieh we spoke be- 
fore, I will suggest less serious matters, reading or 
writing a poem or a speechj the study of history or 
geography, statues, pictures, beautiful scenery: 
sport, hunting, I.ucullus's country house (I ' 
mention your own, for that would give you ii loop- 
hole of escape ; you would say it is a source of Iwdilj' 
enjoj-ment); but take the things 1 have mentioned,— 
do you connect them with bodily sensation ? Is there 
nothing which of itself affords you delight ? Persist 
in tracing back the pleastires 1 have instanced to the 
body — and you show yourself impervious to argu- 
ment; reeant^and you abandon Rpicunis's concep- 
tion of pleasure altogether. 

"As for your contention that mental pleasures anil '"'< 
isaregreater than bodily, because the mind appro- gutu 
' i all three periods of time, whereas the body '''''* 
inly present sensations, surely it is absurd 
J say that a man who rejoices in sympathy with 
my pleasure feels more joy than I feel myself. 
[Pleasure of the mind arises out of sympathy with 
that of the body, and pleasure of the mind is greater 
than that of the body ; thus it comes about that one 
> offers congratulations feels more delight than 
! person congratulated.] But when you try to 
; the Wise Man happy on the ground that he 
s the greatest mental pleasures, atid that these 
^ infinitely greater than bodily pleasures, you do 
not see the difficulty that meets you. For it follows 
that the mental pains which he experiences will also 

K infinitely greater than the bodily ones. Hence 
whom you maintain to be always happy would 

my r 

that ( 


nee vero id dum omnia ad voluptatem doloremque 

3 referetis efficietis umqunni. Quarc aliud aliquod, 
Torqiiate, liominis sum mil in bonum reperiendum 
est; voluptatem bestiis concedamus, quibus vos de 
sunimo bono testibns uti soletis. Quid si etiam 
bestiae inulta faciunt, diice sua quaeque natura, par- 
tim indulgenter vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in 
educando, perfacile ot' apparent aliud quiddam iis 
propositiim, non voluptatem? partim cursu et pera- 
gratione laetantiir; congregatione aliae coetum quo- 

) dam modo civitatis imitantur; videmus in quodam 
volucrium genere notmulla indicia pietatis, co- 
gnitionem, niemoriam ; in multis etiam desideria vide- 
mus : ergo in bestiis erunt secreta a voluptate 
humiuiarum quaedani simulacra virtutum, iu ipsis 
hominibus virtus nisi vuluptatis causa nulla erit? Et 
boniini, qui ceteris aniniantibus plurimum praestat, 
praecipui a natura nibil datum esse dicemus? 

XXXIV. Nos vero, si quidem in voluptate sunt 
omnia, loiige multumque superamur a bestiis, quibus 
ipsa terra fundit ex sese pastus varios atque abun- 
dantes nihil laborantibus ; nobis autem aut vis aut 
ne viK quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus. 
Nee tanien uljo niodo summum pecudis bonum et 
liominis idem mihi videri potest. Quid enim tanto 
opus est instrumento in optimis artibus comparandis, 
quid tanto con cursu honestissimorum studiorum, tanto 

supplied by Miiller. 


HOOK II, wxi 

fact will ^H 

tandard. -^^^f 

inevitaljly be sometimes miserable ; nor in fact r 

you ever prove hiui to be invariably happy, . 

as you make pleasure and pain the sole standard. 

09 Therefore we are bound, Torquatus, to find some Even 
other Chief Good for man. Let us leave pleasure \l 
to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this <i< 
question of the Chief Good your school is fond of 
appealing. But what if even auimals are prompted 
by their several natures to do many actions conclu- 
sively proving that they have some other End hi view 
than pleasure ? Some of them show kindness even al 
the cost of trouble, as for instance in giving birth to 
and rearing their offspring ; some delight in running 
and roaming about ; others are gregarious, and create 

1 something resembling a social polity ; in a certain 
class of birds we see some traces of affection for 
human lieings. recognition, recollection ; and in many 
we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals 
therefore possess some semblance of the human 
virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men them- 
selves to display no virtue except as a means to 
pleasure? And shal^we say that man, who so far 
surpasses all other living creatures, has been 
gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 

. 1 XXXIV. As a matter of fact if pleasure be all in Pc. 

all, the lower animals are far and away superior to loi^uhTT'* 

ourselves. The Earth herself without labour of ^' 

theirs lavishes on them food from her stores in great 
variety and abundance; whereas we with the most 
laborious efforts can scarcely if at all supply our 
needs. Yet I cannot think that the Chief Good can 
possibly be the same for a brute beast and for a man. 
What is the use of all our vast machinery of cul- 
ture, of the great company of libera] studies, of the 


virtutum coraitatii, si ea nullam ad aliam rem nisi ad 
2 voluptatem coiiquinintur ? Ut, ai Xerxes, ciiiii tantis 
classibus tantisqiie equestribus et pedestribus copiis, 
Hellespoiito iinicto, Athone perfosso, mari ambula- 
visset, terra' navigavisset, si, dim tanto impetu in 
Graeciam venisset, caiisam qiiis ex eo quaereret tan- 
tarum copiarum tantique belli, inel se auferre ex 
Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa vide- 
retur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem, plurimis et 
gravissunis artibus atque virtiitibus instructum et 
omatum, non, ut ilium, maria pedibtis pern^rantem, 
classibus montes, sed omne caelum totanique cum 
universo mari terram mente complexum, voluptatem 
petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta moli- 

i "Ad altiora quaedaui ct inagiiiticentiora, itiillj 
crede, 1'nrquate, iiati siimus; nee id ex aiiimi solum 
partibus, ill quibus inest luemnria rerum innumera- 
bilium, in te qiiidem infiiiiti, iHest coniectura conse- 
quentium non multum a divinatione diHerens, inest 

. moderator cupiditatis pudor, iiiest ad liumananf 
societatem'iustitiaefidaciistodia, inest in perpetieadl 
laboribufi adeundisque periculis fiima et 
doloris mortisque conteniptio; — ergo baec ii 
til autem etiam membra ipsa sensusque consi 
tibi.utreliquae corporis partes, non comites solni 

BOOK II. ^xxiv 

goodly fellowsltip of the virtues, jt »11 thew.- thtnvi : 
are sought after solely for the ukv of plcMurc? 

13 Suppose when Xerxes led forth liik liuffe ttnrU 
and armies of horse and foot, bHdf{i-d the HrN'**' 
pont, cut through Athos, marehed ovt-r «ra hih) 
sailed over land — suppose on his reBetilnff Oftmtv 
with his great anijada some one uked litni tW 
reason for all this enormous apparatu» irf w«rbr«. 
and be were to reply that he had wanted ii> jrr'M'iir*- 
Kome honey fi-om Hymettusl mrcly hf wiruld 
he thought to have had no luleqtinti- nirrtlvt< tin 
so vast an undertaking. So with mir WIm- M«m, 
equipped and adorned with nil the nulihul lu/tmn' 
plishuieuts and virtues, not like Xerx-» tr«vrritiiiK 
the seas on foot and the mountain» un tliljfliiHtrd, ln«l 
nientaliy embracing sky ami earth and «i-n In \,\uf\t 
entirety^ — to say that tliis nian's nlni i« ptrakure U In 
say that all his high endeavour In fur the aalte of a 
little honey. 

1 3 " No. Torq uatus , believ - nm. wc .utm l-.^i J].[ 
loftier and more splendid jiurpose». Nor 1« tJilk ~ 
evidenced by the raentAl fileuliifK nlo'ne, includinK 
as they do a memory for countlcui factu, in your 
case indeed a memory of unlimited ranije; a power 
of forecasting the future little short of divination ; 
the sense of modesty to curb the aiipetites ; love of 
justice, the faithful guardian of human society ; con- 
tempt of pain and death, remaining firm and stead- 
fast when toil is to be endured and dajiger under- 
gone. Tliese are our mental endownunts. But I 
would also have you consider our bodilv frame, and 
our organs of sensation, which Intter like the other 
parts of the body yon for your part will esteem riol 
iis the comrades merely Iml lutiiully aathe servantnoi 

1 1 i tutiun sed ministri etiam videbuntur. Quod si in ipso 
corpore multa voluptati prsepoiienda sunt, ut vires, 
valetudo, velocitas, puk-hrituilo, quid tandem in 
animis censes ? in qtiibus doctissimi ilU veteres inesse 
quiddam caeleste et divinum putaverunt. Quod si 
esset in voluptate summum . bonum, ut dicitis, 
optabile esset in maxima voluptate nullo inter- 
vallo interiecto dies noctesque versari, cum omnes 
sensuE dulcedine omni quasi perfusi niovertntur. 
Quis est auteni dignus nomine honiinis qui unum 
diem totum velit esse in genere isto voluplatis? 
CjTcnaici quidem non recusant ; vestri haec vere- 
(l 1 5 candius, illi fortassc constantius. Sed lustremus 
animo non has maximas artes quibus qui carebant 
incites a maioribus nominabantur, sed quaero num 
existimes, non dico Homerum, Archilochum, Pinda- 
runi, sed Phidian, Polyclitum, Zeuxim ad voluptatem 
artes suas direxisse. Ergo opifex plus sibi proponet 
ad formarum quam civis excellens ad factorum pul- 
chritudinem? Quae autem est alia causa erroris 
tanti, tarn longe latetjue diflusi, nisi quod is qui 
voluptatem summum bonum esse decemit non cum 
ea parte animi in qua inest ratio atque consilium, 
sed cum cupiditate, id est cum animi levissima parte 
deliberat? Quaero enim de te, si sunt di, ut vos 
etiam putatis, qui possint esse beati cum voluptates 
corpore percipere non posstnt, aut si sine eo genere 
voluptatis beati sunt, cur similem animi usura 
sapiente esse nolitis. 


urn ^H 

BOOK II. x>\iv 
\l the virtues. But if even the body has many attributel^, 

of higher value than pleasurejSuch_4a.slreagth,healthL 
beauty, speed of foot, what pray think you of ttit^ ' 
.-■mini! ? Tti e wisest ssga of antiquity believed that the 
mind contains an element of the celestial and divins. 
Whereas if the Chief Good consisted in pleasure as 
your school avers, the ideal of happiness would be 
to pass days and nights in the enjoyment of the 
keenest pleasure, without a moment's intermission, 
every sense drenched and stimulated with every sort 
of delight, But who that is worthy to he called a 
liuman being would choose to pass a single entire 
day in pleasure of that description? The Cyrenaics, 
it is true, do not repudiate it; on this point your 
friends are more decent, but the Cyrenaics perhaps 
1 5 more consistent. But let us pass in review not these 
arts' of first importajice, a lack of which with our 
ancestors gave a man the name of inert' or good- 
for-nolhing, but I ask you whether you believe that, 
I do not say Homer, Archilochus or Pindar, but 
Phidias, Polychtus and Zeuxls regarded the purpose 
of their art as pleasure. Then shall a craftsman 
have a higher ideal of external than a distinguished 
citizen of moral beauty? But what else is the 
cause of an error so i>rofound and so very widely 
diffused, than the fact tliat he who decides that 
pleasure is the Chief Good judges the question not 
-with the rational and deliberative part of his mind, 
but with its lowest part, the faculty of desire? For 
I ask you, if gods exist, as your school too believes, 
how can they be happy, seeing that they cannot 
enjoy bodily pleasures? or, if they are happy without 
that kind of pleasure, why do you deny that the Wise 
Man is capable of a like purely mental activity? 

i XXXV. "Lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum 
qui suiit lib Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Agesilai, 
non Aristidi aut I'hemiBtocli, non Pbilippi aut Ale- 
xandri; lege nostrorum honiinum, lege vestrae fanii- 
liae ; neniinem videbis ita laudatum lit artifex (.■n.llidus 
comparandamm voluptatuni diceretur. Non elogia 
monumentorum id significant, velut hoc ad portam : 


■ MARIUM FUI8SB viKuM. Idnc consensisse de Calatino 
plurimas gentes arbitramiir, primarium popiili fuisse 
quod praestantissimus fuisset in conficiendis volupta- 
tibus? Ergo in iis adulescentibus bonam spem esse 
dicemus et magnain iiidoleni quos suis commodis in- 
servituros et quidquid ipsis expediat facturos arbitra- 
bimur ? Noiine videmus quanta perturbatio reruni 
omnium consequatur, quanta confusio? Tollitur 
benefitium, tollitur gratia, quae aunt vincla concor- 
diae. Nee enim cum tua causa cui commodes bene- 
ficium illud habendum est, sed feneratio, nee gratia 
deberi videtur ei qui sua causa commodaverit. 
Maximas vero virtutes lacere omnes iiecesse est 
s'oluptate dominante ; sunt etiam tuipitudines plu- 
rimae quae, nisi honestas natura phirinium valetit. 
cur non cadant in sapientem non est facile defen- 
I 1 1 H dcre. Ac ne plura coinplectur (sunt enim Inn 
rabilia), bene laudata virtus voluptatis nditus i 

BOOK II. \xiv 

6 XXXV. '' Read tlie panegyrics. TorqualuK. not of 
the heroes praised by Homer, not of Cyrus or Agesi- 
laiis, Aristides or Themistocles. Philip or Alexander ; 
but read those delivered upon our own great men, 
read those of your own family, Yoii will not find 
anyone extolled for his skill and punning in procuring 
pleasures. This is not the purport of laudatory epi- 
taphs, likf that one near the city gate; 

Rome's first asd greatest citizen to be. 

7 Do we suppose that all ni.inkind agreed that n 
Calatinus was Rome's greatest citizen because of his '" 
surpassing eminence in the acquisition of pleasures ? 
Then are we lo say that a youth is a young man ol 
great promise and high character, when we judge 
liim hkcly to study his,.«Wir"^it€rests and to do, 
whatever will be for hi^ persona l ;i^ vanta ge ? Do j 
we not see what a i inirerSl-iipbeiifHl a nd confusio:u4 
would_result^^om_siich ajrinciple ? I t does away , 
with generosity and with gratitude, tlieilxinaj of 
mutual harmony. If you lend a man liiBney' for 
jour own advantage, this cannot be considered an 
act of generosity^! t is usury; no gratitude is owing 
to a man who lends money for gain. In fact if 
pleasure usurps the sovereignty, all the cardinal 
virtues must inevitably be dethroned ; and indeed 
there are a number of morally base actions which 
can «*ith difficulty be proved inconsistent with the 
character of the Wise Man, unless it be a law of 

18 nature that moral goodness should be supreme. Not p, 

to bring forward further arguments (for they are " 

countless in number) any honest panegyric of 

\'irtue must needs keep Pleasure at arm's length. 

p 809 



oludat necesse est. Quod iam a me esspectare noli ; 
tute introspice in mentem tuam ipse eamque omni 
cogitation e pertractans percoiitare ipse te, per- 
petuisiie malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea quam 
saepe usurpabas tranquillitate degere omnem acta- 
tem sine do]ore,assuinpto etiam Uloquod vos quidem 
adiungere soletis sed &exi non potest, sine doloris 
nielu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mere- 
rere, cum opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel 
Herculis perpeti aerumnas. Sic enim maiores nostri 
labores non fugiendos tristiasimo tamen verbo aerum- 
) nas etiam in deo nominaverunt. Elicerpm' ex te 
cogeremque ut responderes, nisi vererer ne Hercu- 
lem ipsuni ea quae pro salute gentium sumnio lubore 
gessisset voluptatis causa gessisse diceres." 

Quae cum dixissem, Habeo," inquit Torquatus, 

ad quos ista referam, et, qoamquam aliquid ipse 
poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores." Fami- 
liares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, 
cum optimos viros, turn homines doctissimos." 

Recte/' inquit, intellegis." Age sane," in- 
quam ; sed erat aequius Triarium aliquid de dis- 
sensione nostra iudicare." Eiuro," inquit anidens, 

iniquum, liac quidem de re ; tu enim ista leiiius, hie 
Stoicorom more nos vexat." Turn Triarius : Posthac 


" inquit, and at 

c ipsa mihi ei^^^ 


Do not expect me further to argue the pouit; look 
within^ study your own consciousness. Then after 
full and careful introspection^ ask yourself the ques- 
tion^ would you prefer to pass your whole life in 
that state of calm which you spoke of so often^ 
amidst the enjojnnent of unceasing pleasures^ free 
from all pain^ and even (an addition which your 
school is fond of postulating but which is really im- 
possible) free from all fear of pain^ or to be a bene- 
factor of the entire human race, and to bring succour 
and safety to the distressed, even at the cost of 
enduring the agonies of a Hercules ? Agonies — that 
was indeed the sad and gloomy name which our 
ancestors bestowed, even in the case of a god, upon 
9 labours which yet were not to be evaded. I would 
press my question and drag an answer from you, 
were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules 
himself in the toils and labours that he wrought for 
the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake 
of pleasure!** 

Here I concluded. I am at no loss for authori- 
ties,** said Topquatus, to whom to refer your argu- 
ments. I might be able to do some execution myself, 
but I prefer to find better equipped champions.** 
No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned 
friends Siro and Philodemus.** You are right,*' he 
replied. Pray appeal to them," said I; "but it 
would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some ver- 
dict on our dispute.** I formally object to him as 
prejudiced,'* he rejoined with a smile, "at all events 
on this issue. You have shown us some mercv, but 
Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic.** Oh,** 
interposed Triarius, I'll fight more boldly still next 
time, for I shall have the arguments I have just 
p2 211 


in promptu quae modo audivi; nee ante aggrediar 
quam te ab istis qiios dicis instructum videro.'* Quae 
cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et dis- 



heard ready to my hand^ though I won't attack you 
till I see you have been armed by the instructors 
whom you mention.'* And with these words we 
brought our promenade and our discussion to an end 







1 I. Voluptatem quidem^ Brute, si ipsa pro se lo- 
quatur. nee tarn pertinaees habeat patronos, conces- 
suram arbitror, convietam superiore libro, dignitati. 
Etenim sit impudens si virtuti diutius repugnet aiit 
si honestis iucunda anteponat autpluris esse contendat 
dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam 
gravitatem animi atque constantiam. Quare illam 
quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere iubeainus, 
ne blanditiis eius illecebrisque impediatur disputandi 

2 severitas. Quaerendum est enim ubi sit illud sum- 
mum bonum quod reperire volumus, quoniam et 
voluptas ab eo remota est et eadem fere contra eos 
dici possunt qui vacuitatem doloris finem bonorum 
esse voluerunt; nee vero ullum probetur oportet^ 
summum bonum quod virtute careat, qua nihil possit ^ 
esse praestantius. 

Itaque quamquam in eo sermone qui cum Tor- 
quato est habitus non remissi fuimus, tamen haec 
acrior est cum Stoicis parata contentio. Quae 
enim de voluptate dicuntur, ea nee acutissime 
nee abscondite disseruntur; neque enim qui de- 

' oportet Mailer ; «/ A, B, E ; other MSS. omit; Mdv. {nt\ 
^possit B and inf. MSS. ; posset A, E ; potest Mdv. 



I,], My dear Brutl's. — Were Pleasure to speak for 
herself, iii default of sueh redoubtable advocates as 
she now has to defend her, my beUef is that she 
would own defeat. Vanquished by tlie arguments 
of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory 
to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame 
if she persisted any longer in the battle against 
Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is 
morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment 
or the mental gratification which springs from it is 
of higher value thanlirraness and dignity of character. 
Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her 
keep within her own domains, lest her charms and 
blandishments put snares in the way of strict plnlo- 
i sophical debate. The question before us is, where is 
that Chief Good, whicii is the object of oiir inquiry', 
to be found? Pleasure we have eliminated; the 
doctrine that the End of Goods consists in freedom 
from pain is open to almost identical objections ; and 
in fact no Chief Good can be accepted that is with- 
out the element of Virtue, the most excellent thing 
that can exist. 

Hence although in our debate with Torquatus 
we did not spare our strength, nevertheless a keener 
struggle now awaits us with the Stoics. For pleasure 

n topic that does not lend itself to very subtle or 
mfouiid discussion ; its champions are little skilled in 


lurclFT lacomba 
ana EpicuMBn. 


fendunt eatn versuti in diaserendo suiit nee qui 

S contra dicunt csusam difficilem repellunt. Ipse etiani 
dicit Epicurus ne argumentanduni quidem esse de 
voluptate, quod sit positum judicium eius in sensibus, 
ut commoiieri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. 
Quare ilia nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem 
disputatio. Nee enim in Torquati sermone quidquam 
implicatum aut tortuosum ftiit, nostraque, ut mihi 
videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorurn autem non 
ignoras quani sit subti le vel spiuosum potius disse- 
rendi genus, idqiie cuai Graccis, turn magis nobis 
quibua etiam verba parienda sunt imponendaque 
nova rebus novis nomina. Quod quidem nemo 
mediocriter doetus mirabitur, cogitans in omni arte 
cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit multani 
novitatem nomtnum esse cum constituantur earum 
rerom vocabula quae in quaque arte versentur. 

4 Itaque et dialeetici et physici verbis utuntur iis quae 
ipsi Graeciae nota non sint,' geometrae vero et 
musici, grammatici etiam, more quodam loquuntur 
suo; ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae f'orenses 
atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi 
privatis utuntur ac suis. 

II. Atque ut omittam has artes elegantes et io- 
genuas, ne opifices quidem tueri suaartificia possent 
nisi voeabulis uterenlur nobis incognilis, usitatis sibi. 
Quin etiam agri cultura, quae abliorret ab unmi 
politiort elegantia, tamen eas res in 
' sinl Mdv.t iunt MSS. 


aibus versabj^H 

BOOK III. i-ii 
dial ei:tic, and tlicir adversaries havp no difficult case to 

3 refute. InfactEpicurushimselfdeclares that there is 
no occasion to argue about pleasure at al! : its criterion 
resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely super- 
fluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. 
Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple 
statement of the case on either side. There wa-s 
nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of 
Torquatus, and my own exposition was, 1 believe, as 
clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, 
affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style 
of argument ; and if the Greeks find it so, still more 
must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, 
and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This 
necessity will cause no suiprise to anyone of moderate 
learning, when he reflects that in every branch oi 
science lying outside the range of common everyday 
practice there must always be a large degree of 
novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a 
terminology to denote the conceptions with which 

4. the science in question deals. Thus Logic and Natural 
Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even 
to Greece ; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an 
idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, 
which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to 
the life of the world, nevertheless employ for pur- 
poses of instruction a sort of private and peculiar 

11. And to leave out of account these liberal arts 
and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable 
to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did 
not make use of words unknown to us though 
familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a sub- 
ject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has 


nomiliibus notavit novis. Quo mngis hoc philosopho 
faciendum est; ars est enim philosophia vitHe, de 
qua dis5erens arripere verba de f oro non potest. 

5 Quamquani ex omnibus philosophis Stoici plurims 
novaverunl, Zenoque eorum princeps noii tam reruni 
inventor fiiit quam verborum novorum. Quod si in 
ea lingua quam plerique uberiorem putant concessum 
est ut doctissimi liomines de rebus non peri'agatis 
inusitatis verbis iiterentur, quanto id nobis magis 
est coneedendum qui ea imnc primum audemus 
attingere? Et quoniam sacpe diximiis, et quidem 
cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum 
etiani qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi 
volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum 
copia sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum 
est ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus sed etiam in 
illorum ipsorum assequamur. Quamquam ea verba 
quibus instituto veterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa 
philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialect! ca, grammatics, 
g'eometria, musiea, quamquam I^atine ea dici pote- 
rant, tamen quoniam usu percepta sunt nostra du< 
mus. Atque haec quidem de rerum nominil 

6 De ipsis rebus auteni saepenumero, Brute, 
ne reprehendar, cum haec ad te scribam, qui cm 
in philosopliia, tum hi optimo genere pliilosophiac 
tantum processeris. Quod si facerem quasi te eru- 


BOOK in. ii 

yet bad to coin tecIinicHi terms ta denote the things 
with which it is occupied. All the more is the 
philosopher compelled to do likewise ; for philosophy 
is the Science of Life, and cannot be discussed in 

i language taken at random from tlie street. Still of 
all the philosopliers the Stoics hnve been tlie greatest 
innovators in this respect, and Zeno their founder 
was rather an inventor of new terms than a dis- 
coverer of new ideas. But if men so learned, using 
a language generally supposed to be more copious 
than our own, were allowed in handling recondite 
subjects to employ unfamiliar terms, how much 
more right have we to claim this licence who are 
venturing now to approach these topics for the first 
time? Moreover we have often declared, and this 
under some protest not from Greeks only but also from 
persons who would rather be considered Greeks than 
Romans,' that in fullness of vocabulary we are not 
merely not surpassed by the Greeks but are actually 
their superiors. We are therefore bound to do our 
utmost to make good this claim not in our native 
arts only but also in those that belong to the Greeks 
themselves. However, words which the practice of 
past generations permits us to employ as Latin, e.g. 
the term philosophy' itself, or rhetoric,' logic,' 
grammar,' geometry," music ' we may consider as 
l>eing our own : the ideas might it is true have been 
translated into Latin, but the Greek terms have been 
naturalized by use. So much for terminology. 

i As regards my subject, I often fear, Brutus, that 1 and for ded 
shall meet with censure for writing upon this topic to ^" o^*^^, 
you, who are yourself so great an adept in pliilosophy, phiiowphy. 
andinthehighestbranchof philosophy." Did I assume 
the attitude of an instructor, such censure would be 


diens, iure reprehenderer. Sed ab eo plurimnm 

fthsum iieque ut eii cogiioscas quae tibi iiotissima 
sunt ad te mitto, sed qnia facillime in nomine tuo 
acquiesce et quia le habeo aequissimum eorum studio- 
rum quae mihi communia tecum sunt existimatorem 
tt iudioem. Attendes igitur ut soles diligenter, 
eamque controversiam diiudicabis quae mihi ftiit 
cum avuncuto tuo, divino ac singulari viro. 
' Nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e biblio- 
theca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris ubi, veni in eius 
villam ut eos ipse ut solebam depromereni. Quo cum 
venissem, M. Catonem quem ibi esse nescieram vidi in 
bibliotheca sedentem, multis circumfusum Stoicorura 
libris. Erat enim ut scis in eo aviditas legeiidi, nee 
satiari poterat; quippe qui ne leprensionem quidem 
viilgi inanem reformidans in ipsa curia soleretlegere 
saepe dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae 
detrahens; quo magis turn in sumrao otio raaximaque 
copia quasi helluari hbris, si hoc verbo in tarn clara 
t re utcndum est, videbatur. Quod cum accidisset, 
ut alter alterum necopinato videremuSi surrexit sla- 
tim. Deinde prima ilia quae in congressu solemus: 
Quid tu," inquit, hue? a villa enim credo;" ct: 
Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venisst 
Heri," inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profe 


BOOK 111. ii 
deserved. But nothing could be farther from me. 
I dedicate my work to you, not to teacli you what 
you know extremely well already, but because your 
name gives me a very comforting sense of support, 
and because I find in you a most impartial judge and 
critic of the studies which I share with yourself. 
You will tlierefore grant me, as always, your closest 
attention, and act as umpire of the debate which I 
held with that remarkable man of g-eiiius, your uncle. 

7 I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted Si 
to consult some books from the library of the young „ 
Lucullus ; so 1 went to his country-house, as I was in 
the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I 
needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I 
found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. 
He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; 
for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appe- 
tite for reading, and could never have enough of it; 
indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the 
idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate- 
house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, 
— he did not steal any attention from pubHc business. 
So it may well be believed that when 1 found him 
taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of 
books at command, he had the air of indulging in a 
literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so 

8 honourable an occupation. Upon tliis chance en- 
counter, each of us being equally surprised to see 
the other, he at once rose^unil we began to exchange 
the usual greetings, What brings you here?" cried 
he ; You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had 
1 known you were there," he continued, I should 
have anticipated you- with a visit" Yes," I 
answered, the games began yesterday, so 1 came 


veni ad vespemm. Causa auteni full hue veniendi 
lit quosdnm Iiinc Hbro8 promerem. Et quidem, Cato, 
hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse 
oportebit; nam his Hbris eum malo quam reliquo 
omatu villae delectari. Est eiiim mihi niagnae curae 
(quamquHiii hoc quidem propriiim tuuin luunus est) 
ut ita erudiatur ut et patri et Caepioni nostro et tibi 
tarn propinquo respondeat. Laboro nutem non Hint 
causa ; nam et avi eius menioria moveor (nee enini 
ignoras quanti fecerim Caepionem, qui, ut opinio 
mea fert, in principibus iam esset si vivcret) et* 
Lucullus niihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum omnibus* 
excellens, turn mecum et amicitia et onmi voluntate 
9 sententiaquc coniunctus." Praeclare," inquit, facis 
cum et eorum meinoriam tenes quorum uterque tibi 
testamento liberos suos conimendavit, et puerum 
diligis. Quod autem meiim muiius dicis non equidem 
recuso, sed te adiungo socium. Addo etiam ilhid, 
tnulta iam niilii dare signa puerum et pudoris et 
ingeni; sed aetatem vides." "Video equidem," 
inquam ; ' sed tamen iam inHei debet iis artibus quas 
si dum est tener combiberit, ad maiora veniet para- 
tior." Sic; et quidem diligeiitius saepiusque ista 
loqueinur inter nos agemusque comm.uniter. Sed 
residamus," inquit, si placet." Itaque lecimua. 

' Halm conj. L. Lucullus, 
' Baiter conj. omnibus vMulibus. 
^ The yawng Lucullus's grandfalher, Q. Servilius Caepio, 
was quaestor 100 B.C. anil died go B.C. when Cicero waa 16. 
But the following' words Seem lo refer to a Caepio who, bad 
he not died prematurely, would be in ibc prime of life when 
Cicero writes. This must mean the Caepio of the pre- 
ceiling sentence, Lucullus's uncle, who may well have left 
Cicero as Ihe guardian of his son, as is stated below. Wc 
mav assume that aW is a slip, Mlher of Cicero's or of a 
coti'yist'a, for avuiinili (Schnli). 

out of town, ami arrived late in the afternoon. My 
reason for coining on here was to get some book» 
from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be 
time for our friend I.ucullus to make acquaintance 
with this fine collection; for I hope he will take 
more pleasure in his library than in all the other 
appointments of his country-house. 1 am extremely 
anxious {though of course the responsibility belongs 
especially to you) that he should have the kind of 
education that will turn him out after the same 
pattern as his father and our dear Caepto, and also 
yourself, to whom he is so closely related. And I 
have every motive for my interest in him. I cherish 
the memory of his grandfather' (and you are aware 
howhighlyl esteemedCaepio,whoinmy belief would 
to-day be in the front rank, were he still alive). And 
also I.ucullus is always present to my mind; he was 
a man of surpassing eminence, united to me in senti- 
9 ment and opinion as well as by (Viendship," I com- 
mend yoii," rejoined Cato, for your loyalty to the 
memory of men who both bequeathed their children 
to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest 
in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I 
by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it 
with me. Moreover I may say that the youth 
already seems to me to show many signs both of 
modesty and talent ; but you know how young he 
is." I do," said I, 'but all the same it is time for him 
to be dipping into studies which, if allowed to soak 
in at this impressionable age. Mill render him better 
equipped when he comes to the business of life." 
True, and we will discuss this matter again several 
times more fully and takecommon action. But let us be 
seated," he said, if agreeable to you." So we sat down. 


I III. Turn ille: "Tu autem cum ipse tantum libro- 
rum habeas, quos hie tandem requiris?" Commen- 
tarios quosdani," inquam, AristotcHos, quos ]iic 
sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerein dura 
essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe con- 
tingit." " Quam velleiu," inquit, te ad Stoicos 
inclinavisses ! Erat enim, si cuiusquaai, certe tuum 
nihil praeter virtutem in bonis dueere." Vide ne 
magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi quod 
mihi videretur, non nova te rebus nomina imponere. 
Ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio," Mi- 
nime vero," inquit ille, "consentit. Quidquid enim 
praeter id quod honestum sit espctendum esse dixe- 
ris in boiiisque numeraveiis, et houestum ipsutn, 
quasi virtutis lumen, exstinKeris ct virtutem penitus 

I everteris." Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice," in- 
quam; sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum 
Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, 
essecommunem? de quibus cupio scire quid sentias." 
"Egone quaeris," inquit, "quid sentiam? quos bonos 
viros, fortes, iustos, moderates nut aiidivimus in re 
publica fiijsse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina, 
naturam ipsara secuti, multa. laudabilia fecerunt, eos 
melius a natura institutos fuisse quam institui potuis- 
sent a philosophia, si ullam aliam probavissent praeter 
earn quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, 
nihil nisiturpeiiimaLs; oeterae philosophorum disci- 

BOOK III. iii 

10 III. Cato then resumed: " But what pray are tJie-ftdiminMy 
books tliat you must come here for, when you have so ctS™3nj- 
large a librarj' of your own?" "l have come tojai^'wwSn 
fetch some commentaries on Aristotle," I replied, desirable, VMiii 
" wliich I knew were here. I wanted to read them n«^ u bt' 
during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." ^^^J'^J,"" 
How 1 wish," said he, 'that you had thrown in always bappj- 
your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might 
liave been expected to reckon virtue as*the only 
good." "Perhaps you might rather have been ex- 
pected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a 
new terminology, when in substance you think as I 
do. Our principles agree ; it is our language that is 
at variance." ' Indeed," he rejoined, ' they do not 
agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be 
desirable, once reekon*ttiything asagood,other-than~ 
Mbral Worth, and you have extinguished the very" i 
light of virtue. Moral Worth itself, and overthrown 

[] virtue entirely." That all sounds very fine, Cato," 
I replied, but are you aware that you sliare your 
lofty pretensions with Pyrrho and with Aristo, who 
make all things equal in value ? I should like to know 
what your opinion is of them." My opinion ? " he 
said. You ask what my opinion is F That those 
good, brave, just and temperate men, of whom we 
have heard as having lived in our state, or whom we 
have ourselves seen, who under the guidance of 
Nature herself, without the aid of any learning, did 
many glorious deeds,^that these men were better 
educated by nature than they could possibly have 
been by philosophy had they accepted any other 
system of philosophy than the one that counts 
Mc^lW^orth the only good and Moral Basenessthe 
onlyevir. Att-otliet^hilosophlCal sysleins — in vary- 

only e 



alia niagis alia, sed tamen omnes quae 
rem ullam virtutis expertem ant in bonis aut in malis 
numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque 
afferre^ quo meliores simus, sed ipsain dcpravare natu- 
ram-Nam nisi hoc obtineatur, id solum bonum esse quod 
honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit beatam vi- 
tam virtute effici ; quod si ita sitj cur opera philoso- 
phiae sit dlinda, nescio. Si enim sapiens aliquis raiser 
esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque 
virtutem non magno aestiraandam putem." 

i IV. " Quae adbuc, Cato, a te dicta sunt, eadem," 
inquam, dicerc posses si seqiicrere Pyrrhonem aut 
Aristonem. Nee enim ignoras iis istud honestum 
non summum modo sed etiam ut tu vis solum bonum 
videri ; quod si ita est, sequitur id ipsum quod te 
velie video, omnes semper beatos esse sapientes. 
Hosne igitur laudas et haiic eorum," inquam, sen- 
tentiam sequi nos censes oportere ? " Miiiime vero 
istorum quidem," inquit ; cum enim virtutis hoc 
proprium sit, carum rerum quae secundum iiaturam 
sint habere delectum, qui omnia sic exaeq nave runt 
lit in utramque partem ita paria redderent uti nulla 
selectione uterentur, hi virtutem ipsam sustulemnt." 

i Istiid quidem," inquam, optime dicis ; sed quaere, 
nonne tibi faciendum idem sit nihil dicenti bonuin 
quod uon rectum houestumque sit, reliquarum rerum 
discrimeu omiie toUenti." "Si quidem," inquit, 

I tollerem; sed relinquo." Quo 

' a^erre cdd.; affirmare MSS., and Mdv. with r 

do.' ffi^_ 


BOOK in. iii-iv 
ing degrees no doabt, but still all,— which reckon 
anything of which virtue is not an element either as 
a good or an evil, do not merely, as I hold, give us no 
assistance or support towards becoming better 
but are actually corrupting to the character. Either 
this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral 
Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impos- 
sible to prove that virtue conslntutes happiness. And 
in that case I do not see why we should trouble to 
study philosophy. For if a Wise Man could be 
miserable, I should not set much value on your 
vaunted and belauded virtue." 

1 2 IV. What you have said so far, Cato," I answered, 
might equally well be said by a follower of Pyrrho 

or of Aristo. They, us you are aware, think as you 
do, that this Moral Worth you speak of is not merely 
the chief but the only Good ; and from this of 
necessity fallows the proposition that I notice you 
maintain, namely, that the Wise are always happy. 
Do you then," I asked, commend these philosophers, 
andthink that weoughttoadopt this view of theirs?" 
I certainly would not have you adopt Iheir view," he| 
said ; for it is of tlie essence of virtue to exercise 
choice among the things in accordance with natuie; 
so that philosophei's who make all things absolutely! 
equal, rendering thera indistinguishable either as 
better or worse, and leaving no room for selection 

13 among them, have abolished virtue itself." Excel- 
lently put," I rejoined; but pray are not you 
committed to the same position, if you say that only 
what is right and moral is good, and abolish all dis' 
tinction between everything else ? " Quite so," 
said he, " if I did abolish all distinction, but I do 

14 not." "How so?'*T said, "if only virtue, only that 

Pytrlio ? They 

quam. Si una virtus, unum istud quod honestuni 
appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum (erit enim 
notius quale sit pluribtis notatum vocabiilis idem 
declarantibus), id igitur, inquam, si solum est bonum, 
quid Iiubebis praeterea quod sequare? aut, si nihil 
malum niai quod turpe, inhonestum, indecorum, pra- 
rum, flag-itiosum, foedum (ut hoc quoqiie pluribus 
nominibus insigne faciamus), quid praetereadices ease 
fugiendum?" Non ignoranti tibi," inquit, quid 
sim dicturus, sed aliquid, ut ego suspicor, ex: mea 
brevi responsione arripere cupienti non respondebo 
ad singula; explicabo potius, quouiam otiosi sumus, 
nisialienum putas, totam Zenonis Stoicorumque sen- 
tentiam." Miiiime id quidem," inqnum, atienum, 
multumque ad ea quae quaerimus explicatio tua 
15 ista profecerit." Experiamur igitur," inquit; etsi 
habet haec Stoicorum ratio difKcilius quiddam et 
obscurius. Nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa 
quondam renim nomina novarum . . .^ non videban- 
tur, quae nunc consuetude diutuma trivit ; quid 
censes' in Latino foref" Facillimum id quidem 
est," inquam. "Si enim Zenoni lieuit, cum rem 
aliqiiam invenissct inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei 
rei nomen imponere, cur non Uceat Catoni? Nee 
tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut inter- 
pretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem 
declaret magis usltatuni ; eqiiideni soleo etiam, quod 
uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pli 

' Mdv. marks lacuna, and corijqclurc; 
rmvt firenda non vi'drbantiir. 


one thing which you call moral, right, praiseworthy, 
becoming (for its nature will be better understood if 
it is denoted by a number of synonyms), if then, I 
say, this is the sole good, what other object of pur- 
suit will you have beside it? or, if there-be nothing 
bad but what is base, dishonourable, disgraceful, 
evil, sinful, foul {to make this clear also by using a 
variety of terms), what else will you pronounce 
worthy to be avoided ? " " You know quite well," he 
retorted, what I am going to say ; but I suspect you caio pcoposo 
want to catch np something in ray answer if I put it st^ic'Mdral'" 
shortly. So I won't answer you point by point, Phiiosophj', 
Instead of that, as we are at leisure, I will expound, 
unless you think it out of place, the whole system of 
Zeno and the Stoics." 'Out of place?" I cried. 
" By no means. Your exposition will be of great ^/ ^i^n 
assistance towards solving the questions we are ask- - _ - 
> ing." "Then let us make the attempt," said he, 
" albeit there is a considerable element of difficulty Apology (or i 
and obscurity in this Stoic system. For at one time """■""'oW' 
even the terms employed in Greek for its novel 
conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were 
novel, though now daily use has made them familiar; 
what then do you think will be the case in Latin?" 
" Do not feel the least difficulty on that score," said 
I. " If when Zeno invented some novel idea he 
was permitted to denote it by an equally unheard-of 
word, why should not Cato be permitted to do so 
too ? Though all the same it need not be a hard 
and fast rule that every word shall be represented 
by its exact counterpart, when there is a more 
familiar word conveying the same meaning. That 
is the way of a clonisy translator. Indeed my own 
practice is to use several words to give what is ex- 

verbis exponere. Et tamen puto concedi nobis 
oportere ut Graeco verbo iitamur, si quando minus 
occurret Lfttinum, ne hoc epliippiis ' et acralti- 
phoris ' potius quam proegmenis ' et apoproegme- 
nis ' concedatur. Quamquam Iiaec quideni praepo- 
) site ' recte et ' reiecta ' dicere licebit" " Bene facis," 
inquit, quod me adiuvas; et istis quidem qune 
modo dixisti utar potius Latiitis; in ceteris subvenies 
si me haerentem videbis." Sedulo," inquam fa- 
ciam. Sed fortuna fortes; quare conare, quaeso. 
Quid enim possumus hoe agere dii-inius?" 

V. Placet his," inquit, quorum ratiu mihi pro- 
batur, simul atque natuni sit animal (hinc enim est 
ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad 
se conservandum et ad suum stetum eaque quae 
conservantia sunt eiiis status diligenda, alienari 
autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum vi- 
deantur afferre, Id ita esse sic ppobant, quod ante 
qunm voluptas aut dolor attigerit, saluteria appetnnt 
parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret nisi 
stetum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. Fieri 
autem non posset ut appeterent nliquid nisi sensura 
haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Ex quointellegi 


pressed in Greek by one, if J cannot convey the 
sense otherwise. And at the same time 1 hold that we 
may fairly claim the licence to employ a Greek word 
when no Latin word is readily forthcoming. Why 
should this licence be granted to epAippio (saddles) 
and acratopkara (jars for neat wine) more than to 
prvcgmena and apoproegmenni These latter however 
it ia true may be correctly translated ' preferred ' and 
3 'rejected.'" "Tlianks for your assistance," he said. 
I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equiva- 
lents you have just given; and in other cases you shall 
come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." I'll 
do my best," I replied. But fortune (avours the 
bold ; so pray make the venture. What sublimer 
occupation could we find ? " 

V. He began: It is the view of those whose 
system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (fc 
that is the proper point lo start ^ronij a" livin 
creature fee ls an attachment for itself, and a 
im pulse to prese rve itself and to Teel aflection for 
itsowji constitu tion and for those thmgs which teitd 
eivfi-lhateoiistitution ; while on the otlier hand 

[i antipathy to destruction and to those 
things which appear to threaten destruction. In 
proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire 
things conducive to their health and reject things 
that are the- opposite before they have ever felt 
pleasure or pain ; this would not be the case, unless 
they felt an aftection for their own constitution and 
were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible 
that they should feel desire at all nnless they pos- 
sessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affec- 
tion for themselves. This leads to the conclusion 
that it is love of self which supplies the primary 

SUtement aod 
defence alSlolo 

1. TM ^-itani 
ttio Chief Good. 
The new-bom 
cnstnic initlnc 
tlvely seeki eell 

Ihinp con- 



17 debet principium ductum ease a se diligendo. In 
principiis autem naturalibuK jilerique Stoid non pu- 
tant voluptatem esse ponendam ; quibus ego vehe- 
menter assentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse 
in lis rebus vidcatur quae primae appetuntur, multa 
turpia sequantur. Satis esse autcm argugnenti vide- 
tur quamobreni ilia Quae priiiiH sunt oscita natura 
diligamus, quod est nemo quin, cuci utrtimvis liceat, 
aptas malit et integras omnes partes corporis quam 
eodem usu iinmiiiutas aut detortas habere. 

" Rerum autem cogmtiones (quas vel comprebensi- 
ones vel perceptiones vel, si liaec verba ant minus pla- 
cent aut minus iiitelleguntur, KinaK^ipeis appellemus 
licet), eas igitur ipsas propter se asciscendas arbitra- 
mur, quod babeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et 
continens veritatem. Id autem in parvis intellegi 
potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil 
1 a intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. Art<s 
etiam ipsas propter se assumendas putamus, cum quia 
sit in iis aliquid dignum assumptione, tum quod con- 
stent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se 
ratione constitutum et via. A falsa autem assensione 
magis DOS atienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus quae 
sint contra naturani, arbitrantur. 

(lam membrorum, id est, partium fflrporis alia 
videiitur propter eorum usum a uatura esse donat», 
ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea quae sunt intus in 
corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis et^^_ 

* This parenlhe^s has no relevance Id the contac^^^| 


7 inqwri sc t o a c ti pTt; — Pleasure on the contrary, aceord- 
ing to most Stoics, is not to be rt'ckontd among 
the prim»ry objects of natural impulse ; and I very 
strongly agree with them, for fear lest many 
immorjil consequences would follow if we held that 
nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects 
of desire. But the fact of our affection for the 
objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to 
require no further proof than this, that there is no one 
who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all 
the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than 
maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. 

' '^ifP''" '";^'' "*" cognition ( which we may term 
comprehensions or percept ibos, or, if these words are 
distasteful or obscure. Acta %ieisi ^rr^ these- we-con? 
sider meet to be adopted for theirownjafce, becausa 
they possess an element that so to speak embrace* 
and contains the truth. This can be seen in th* 
case of children, whom we may observe to take 
pleasure in finding something out for themselves by 
the use of reason, even thougli they gain nothing bj' 

i it. The sciences also, we consider, are things to be 
chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in 
them something worthy of choice, partly because 
they consist of acts of cognition and contain an 
element of fact established by methodical reasoning. 
The mental assent to. what is false, as the Stoics 
believe, isjnore repugnant to us than all the other 
things that are contrary to nature. 

(Again,' of the members or parts of the body, 
some appear to have been bestowed on us by natwe 
for the sake of their use, for example the hands, 
legs, feet, and the internal organs, as to the degree 
of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; 

disputstur, alia autem uullam ob utilitatem quasi 
Bd quendam omatunij ut Cauda pavoni, p]iiinae 
versicolores columbis, viris mammae atqtie barba.) 

19 Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiuniiis; sunt enim quasi 
prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis 
adliiberi vix potest ; nee equidem earn cogito eonse- 
ctari ; yerum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, 
ipsae res verba rapiunt ; itfl, fit cum gravior, turn 
etiam splendldior oratio." Est ut dicis," inquam: 
" sed tamen omne quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, 
mihi praeclare dici videtur. Istiusmodi autem res 
dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et 
perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri." 

'20 VI. Pragrediaraur igitur,qiioniam," inquit, abhis 
priiicipiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere de- 
bent quae sequuntur. Sequitur autem haec prima 
divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt (sic enim, ut opinor, 
appellemus) id quod aot ipsum secundum naturam 
sit HUt tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum pro- 
pterea sit quod aliquod poiidus babept 'dignuii ^ aesti- 
mattone, quam illi aitav vocant, contraque inaestima- 
bfle quod sit superiori contrarium. Initiis igitur ita 
constitutis ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa 
propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, 



BOOK in. v-vi 
while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to 
be intended for ornament ; for instance the pea- 
cock's tiil, the plumage of the dove with its shitting 
colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human 

19 being.) All this is perhaps somewhat baldlf ex- 
pressed; for it deals with what may be called the 
primary elements of nature, to which any embelhsh- 
ment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my 
part concerned to attempt it. On tlie other hand, 
when one is treating of more majestic topics the style 
instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance 
of the language increases with the dignity of the 
theme." 'True," I rejoined; "but to my mind, 
any clear statement of an important topic iwssesses 
exeellence of style. It would be childish to desire 
an ornate style in subjects of tlie kind with which 
you are dealing. A man of sense and education will 
be content to be able to express his meaning plainly 
and clearly," 

;) Vl. To proceed then," he continued, for we have 
been digressing from the primary impulses of nature ; 
and with these the later stages must lie in harmony. 
The next step is the following fundamental classifi- 
cation: That which is in itself in accordance with 
nature, or whtcTi^ produces something else th at is so , 
and wKTcli Tli efefore is "ilgsefv ing of ctToice as 
possessing a certain amount oi' positi ve vaLu^-r - 

' valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); 
and on the other hand tiiat which is the contrary of 
tlie former they term valueless.' The initial prin- 
ciple being thus established that things in accordance 
with nature are things to be taken ' for their own 
sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be 




primum est otficium (id eniiu appello KudiiKov) ut se 
conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat 
quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria; 
qua inventa seleclione et item reiectione, sequitur 
deinceps cum oiiicio selectio, deiiide ea perpetua, 
turn ad extremum constans consent aiieaque niiturae, 
in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit 
quod vere bonum possit did. Prima est enim con- 
ciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam ; 
simul autcm cepit iiitellegentiam vel notionem potius, 
quam appellant tiivoiav illi, viditque rerum agenda- 
rum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo earn 
pluris aestimavit quam omnia ilia quae prima dilexe- 
rat, atque ita cognitlone et ratione collEgit ut sUi> 
tueret in eo collocatum siimmum illud hominis per 
se laudandum et expetendum bonum ; quod cum 
positum sit in eo quod oiiokoyltn' Stoici, nos appelle- 
mus convenientiamj si placet, — cum igitur in eo sit 
id bonum quo omnia referenda sunt, lioneste facta 
ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, 
quamquam post oritur, biraen id solum vi sua et 

* The Latin is here inadequate ; what is me 
rently that tlie adult deliberately selects the tis 
which as a child he pursued instinctively, i 
selection is now an offictKM. If however cu-tH 
mark oi scUctio at this later stage, Cicero i 
above when he applies offirium to the inst 
preservation and the instinctive choice o'' 
On the other hand it is not dear why the; 

nt >s appa- 

id tliat the 

hould not bs 
I ' or q^n'wjfc— II 
le account ^^Hl 



rejected,' the first ' a ppropriate act ' (f pyso I render!' Appro^ 
the Greek kalkvkon) is to preserve o neself in one's 
na tural eonstitulion; th e next is to retain those things ' 
"wHich are in accordMicejdth-uatUfejnd -t» tepel 
thoseJiat are theT5ntrary; then when this principle ,- ,!.•" 
of choice and also ot rejection lias been discovered^ 
there follows next in order choice conditioned Laipt we ci 
by appropriate action';^ then, such choice be- fy^iahin 
come a fixed habit ; and finaljyj choice fully SjJVj'"^ 

this (m^stogeJhaTthejGQQa n J tutL'^ r ^^ 

emerggs- and comes to be.uiiderstooH in its true tfCWefai 
I nature. Ma n's first attraction is towards tlie tTiiugs 
in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has 
attained to understanding, or rather to conscious in- „ 
telligence- — in Stoic phraseology ennoia — and has die- 1 
cgQi£dJji£ order and so to speak harmony that should 
fco ^m con duc"tJh e then Rst,epnifi t.hifiTi^i -ififinY fr r 
fewie-faighLy tn MJall the thing sfom^hich he originally | 
fMtM^a^ctuTn, and by exercise of ihtelligence and 
reason infers the conclusion tl<at i n 1jhTs oritu r jesideg 
the Chief flood nf man , tlip. thiny fliiit is praise^ 
woHExJHid desirab le fo r its own_5abe ; and that in- 
asmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term 
/lomologia and we with your approval may call con- 
formity''' — inasmuch I say as in this resides that 
Good which is the End to which all else is a meuis, 
moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone 
is counted as a good, although of subsequent develop- 
ment, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its 

1" To live conformably,' i)i.o\oyoiiiiiyaii ffu, was Zeno's 
formula for the End; ii was interpreted as meaning "to 
live on one harmonlouii pla.ii. " CleanLbes added, r-j ijiiad, 
'to live in conformity with nature.' 



dignitate eJcpetendum est, eorum autem quae sunt 
prima naturae propter se nihil est expetendum. 
22 Cum vero ilia quae oflicia esse dixi proficiscantur ab 
initiis naturaej necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut 
recte dici possit omnia oflicia eo referri ut adipisca- 
mur principia naturae, nee tamen ut hoc sit bonorum 
ultimiim, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae 
conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens est enim 
et post oritur, ut dixi. Est tamen ea secundum 
naturam multoque nos ad ae espetendam magis hor- 
tatur quam superiora omnia. Sed e\ hoc primum 
error tollendus est, ne quis seqiii existimet ut duo 
sint ultima bononim. Ut enim si cui propoaitum sit 
collineare hostora aliquo aut sagittam, sicut ' nos 
ultimum in bonis didmus, sic illi facere omnia quae 
possit ut collineet: huic in eiusmodi similitudine 
omnia sint facienda ut collineet, et tamen, ut omnia 
faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit* hoc quasi ulti- 
mum quale nos summum in vita bonum dtcimus, illud 
autem ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non espetendum. 
S VII. Cum autem omnia oflicia a principiis naturae 
proliciscantur, ab iisdem necesse est proficisci ipsam 
sapientiam. Sed quemadmodum saepe fit ut is qui 
commendatus sit alieui pluris cum faciat cui com- 
mendatus quam ilium a quo sit, sic minime mirum 
'sicui MSS.; JiVMdv,, br-ncketine sicilic—comitKl ; the 
.seuCence so emended may be rendered "For suppose a 
man were to set himself to take true aim at a. mark with a 
apear or an arrow, tliis purpose would correspond lo the 
Ultimate Good as we define it. The archer in this illustra- 
tion would have to do all he could to aim slraig-ht, and yet 
it is this doing all he could to attain his purpose that would 
constitute his Ultimate End, as we call it, answering lo 
the Chief Good, as defined by us, in the conduct of life ; 
the actual hitting- of the mark would be, in our phrase, 
' to be chosen,' not ' lo he desired.' " ''sit edd. ; sic MSS, 

to da all lie ca- H *«'»■» s^^ikti the HMn in ti»b 
ilU^tntion «osld ba*v to do rrr-TTrthinit to aiw 
stniicht, and jet, altboo^ he did cvrrirthinK to 
attain his parpaee, his ' oltimate Eih).' $« to Kpndc, 
would be miat correspofxied to what wc c«ll lh< 
Chief Good Id the conduct of life, whcrva^ thr actual 
hitting of the mark «-ould l>e ia our phnur 'to br 
choienZiml not ' to he desired.' 
i VII. " Again, as all " ag^roiiriHlc «rls' nrv l>*«cd V' *] 
on the primary impulses of luiturv, it follow», tlml. dy., . 
WisdoinTtself iVbased on them ulso. But ns it .il>ci 
happens that a man who is hitrwhircd to miutlicr ^l«ii 
values this new friend more higlily tUsii he diiei» the 
person who gave him the iiitroductiuii, so In llkr 
R »41 


est primo nos sapientiae com mend a ri ab initiis 
naturae, post auteni ipsam siipieiitiam nobis cariorem 
fieri quam ilia sint a quibus ad hanc venerimus. 
Atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt ut ad quandam 
rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio 
animi, quae op/i^ Graeee vocatur, non ad quodvis 
genus vitae sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur 

2i data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. Ut enim 
histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis sed certus 
quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo Renere 
quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens con- 
sentaneumque dicimus. Nee enim gubemationi aut 
niedicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed 
actioni illi potius quam modo dixi et saltAtioni, ut in 
ipsa insit, non tons petatur extremum, id est artis 
effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis 
artibus sapientiae dissimilitude, propterea quod in 
illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen 
omnes partes e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut 
recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem 
appellant KaTopBw/iaTa, omnes numeros virtutis con- 
tinent Sola enim sapientia in setotaconversaest, quod 

35 idem in ceteris artibus non fit. Inscite autem medicinae 
et gubemationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae com- 
paratur. Sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem 

^ Effectio 

is here 

Ukenase ui- 

.-alent 1 


but it 

might b. 

rued as having the 


' In Tusc J. : 

sense, the 


t of ; 

in art, c 

tjvering 6oth praxis, the 

actual exci 

rcise of the 

art, whi 

rt, and 


in the n 

r sense, "effcclua" 

e extra 



'poieiic' or con- 

manner it b br do means sa r pnaag that tboo^ we 

instucts, afiemuds WisdoDt itself becooKs dCKCtlo. I 
OS than are the instincts &t>m whid we cane to ber. 
And jnat as our limbs are $o fashtotted that it is clear 
that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a 
certain mode of life, so oar faculty of appetition, in 
Greek karme, was obvionslT designed not for any kind 
of life one may choose, but for a particular mode «rf 
living : and the same is true of Reason and of per- 
'i fected Reason. F or just as an actor or dancer has w i^tnl,». 

'°"i7"^ \-i hil" -"* '-"T '■"t 1 rf^P parHmlar part ^"-t- 

OT^ dance, so life has to be conducted in a E< ;rt«in 
fiiett way, and iiot in any wa y we~T^e. This fiied 
• ^y we speak of as conformabl e ' and suitable. In ^^ 
fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship , 
or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and 
of dancing just mentioned ; its End, l>eiiig the | 

aetnal fffrri^.p' nf tli ^ art^jg_f-fiii^ainpj^ KJtliin the _ _. 

tiie Wiine limc there is also another point which 
marks a dissimilaritj" betiveen Wisdom and these 
same arts. In the latter a movement perfectly 
executed nevertheless does not involve all the 
various motions which together constitute the sub- 
ject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of 
conduct, what we may call, if you approve, right 'Righti 
actions,' or ' rigiitly performed actions,' in Stoic Jp"]y^ 
phraseology ioioriSSinafn .contain all the categories of «upceii 
virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-eontalned, * 

i^ which is not the 

erroneous, however, to pla 
of navigation exactly on 
Wisdom, For Wisdom i 

ith the other arts, 
ce the End of medicine or 
a par with the End of 
icludes also magnanimity 

complectitur et iustitiam et ut omnia quae honiini 
ucddunt infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris nrti- 
bus non coiitingit. Teiiere autem virtutes eas ipsas 
quarum modo feci mentionem nemo poterit nisi 
statuerit nihil esse quod interstt aut diHerat: aliud ab 
alio praeter honesta et turpia.' 

'iG Vide^mus nunc quani sint praeclare ilia his quae 

iain posui const^queiitia. Cum enim hoc at' extre- 
mum (scntis enim, credo, me iam diu quod teAm 
Graeci dicunt id dicere turn extremu'm, turn ulti- 
mum, tum sunimum; Hcebit etiam finem pro extreme 
aut ultimo dicere) — cum igitur hoc sit extremum, 
congruenter naturae coiiveiiienterque vivei'c, neces- 
sario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, abso- 
lute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, iiuUa prohi- 
beri, nulla egere. -Quod autem eoiitinet non magis 
earn disciplinAm de qua loquoi- qunm vitam fortunas- 
que nostras, id est ut quod honestiim sit id solum 
bonum iiidiccmus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose 
et omnibus electissimis verbjs gravissimisque sen- 
tentiis rhetoi'ice ' et augeri et ornari; sed consectariA 
ine Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectaiit. 

27 VIII Concluduntur igitur eorum arguments 
sir?: Quod est bonum omne laudabile e<it; quod 
autem laudibde Lst omne est hont.stum boiiiun 
igitur quod tst, Iioiiestimi est batisne hoc conolu- 
sum videtur Certe quod emm efhciebatur ex iis 

duobus quae ernit sumpta, i 

ISC coiw^^^ 


and justice and a sense of superiority to ull 
accidents of mans estatej but this is not the 
with the otlier arts. Again, even the very virtues 
have just mentioned cannot be attained by anyone 
unless lie has realizi^d that all things are indifferent - 
and indistinguishable except moral worth and base- ' 

?6 We may now ohserve how strikingly the prin-i Hm 

ciples I have established support the following tiapi 
corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim — (and you 
have observed, no douht, that I hiive all along heen 
translating the Greek term lelot eithex ljy final ' or 
ultimate aim,' or chief Good,' and for final or 
ultimate aim ' we may also substitute End O^inas- 
much then as the final aim is to live in agreement 
and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows 
that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect 
and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, inter- 
ference or want. The essential principle not merely 
of the system of philosophy I am discussing but 
alsoof our life and fortunes is, that we should beheve -■ 
Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle viri 
might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical Siji 
manner, with great length and fullness and with 
all the resources of choice diction and impressive ' 
argument; but fur nuy own part 1 like the terse and 
pointed syllogisms of the Stoics. 

27 VIII. ■* They put their arguments in the follow- (Ut 
ing syllogistic form : Whates-er is good is praise- hom 
worthy : but whatever is praiseworthy is morally '""' 
honourable : therefore that which is good is morally 
honourable. Do yon think this is a valid deduction ? 
Undoubtedly it ta so ; you can see that the conclusion 
rests on an inference logically drawn from the two 
9 1..'. 

11 the ^H 

tues I ^^1 


If Ihoinlr 



disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi 
ad quendam omatum, ut cauda pa von i, plumae 
versicolores coliimbis, viris mammae atqiie barba.) 

3 Haec diciintur forlasse ieiiinius ; sunt enim quasi 
prima elementa naturae, qnibus ubertas oratlonis 
adhiberi vix potest; nee equidem earn cogito conse- 
ctari; verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dieas, 
ipsae res verba rapiunt ; ita fit cum gravior, turn 
etiam splendidior oratio." Est ut dicis," inquam; 
sed tamen omne quod de i-e bona dilucide dicitur, 
raihi praeclare dici videtur. Istiusmodi autem res 
dicere ornate velie puerile est, plane autem et 
perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri." 

J VI, "Progrediamurtgitur,quoniam,"inqiiit, 'abhis 
principiis naturae discessimu^, quibus eongruere de- 
bent quae sequuntur. Sequitur autem haec prima 
divisio : Aestimabile esse dieunt (sic enim, ut opitior, 
appellemus) id quod aut ipsum secundum iiaturam 
sit aut tale quid efticiat, ut selectione dignum pro- 
pterea sit quod aliquod pondus habe ^ digiiui^ aesti- 
matione, qiiam illi d^iai/ vocant, contraque inaestima- 
bHe quod sit superiori contrarium. Initiis igitur ita 
constitutis ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa 
propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, 

while others scire no useful purpose, but appear to 
be intended for ornament: for instance the pea- 
cock's tailj the plumage of the dove with its shifting 
colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human 

19 being.) All this is perhaps somewhat baldly ex- 
pressed; for it deals nith what may be called the 
primary elements of nature, to which any embellish- 
ment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my 
part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, 
when one is treating of more majestic topics the stj'le 
instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance 
of the language increases with the dignity of the 
theme." True," I rejoined; but to my mind, 
any clear statement of an impmrtant topic possesses 
excellence of style- It would be childish to desire 
an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which 
you are dealing. A man of sense and education will 
be content to be able to express his meaning plainly 
and clearly." 

'20 VI. To proceed then," he continued, for we have Suci 
been digressing irom the primary impulses of nature; ■\q 
and with these the Liter stages must be in harmony. ""^ 
The next step is the following fundamental classifi- 
cation: That which is in itself ui accordance with 
nature, or which produces something else that is so ", 
which "therefore is degCfVlng" 

possessing a certain amount of" positiv e ^liie-^ 

aria as the StoIffB 'ealt tt^^.tiis tfipv prnnoiim-p tn 1m- 

'valuab le' (for so I suppose we may translate it); 
and on the other hand that which is the contrary of 
the former they term 'valueless.' The initial prin- 
ciple being thus established that things in accordance 
with nature are ' things to be taken ' for their own 
sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be 


magno sit animo iitque furti omnia quae cadere i 
hominem possint despicere ac pro nihilo putare. 
Quae cum ita siiit, etfectum est nihil ease malum 
quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excel- 
lena, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana 
ducetis, is, inquam, quern efficere volumus, quem 
quaerinius, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae 
et actae et consequent! et bene de sese iudicare, 
statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. Ex quo 

1^— intellegilur idem ilJud, solum bonum esse quod 

I honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere, injneste, id est 

l__ cum virtijte vivere, 

SO IX. Nee vero ignoro, vorias philosophomm fuisse 
sententias, eorum dico qui suminum bonum, quod 
ultimum appello, in animo ponerent. Quae quam- 
quam vitiose quidam secuti sunt, tamen nou modo 
iis tribus qui virtutem a summo bono scRregaverunt, 
cum aut voluptatem ant vacuitatem doloris aut prima 
naturae in summis bonis ponerent, sed etiam alteris 
tribus qui mancam fore putaverunt sine aliqua acces- 
sione virtutem ob eamque rem triura earum rerum 
quas supra dixi singuli singulas addidcrunt, his tamen 
omnibus eos antepono, cuicuimodi simt, qui summum 
31 bonum in animo atque in virtute posuerunt Sed 
sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii qui cum scientia vivere 
uhimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam 
esse dixcrunt atque ita sapientem beatum fore, 
nihil aliiid alii momento ullo antepouentem, et qui,' 

' ei qui inserted by Mdv. 

^B BOOK III. viiUix 

biifh-mi&ded man despises and holds of no account 
all the accidents to which mankind is liable. The 
conclusion follows that nothinif is evil that is not '. 
base. Also, your lofty, distinguished, magnanimous 
and truly brave man, who thinks all human vicissi- 
tudes beneath him, I mean, the character we des 
to produce, our ideal man, must unquestionably have 
faith in himself and in his own career l»oth past and 
future, and think well of himself, holding that no ill 
can befall the wise man, Here then is another proof 
of the same position, that Moral Worth alone is good, 
and that to live honourably, that is virtuously, is to " 
live happily. 

) IX. I am well aware, it Ls true, that varieties of g.TiwSifflc 
opinion have existed among philosophers, I mean 5^^*'^'^^ 
among those of them who have placed the Chief Good, p»riann «iiu 
the ultimate aim as I call it, in the mind. In follow- Thoughit 
ing out these various views some of them fell into ^i,\"j^'^nciud 
errors; but nevertheless I rank all those, of whatever other ihinssiiii 
type, who have placed the Chief Good in the mind jndudeKrtu», 
and in virtue, not merely above the three philoso- iiwChwfGooa 
phers* who dissociated the Chief Good from virtue ^_ 

altogether and identified it either with pleasure or ^H 

freedom fron) pain or the primary impulses of nature, ^H 

but also above the other three, who held that virtue ^H 

would be incomplete without some enhancement, 
and therefore added to it one or other respectively 

1 of the three things I have just enumerated. But still yetuisaiwer 
those thinkers are quite beside the- mark who pro- aii dUim thing! 
nounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to vi*S^™iieis 
knowledge; and those who declared that all things "ighi choice 
are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure """"^ """"' 
happiness by not preferring any one thing i 
least degree to any other; and those again who si 

in the ^m 

'ho said, ^^t 

ut quidam Acndemici constituisse dicuntur,extremuttt 

bonoriim et summuin mtinus esse sapientis obsistere 
visis assensusque suos firme sxistinere. His singulis 
eopiose responderi solet. Sed quae perspicua sunt 
longa esse non dcbent ; quid auteni apertius quam, 
si selectjo nulla sit ab iis rebus quae contra naturam 
sint earuin rerum quae sint secundum naturam, 
tollatur' omnis ea quae quaeratur laudeturque pru- 
dentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis quas 
posui, et ii!< si quae similes eanun sunt, relinquitur 
ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adbibenteni 
earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentera quae 
secundum Daturam et quae contra naturam sint 
reicienteni, id est con veni enter congruenterqae 
naturae vivere. 
! Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, 

posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum 
est, quod illi «riytvnj/iaTiKoV appellant; com autem 
in quo sapieiiter dicimus,* id a primo rectissirae 
dicitur. Quidquid enim a sapient e proficiscitur, 
id continuo debet expletom esse orani!)us suis 
partibus ; in eo enim positum est id quod dicimus 
esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam 
prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt 
in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse 
peccatum est etiam sine effectu. Verum ut haec noa 

^tollatur; Mdv. adds a mark of corrupil 
* dicnntis A ooiiCs. 


BOOK 111. is 
BS some members of the Academy are said to have 
maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of 
the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely 
withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impres- 
sions. It is customary to take these doctrines seve- 
rally and reply to them at length. But there is 
really no need to labour what is self-evident ; and 
what could be more obvious than that, if we can 
exercise no choice as between things consonant with 
and things contrary to nature, no scope is left at all 
for the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence ? 
Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and R' 
any others that resemble them,we are left with the 
^conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying 
the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of 
itural causes, choosing what is in accordance with 
Iture and rejecting what is contrary to it ; in other 
i, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in 
harmony with nature. 

But in the' other arts when we speak of an Mc 

artistic' performance, this quality must be con- h,; 

sidered as in a sense subsequent to and a result of ^"^ 

the action ; it is what the Stoics term epigennematikon 

(in the nature of an after-growth). Whereas in con- 

' let, when we speak of an act as 'wise,' the term is ,■ 

iplied with full correctness from the first inception 

the act. For every action that the Wise Man 

Ltes must necessarily be complete forthwith in 

its parts; since the thing desirable, as we term 

consists in his activity. As it is a sin to betray 

s country, to use violence to one's parents, to 

a temple, where the offence lies in the result of 

act, so the passions of fear, grief and lust are 

, even when no extraneous result ensues. The 


in posteris et in consequentibus, set! in primis 
tinuo peccata sunt, sic ea quae proficiscuntor a 
tute, suseeptione prima, non perf'ectione, recta 

33 X. "Bonum aulem quod in hoc sermone to 
usurpatum est id etiam definitione explicatur. 
eorum definitiones pauliim oppido inter se differunt, 
et tameii codem spectant. Effo assentior Diogeni 
qui bonum definierit id quod esset natura absolutum. 
Idautemsequensillud etiam quodprodesset((u<^A»jfio 
enini sic appellemus) mo turn aut statum esse dixit e 
natura abaoluto. Cumque rerum notiones in animis 
fiant si aut usii aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione 
aut similitudine aut collatioue rationis, hoc quarto 
quod extremum poBui boni notitia facta est. Cum 
enim ab iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam 
ascendit animus collatione rationis, turn ad notionem 

34 boni pervenit. Hoc autem ipsum bonum non acces- 
sione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris ctimparaiido, 
sed propria vi sua et seiitimus et appellamus bonum. 
lit enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tumen pruprio 
genere saporis, non comparatione cum uiiis dulce 
esse sentitur, sic l>onuni hoc de quo agimus est illud 
quid em plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio 
genere valet, non magnitudine. Nam cum aestimatio, 
quae dji'a dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nee 
rursus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo 

BOOK in. 

latter are sins not in their subsequent effects, hxtt 
immediately upon their inception; similarly, actions 
springing from virtue are to be judged right from 
their first inception, ;md not in their successful 

SS X. Again, the term Good,' which h(is been rvfii 
employed so frequently in this discourse, is also ex- 
plained by definition. The Stoic deliiiitions do in- 
deed differ from one another in a very minute degree, 
but they all point in the same direction. I'ersonally 
I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that 
which is by nature perfect. In consonancewith thishe 
pronomiced the ' beneficial ' (for so let us render the 
Greek ophelema) to be ii motion or state in accordance 
with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions 
of things are produced in the mind when something 
has become known either by experiejice or by com- 
bination of ideas or by likeness or by analogy. Tlie 
fourth-and.last method_^in this list is the one that haa 
given «sthe conception of the Good, Theinindasceads 
by analogy from the things in accordance with nature^ 

Ri tilL finally it arrives at the notion of Good. At the 
same time Goodness is absolute, and is not n ques- 
tion- of. degree; thc_GoojL is_ r^'cogmKcd mid pro- 

and not by comparison with other things. Just as 
htifray, tliuugll txTremely swe^, IS' 'yei perceived to 
be sweet by its own peculiar kind of flavour and not 
by being compared with something elxe, so this 
Good which we are discussing is superlatively valu- 
•, yet the value iq its case depends on kind and 



genere manebit. Alia est igitur propria aestii 

virtutis, quae 
i "Nee V. 



e genere, non crescendo valet, 
■o perturbationes animorum, quae 
1 miseram acerbamque reddunt (quas 
7 appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum 
s morbos appellare, sed non conveniret' 
nd omnia; quis enim miserieordlam aut ipsom 
cundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt s-d 
sit igitur pertilrbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa 
clarari videtur ; nee eae perturbationes vi aliqua 
natural] moventur*; oninesque eae sunt genere quat- 
tuor, parti bus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, 
quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et aiiimi 
^Bov^v appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi 
gestientis animi elationem voluptariam :) perturba- 
tiones autem nulla naturae vi commoventur.omniaque 
ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis ; itaque his 
sapiens semper vaeabit. 
] XL Omne autem quod honestum sit id esse 
propter se expetendum, commune nobis est cum 
multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. Praeter 
enim tres disciplinas quae virtutem a summo buna 
excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis bacc est 
tuenda sententia, maxime tnmen his qui' nihil aliud 
in bonorum numero nisi honestum esse voluerunt. 
Sed haec quidem est perfacilis et expedita de- 
fensio. Quis est enim aut quis umquam fuit aut 
avaritia tarn ardenti aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus. 

I edd. ; 

■( MSS. 

'net — moventur Mdv. brackels, 
'Ail gut Mdv.; his Stoicis qui HSS. 

in kind. The vJue._o£ Virtue 4s there for e peeuliar 
finrl liitrtinrLLffj gpcnds o n kind and not on descee^ 

)5 Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass Thr passioiii not 

and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek.tenn 
for these is pathos, and I might have rendered this 
literally and styled them diseases,' but the word 
disease' would not suit all instances; for example, 
no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, 
though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then 
accept the term emotion,' the very sound of which 
seems to denote something vicious, and these emo- 
tions are not excited by any natural influence. The 
list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with 
numerous subdivisions, namelj^ sorro.^j'fear,^Ust, and 
that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name 
that also denotes a bodily feeling, AS/on?"" pleasure,' 
but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the 
sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of ex- 
ultation), these emotions, 1 say. are not excited by 
any influence of nature ; they are all of tliem mere 
fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise 
Man will always be free from them. 

i6 XI. "The view that all Moral Worth is intrinsi- Morainy 
cally desirable is one that we hold in common with [romcu: 
many other systems of philosophy. Excepting three ^^™J 
schools that shut out Virtue from the Chief Good 
altogether, all the remaining philosophers are com- 
mitted to this opinion, and most of all the Stoics, 
with whom we are now concerned, and who hold 
that nothing else but Moral Worth is to be counted 
as a good at all. But this position is one that is ex- 
tremely simple and easy to defend. For who is there, 
or who ever was there, of avarice so consuming and 
appetites so unbridled, that, even though willing to 


ut eaiidem illam rem qunm adipisci scelere quovis 
velit non multis partibus malit ad sese etiam omni 
impunitate proposita sine facinore quam ilia modo 
per venire? 

:17 "Quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes 
scire cupinius ilia quae occulta nobis sunt, quomodo 
nioveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur* in 
caelo? Quis aiitem tam agrestibus institutls vivit 
aut quis contra studia naturae tam vehementer obdu- 
riiit ut a rebus cognitione dignls abhorrent easque 
sine voliiptate aut utilitate aliqua non reqfuirat et 
pro nibilo putet ? aut qnis est qui maiorum * aut Afri- 
canorum aut eius quem tu in ore semper babes, 
proavi mei ceterorumque virorum fortium atque 
omni virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consiUa co- 

:i8 gnoscens nulla anirao afficiatur voluptate? Quis 
autem honesta in familia. institutus et educatus inge- 
nue non ipsa turpitudine etiamsi eum laesura non sit 
offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum quem impure 
ac ftagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordldos, 
vanos, leves, futiles? Quid autem dici poterit, si 
turpitudinem non ipsam per se fugiendam esse sta- 
tuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem 
nacti nuUo dcdecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se 
foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterreat? Innume- 
rabilia dici possunt in banc sententiam : sed non 
nccesse est. Nihil est enim de quo minus dubitari 
possit quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodeni 

J9 modo turpia per se esse fugienda. Constituto autem 

r Mdv. conj., but prints I'n I'eisfnrtf 

wllh MSS. {w 

/ Weidner conj.; Maxt». 


BOOK 111. xi ■ 

commit any crime to achieve his end, and even 
though absolutely secure of impunity, yet would not 
a liuiidred times rather attain the same object hy 
innocent than by guilty means? 

37 ' Again, what desire for profit or advantage under- 
lies our iluriosily to learn the secrets of nature, the 
mode and the causes of the movements of the 
heavenly bodies ? Who lives in sucli a boorish state, 
or who has become so rigidly insensible to natural 
impulses, as to feel a repugnance for these lofty 
studies and eschew them as valueless apart from any 
pleasure or profit they may bring? Or who is there 
who feels no sense of pleasure when he hears of the 
wise words and brave deeds of our forefathers, — of 
the Africaid, or my great-grandfather whose name 
is always on your lips, and the other heroes of valour 

3S and of virtue? On the other hand, what man of 
good breeding, brought up in an honourable family, 
is not shocked by moral baseness as such, even when 
it is not calculated to do him personally any harm? 
who can view without disgust a person whom he 
believes to be dissolute and an evil hver? who does 
not hate the mean, the empty, the frivolous, the 
worthless? Moreover, if we decide that baseness is 
not a thing to be avoided for its own sake, what 
arguments can be urged against men's indulging in 
every sort of unseemliness in privacy and under 
cover of darkness, unless they are deterred by the 
esseJitial and intrinsic ugliness of what is base ? 
Endless reasons could be given in support of this 
view, hut they are not necessary. For nothing is 
less open to doubt than that what is morally good is 
to be desired for its own sake, and similarly what is 
39 morally bad is to be avoided for its own sake. Again, 
s 257 

illo de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset id esse 
solum bonuiDj intellegi necesse est pluris id quod 
honestum sit aestimandum esse quam ilia media quae 
ex eo comparentur. StuUitiam autem et timiditatem 
et iniustitiam et inteniperantiam cum dieynus ease 
fugienda propter eas res quae ex ipsis eveniaiit, non 
ita diciraus ut cum illo quod positum est, solum id 
esse malum quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur 
oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommo- 
dum referuntur sed ad turpes actiones quae oriuntur 
e vitiis (quas enim Kaicias Graeci appellant, vitia malo 
quam malitias nominare)." 
) XII, "Ne tu," inqnam, "Cato, verbis illustribus 
et id quod vis declaranttbus I Itaque niihi videris 
Latine docere philusopliiam et el quasi civitatem 
dare; quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Eomae vide- 
batur nee oiFerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista 
maxime propter liraatam quandam et rerum et 
verborum tenuitatem. (Scio enim esse quosdam qui 
quavis lingua pliilosuphari possint ; nullis enim parti- 
tionibus, nullis definition! bus utuntur, ipsique dicunt 
ea se modo probare quibus natura tacita assentiatur; 
itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud 
eos disserendi labor.) Quare attendo te studiose et 
quaecumque rebus iis de quibus hie sermo est no- 
mina imponis memoriae mando ; mihi enim erit 
iisdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur 
rectissime mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae 
oratiunis vitia posnisse eontraria. Quod enim vitu- 

m perfect ion raibcr 


the F 


principle already discussed, that Moral Worth is 
the sole Good, involves the corollary that it is of more 
value than those neutral things which it procures. 
On the other hand when we say that folly, cowardice, 
injustice and intemperance are to be avoided because 
of the consequences they entail, this dictum must 
not be so construed as to appear inconsistent with 
the principle already laid down, that moral baseness 
alone is evil ; for the reason that the statement does 
not refer to bodUy harm but to the base actions to 

which these vices give rise (the term vice ' * I prefer 

to badness' as a translation of the Greek takia}." |Th«tt«wUliM 

XII, Indeed, Cato," said 1, your language is ot iratU.) 
lucidity itself; it conveys your meaning exactly. In 
fact I feel you are teaching philosophy to speak 
Latin, and natural i;ting her as a Ruman citizen. 
Hitherto she has seemed a foreigner at Rome, and 
not able to fall in with our ways of speaking; and 
this is especially so with your Stoic system because ■ 
of its precision and subtlety alike of thought and 
language. (There are some philosophers, I know, who 
could express their ideas in any language ; for they 
ignore Division and Definition altogether, and them- 
selves profess that they seek to commend only those 
principles which receive the tacit assent of nature. 
Hence, their ideas being so far from recondite, expo- 
sition is with them no laborious matter.) So I am 
following you attentively, and am committing to 
memory all the terms you use to denote the con- 
ceptions we are discussing. For very likely I shall 
soon have to employ the same terms myself Well, 
I think you are quite correct in calling the oppo- 
site of the virtues vices.' This is in conformity 
witli the usage of our language. The word rice ' 
33 859 

perabile est per se ipsiiin, id eo ipso vibium nomina- 
turn puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. Sin 
KaKiav malitiam dixlsses, ud aliud nos unum cerium 
vitium consuetude Lattna tradoceret ; nunc onmi 
virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur." 

1 Turn illc: His igitur ita positis," inquit, 'sequi- 
tur magna contentio, quam tractatam a Peripateticis 
mollius (est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non 
satis acuta propter ignoralionem dialecticae) Camea- 
des tuuH egregia qiiadam exercitatione in dialecticis 
summaque eloquentia rem in Bummum discrimen 
iidduxit, propterca quod pugnare non deslitit in 
ouini liac quaestione quae de bonis et maiis appelletur 
non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis contro- 
versiam sed noniinum. Mihi autent niliil turn perspi- 
cuum videtiir quam has sententias eorum pliiloso- 
phorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere: 
maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum 
esse aio discrepantiani quani verborumj quippe cum 
Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant pertjnere 
dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni quod 
aestimatione aliqua digiium sit compleri vltom beatam 

; XIII. "An vera certins quidquam potest esse 
quam illorum ratione qui dolorem in malis ponunt 
non posse sapientem beatum esse cam eculeo tor- 
queatur? Eorum autcm qui dolorcin in malis non 

BOOK III. xii-xiii 

denotes, I believe, that which is in its own nature 

' vituperahle ' ; or else vituperable' is derived from 
vice.' \^'ht-reas if you had rendered kakia by 
'badness' ('malice'), Latin usage would point us to 
another meaning, that of a single particulai 
As it is, we make vice ' the oppasite term to virtue ' 
in general." 

I WeU, then," resumed Cato, these principles siofcs'diwgwf- 

established there follows a great dispute, wliich on "a\°ti«dor^'" 
the side of the Peripatetics w^as carried on with no nwieiy v«;b»i: 
great pertinacity {in fact their ignorance of logic ren- 
ders their habitual style of discourse somewhat defi- 
cient in cogency) ; but your leader Cameades with his 
exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate 
eloquence brougllt the controversy to a head. Car- 
neades never ceased to contend that on the whole 
so-called 'problem of good and evil,' there was no 
disagreement as to facts littween the Stoics and the 
Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my [jart, how- 
ever, nothing" seems to me more manifest than that 
there is more of a real than a verbal difference of 
opinion iietween those philosophers on these points. 
I maintain that there is a far gj'eater discrepancy 
between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts 
than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the 
things which under their system are calledgoods con- 
tribute to happiness; whereas our school does not 
believe that total happiness comprises everything 
that deserves to have a certain amount of value 
attached to it. 

i XIII, Again, can anything be more certain than iqe under the 
that on the theory of the school that counts pain as m'ihesipiBnii' 

an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is nr'-' 

being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system 


htbai l ratio eatt «git «t m n—il 

'eter bests rita sm^ieati. Knum 

illnd qitidcm «t oaasentmenm, «t si cum tria genen 
iMOonnii si'nt, quae tententia est Penpatcbconnn, eo 
beaUor quuqne fit, qno sit txoporis aiit extemis bonis 
pl«iii>r. ut hoc ideni apfwolnndam ^t nobis, ut qui 
pinra Itabeat ea qnae in corporc nuKni aestimantur 
lit beatior. Illi eniin corporis conunodis compieri 
viUm beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. Nam cum 
Ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum quae nos bona 
vcre appellenius freqaentia beatiorem «itam 6eri aut 
maifin expetendam aut pluris aeatimandani, certe 
minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitude corporis 
I'V commodorum. Etenim si et sapere expetendum sit 
ct valere, coiiiunctuni utrumque ma^s expetenduui 
sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen si utrumque sit 
aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quaui 
«ape re ipsum separatim.^ Nam qui valetudinem 
aestimatione altqua dignam iudicamus neque earn 
tamen in bonis ponimus, iidem censemus nuUam esse 
tantam aestimationem ut ea virtuti antcponatur ; 
quod idem Peripatetic! non tenent, quibus dicenduni 
est quae et lionesta actio Bit et sine dolore earn magis 
esse expetendam quam si esset eadem actio cum 
dolore. Nobis aliter videtur ; recte seeusne, p 
sed poteatne rerum maior esse dissensio ? 
^ separalim MSS. ; irpamlum Mdv. 

cusne, ptKt^^^ 

BOOK in. siii 

that considers pain no evil clearlyproves that the Wise 
Man retains liis happiness amidst the worst torments. 
The mere fact that men endure the same pain 
easily wlien they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of 
their country than when they suffer it for some lesser 
cause, sh ows that the inte nsity of the pain de pends on 
the state of mind of the suftereFj n ot on its ow n intrui- 

13 sic natu re. Further, on the Peripatetic theory tliat ■"' 
there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly gij 
supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the 
happier he is ; but it does not follow that we Stoics can 
accept the same position, and say that the more a man 
has of those bodily things that are highly valued the 
happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that thesura of 
happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny 
this altogether. We hold that the mtilti plication even 
of those goods that in our view are truly so called does 
not render life happier or more desirable or of higher 
value; even less therefore is happiness affected by 

■H the accumulation of bodily advantages. Clearly if 
wisdom and health be both desirable, a combination 
of the two would be more desirable than wisdom 
alone ; but it is not the case that if both be deserv-- 
ing of value, wisdom pltu >fealth is worth more than 
wisdom by itself separately. We deem health to be 
deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon 
it a good; at the same time we rate no value so, 
highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the 
view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that - 
an action which is both morally good and not attended 
by pain is more desirable than the same action if 
accompanied by pain. We think otherwise — wlipther 
rightly or wrongly, I will consider later ; but bow could 
there be a wider or more real difference of opinion ? 



XIV. Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur li 
lumen lucemae, et ut interit in ' iiiagnitudine maris 
Aegaei stilla mellis et ut in divitiis Croesi terunci 
acccEsio et gradus unus in ea via quae est hinc in 
Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonoruni finis quern Stoici 
dicunt. omnis ista rerum. corporearuni aestimatio 
splendore virtiitis et raagnitudine obscuretur et ob- 
niatur atque interest necesse est. Et quemadmo- 
cluTO opportonitiLs (sic enim appcllemua tvKaiptav) 
non fit maior productione temporis (habent- enim 
suiim modura quae opportuna dtcuntur), sic 'reet« 
efkctioiKaTopduiiriv enim itaappello, quoniani rectum 
factum KnTopfluijm), recta igitur effectio, item con- 
venientia, denique ipsum bonuni, quod in eo positum 
est ut naturae consenliat, crescendi accessionem 
nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas ilia, sic haec 
de qui bus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione 
maiora. Ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur opta- 
bilior nee magis expetenda beata vita si sit longa 
quam si brevis ; utunturque simili : Ut, si cothurni 
laus ilia esset, ad pedeni apte convenire, neque multi 
cothurni paucis anteponerentur nee maiores rainori- 
bus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenieutiu atque 
opportunitate finitur, ea^ nee plura paucioribus nee 
47 longinquiorabrevioribusanteponentur." Necverosatis 
acute dicunt : Si bona valetudo pluris aestimanda sit 
longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus 
quisque sit plurimi. Non intelle(;unt vuletudinis 

' ." inserted by Halm, Mdv. 

»ea inserted by Mllller Ifinilur e »tc A), 

' an/efiuiifn/ur MSS.i anlc/MHten/ Mdv. 


^^ BOOK III. xiv 

45 XIV. " Tlie light of a lamp is eclipsed and over- 
powered l)y the rajs of the sun; adropof honey is lost 
in the vastness of the Aegciui sea ; an additional six- 
pence is nothing amid the wealth of Croesus, or a single 
step in the journey from here to India. Similarly if 
the Stoic definition of the End.of Goods he accepted, 
it follows that all the value you set on bodily advan- 
tages mQst be absolutely eclipsed and annihilated by 
tiie brilliance and the majesty of virtue. And just Moraifty.ind 
as opportuneness (for so let us translate eukairia) is ?4^Brt^'''''' 
not increased by prolongation of time (since things ii»ni»db3 
we call opportune have attained their proper 
measure), so right conduct (for thus I translate 
kaioTthosis, since katoiiluima is a single right action), 
right conduet, I say. and also propriety, and lastly 
Good itself, which consists in harmony with nature, 

IG are not capable of increase or addition. For these 
things that I speak of, like opportuneness before men- 
tioned, are not made greater by prolongation. And on 
this ground the Stoics do not deem happiness to be 
any more attractive or desirable if it be lasting than if 
it be brief; and they use this illustration: Just as, sup- 
posing the merit of a shoe were to fit the foot, many 
shoes would not be superior to few shoes nor bigger 
shoes to smaller ones, so, in the case of things the 
good of which consists solely and entirely in pro- 
priety and opportuneness, a larger number of these 
tilings will not be rated higher than a smaller 
number nor those lasting longer to those of shorter 

Vl duration. Nor is there much point in the argu- 
ment that, if good liealtll is more valuable when 
lasting than when brief, therefore the « 
wisdom also is worth most when it continues longest. 
This ignores the fact that, whereas the value i 


St. ^^ 



aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis opportunitate ; 
ut videantur qui illud dicant iidem hoc esse dicturi, 
bonsm mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum 
esse quam brevem. Non vident alia brevitate pluris 

i aestimari, alia diutumitate. Itaque consentaneum 
est his quae dicta sunt ratione illorum qui ilium 
bonorum Hnem quod appellamus extremum, quod 
ultimum, crescere putent posse, iisdem placere esse 
alium alio etjam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis 
alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non 
licet dicere qui crescere bonorum finem iionputamus, 
Ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihito magis respi- 
rare possunt si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam 
iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam turn essent 
in profundo, nee catulus ille qui iam appropinquat ut 
videat plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus, item 
qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo 
minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil prcwessit. 

XV. Haec mirabilia videri intellego ; sed cum 
certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea 
conseutanea et consequentta, lie de horum quidem 
est veritate dubitandum. Sed quamquam negant 
nee virtutes nee vitia crescere, tamen utrumque 
eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. 

it Divitias autem Diogenes censet non earn modo vim 


e wlio use ^^H 
e expected ^^^ 

i estimated by duration, that of v 
isured by opportuneness ; so that those wli< 
e argument in question might equally be expected 
p say tliat an easy death or an easy child-birth would 
E better if pi-otracted than if speedy. They fail to 
t that some things are rendered more valuable 
48 by brevity as others by prolongation. So it is con- 
sistent with the principles already stated that those 
who deem the End of Goods, that which we term ^ 
the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of p= 
degree, are on their own theory also bound to 
hold tliat one man can be wiser than another, and 
nilarly that one can commit a more sinful or more 
ighteous action than another ; which it is not open 
; to say, who do not think that the End of 
1 vary in degree. For just as a drowning 
"man is no more able to breathe if he be not tar from 
the surface of the water, so tliat he might at any 
moment emerge, than if he were actually at the 
bottom already, and just as a. puppy on the point of 
opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, 
similarly a man that has made some progress towards 
the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he 
that has made no progress at all. 

XV. I am aware that all this seems paradoxical ; yet capable o 
but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true ""^"^^ 
and welt established, and as these are the logical 
inferences from them, the truth of these inferences 
also cannot be called in question. Yet although the 
Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be in- 
creased in degree, they nevertheless believe that 
both of them can be in a sense expanded and 
+9 widened in scope." Wealth again, in the opinion of * 



^^^Soods I 



habere ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad vale- 
tudinem bonam, sed etiam uti ca contineaiit; nou 
idem facere eas in virtute Deque in ceteris artibus, 
ad quas esse dux pecuiiia potest, eontinere autem 
non potest ; itaque si voluptas aut si bona valetudo 
sit in bonis, dit'itias quoque in bonis esse ponendas : 
at si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi ut etiam divitias 
bonum esse dicamus. Neque ab ulla re quae non sit 
in bonis id quod sit in bonis contineri potest ; ob 
eunque causam, quia cognitiones cumprensionesque 
rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes_. appetitionem mo- 
vent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis 
I 50 contineri potest. Quod si de artibus concedamus, 
virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod 
haec plurimac commentation is et exercitationis iudi- 
geat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus 
stabilitatem, lirmitatemj constantiaro totius ritae 
complectatur nee haec eadem in artibus esse ndea- 

Deinceps explicatur diiTerentia rerum: quam si 
non uUam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, 
ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae niunus aut 
opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas quae ad vitam 
degendam i>ertinerent nihil oninino interesset Deque 
ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. Itaque cum 
esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum quod 
esset honestum et id malum solum quod turpe, tnm 
inter ilia quae nihil lalerent ad beate misere vc 

" ll U lo be remembered (hat ' arles,' technai, inch 
profcssiona, Irades and handicrafts afi u*c 
ihe line art!, and it is of ihe simpler crafls (hat pi 
sophcra, following Socrates, were mostly (Linking ' 

Ihey compared and contrasled the other 

■ars Vivendi.* 

Diogenes, though so important for pleasure atid 
health as to be not merely conducive but actually 
essential to them, yet has not the same efTect in rela- 
tion to virtue, nor yet in the case of the other arts; for 
money may be a guide to these but cannot form an 
essential factor in them; therefore although if plea- 
r if good health be a good, wealth also must be 
inted a good, yet if wisdom is a Good, it does not 
V that we must also pronounce wealth to be a 
, Nor can anything which is not a good be essen- 
tinl to a thing that is a good; and hence, because 
acts of cognition and of comprehension, which form 
the raw material of the arts, excite desire, since 
wealth is not a good, wealth cannot be essential to 
,iO any art. But even if we allowed wealth to be 
essential to the arts, the same argument neverthe- 
less could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as 
Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought 
and practice, which is not the ease to the same extent 
with the arts," and because virtue involves life-long 
sleadfastness,strength and consistency, whereas these 

Iualities are not equally manifested in the arts. 
'Next foUows an exposition of the diiference be- lihedocL 
reen things; for if we maintained that all things j,\?-''."*'' 
Pere absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would 
e thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and r 
mction or task could be found for wisdom, since 
liere would be absolutely no distinction between 
tbe things that pertain to the conduct of life, and 
no choice need be exercised among them. Accord- AiithiDgsbut 
ingly after conclusively proving that morality ulone StSfliflrreni 

I is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on iS^^^''^^^ 
tlU^ affirm that among those tilings which were of no lohappinfcs; 
Importance for happmess or misery, there was 


vivendum aliquid taraen quod differret esse voluerunt, 

ut essent eornni alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia 

al neutrum. Quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in 
aliis satis esse eausae quamobrem quibusdam antepo- 
nerentur, ut in valetudSne, ut in integritate sensuum, 
ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, simi- 
lium rerum,' alia autem iion esse eiusmodi; itemque 
eorum quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim 
satis habere causae quamobrem reicerentur, ut dolo- 
reni, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, 
ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. Hinc 
est illud exortum quod Zeno Trpay]yfi.kvov, contraque 
quod a.inmpfyriyii.kyov nominavit, cum uteretur in 
lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod 
nobis in hac inopi lingua Jion conceditur ; quaniquam 
tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non 
alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, ra- 
tionem buius verbi' faciendi Zenonis exponere. 

52 XVI. Ut CJiim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem 
ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est 
enim Trptnjyi^vav), sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt 
quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad 
regium principatum, sic in vita non ea quae primo 
ordine sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, 
Trporiyiikva, id est, producta nominentur ; quae vel ita 
appellemus (id erit verbum e verbo) vel promota 
remota vel ut dudum diximus praeposita vel pri 
■n asH conj. O. Hcin. 

" firimo ordine coa'j. Mdv.; 
!uco with mark of corruption 



:>ta <^H 


BOOK 111. xv-xvi 
nevertheless an element of difference, making som^ 
of them of positive and others of negative valued 

51 and others neutral. Again among things valuable but iher in d 
— e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, v™u"'l^'ihr 
fame, wealth and the like — they said that some afford «'"ndard of 
us adequate grounds for preferring them to other'pr 
things, while others are not of this nature ; and sim 
larlf among those things which are deserving of n 
value some afford adequate grounds for uur rejecting 
them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, 
disgrace, and the like ; others not so. Hence arose the 
distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proegmena 
and the opposite, apoprocgmena — for Zeno using the 
eopious Greek language still employed novel words 
coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us 
with the poor vocabulary of Latin ; though you are 
fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than 
Greek. However, to make it easier to understand 
the meaning of this term it will not he out of place 
to explain the method wliich Zeno pursued in coin- 
ing it. 

52 XVI. In a royal court, Zeno reuiarks, no one 
speaks of the king himself as promoted' to honour 
(for that is the meaning of proegmenon), but the term 
is applied to those holding some office of state 
whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is 
second to, the royal pre-eminence ; similarly in the 
conduct of life the title proegmenort, that is, pro- 
moted,' is to be given not to those things which are 
in the first rank, but to those which hold the second 
place ; for these we may use either the term aug- 

^_ eested (for that will be a literal translation) or 
^^K;«dvanced ' and 'degraded,' or the term we have 
^Hfeeen using all along, ' preferred ' or ' superior,' and 

pua, et ilia reiecta. Re enim intellecta in verbo- 

M ruin usu faciles esse debemus. Quoniain autem 
omne quod est boiium primum locuin tenere dicimus, 
necesse est nee bonuin esse nee malum hoc quod 
praepositum vel praecipuutn nominamus ; idque ita 
definimus, quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione 
mediocri ; quod enim Uli a.5ia<S>opoi- dicunt, id mihi 
ita occurrit ut indifferens dicerem. Neque enim 
iUud fieri poterat ullo modo ut nihil relinqueretur in 
mediis quod aut secundum naturam essetaut contra, 
nee, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poui quod 
satis aestimabile esset, nee hoc posito non aliqna esse 

S-t praeposita. Recte igitur hnec facta distitictio est ; 
atque ettam ab its quo facilius res perspici possit lioc 
simile ponitur : Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus 
esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum ut 
rectus assistat, qui ita talus erit iactus lit cadat 
rectus praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui 
aliter contra, neque tamen ilia praepositio tali ad 
eum quem dixi finem pertinebit, sic ea quae sunt 
praeposita referuntur ilia quidem ad finem sed ad 
eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent. 

55 Sequitur ilia divisio, ut bonorura alia sint ad 

illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello quae 
T£A(Ko dicuutur ; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut 
placuit, pluribus verbis dicere quod uno nou poteri- 

a Tali, real or artificial, were used as dice ; lliey had four 
long sides and two pointed ends ; of the sides two were 
broad and two narrow. The lalus was said lo be recivs 

when lying on a narrow side, and firoiius when on a I ' 

side. Thus cadere rectus, lo alight upright when thi 
would be the first stage towards ' ' ' ' 

standing uprig-ht. 


fbr the opposite rejected.' If the meaning is intel- 
ligible we need not be punctilious about the use of 

53 words. But since we declare that everything that 
is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this 
which we entitle preferred or superior is neither 
good nor evil ; and accordingly we define it as Ireing 
indifferent but possessed of a moderate value — since 
it has occurred to me that I may use the word 
indifferent ' to represent their term adiapkoron. 
For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of inter- 
mediate things should contain some things that were 
either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and 
this being so, that this classshould include some things 
which ijossessed moderate value, and, granting this, 
that sonie things of this class should be preferred.' 

i4 There were good grounds therefore for making this 
distinction ; and furthermore, to elucidate the matter 
still more clearly they put forward the following illus- 
tration : Just as, supposing we were to assume that 
our end and aim is to throw a knuckle-bone ^ in such 
a way that it may tiaiid upright, a bone that is thrown 
so as to Jail upright will be in some measure pre- 
ferred ' or advanced in relation to the proposed end, 
and one that falls otherwise the reverse, and yet 
that 'advance' on the part of the knuckle -bone will 
not be a constituent part of the end indicated, so 
those things which are preferred ' are means it is 
true to the End but are in no sense constituents of 
its essential nature. 

3^ Next comes the division of goods into three & 

classes, first those which are constituents' of the ■, 
final End (for so I represent the term telika, this jjj 
being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we 
agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do 
T 973 


mus, ut res intellegutur), alia autem efficientia, quwt 
Graeci wonp-iKa, alia iitrimiqiie. De pertinentibus 
nihil est bonum praeter aotiones honestas, de effi- 
cientibus nihil praeter amiciim, sed et pertinentein 
et efficientem sapientiam volunt esse. Nam quia 
sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo ' pertinenU 
genere quod di.\i ; quod autem honestas actlones 
affert et efficit, id' efficiens did potest. 

) XVII. Haec quae praeposita dicimtis ptartim sunt 
per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, 
partim utrumque i per se, ut quidam Jiabitus oris et 
vultus, ut status, ut motus, in quibus sunt et prae- 
ponenda qtiacdam et reicienda; alia ob earn rem 
praeposita diceiitur quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut 
petunia, alia aittem ob utramque rem, ut integri 

J sensus, ut bona valetudo. De bona auteiu fama 
(quam euim appellant ivSo^ia.i' aplius est bonam 
famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriara), Chrysippus 
quidem et Diogenes detructa utilitate lie digitum 
quidem eius causa porrlgendum esse dicebant, qui- 
bus ego vehemeuter assentior. Qui auteai post eos 
fuerunt, cum Cameadein sustinere non possent, huic 
quam dixi bonam Famam ipsam propter se praeposi- 
tam et simiendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis 
ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a 
parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque 
propter rem ipsam, non propter usum ; dicuntque, ut 

BOOK III. xvi-xvii 
1 order to make the meaning clear] 
secondly those wliich are ' productive ' of the End, 
the Greek poietitn; and tliirdly those which are 
both. The sole instance of a good of the con- 
stituent ' class is moral action ; the sole instance of 
a productive ' good Is a friend. Wisdom, according 
to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive ; 
for as being itself an appropriate activity it 
under what I called the constituent class ; as causing 
and producing moral actions, it can be called pro- 

J XVII. "These things which we call ' preferred " 
*re in some cases preferred for tiieir own sake, in 
others because they produce a certain result, and in 
others for both reasons ; for their own sake, as a 
certain cast of features and of countenance, or a 
certain pose or movement, tilings which may be in 
themselves either preferable or to be rejected ; 
others will be called preferred because they produce 
a certain result, for example, money ; others again 
for Ijoth reasons, like sound senses and good health. 

r About good fame (that term being a better transla- 
tion in this context than 'glory' of the Stoic ex- 
pression eudoiia) Chrysippus and Diogenes used to 
aver that, apart from any practical value it may 
possess, it is not worth stretching out a linger for ; 
and 1 strongly agree with them. On the other hand 
their successors, finding themselves unable to resist 
the attacks of Curneades, declared that good fame, 
as I have called it, was preferred and desirable for 
its own sake, and that a man of good breeding and 
liberal education would desire to have the good 
opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good 
men in general, and that for its own sake and not 
t2 275 

liberis consultum velimus etiamsi postumi futuri sint 
propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortcra famae tamen 
esse propter rem etiam detracto usu consulendum. 

1 ' Sed cum guod lionestum sit id solum bonum esse 
dicamus, consentaneum tanien est fungi officio cum 
id otficium nee in bonis ponamus nee in mails. Est 
enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita ot 
eius ratio reddi possit; ergo ut etiam probabiliter 
acti ratio reddi possit; est autem oHiciiim quod ita 
factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit ; 
ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam esse 
quod nequc ill bonis ponatur neque iu contrariis. 
Quoniamque in iis rebus quae neque in virlutibus 
sunt neque in vitiis, est tanicn quiddam quod usui 
possit esse, tolleiidum id non est. Est auteni eius 
generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis at 
ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorura; quod 
autem ratione actum est id ofRcium appellamus; est 
igitur ofiicium eius generis quod nee in bonis ponatur 
nee in contrariis. 

) XVIII. Atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in 

istis rebus mediis aliquid agere supientem. ludicat 

igitur cum agit officium illud esse. Quod quoniam 

numquam fallitur in iudieando, erit in mediis rebus 


^m BOOK III. xviUxviii 

for atiy practical advantage ; and they argue that 
just as we study the welfare of our children, even of 
such as may be born after we are dead, for their 
own sake, so a man ought to study his reputation 
even after death, for itself, even apart from any 

^ " But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be a 
the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perfor 
an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count " 
appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in u 
the sphere of these neutral things there is an element ^ 

of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can dt . 

be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an a '^■^- 
account can also be rendered of an act reasonably '' 
perfoiined ; now an appropriate act ia an act so per- 
formed that a reasonable account can be rendered 
of its performance ; and this proves that an appro- 
priate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned 
neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since 
those things which are neither to be counted among 
virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which 
can be useful, their element of utility is worth pre- 
ser\'ing. Again, this neutral class also includes action 
of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us 
to do or to produce some one of these neutral things ; 
but an action reasonably performed we call an appro- 
priate act; appropriate action therefore is included 
in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor 
the opposite. 

iS) XVIII. "It is also clear that some actions are 
performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of those 
neutral things. Well then, when he does such an 
action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And 
as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore 

officium. Quodefficitur hacetintnooncltisionerationis: 
Quoniam enim videmUs esse quiddam quod reete 
factum appellemus, id autem eat perfectum otficium, 
erit etiam iiichoutum ; ut, si iiiste deposituin reddere 
in recte faclis sit, in officiis ponatur deposituin red- 
dere ; illo enim addito ' iuste/ fit recte factum, per se 
autem hoc ipsum reddere in oHicio ponitur. Quoiii- 
amque non dubium est quin in iis quae media dica- 
mus sit aliud sumendiim, aliud reieieudum, quidquid 
ita lit nut dicitur omne officio continetur. Ex quo 
intellegitur quoniam se ipsi omnes natura diligant, 
tarn insipientera qunm sapientem sumpturum quae 
secundum naturam sint reierturumque contraria. Ita 
est quoddam commune ofiieium sapientis et insi- 
pientis ; ex quo efficitur versari in iis quae media 
60 dicamus. Sed cum ab liis omnia proliciscantur 
officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea rcferri omnes 
nostras cogitationes. in his et excessum e vita et in 
rita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt quae 
secundum uaturam sunt, huius officium est in vita 
manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut 
fore videntur, huius oificium est e vita excedere, 
K quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando oHtcium 

BOOK III. Kviii 
«ppropriale action will exist in the sphere of these 
neutral things. This is also proved by the following 
syllogistic argument: We observe tliat something 
exists which we call right action ; but this is an 
appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there 
wilt also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate 
act : so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of prin- 
ciple is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted 
as an appropriate act ; the addition of the quatiiica- 
tion on principle' makes it a right action ; the 
restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. 
Again,sirice there can be no question but that the class 
of things we call neutral includes some things worthy 
to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore 
whatever is done or described in this manner is en- 
tirely included under the term appropriate action. 
This shows that since love of self is implanted by 
nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike 
will choose what is in accordance with nature and re- 
ject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate 
action which is common to the wise and the unwise ; 
and this proves that appropriate action deals with 
60 the things we call neutral. But since these neutral 4.Pcaoiiiai 
things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there sutcldfmvbi 
is good ground for the dictum that it is with these " ' 
things that all our pi'actieal deliberations deal, in- 
cluding the will to live and the will to quit this life. , 
Wlien a man's circumstances contain a preponderance 
of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate 
for him to remain alive ; when he possesses or sees ^ 
in prospect a m^ority of tile contrary things, it isl 
appropriate for him to depart from life. This make» 
it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the 
Wise Man to quit life although he is linppy. and also 

i vita cum beatus sit, et stuiti n 
til vita cum sit miser. Nam bonum illud et malum quod 
saepe iam dictum est postea consequitur ; prima autem 
ilia naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub judicium 
sapientis et dilectum caduiit, estque ilia subieeta 
quasi materia sapientiae. Itaque et manendi in vita 
et migrandi ratio Dnmis iis rebus quas supra dixi 
metienda. Nam neque . . } virtute retinetur in vita, 
nee iis qui sine virtute sunt mors est oppetenda. Et 
saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita cum sit 
beatjssimus, si id opportune facere possit. Sic enira 
censent, opportunitatis esse beate vivere quod est 
convenienter naturae vivere.' Itaque a sapientia 
praecipitur se ipsam si usus sit sapiens ut relinquat. 
Quamobrem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit ut causam 
alferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam 
stultorum qui iideni miseri sint officium esse manere 
in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerura quas 
secundum naturam esse dicimus, Et quoniam exce- 
dens e vita et manens aeque miser est, nee diutumttas 
magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur 
iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita 
I XIX. " Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur in- 
tellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur ; 

' Mdv. < 


anj. neg,u 



BOOK III, sviii-Kix 
of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is 

61 miserable. For with the Stoics good and evil, as 
has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent 
outgrowth ; whereas the primary things of nature, 
whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the 
judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form 
so to speak the subject-matter, the given material 
with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons 
both for remaining in life and for departing from it 
are to be measured ^entirely by the primary things 
of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not 
necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those 
who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek 
death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise 
Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoy- 
ing supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for 
making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that 
happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, 
is a matter of seining the right moment. So that 
Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise 
Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess 
the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear 
that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it 
is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a pre- 
dominance of those things which we pronounce to 
be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is 
equally miserable when departing from life and 
when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his 
life is not increased by its prolongation, there is 
good ground for saying that those who arc in a 
position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are 
natural ought to remain in life. 

62 XIX. Again, it is held by the Stoics to be im- S' 
portant to understand that nature creates in parents ni 


a quo initio profeftain communem liumani generis 
societatem persequimur. Quod pritnum intellegi 
del>et figura menibrisque corporum, quae ipsa de- 
clarant, procreandi a natura babitam esse rationem. 
Neque vero haec inter se congruere possent ut na- 
tura et procreari vellet et dUigi procreatos non 
curaret. Atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici 
potest ; quarum in fetn et in educatione lalKirem 
cum cernimus, naturae ipsius \-«oein videmur audire. 
Quare ut' perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abbor- 
rere, sic apparet a naturn ipsa ut eos quos genueri- 
63 mus amemus inipelli. Ex hoe nascitur ut etiam 
communis hominum inter lioraines naturalis sit com- 
mendatio, ut oporteat honiinem ab homine ob id 
ipsum quod homo sit ron alienum videri. Ut enim 
in membris alia sunt tiunquain sibi nata, ut oculi, ut 
aures, alia etiam ccterorum membrorum usum adiu- 
vant, ut crura, ut manus, sic immanes quaedam 
bestiae sjhi solum natae sunt, at ilia quae in concha 
patula pinn dicitur, isque qui enut e concha, qui quod 
eam custodit pinoteres vocatur, in eandeinqiie cum 
se recepit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut cave- 
ret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae alionim etiam 
' u/ inserted by edd. 

»A reminiscence of Terence, who liumoroiisly puts tliis 
Stoic lag into ihe mouth of Cliremcs as an cstciise for his 
neighbourly curiosity! Homo sum, humani nil a mealienum 
puto, Hiaut. 25, Cp. I 3, 11 14. 

b A mussel in wliose ' beard ' a small crab is oflen found 
entangled. The notion of their paitnership is found il 
flrislotle; ChtysippilS introduced it as an illuslratioit ^' 

found M^ 

miion jH 

^" BOOK III. xi-x 

an affection for their children ; and parental affec- 
tion is the germ of that social community of the 
human race to which we afterwards attain. This 
cannot but be clear in the first place from the con- 
formation of the body and its members, which by 
themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme 
included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could ?■ 
not be consistent that nature should at once intend 
offspring to be bom and make no provision for that 
offspring when born to be loved and cherished. 
Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be 
clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that 
they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we 
seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. 
Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to 
shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from 
nature heraelf the impulse to love those to whom we ^^^ 

fis have given birth. From this Impulse is developed PhiUoitinpU. 
the sense of mutual attraction which unites human 
beings as such: this also is bestowed by nature. 
The mere fact of their common humanity requires 
that one man should feel another man tn be akin to 
him." For just as some of the parts of the body, 
Buch as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were 
for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the 
hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the 
members, so some very large animals are bom for 
themselves alone ; whereas the sea-pen,*" as it is 
called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named 
the pinoteres ' because it keeps watch over the sea- 
pen, which swims out of the sea-pen's shell, then re- 
tires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appear- 
ing to have warned its host to be on its guard — these 
creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do 



causa quAedam faciiuit. Multo haec ' coniuni 

homines.^ Itaque natura sumus apti od coetus, 
cilia, civitates. 

t Mundum autem censent regi numine deomim 

eumque esse quasi communeta urbem et civitatem 
liominum et deoruiOj et imumquemque nostnim eius 
mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequl ut 
communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. Ut 
eniin leges omnium salutem siiigularum saluti ante- 
ponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et 
civilis oflici non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam 
unius alicuius aut suae consulit Nee magis est vitu- 
perandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis 
aut safutis deserter propter suam utilitatem aut 
salutem. Ex quo fit ut laudaiidus is sit qui mortem 
oppetat pro re publica, quod defeat cariovem nobis 
esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. Quoniamque ilia 
VOX inhuiuana et scelerata ducitur eorum qui iiegant 
se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium 
deflagratjo cousequatur (quod vulgari quodam versu 
Graeco pronuntiari solet), certe verum est etiam iis 
qui aliquaudo futuri sint esse propter ipsos con- 
sul endum. 

> XX. Ex liac animorum affectione testamenta 
commendationesque morientitim natae sunt. Quod- 
que nemo iii summa soUtudine vitam agere velit ne 
cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile 
intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregation em- 
que liominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse 

certain actions for the sake of others besides them- 
selves. With human beings this bond of mutual ai 
is far more intimate. It follows that we are by 
nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 

V Again, they hold that the universe is governed TbcCmi 

by divine will ; it is a city or state of which both 
men and gods are members, and each one of us is a 
part of this universe ; from which it is a natural 
consequence that_Ke. -Should prefer the common 
advantage to our own. For just as the laws set J 
tKe~safety of -all above the safety of individuals, so i 
a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his I 
duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more I 
than that of himself or of any single individual. The 
traitor to his country does not deserve greater repro- 
bation than the man who betrays the common 
advantage or security for the sake of his own advan- i 
tnge or security. This explains why praise is owed Aui 
to one who dies for the commonwealth, bei'ause it 
becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. 1 
And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to 
declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar 
Greek line') that they care not if, when they them- 
selves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, 
it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study 
the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 

> XX. "This is the feeling that has given rise to Caiefor 
the practice of making a wOl and appointing ^" ''' 
guardians for one's children when one is dying, ^^m 

And the fact that no one would care to pass his life ^^H 
alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures ^^H 
in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are ^^H 
bom for society and intercourse, and for a natural jbc imparting 
partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature tomwlciiBt. 


n»tos. ImpelliiuuT autem natura ut prodesse velimUB 
quam plurimis iu primisque docendo rationibusque 
66 pmdentiae tradendis. Itaijue non facile est iiivenire 
qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri ; ita non solum 
ad discendum propensi suraus verum etiam ad docen- 
duni. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vi- 
tulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, 
sic ii qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de 
Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandura genus 
hominum natura incitaiitur. Atque etiam lovem 
cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem 
SaFutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volu- 
mus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. Minime 
autem convenitj cum ipsi inter nos viles neglectique 
simus, postulare ut dis immortalibus cari simus et ab 
iis dihgamur. Quemadmodum igitur membris uti- 
mur prius quam didicimus cuius ea utilitatis causa 
habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communi- 
tatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. Quod ni ita se 
haberet, nee iustitiae ullus esset nee bonitati loous. 

Sed ^ quomodo hominum inter homines iuris 
esse vincula putant, sic homini niliil iuris esse cum 
bestiis. Praeclare enim Chrysippus eetera nata esse 
hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et 
societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem 
sUBjn possint ^ne iniuria ; quoniamque ea natur« 
esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civfl* 
■jerfMdv.; ct USS. 



inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people 

as we can, and especially by imparting information and 

66 the principles of wisdom. Hence it would be hard to 
discover anyone who will not impart to another any 
knowledge that he may himself possess ; so strong is 
our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. 
And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight niFproi 
with all their strength and force in defending tJieir "'"""" 
calves against lions, so men of enceptional gifts and 
capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the 
legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors 
of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove 
the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, 
Lord of Guests, Eallier of Battles, what we mean to 
imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keep- 
ing. But how inconsistent it would be for us to 
expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, 
when we ourselves despise and neglect one another I 
Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before 
we have learnt for what particular useful purpose 
they were bestowed upon us, so we are by nature 
united and allied in the common .society of the state. 
Were tliis not so, there would be no room either for 
justice or benevolence, 

67 But just as they hold that man is united with Auiniais bivi 
man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no "* '' 
right exists as between man and beast. For Chry- 

sippus well said, that aU other things were created for 
the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their ^^_ 
own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can ^^H 
make use of beasts for tlieir own purposes without ^^H 
injustice, And the nature of man, he said, is such, ^^| 

Kt as it were a code of law subsists between the Tkedabistrf 
ividual and the human race, so that he who up- "^*"- 
^ i 

ills intercede ret, qui id Conservaret euni iustum, qui 
migraret iniiistum fore. Sed quenoadmodum, thea- 
trum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius 
esse enm locum quern quisque occuparit, sic in urbe 
raundove coiiimuni non adversatur ius quo minus 

(is suum quidque cuiusque sit. Cum autem ad tuendos 
conservandosque homines hominem natum esse vi- 
deamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens 
velit gererp et administrare rem publicam atque, ut 
e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et ve!Ie ex ea 
liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos 
esse arbitrantur. Cynicorum autem rationem atque 
vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eius- 
modi forte casus incident ut id faciendum sit, alii 
iiullo modo. 

69 XXI. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga 
liominem societas, coniiinctio, carilas, et emolument» 
etdetrimenta(quaecu^tA.^;io;Taet0\a/i;iaTfii appellant) 
communia esse voluerunt, quonim altera prosunt, 
iioceiit altera; neque solum ea communia veruin 
etiam paiia esse dixerunt. Incommoda autem et 
commoda (ita enim Ei'xpijoTijjiaTa et SLiTXpJ)CTn}/iaTa 
appello) communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. 
Ilia enim quae prosunt aut quae nocent aut bona 
sunt auf mala, quae sint paria necesse est ; commoda 
autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt quae prae- 
posita et reiecta dicimus; ea possunt paria non esse. 
Sed eraolumenta ' communia esse dicuntur, recte 
'After emolumenla Lambinus inserts et detrimental 

1 The Cynics cast off the ties of country and family, and 
pi-oclaiwed themselves Kesmou Palitai, citizens of the 
Universe and memberii of Ihe universal brotherhood of 

if liOOK III. xx-xxi 

pblds this code will be just and he who departs from 
Etf unjust. But just as though the theatre i 
pubUc place it is yet correct to say that the parti- 
cular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the 
state or in the universe, though these are common 
to all, no principle of justice militates against the 
68 possession of private property. Again, since we see Poiiti««J_ 
that man is designed by nature to safeguard and ^''17.'' ' 
protect his fellows, it follows from this natural dis- 
position, that the Wise Man should desire to engage 
^to politics and government, and also to HVe in ac- 
e with nature Ijy taking to himself a wife and 
desiring to have children by her. Even the passion 
of love when pure is not thought incompatible with 
the character of the Stoic Sage. As for the principles 
and habits of tlie Cynics,* some say that these befit 
the Wise Man, if cii'cumstanccs should happen to 
indicate this course of action ; but other Stoics reject 
the Cynic rule unconditionally. 
6'9 XXI. Tosafeguard the universal alliance,solidarity iq, 
and affection that subsist between all mankind, the ^P 
Stoicsheld that both benefits'and injuries' (intheir inon.a 
terminology, opheleniaUl and blammala) are common, pSs^ 
the former doing good and the latter harm ; and they con"™ 
^Bflronounced them to be not only 'common' but also 
^Hnsgual.' Disadvantages' and 'advantages' (for so I 
^V^ftnder euckreslhnnia and tlusckrSsteinala) they held to 
^*^'be common' but not 'equal.' For things 'beneficial' 
and injurious' are goods and evils respectively, and 
these must needs be equal; but advantages' and 
disadvantages' belong to the class we speak of as 
preferred' and rejected,' and these may differ in 
degree. But whereas benefits' and injuries' are 
V 389 

ftlitem facta et peccata non habentur < 

TO Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent quia 

sit ex eo genere quae prosunt. Quamquam autem 
in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti 
rationeni amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique 
cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur 
alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, 
detrahere quid de aliquo quod sibi iissumat. Minime 
vero probatur huic disciplinae de qua loquor aut 
iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates ascisci aut 
probari. Eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labe- 
factarc atque pervertere. Etenim nee iustitia nee 
amicitia esse omnino poterunt nisi ipsae per se 

7 1 expetuntur.^ lus autem, quod ita dici appellarique 
possit, id esse natura; alienureque esse a sapiente 
non modo iniuriam cui facere venim etiam nocere. 
Nee vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis 
! aut coniungere iniuriam; gravissiroeque 
defenditur numquam aequitatem ab 
utibtate posse seiun^, et quidquid aequum iustumque 
esset id etiam honestum, vicissimque quidquid esset 
honestum id iustum etiam atque uequum fore. 

' exfietunfiir .■ \n{. MSS, e.xpetantur. 'jh 

■Moral and immoral acts (a) viewed Tor their results'Q^ 
g'ood and ill atfect all mankind, (b) viewed in themselves 
concern the agent only; while in both aspects they do not 
admit of degree, but are either g-ood or bad, rig-hl or wrong 
absolutely. Whereas things IndilTerent (i.e. everything but 
moral good and evil) are more or less advantageous or the 
reverse, both to the person immediately concerned and to 
the world at large, 



pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and ainfiil 
acts are not considered 'common.'' 

70 They recommend the cultivation of friendship, Friend! 
classing it among- tilings beneficial.' In friendship tiwotu 
some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends." owom 
interests as dear as his own, while others say that a 
man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to 

him ; at the same time the latter admit that to en- 
rich oneself by another's loss is an action repugnant 
to that justice towards which we seem to possess a 
natural propensity. But the school I am discussing 
emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or ap- 
prove either justice or friendship for the sake of 
their utiHty. For if it were so, the same claims of 
utility would be able to undermine and overthrow 
them. In fact the very existence of both justice 
and friendship will be impossible if tliey are not 

7 1 desired for their own sake. Right moreover, properly 
so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature ; 
and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not 
only to wrong l)ut even to hurt anyone. Nor again 
is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrong- 
doing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is 
most truly and cogently maintained that honesty 

^^ is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair 
^L^d just is also honournl^le,'' and conversely whatever 
^HlB honourable ^ will also be just and fair. 


propositi ratio postularet. Verum admirabilis com- 

positio disciplinae incredibilisque me re rum traxit 
ordo ; quern per deos immortales nonne miraris ? 
Quid enira aut in natura, qua nihil, est aptius, nihil 
descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tarn compo- 
situm tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri 
potest ? quid posterius priori non convenit ? quid 
sequitur quod non respondeat superiori ? quid non 
sic aliud ex alio nectitur ut si ullam litteram moveris 
labent omnia ? Nee tamen quidquam est quod mo- 
veri possit. 
i Quam gravis vero, quam magnilica, quam constans 

confidtur persona sapientis I qui, cum ratio docuerit 
quod honestum esset id esse solum bonum, semper 
^ est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina 
t quae irrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius 
enim appellabitur reK quam Tarquinius qui nee se 
nee suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi (is 
enim est dictator) quam Suila qui trium pestifero- 
rum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis magi- 
ster fuit, rectius dives quam Crassiis qui nisi eguisset 
numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire vo- 
luisset. Recte eius omnia dicentur qui scit uti solus 
omnibus ; recte etiara pulcher appellabitur (animi 
enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis) recte 
solus liber, nee dominationi cuiusquara parens nee 


BOOK III. xxii 
plan that 1 set before me. The fact is that I have been 
led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic sys- 
tem and the miraculous sequence of its topics ; pray 
tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration ? 
Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than 
nature ; but what has nature, what have the pro- 
ducts of handicraft to show that is so well con- 
structed, so firmly jointed and welded into t 
Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with 
its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and 
a later statement ? Where is lacking such close 
interconne!£ion of the parts that, if you alter a single 
letter, you shake the whole structure? Though 
indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to 
i " Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent wutMiii 
is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! 
Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole 
good, it follows that he must always be happy, and 
that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of 
deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he 
wOI have a. better claim to the title of King than 
Tarquin, who could not rule cither himself or his 
subjects; a better right to the name of Master" of 
the People ' (for that is what a dictator is) than 
Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, 
licentiousness, avarice and cruelty ; a better claim to 
be called rich than Crassus, who had he needed 
nothing would never have been induced to cross the 
Euphrates for any military reason. Rightly wUI he 
be said to own all things, who alone knows how to 
use all things ; rightly also will he be styled beauti- 
ful, for the beauty of the soul is fairer than that of 
the body ; rightly the one and only free man, as sub* 


obediens cupiditati^ recte invictus^ cuius etUmsi 
corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici 
76 nulla possint. Nee exspeetat^ uUum tempus aetatis^ 
ut turn denique iudieetur beatusne fuerit cum ex- 
tremum vitae diem morte confecerit ; quod ille unus 
e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit^ 
nam si beatus umquam fuisset^ beatam vitam usque 
ad ilium a Cyro exstructuin rogum pertulisset. Quod 
si ita est ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes 
boni beati sint^ quid philosophia magis colendum aut 
quid est virtute divinius ? " 

^expectat ed. : expectet MSS., edd. ('transit ad poten- 
tialem orationis formam ' Mdv.). 


son fisw nf up ^jiyw.'tllir 

IT be iouJ^ 
«■Jr 'vlmi hit b» rounded cdTte^ liie^s 
list dsf m doA- — 43k ^nimtf namii ^ sd miwise^ 
gnren to Gtocihs br cM SaSan. «e ckT ibe scne» 
Wiselfoi; iorhidCAiK9KriTTbenliappj,lie^nMald 
hdiTC cmied liis hiinwirife Mwiwt*«i i u|rf#^ to ibe pyre 

nised fiir Inn bgr Cttik. If Hkb it be tnie tbat all 
the good and none but ibe good are bappr, wbat 
pooesnon is move p re cj on s tban philosopby, wbat 
more dnrine tban YirtBe?** 







1 I. Quae cum dixisset, finem ille. Ego autem: 
Ne tu, iiiquam, Cato, ista exposuisti, ut tarn multa, 

memoriter, ut tarn obscura, dilucide, Ituque aut 
omtttamus contra oranino velle aliquid aut spatium 
sumamus ad cof^itanduui ', tain enini diligenter, 
etiamsi minus vere (nam nondum id quideni Rudeo 
dicere)j sed tamen ' accurate non modo fundatam 
verum ctiam exstructatn disciplinam non est facile 
perdiscere." Tum ille; Ain tandem?" inquit ; 
cum ego te Lac nova lege videam eodem die accu- 
satori respondere et tribus horis perorare, in hac me 
causa tempus dilatunim putas? quae tameii a te 
agetur non melior quam iUae sunt quas interdum 
obtines. Quare istam quoque aggredere, tractatam 
praesertim et ab aliis et a te ipso saepe, ut tibi 

2 deesse non possit oratio." Tum ego: ' Non meher- 
cule," inquam, soleo temere contra Stoicos, non quo 
illis admodum assentiar, sed pudore inipedior; ita 
multa dicunt, quae vis intellegam." 'Obscura," 
inquit, quaedani esse confiteor; nee tamen ab dlis 
ita dicuntur de industria, sed inest in rebus ipsis 

sed tarn. 

: Lambinus onjeclures sed tamen tarn, Davis 
rhaps audeo dicere, sed tamen) nan modo; and 
rate as inlerpolaled. 

"Passed by Pompey, 51 B.C., to limit ihe concluding 
speeches in lawsuits to two hours for the prosecution and 
three for the defence, both to be delivered on the same day, 


1 1. With these words he conciiided. "'A most Re (u 
faithful and lut^id expu&itlon, Catu/' said I, "con-cj«! 
sidering the wide range of your subject and its '""' 
obscurity. Clearly I must either give up all idea ot 
replying, or must take time to think it over; it is 

no easy task to get a thorough grasp of a system so 
elaboratCj even if erroneous (for on that point I do not 
yet venture to speak), but at all events so highly finish- 
ed both in its first principles and in their working out," 
You don't say so!" replied Cato. 'Do you sup- 
pose I am going to allow our suit to be adjourned, 
when I see you under this new law" replying for 
the defence on the same day as your opponent con- 
cludes for tjie prosecution, and keeping your speech 
within a three hours' limit? Though you will find 
your present case as shaky as any of those which 
you now and then succeed in pulling off. So tackle 
this one hke the rest, particularly as the subject is 
familiar; others have handled it before, and so have 
you repeatedly, so that you can hardly be gravelled 

2 tor lack of matter." I protest," I exclaimed, "l 
:im not by way of challenging the Stoics lightly; 
not that I agree with them entirely, but modesty 
restrains me : there is so much in their doctrines 
that I can hardly understand." ' I admit," he said, 

that some parts are obscure, but the Stoics do not 
^^jjiffeet an obscure st^'le on purpose; the obscurity is 
^^^dierent in the sulijects themselves." " How is it, 

obscuritas." Cur igitur easdem res," mqu&m, 
' Peripateticis dicentibus verbum nullum est quod 
non intellegatur ? " "Easdemne res?" inquit; "an 
parnm disserui non verbis Stoicos a Peripateticis sed 
universa re et tota sententia dissidere?" 'Atqui," 
inquam, Cato, si istud obtinueris, traducas me ad 
tetotumlicebit." Putabam equidem satis," inquit, 
me dixisse. Quare ad ea primum, si videturj sin 
aliud quid voles, postea." ' Immo istud quidem," 
inquam, quo loco quidque . . .' nisi iniquum postulo, 
arbitratu meo." Ut placet," inquit; etsi enJm 
illud erat aplius, aequum cuique concedere." 

3 II. "Existimo igitur," inquam, "Cato, veterea 
illos Platonis auditores, Speusippum, Aristotelem, 
Xenocratem, deinde eorum Polemonem, Theophra- 
stum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitu- 
tam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni cum 
Polemonem audisset cur et ab eo ipso et a superiori- 
bus dissideret; quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua 
animadvertus velim quid mutandum putes, nee 
exspeetes dum ad omnia dicam quae a te dicta sunt; 
universa enim illaruin ratione cum tota vestra con- 

* fligendura puto. Qui cum viderent ita i 
natos ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essei 


BOOK IV. i-ii 
then," I replied, " that when the same subjects «re 
discussed by the Peripatetics, every word is intelli- 
gible? " The same subjects? " he cried. Have 
I not said enough to show that the disagreement 
between the Stoics and the Peripatetics is not a 
matter of words, but concerns the entire substance 
of their_ whole system?" "O well, Cato," I re- 
joined, "if you can prove tliat, you are welcome to 
claim me as a whole-hearted convert." "l did 
think," said he, ' that I had said enough. So let us 
take this question first, if you like ; or if you prefer 
another topic, we will take this later on." Nay," 
said I, as to that matter I shall use my own dis- 
cretion, unless this is an unfair stipulation, and deal 
with each subject as it comes up." Have it your 
way," he replied ; my plan would have been n 
suitable, but it is fair to let a man choose for 

3 II, My view then, Cato," I proceeded, is this, R 
tliat those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aris- , 
totle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils "' 
Polemo and Tlieophrastus, had developed & body of ti 
doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in 
fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil ^i 
of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his 
master himself or from his master's predecessors. 
The outline of their theory was as follows — but 
I should be glad if you would call attention to any 
point you may desire to correct without waiting for 
me to deal with the whole of your discourse ; for 1 
think I shall have to place their entire system in 

4- conflict with the whole of yours. Well, these philo- 
sophers observed (l) that we are so constituted as 
to have a natural aptitude for the recognized and 

quae notae illustresque suntj iustitiam dico, tempe- 
rantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem (quae omnes similes 
artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem 
partem et trnctationc differunt), casque ipsas virtutes 
viderent nos itiagnificentius appetere et ardentius: 
habere etiam iiisitani quandam vel potius innatam 
cupiditutetn seientiae, natosque esse ad coiigrej^a- 
tionem hominum et ad sucietatem com muni tatemque 
generis humani, eaque in maKiinis ingeniis niaxinie 
elucere, totatn philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt, 
quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus. 
J Quarum cuoi una sit qua mprg s confor mari putantur, 
difFero earn partem, quae quasi stirps est huius 
quaestionis ; qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox ; lioc 
loco tantum dico a veteribus Peripateticis Aeademi- 
cisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, 
eum locum quern civilem recte appellaturi videmur 
(Graeci -jroXiTiKnv) graviler et copiose esse tractatiun, 
III. Quam muita illi de re publica scripserunt, 
quam muUa de legibits '■ quam multft non solum 
praecepta in artibus sed etiani exempla in orationi- 
bus bene dicendi reliquerunt ! Primum enim ipsa 
ilia quae siibtiliter disserenda erant polite aptegue 
dixerunt, tum definientes, turn partientes, ut vestri 
etiam; sed vos squalidius ; illorum vides quam niteat 

"-This sentence might appear to imply that the three 
departments of phiJoaopby were (i) Ethics, (2) Physics and 
Logic, (3] Politics; but in the fallowing chapters Cicero 
adopts the nonnal division, (1) Logic, c. IV, (i) Physics, 
c. V, (3) Ethics, cc. VI foil., with its Iwo subordinate 
branches of Politics and Rhetoric which are dismissed 
parenthelically in c. IM. 

standard virtues in general, I mean Justice, Tem- 
perance and the otUera of that class (all of whji 
resemble the rest of the arts and differ only by ex- 
celling them in the material with which they work 
and in their treatment of it); they observed n 
over that we pursue these virtues with a more lofty 
enthusiasm than we do the arts ; and (s) that 
we possess an implanted or rather an innate appe- 
tite for knowledge, and (s) that we are naturally 
disposed towards social life with our felloi 
and towards fellowship and community with the 
human race ; and that these instincts are displayed 
roost clearly in the most highly endowed natures." 
Accordingly they divided philosophy into three 
departments, a division that was retained, as we 
> notice, by Zeno. One of these departments is the Eihiotdniemd 
science that is held to give rules for the formation pniiiif«»nrt' 
of moral character; this part, which is the founda- {^^f^'^,'^? 
tion of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall Old '\aiihmj 
consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. p"ie[iia. 
For the present I only say that the topic of what I 
think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjec- 
tive in Greek is poUHtos) was handled with authority 
and fiillness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, 
who agreed in substance though they differed in 

III. What a vast amount they have written on 
politics and on jurisprudence ! how many precepts of 
oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how 
many examples in their discourses! In the first 
place, even the topics that required close reasoning 
they handled in a neat and polished manner, em- 
ploying now deiinitioD, now division ; as indeed 
your school does also, but your style is rather out- 
X 305 


6 oratio. Deinde ea quae requirebant orationem 
ornatiim et gravem, quam magnifice stmt dicta ab 
illis, quam spleiidide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de 
fortitudine, de aniicitia, de aetate degeiida, de plii- 
losophia, de capessenda re piiblica, hominum nec 
spinas vellentium, ul Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, 
sed eorum qui gratidin ornate vellent, enucleate 
minora dicere. Itaque quae sunt eorum consola- 
tiones, quae coliortationes, quae etiam monita et 
consilia scripta ad summos viros ! Erat enim spud 
COS, ut est reruni ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exerci- 
tatio duplex. Nam quidiiuid quaeritur, id habet aut 
generis ipsius sine personis teuiporib usque aut iis 
adiunctis facti aut iuris aut iioniinis controversiam. 
Ergo in utroque exercebantur ; eaque disciplina 
effeeit lantum illorum utroque in genere dicendi 

7 copiani. Totum genus boc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt 
aut non potuerunt tueri ^ aut noluerunt, certe re- 
liquerunt. Quamquam scrips it art em rbe tori cam 
Cleanthes, Clirj-sippus etiam, sed sic ut si quis 
obmutescere concupierit nihil aliud legere debeat. 
Itaque vides quoniodo loquantur: nova verlia fingunt. 
deserunt usitata. At quanta conanturl- — ^mundum 
hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum. Vides quan- 
tarn rem agat ut Circeiis qui liabitet totum hunc 
mundum suum municipium esse existimet. Incendit 

'«ecMQller; no» Mdv.; rff MSS. 

-(' inserted by Cobct, Mdv. c 


BOOK IV. iii 

> at-ellxiwsj while theirs is noticeably flegunt. Then, 
in tliemes demanding ornate and dignified treat- 
ment, how imposing, how brilliant is their diction ! 
On Justice, Teinperanee, Courage, Friendship,on tlie 
conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, 
of the statesman, — no hair-splitting like that of the 
Stoics, no bare skeleton of argument, but the loftier 
passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics 
studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of 
their consolations, their exhortations, even their 
warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the 
highest eminence 1 In fact, their rhetorical exercises 
were twofold, like the nature of the subjects them- 
selves. For every question for debate can be argued 
either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or 
circumstances involved, or, these also being taken 
into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of 
nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves 
in both kinds; and this training produced their ^^,^,;^ 

" remarkable Huency in each class of discussion. This Potttteineg- 
whole field Zeno and his successors were either stoia.Vnd'uM 
unable or unwilling to cover; at all events they ^"''^' '"'"■'" 
left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a 
treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, 
but what are they like? why, tliey furnish a com- 
plete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold Ilia 
tongue ; you can judge then of their style, coining 
new words, discarding those approved by use. But,' 
you will say, think how vast are the themes that 
they essay ; for example, that this entire universe is 
our own town.'' Vou see the magnitude of 
a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii 
that the whole vast world is his own borough ! If 
so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.' 

igituT eos qui audiunt. Quid? ille incendat? 1 
stinguet citius si ardentem acceperit. Ista i 
quae tu breviter, regem, dictatorem, divitem sol 
esse sapienteni, a te quid em aptc ac rotund) 
quippe; iiabes enim a rhetorilms; illorum 
ipsa quam exsiUa de virtutis vil quam tantam volunt 
esse ut lieatum per se efficere possit. Pungunt 
enim, quasi aculeis, interrogatiunculis angustis, 
quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil coounutantur 
animo et iidem abeunt qui venerant; res enim for- 
tasse verae, eerte graves, noii ita tractantur ut 
debentj sed aliquanto minutius. 
} IV. Sequiturdisserendi ratio cognitioque naturae; 
nam de sumtno bono mox, ut dixi, videbimus et ad 
id explicandum disputationem oninem conferemus. 
In his igitur pnrtibus duabus nihil erat quod Zeno 
coromutare gestiret; res enim ae praeclare lialjebat, 
et quidem in utraque parte. Quid enim ab antiquis 
ex eo genere quod ad disserenduni valet praetermis- 
Bum est? qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi 
artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiun- 
etum, ut res in partes dividatur, id et fit ab illis et 
quemadmoduni fieri oporleat traditur ; item de c 
trariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum ven^ 
runt lam argument! ratione conclusi caput ( 
faciunt ea quae perspicua dieunt; deinde ordinc^ 
sequuntur; tum quid verum sit in singulis extresi 

BOOK IV. iii-iv 

What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much 
more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student 
may have had to begin with. Even those brief 
maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man 
alone is king, dictator, millionaire, — neatly rounded 
off no doubt as you put them ; of course, for you 
leamt them from professors of rhetoric; — hut how 
bald are those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, 
when they talk about the potency of virtue, — virtue 
which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they 
say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllo- 
gisms are mere pin-pricks; even if they convince 
the intellect, they cannot convert the heart, and the 
hearer goes away no better than he came. What 
they say is possibly true, and certainly important; 
but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far 
too niggling. 
i IV, 'Next come Logic and Natural Science; for A» 
the problem of Ethics, as I said, we shall notice adi 
later, concentrating the whole force of the discussion '"' 
upon its solution. In these two departments then, 
there was nothing that Zeno need have desired to 
alter ; since all was in a most satisfactory state, and 
that in both departments. For in the subject of 
Logic, what had the ancients left undealt with ? They 
defined a multitude of terms, and left treatises on 
Definition ; of the Jjindred art of the Division of a 
thing into its parts they give practical examples, and 
lay down rules for the process ; and the same with 
the Law of Contradictories, from which they arrived 
at genera and species. Then, in Deductive reason- 
ing, they start with what they term self-evident 
propositions ; from these the argument proceeds by 
rule ; and finally the conclusion gives the inference 


9 ponclusio est. Quanta autem ab iUis varietas argu- 
mentorum rati one concludentium eommqiie cum 
captiosis intt^rrogationibus dissimilitudo ! Quid quod 
pluribus lotis quasi denuntiunt ut tieque sensuum 
fideni sine ratione nee rationis sine sensibus exqui- 
ranius atqiie ut eorum alterum ab altero ne^ seps- 
remus? Quid? ea quae diaiectici nunc tradunt el 
docent, nonne ab illis instituta sunt?' De quibus 
etsi a Clirysippo niaxime est elaboratuni, tanien a 
Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis ; ab hoc autem 
quaedam non melius quam veteres, quaedam omiiino 
10 rebcta. Cumque duae sint artes quibus perfecte 
ratio et oratio compleatur, una inveniendi, altera 
disserendi, hanc posteriorem et Stoici et Peripatetici, 
priorem autem ilb egregie tradiderunt, hi omnino ne 
attigenint quidem. Nam e quibus ]ocis quasi the- 
sauris argument» deproiiierentur, vestri ne suspicati 
quidem sunt, superiores autem artilicio et via tradi- 
derunt. Quae quidem ars'' efficit ne necesse sit 
iisdem de rebus semper quasi dictata deeantare Deque 
a commentariolis suis discedere. Nam qui sciet ubi 
quidque positum sit quaque eo veniut, is, etiamsi 
quid obnitum erit, potent eruere semperque esse in 
disputando suus. Quod etsi ingeniis niagnis praediti 
quidani dicendi copium sine ratione cunsequuutur, ars 

' ne supplied by Lambinus, Mdv. 

^ After inslituia sunl all but one Inferior MS. add invcHla 
sunt: Mdv. brackets, 

' ars Mdv. : om. A, other MSS. tes. 

fl Cp. I, 39. 
1- ' Inveiilio,' Topiki. 
lopoi, pi^on-hoies as 

HOOK IV. iv 
9 valid in tiie particular rase. A^aln, how mauy diHerent 
forms of Deduction they distinguish, niid how widely 
these differ from sophistical syllogisms" ! Think how 
earnestly they reiterate the warning, that we must 
not expect to liiid truth i]i sensation unaided by 
reason, nor in reason without sensation, and that we 
are not to divorce the one from the other ! Was it 
not they who first laid down the rules that form the 
stock-in-trade of professors of logic to-dny ? Logic, 
no doubt, was very fully worked out by Chrysippus, 
but much less was done in it by Zeno than bj' the 
older schools ; and in some parts of the subject 
his work was no improvement on that of his pre- 
decessors, while other parts he neglected altogether. 
10 Of the two sciences which between them cover or 
the whole field of reasoning and of oratory, one the ^^ 
Science of Topics'' and the other that of Logic, 
the latter has been handled by both Stoics atid 
Peripatetics, but the former, though excellently 
taught by the Peripatetics, has not been touched by 
the Stoics at all. Of Topics, the store- chambers in 
which arguments are arranged ready for use, your 
school had not the faintest notion, whereas their 
predecessors propounded a regular technique and 
method. This science of Topics saves one from 
always having to drone out the same stock argu- 
ments on the same subjects without ever departing 
from one's notes. For a man who knows under what 
general heading each argument comes, and how to 
lay his hand on it, will always be able to unearth 
any particular argument however far out of sight it 
lies, and will never lose his self-possession in debate. 
The fact is tliat altliough some men of genius attain 
to eloquence without a system, nevertheless science 


tamen est dux certior quam natura. Aliud est enim 
poetarum more verba fundere, aliud ea quae dicas 
ratione et arte distiiiguere. 

11 V. Similia dici possunt de explicatione naturae, 
qua et hi utuntur et vestri, neque vero ob duas 
modo causas, quoniodo Epicuro videtur, ot pellatur 
mortis et religionis metus; sed etiam modestiam 
quandam cognitio rertim caelestium afFert iis qui 
videant quanta sit etiam apud deos moderatio, quan- 
tuB ordo, et magnitudinem animi dcorum opera et 
facta cernentibus, justitiam etiam, cum cognitum 
habeas quod sit summi rectoris ac dumini numeii, 
quod consilium, quae voluntas; cuius ad naturam 
apta ratio vera ilia et summa lex a philosophis dicitur. 

18 Inest in eadem explicatione naturae insatiabilis quae- 
dam e cognoscendis rebus voluptas, in qua una, 
confectis rebus necessarjis, vacui negotiis honeste ac 
liberaliter possimus vivere. Ergo in hac ratione tota 
de maximis fere rebus Stoici illos secuti sunt, ut et 
deos esse et quattuor es rebus omnia constare dice- 
rent. Cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis 
num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse ex qua 
ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis 
cuius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse 
ignem ; nonnulla deinde «liter, sed ea pauca ; de 
a autem re eodem modo, divina mente atque 
n et hi Mdv.i ?«e hie, qua kic MSS. 

a ArislQtIe spoke of a fifth sort of mi 
in acircle, aetlierial, unchanged,' vvhicl 
ihe heavenly liodies ; bul he nowhere 
composed of liiis, but on the contrary u 


/ays regard» mind 


pouring ^^H 

cientific |^| 

is a safer guide than nature. A poetic out-pouring 
of language is one thing, the systematic and scientific 
marshalhng of one's matter is another 

11 V, Much the same may be said about Natural inPhysIeit» 
Philosophy, which is pursued both by the Peripatetics JSedecessori' 
and by your school, and that not merely for the two ire muctinfe 
objects, recognized by Epicurus, of banishing super- oe 
stition and the fear of death. Besides these benefits, 
the study of the heavenly phenomena bestows 
a power of self-control that arises from the percep- 
tion of the consummate restraint and order that 
obtain even among the gods ; also loftiness of mind 
is inspired by contemplating the creations and 
actions of the gods, and justice by realizing the 
will, design and purpose of the Supreme Lord 
and Ruler to whose nature we are told by philo- 
sophers that the True Reason and Supreme Law 

1 2 are conformed. The study of Natural Philosophy 
also alfords the inexhaustible pleasure of acquiring 
knowledge, the sole pursuit which can afford an hon- 
ourable and elevated occupation for the hours of leisure 
left when business has been finished. Now in the whole 
of this branch of philosophy, on most of the impor- 
tant points the Stoics followed the Peripatetics, 
maintaining the existence of the gods and the 
creation of the world out of the four elements. 
Then, coming to the very diificult question, whether 
we are to believe in the existence of a fifth substance,^ 
as the source of reason and intellect, and bound up 
with this the further question of the nature of the 
soul, Zeno declared this substance to be fire ; next, 
as lo some details, but only a few, he diverged from 
his predecessors, but on the main question he agreed 
that the universe as a whole and its chief parts are 



naturatnundumuniverEun] atque eiits maximas partes 
administrari. Materiam veto revum et copiam apud 

13 hos exilcnij apud illos ubeminam reperiemus. Quam 
multa ab iis conquisita et collects sunt de omnium 
animantiuni genere, ortu, membris, aetatibus 1 quam 
multa de rebus iis quae gignuntur e terra \ quam 
multae quamque de variis rebus et causae cur quid- 
que 6at et demonstration es quemadraodum quidque 
fiat! qua e\ omni copia plurima et certissinia argii- 
menta sumuntur ad cuiusque rei naturam explican- 
dam. Ergo adliuc, quantum eqiiidem intellego, 
cautia non videtur fuisse inutandi nominis; non enim, 
si omnia non sequebatur, idcirco non erat ortus 
illinc. Equideni etiam Epicni'um, in physicis quidem, 
Democriteum puto. Pauca mutat, vel plura sane; at 
cum de plurimis eadeni dicit, turn certe de maxi- 
mis. Quod idem cum vestri faciant, non satis ma- 
giiam tribuunt inventoribus gratiam. 

1 -1- VI. ' Scd haec hactenus. Nunc vie 
de summo bono, quud continet pliili 
tandem attulerit quamobrera ab inv 
quam a parentibus dissentiret. Hoc igitur loco, 
quaniqiiam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum fmis 
hie bonorum et qui a Stoicis et quemadmodiuu di- 
ceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspicia- 
muE si potuerimus quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. 

imus, quaeso, 
}phiam, quid 
toribus tam- 

BOOK IV. v-vi 
governed by a divnne mind and substance. In point 
of fullness, Iiowever, and fertility of treatment we 
shall find the Stoics meagre, whereas the Peripatetics 

} are copious in the extreme. Wliat stores of facts 
they discovered and collected about the classification, 
reproduction, morphology- and biology of animals 
of every kind ! and again about plants I How- 
copious and wide in range tlieir explanations of the 
causes and demonstrations of the mode of different 
natural phenomena '. and nil these stores supply them 
with numerous and conclusive arguments to ex- 
plain the nature of each particular thing. So far 
then, as far as I at least can understand the case, 
there appears to have been no reason for the change 
of name^; that Zeno was not prepared to follow the 
Peripatetics in every detail did not alter the fact 
that he had sprung from them. For my own part I 
consider Epicurus also, at all events in natural 
philosophy, simply a pupil of Democritus. He makes 
a few modifications, or indeed a good many ; but on 
most points, and unquestionably the most important, 
he merely echoes his master. Your leaders do the 
same, yet neglect to acknowledge their full debt to 
the original discoverers. 

!■ VI. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, in nihics, (ha 
turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, 'ZtorA S?" 
which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise i^^ j^^^^^ 
contribution did Zeno make to justify his quarrelling naiura 
with his parents, the originators of the doctrine? 
Under this head j'ou, Cato, gave a careful exposition 
of the Stoics' conception of this End of Goods,' and 
of the meaning they attached to the term ; still I also 
will restate it, to enable us to perceive, if we can, 
what element of novelty was introduced by Zeno. 

SIS ^^^^Bi 

Cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, 
secundum naturam vivere summum bouum esse 
dixissent, his verbis tria significari Stoici dicunt, 
unum eiusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum 
reram quae natura evenirent ; himc ipsum Zenonis 
aiunt esse finem, declarantem illud quod a te dictum 
1 5 est, convenienter naturae vivere. Alteram signifi- 
cari idem ut si diceretur officia media omnia aut 
pleraque servantem vivere. Hoc sic expositum dis- 
simile est superiori ; illud enim rectum est (quod 
KaTopSuifia dicebas) contingitque sapienti soli; hoc 
autera inchoati cuiusdam offici est, non perfecti, quod 
cadere in nonnullos insipientes potest, Tertium 
autein, omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secun- 
dum naturam sint fruentem vivere. Hoc non est 
positum in nostra actione ; completur enim et ex eo 
genere vitae quod virtute fruitor et es iis rebus 
quae sunt secundum naturam nequc sunt in nostra 
potestate. Sed lioc summum bonuni quod tertia 
significatione intellegitur, eaque vita quae ex summo 
bono degitur, quia coniuncta ei virtus est, in sapien- 
tem solum cadit, isque finis bonorum, ut ab ipsis 
Stoicis scriptum videmus, a Xenocrate atque ab 
Aristotele constitutus est. Itaque ab iis constitutio 
ilia prima naturae a qua tu quoque ordiebare I 
prope verbis exponitur. 

■ BOOK )V. vi 

Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly 
Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being- 
to live ill accordance with nature." This formula 
receives from the Stoics three interpretations, 
first runs thus, Jo live in the light of a kaowJedge_of C 
t he na turaj_sequence of causation.' This conceptior 
oftheT-nd they declare fo be identical with Zeno's. 
being an explanation of your phrase ' to hve in agree- 

i ment with nature,' Their second interpretation is that ioif-rpceiniu 
it means tlie same as 'to Jive in the performance pf i^trtta'^ec 
all, or most, of one's intermediate dutie^^ The 'n accordanee 
CEi^Cood as thus expounded is not the same as "1»^"""- 
that of the preceding interpretation. That is right " 
action ' (kalorlhihna was your term), and i 
achieved only by the Wise Man, but this belongs to 
duty merely inchoate, so to speak, and not perfect, 
which may sometimes be attained by the foolish. 
Again, the third interpretation of the formula is. ' to 
hveintheenjoymentofall, or of the greatest, of thtrae \ 
things which are in accordance- wiUuiaiui».' This 
does not depend solely on our own conduct, for it 
involves two factors, first a mode of life ei\joying 
virtue, secondly a supply of the things which are in 
accordance with nature but which are not within 
our control. But the Chief Good as understood in 
the third and last interpretation, and life passed on 
thebasisof the Chief Good, being inseparably coupled 
with virtue, lie within the reach of the Wise Man 
alone ; and this is the account of the End of Goods, 
as we read in the writings of the Stoics themselves, 
which was given by Xenocrates and Aristotle. They 
therefore describe the primary constitution of nature, 
which was yom: starting point also, more or less in 
the following terms. 


VII. Onuiis natura vult esse conservatris sui, ut 
ct salva sit et in genere conservetur suo. Ad banc 
rem aiunt artes quoque requisitas quae naturam 
adtuvarent, in quibus ea numeretur in primis quae 
est Vivendi ars, ut tueatur quod a natura datum sit, 
quod desit acquirat ; iidemque diviserunt naturam 
homintij in animum et corpus ; eumque eorum utrum- 
que per se CKpetendum esse dixisseut, virtutes quo- 
que utriusque eorum p^rse expetendasesse dieebant; 
et^ cum aniruum infinita quadam laude anteponerent 
corpori, virtutes quoque animi bonis corporis ante- 
ponebant. Sed cum sapientiam totlus liominis CU- 
et procuratricem esse vellent, quae esset 
et adiutrix, boc sapientiae munus esse 
am eum tueretur qui constaret ex 
animo et corpore, in utroque luvaret eum ac conti- 
neret. Atque ita re sinipliciter primo collocata, 
reliqua subtilius persequentes corporis bona facilem 
quandam rationem habere censebant, de animi bonis 
accuratius exquirebant, in primisque reperiebant esse 
in iis iustitiae seraina, primique ex omnibus philo- 
sophis natura tributum esse docuerunt ut ii qui pro- 
creati essent a procreatoribus amarentur, et, id quod 
temporum ordine autiquius est, ut coniugia virorum 
et uxorum natura coniuncta esse diccrent, qua e« 
stirpe orirentur amicitiae cognationum. Atque ab 
liis initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et 

naturae com 
dicebant ut 

li MSS. 

BOOK fV. vii 
Ei'cry natural organism aims at being its ForstirttaB 
1 preserver, so as to secure its safety and also its stiocioi «it- 
preservation true to its specific type. With this Ss^imk™'- 
object, they declare, man called in the aid of the coumof body»' 
arts also to assist nature ; and chief aniong the arts ihangb drcmint 
is counted the art of living, which aims at guarding ™"^o^°mDor 
the gifts that nature has bestowed and at obtaining ta ■ 
those that are lacking. They further divided the 
nature of man into soul and Iwdy. Each of these 
parts they pronounced to be desirable for its own 
sake, and consequently they said that the virtues 
also of each were desirable for their own sakes ; at 
the same time they extolled the sou! as infinitely 
surpassing the body in glory, and accordingly placed 
the virtues also of the m.ind above the goods of the 
' body. But they held tliat wisdom is the guardian 
and protectress of the whole man, as being the com- 
rade and helper of nature, and so they said that the 
(imction of wisdom, as protecting a being that con- 
sisted of a mind and a body, was to assist and pre- 
serve him in respect of Irath. After thus laying the 
first broad foundations of the theory, thej' went on 
to work it out in greater detail. The goods of the 
body, they held, required no particular explanation, indalsothe 
but the goods of the soul they investigated with E^'Sfd' w^.*ih- 
more elaboration, finding in the first place that in Virtues, 
them lay the germs of Justice ; and they were the 
first of any philosophers to teach that the love of 
parents for their offspring is a provision of nature ; 
and that nature, so they pointed out, has ordained 
the union of men and women in marriage, ■ 
prior in order of time, and is the root of all the 
family alfections. Starting from these first prin- 
ciples they traced out the origin and growth of all 



progress! onem persecuti sunt. Es quo magtiitudo 
quoque arimii exsistebnt qua facile posset repugnari 
obsistique fortunae, quod raasimae res essent in 
potestate sapientis; varietates autem iniuriasque for- 
tunae facile veterum philosophorum praeceptis in- 
1 a stituta I'ita superabat. Principiis autem a natura 
datis aniplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur, 
partim profectae a contemplationc rerum occultarum, 
quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam 
rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas conse- 
quebatur ; quodque hoc solum animal natum est 
pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque con- 
victum hominum ac societatem animadvertensque in 
omnibus rebus quas ageret aut diceret ut ne quid ab 
eo fieret nisi honeste ac decore, his initiis et ^ ut 
ante dixi seminibus a natura datis, temperantia, 
modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluts 
19 VIII. Habes," inquam, Cato, formam eorum 
de quibus loquor philosophorum. Qua exposits 
scire cupio quae causa sit cur Zeno ab hac antiqua 
constitutione desciverit, quidnam horum ab eo non 
naturam conservatri- 
nne animal ipsum sibi 
in suo gen ere inco- 
n omnium artium finis 
quaereret, idem statui 
It quod, cum ex animo 

sit probatum: quodi 
cem sui dixerint, an quod 
commendatom ut se salvu 
lumeque vellet, an quod,^ ■ 
is esset quern natura 
debere de totius arte vitae, 
'(T/inserled by Mdv. 
^sesaivum Lambinus, Mdv.j 
* yuorf inserted by Mdv. 



BOOK IV. vii-viii 
the virtues. From the same source was developed 
loftiness of mind, which could render us proof against 
tile assaults of fortune, because the things that 
matter were under the control of the Wise Man ; 
whereas to tlie vicissitudes and blows of fortune a 
life directed by the precepts of the old philosophers 

i could easily rise superior. Again, upon the founda- 
tions given by nature was erected a spacious struc- 
ture of excellences, partly based on the contemplation 
of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an 
innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the 
passion for argument and for discussion ; and also, 
since man is the only annual endowed wit 
of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse 
and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous 
care in all his words and actions to avoid any con- 
duct that is not honourable and seemly, from these 
beginnings or germs, as I called them, before, of 
nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self- 
control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full 
flower and perfection. 

} VIII. "There, Cato," I said, " is an outline of the T 
philosophers of whom I am speaking. Having put bi 
it before you, I should be glad to learn what reason "• 
Zeno had for seceding from this old-established 
system. Which precisely of these doctrines did he 
think unsatisfactory: the doctrine that every organism 
instinctively seeks its own preservation ? or that every 
animal has an affection for itself, prompting it to 
desire its own continuance safe and unimpaired in 
its specific type ? or that, since the End of every art 
is some special natural requirement, the same must 
be affirmed as regards the art of life as a whole? c 
that, as we consist of soul and body, these and aisc 


c'onstaremus et corpore, et haec ipsa et eorum vir- 
tutes per se esse sumendas. An vtro displieuit ea 
quae tributa est animi virtutibus tanta praestantia? 
an quae de prudentia, de cognitione reriim, de con- 
iunctione generis humani, quaeque ab iisdem de 
temperantia, de modestia, de magnitudine animi, de 
omni honestate dicuntur? Fatebuntur Stoici haec 
omnia dicta esse praeclare neqoe earn causam Zenoni 
3 desciscendi fuisse. Alia qiiaedani dicent, credo, 
magna antiquorum esse peccata quae ille veri inve- 
stigandi ciipidus nullo niodo ferre potuerit. Quid 
enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius 
quatn bonam valetudinem, quam dulorum omnium 
vacuitatem, quam integrttatem oi-ulorum reliquorum- 
que sensuum ponere in bonis potius quam dicerent 
nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? 
ea enim omnia quae illi bona dicerent praeposita 
esse, non bona; itemque il!a quae in corpore excel- 
lerent atulte antiquoa disisse per se esse espetenda; 
sumenda potitis quam expetenda; ea denique omni 
vita quae in virtute una consisleret, illam vitam quae 
etiam ceteris rebus quae essent secundum tiaturam 
abundaret, magis expetendam non esse sed rangis 
sumendam; cumqiie ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam 
vitam ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam 
deesse sapientibus turn cum sint beatissimi ; itaque 
eos id agere ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates 

BOOK IV. viii 

the virtues of these are desirable for their own 
sakes? Or again, did he take exeeptioo to the 
ascription of such pre-eminence to the virtues of the 
soul? or with what they say about prudence and 
knowledge, about the sense of human fellowship, or 
about temperance, self-control, magnanimity, and 
moral virtue in general? No, the Stoics will admit 
that all of these doetrines are admirable, and that 
ao Zeno's reason for secession did not lie here. As I 
understand; they will accuse the ancients of certain 
grave errors in other matters, which that ardent 
seeker after truth found himself quite unable to 
tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more 
insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good 
health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eye- 
sight and of tile other senses, and class them as 
goods, instead of saying that there was nothing 
whatever to choose between these things and their 
opposites? According to him, all these things 
which the ancients called good, were not good, but 
preferred'; and So also with bodily cicellences, it 
was foolish of the ancients to call them desirable 
for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' 
but worth adopting'; and in short, speaking 
generally, a life bountifiilly supplied with all the 
other things in accordance with nature, in addition 
to virtue, was not more desirable,' but only more 
worth adopting' than a life of virtue and virtue 
alone ; and although virtue of itself can render 
life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet 
there are some things that Wise Men lack at the 
very moment of supreme happiness ; and accordingly 
they do their best to protect themselves from pain, 
disease and infirmity. 

y2 323 


21 IX. ' O magnam vim ingeni causamque iustam cur 
nova exsisteret disciplina! Pergcporro: sequuntur 
enim ea quae tu scientissime complexus es, omnium 
insipientinni, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, om- 
niaque peccata esse paria, eosque qui natura doctri- 
naque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi earn 
plane consecuti essent, sumrne esse miseros, neque 
inter eorura vitani et improbissimorum quidquam 
omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens 
non fiierit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus 
nee beatius vixerit. Haec videlicet est correctio 
philosopbiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino 
aditum nullum Iiabere potest in urbem, in fonnrjj in 
curiam. Quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum 
qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter ai^endae 
profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem,' cumque 
idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem 
vim tribueret alia nomina imponentem, verba niodo 

22 mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? Pa- 
tronusne causae in epilogo pro reo dicens negaret 
esse malum essilium. publicationem bonorum? hace 
reicienda esse, non fugienda? ncc misericordem 
iudicem e.sse oportere ? In contione autem si 
loqueretur, si Hannibal ad portas vcnisset murumque 
iaculo traiecisset, negaret esse in malis capi, venire, 
interfici, patriani amittere? An senatus, cum trium- 

j brackcled bj- Mdv. and 

BOOK IV. ix 

I JX. " What acuteness of intellect '. What a satis- si 
factory reason for the creation of a new philosophy '. 'j 
But proceed further; for we now come to the C' 
doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, 
that all men's fully, injustice and other vices are 
alike and all sins are equal ; and that those who by 
nature and training have made considerable pro- 
Sress towards virtue, unless they have actually 
attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is 
nothing whatever to choose between tlieir existence 
and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the 
great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a 
Wise Man, lived a nn better and no happier life 
than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you 
please, is your revised and corrected version of the 
old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be 
produced in civic life, in the law-courts, in the 
senate '. For who could tolerate such a way of speak- 
ing in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and 
moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter 
the names of things, and while really holding the 
same opinions as everybody else, to impose different 
names on things to which he attaches the same 
meanings as other people, just altering the terms 
while leaving tlie ideas themselves untouched? 
12 Could an advocate wind up his defence of a client by 
declaring that exile and confiscation of property are 
not evils? that they are 'to be rejected,' but not 
to be shunned'? that it is not a judge's duty to 
show mercy? Or supposing him to be addressing a 
meeting of the people; Hannibal is at the gates 
and has flung a javelin over the city walls; could he 
say that captivity, enslavement, death, loss of 
country are no evils? Could the senate, decreeing 

phuin Africano decemeret, quod eius virtute,' aut 
felicitate ' posset dicerCj si neque virtus in ullo 
nisi in' sapiente nee felicitas vere dici potest? 
Quae est igitur ista pliilosophia quae communi more 
in foro loquiturj in libellis suo? praesertim cum 
quod illi suis verbis significant* in eo nihil novetur/ 

33 eaedem res tnaneant alio mudo. Quid enini interest, 
divitias, opes, valetudinem bona dicas anne prae- 
posita, cum ille qui ista bona dicit niliilo plus iis tri- 
buat quam tu qui eadeni itia praeposita nominas? 
Itaque homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus ilia 
famiiiaritate Scipionis et Lueli, Panaetius, cum ad 
Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet, quod 
esse caput debebat si probari posset, nusquam posuit 
non esse malum dolorem. sed quid esset et quale, 
quantumque in eo esset alieni, deinde quae ratio 
esset perfercndi; cuius quidem, quoniam Stoicus 
fiiit, sententia condemnata milii videtur esse inanitae 
ista verborum. 

Si X. Sed ut propius ad ea, Cato, accedam quae a 
te dicta sunt, pressius agamus eaque quae modo 
dixisti cum iis conferamus quae tuis antepono. Quae 
sunt igitur communia vobis cum antiquis, iis sic 
utamur quasi coneessis ; quae in controversiam ve- 

/«om. most MSS. 

'sig^ijicant Kayser ; signijivtnt MSS,, Mdv. 
^ Aii-er novelur MSS. add ae ipsis rebus nihil t 


^P BOOK IV. ix-x 

a triumph to Africanus, use the formulaj whereas 
by reason of his valour,' or good fortune,' if no 
one but the Wise Man can truly be said to possess 
either valour or good fortune? What sort of a 
philosophy then is this, which speaks the ordinary 
language in public, but in its treatises employs an 
idiom of its own? and that though the doctrines 
which the Stoics express in their own peculiar 
terms contain no actual novelty; the id' 

S3 tlie same, though clothed in another dress. Why, 
what difference does it make whether you call 
wealth, power, health goods,' or things pre- 
ferred,' when he who calls them goods assigns no 
more value to them than you who style exactly the 
same things preferred'? This is why so eminent 
and, high -minded an authority as Panaetius, a worthy 
member of the famous circle of Scipio and Laelius, 
in his epistle to Quintus 'I'ubero on the endurance 
of pain, has nowhere made what ought to have been 
his most effective point, if it could be shown to be 
true, namely that pain is not an evil ; instead he 
defines its nature and properties, estimates the de- 
gree of its divergence from nature, and lastly pre- 
scribes the method by which it is to be endured. 
So that by his vote, seeing tllat he was a Stoic, your 
terminological fatuities seem to me to stand con- 

2+ X. But 1 want to come to closei' quarters, Cato, r 
with the actual system as you stated it; so let us '' 
press the matter home, and compare the doctrines hi 
you have just enunciated with those which I think" 
superior to yours. Let us then take for granted the °' 
tenets that you hold in common with the ancients, 
but discuss, if you are willing, those about which 

ntunt, de iis si placet disseramus." Mihi vero/' 
inquit, placet agi subtilius et ut ipse dixisti pres- 
sius. Quae enim adhuc protulisti, popularia sunt; 
ego autem a te elegantiora desideru," A mene 
tu?" inquam; sed tamen enitar, et si minus niulta 

95 mihi occurrent nou fiigiam ista popularia. Sed 
posituiu sit primum nosmet ipsos commendatos esse 
nobis primamque ex natura banc habere appetitionem 
ut conservemus nosmet ipsos. Hoc tonvenit; sequi- 
tur illud ut animadvertamus qui simus ipsi, ut nos 
quflles oportet esse servemus. Sumus igitur homfties ; 
ex auimo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam 
modi, nosque oportet, ut prima appetitio naturalis 
postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex liis finem 
ilium sumiDi boui atquc ultimi ; quern si prima vera 
sunt ita constitui necesse est, earum rerum quae sint 
secundum naturam quam plurima et quam maxima 

2fi adipiaci. Hunc igitur finem illi tenuerunt, quodque 
ego pluribus verbis, illi brevius, secundum naturam 
vivere, hoc iis bonorum videbatur extremum. 

XI. Age nunc isti doceant, vel tu potiua (quii 
enim ista melius?), quouam modo ab iisdem princi- 
piis profecti efficiatis ut honeste vivere (id est enim 



there is dispute." Oh," said he, I am quite 
willing for the debate to go deeper ; to be pressed 
llome, as you phrase it. The arguments you liave 
so far'put forward are of tlie popular order ; but I 
look to you to give me sometiiing more out of the 
common." " What, do you look to me ?" said I. "But 
all the SHme I will do my best, and if I am short of 
matter, 1 shall not shrink from the argimients you are 

95 pleased to call popular. But let it be granted to b< 
begin with, that we have an afltction for ourselves,^ 
and that the earliest impulse bestowed upon us by cu 
nature is a desire for seTPprservation. On this we 
are agreed ; and the implication is that we must 
study what we ourselves are, in order to keep our- 
selves true to our proper character. We are then 
human beings, consisting of soul and body, and these 
of a certain kind. These we are bound Ui esteem, as 
our earliest natural instinct demands, and out of 
these we must construct our End, our Chief and 
Ultimate Good. And, if our premises are correct, 
this End must be pronounced to consist in the 
attainment of the largest number of the most im- 

i6 portant of the things in accordance with nature. This 
then was the conception of the End that they up- 
held ; the supreme Good they believed to be the thing 
which I have described at some length, but which 
they more briefly expressed by the formula ' life ac- 
cording to nature.' 

XI. " Now then let us call upon your leaders, or Bu 
better upon yourself (for who is more qualilied to ^' 
speak for your school?) to explain this : how in the '"' 
world do you contrive, starting from the same first 
principles, to reach the conclusion that the Chief 
Good is morality of life? — for that is equivalent 

to ^H 

vel e virtute vel naturae congruenter vivere) sum- 
mum bonum sit, et quonam modo aut quo loco 
corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea quae secun- 
dum naturam cum sint absint a nostra potestatc, 
ipsum denique officium. Quaero igitur quomodo hae 
tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a 

97 sapientia relictae sint. Quod si non hominis sum- 
mum bonum quaereremus sed cuiusdam animaritiSj 
is autem esset nihil nisi animus (liceat enim fingere 
aliquid eiusmodi quo verum facilius reperiamus), 
tamen illi animo non esset hie vester finis. Deside- 
raret enim valetudincm, vacuitatem doloris, appeteret 
etiam conservation em sui earumque rerum custodiam, 
finemque sibi constitueret secundum naturam vivere, 
quod est ut dixi habere ea quae secundum naturam 

SS sint ve! omnia vel plurima et masima. Cuiuscum- 
que enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, 
etianisi id sine corpore sit ut fingimus, tamen ossein 
animo quaedam similia eorum quae sunt in corpore, 
ut nulto modo nisi ut expusui constitui possit finis 
bonorum. Chrysippus autem exponens differentias 
animantiuni ait alias earum corpore excellere, alias 
autem animo, nonnullas valere utraque re; deinde 
disputat quod ciiiusque generis animantium st&tui 
deceat extremum. Cum autem hominem in eo ge- 
nere posuisset ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam, 

BOOK IV. xi 
your life in agreement with virtue ' or ' life in har- 
mony with nature.' By what means or at what 
point did you suddenly discard the body, and all 
those things which are in accordunee with nature 
but out of our control, and lastly duty itself? My i 
question then is, how comes it that so many things 
that Nature strongly recommends have been sud- 

i7 denly abandoned by Wisdom? Even if we were not 
seeking the Chief Good of man but of some Uving 
creature that consisted solely of a mind (let us allow 
ourselves to imagine such a creature, in order to 
facilitate our discovery of the truth), even so that 
mind would not accept this End of yours. For such 
a being would ask for health and freedom from pain, 
and would also desire its own preservation, and 
security for the goods just specified; nn'd^f would 
set up as its End to live according to nature, which 
means, as I said, to possess either all or most and the 
most impoj^nt of the things which are in accord- 

28 ance with nature. In fact you may construct a 
living creature of any sort you like, but even if it 
be devoid of a body like our iniaginary being, never- 
theless its mind will be bound to possess certain 
attributes analogous to those of the body, and con- 
sequently it will be impossible to set up for it an 
End of Goods on any other lines than those which I 
have laid down. Chrysippus, on the other hand, in 
his survey of the different species of living things 
states that in some the body is the principal part, in 
others the mind, while there are some that are equally 
endowedinrespect of either; and then he proceeds to 
discuss what constitutes the ultimate good proper to 
each species. Man he has placed under that species in 
which the mind is principal ; and yet he so defines 

a bonum id constituit, non ut excellere ani- 
mus setl ut niliil esse praeter animum videretur. 
XII. Uno autem modo in virtute sola sununiun 
botium recte poneretur, si quod esset animal quod 
totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic ut ea 
mens nihil haberet in se quod esset secundum natu- 

99 ram, ut valetudo est. Sed id ne cogitari quidem 
potest quale sit ut non repugiiet ipsum sibi. 

Sin dicunt' obscurari quaedam nee apparere 
quia valde parva sint, nos quoque concediTnus; quod 
dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptute, quae minimae 
sint voluptates, eas obseurari saepe et obrui ; sed non 
sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis 
tamque productae tennporibus tamque multae. Ita- 
que in qui bus propter eorum exiguilateni obscnratio 
conseqiiitur, saepe accidit ut nihil interesse nostra 
fateamur sint ilia necne sint (ut in sole, quod a tc 
dicebatur, lucernam adhibcre nihil interest aut 

30 teruncium adicere Croesi pecuniae); quibus autem 
in rebus tanta obscuratio non fit, fieri tamen potest 
ut id ipsum quod interest non sit magnum (ut ei 
qui iucunde vixerit an nos decern si aeque vita 
iucunda menstrua addatur, quia momentum aliquod 
babeat ad iueunduin accesaio,' bonum sit ; si autem 
id non coucedatur, non continuo vita beata toltitur). 
Bona autem corporis huic sunt quod posterius posui 
similiora. Habent enim accessionem dignam in qua 
elaboretur: ut mihi in hoc Stoici iocari videantur 

•diciinl Md«.; dicit MSS. (in 
Other MSS. have ad iucuac 


las diamt 

^^ BOOR IV. xi-3iii 

man's End as to make it appear, not that he is prin- 
cipally mind, but that he consists of nothing else. 
XII. But the only case in which it would be correct 
to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if tliere 
existed a creature consisting solely of pure intellectj 
with the further proviso that this intellect were 
devoid of any attribute that is iii accordance with 

39 nature, such as health. But it is impossible even 
to imagine a self-consistent picture of what such a 
creature would be Uke. 

If on the contrary they urge that certain things 
are so estremely small that they are eclipsed and lost , 
sight of altogether, we too admit this ; Epicurus also 
says the same of pleasure, that the smallest pleasures 
are often eclipsed and disappear. But things so im- 
portant, permanent and numerous as the bodily 
advantages in question are nut in this category. On 
the one hand tjierefore, with things so small as to 
be eclipsed from view, we are often bound to admit 
that it makes no difference to us whether we have 
themornot (j ust as, to take your illustration, it makes 
no difference if you light a lamp in the sunshine, 

30 or add sixpence to the wealth of Croesus) ; whOe on 
the other hand, witli things which are not so com- 
pletely eclipsed, it may nevertheless be the case that 
the precise difference they make is not very great 
(thus, if a man who has lived ten years enjoyably 
were given an additional month of equally enjoy- 
able life, the addition to his enjoyment, being of 
some value, would be a good thing, but yet the re- 
fusal of the addition does not forthwith annihilate 
his happiness). Now bodily goods resemble rather 
the latter sort of things. For they contribute some- 
thing worth taking trouble to obtain ; so that 1 feel 


interdum cum ita dicant, si ad illamvitam quae cuni 
virtute degatur ampulla nut atrigilis accedat, sum- 
pturum sapientem eam vitam potius quo haec adiecta 

: sint nee beatiorem tatneii ob eam causam fore. Hoc 
smiile tandem est ? non risu potius quam oratione 
eieieudum? Ampulla enim sit ne cue sit, quis non 
iure Optimo irrideatur si laboret ? At vero pravi- 
tate^ membrorum et cruciatu dolonim si quis quem 
levet, magnam ineat gratiam; nee si ille~ sapiens ad 
tortoris eculeum a tyranno ire cogatur similein ha- 
beat vultum et si ampullam perdidisset, sed ut 
magnum et difficile certamen iniens, cum sibi cum 
capital! adversario, dolore, depugnandum videret, 
excitaret omnes rationes fortitudinis ac patientiae 
quarum praesidio iniret difficile illud ut dixi ma- 
gnumque proelium. Delude non quaerimus quid 
obscuretur aut intereat quia sit admoduni parvuin, 
sed quid tale sit ut expleat summani. Una volnptas 
e multis obscuratur in ilia vita voloptaria ; sed tanien 
ea, quamvis parva sit, pars est eius vitae quae posita 
est in voluptate. Nummus in Croesi divitiis obscu- 
ratur, pars est tamen divitiarum. Quare obscurentur 
etiam liaec quae secundum naturam esse dicimus in 
vita beata, sint modo partes vitae beatae. 

2 Xlll. Atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, 
est quaedam appctitio naturalis ea quae secundum 
naturam sunt appetcns, eorum omnium est aliqua 

BOOK IV. xii-xiii 

the Stoics must sometimes be joking on this point, 
when they say that if to the life of virtue he added 
an oil-flask or a flesh-brush, the Wise Man will 
choose the life so augmented] by preference, but yet 

31 will not on that account be any happier. Pray does 
this illustration really hold good ? is it not ratlier to 
be dismissed with a laugh than seriously refuted ? 
Who does not richly deserve to be laughed at if he 
troubles about having or not having an oiUflask ? But 
rid a man of bodily deformity or agonies of pain, 
and yon earn his deepest gratitude ; and if the Wise 
Man ia ordered by atyrant to go to the rack, he would 
not near the same look as if he had lost his oil-flask. 
He would feel that he had a severe and searching 
ordeal before him ; and seeing that he was about to 
encounter the supreme antagonist, pain, he would 
summon up all his principles of courage and endur- 
ance to fortify him against that severe and searching 
struggle aforesaid.^ Again, the question is not 
whether such and such a good is so trifling as to be 
eclipsed or lost altogether, but whether it is of such 
a sort as to contribute to the sum total. In the life 
of pleasure of which we spoke, one pleasure is lost to 
sight among tlie many ; but all the same, small as it is, 
it is a part of the life that is based upon pleasure. A 
halfpenny is lost to sight amidst the riches of Croesus ; 
still it forms part of those' riches. Hence the circum- 
stances according to nature, as we call them, may be 
unnoticed in a life of happiness, only you must allow 
that tliey are parts of that happiness. 

32 Xin. " Yet if, as you and we are bound to agree, ai 
there does exist a certain natural instinct to desire ^ 
the things in accordance with nature, the right proce- 
dure is to add together all these things in one definite 



sumina facienda. Quo coostituto turn licebit otiose 

ista quaerere, de magnitudine rerum, de excellentia 

quanta in quoque sit ad beate vivendum, de istis 

ipsis obscurationibus quae propter ejtiguitatem vix 

aut ae viK quidem appareant. Quid de quo nuUa 

? Nemo enim est qui aliter diierit quin 

1 naturarum simile csset id ad quod omnia 

referrentur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendaruro. 

Onmis enim est natura diligens sui. Quae est enim 

quae se umquam deserat aut partem aliquam suj aut 

s partis habitura aut vim aut ullius earum rerum 

le secmidum naturam sunt aut motiun aut statum ? 

ae aiitem natura suae primae iiistitutionis oblita 

est? Nulla profecto est^ quin suam vim retineat A 

33 prim.o ad estremum. Quomodo igitur evenit at 
hooiinis natura sola esset quae liominem relinqueret, 
quae oblivisceretur corporis, quae summum bonuin 
non in toto homine sed in parte liomdnis poneret? 
Quomodo autem, quod ipsi etiam fatentur constatque 
inter omnes, conservabitur ut simile sit omnium 
naturarum illud ultimum de quo quaeritur ? Turn 

1 esset simile si in eeteris quoque naturis id 
cuique esset ultimum quod in quaque escelleret. 

34 Tale enim visum est ultimum Stoicorum. Quid 
dubitas igitur mutare principia naturae? Quod* 

Lenim dicis, omne animal, simul atque sit ortam, 
applicatum esse ad se diligendum esseque in ae 
conservando occupatum, quin potius ita dicis, omne 
' fsi supplied by Mdv. 
*gitoiicon}. MQIIer; MSS. 


cdd. Quid—occ^ 

e open ^^^M 
;nd tile ^H 

^P BOOK IV. Kiu 

total. This point establislied, it will then be 
to us \a investigate at our leisure your questi 
about .the importance of the separate items, and 
value of their respective contributions to happiness, 
and about that eclipse, as you call it, of the things 
so small as to be almost or quite imperceptible. 
Then what of a point on which no disagreement acm 
exists ? I mean this : no one will dispute that the ^''^ 
supreme and final End, the thing ultimately de- ite» 
sirable, is analogous for all natural species alike. 
For love of self is inherent in every species ; since 
what species exists that ever deserts itself or any 
part of itself, or any habit or faculty of any such part, 
or any of the things in accordance with nature, either 
in motion or at rest? What species ever forgot its 
own original constitution ? Assuredly there is not 
one that does not retain its own proper faculty from 

13 start to finish. Huw then came it about that, of all 
the existing species, mankind alone simuld abandon 
man's nature, forget the body, and find its Chief 
Good not in the whole man but in a part of man ? 
How moreover is the axiom to be retained, admitted 
as it is even by the Stoics and accepted universally, 
that the End which is the subject of our inquirj' i.s 
analogous for all species ? For the analogy to hold, 
every other species also would have to find its End 
in that part of the orgatQsm which in that particular 
species is the highest part ; since that, as we have 
seen, is how the Stoics conceive the End of man. 

14 Why then do you hesitate to alter your conception ^^ ,jj 
of the primary instincts to correspond? Instead of^»"' 
saying that every animal from the moment of its puiw 
birth is devoted to love of itself and engrossed in p^^n 
preserving itself, why do you not rather say that only. 

z 337 

tinimal applicatum esse ad id quod in eo sit optimuni 
et in eius unius occup«tum esse ciistodia, reliquasque 
natums nihil aliud agere nisi ut id conservent quod 
in quaque optimum sit ? Quomodo autera optimum, si 
bonuin praeterea nullum est ? Sin autem reliqua appe- 
tenda sunt, cur, quod est ultimum rerum appetenda- 
rum, id non aut ex omnium earum aut ex pluriraarum 
et maximarum appetitione concluditur ? Ut Phidias 
potest a piimo instituej^ signum jdque perficere, 
potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere, huic 
similis est sapientia ; nan. enim ipsa genuit hominem 
sed accepit a natura inchoatum ; hanc erg-o intuens 

35 debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere. Qua- 
lem igitur hominein natura inchoavit ? et quod est 
munus, quod opus sapientiae ? quid est quod ab ea 
absolvi et perfici debeat? Si nihil [in eo quod 
perficiendum est]' praeter motum ingeni quendam, 
id est, rationem, necesse est huic ultimum esse ex 
virtute agere ; rationis enim perfectio est virtus ; si 
nihil nisi corpus, summa erunt ilia, valetudo, vacuitas 

36 doloris, pulchritudo, cetera. XIV. Nunc de hominis 
summo bono quaeritur ; quid igitur dubitamus in 
tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectuui ? Cum 
enim constet inter otnnes omne officium munusque 
sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii (ne 
me esistimes contra Stoicos solum dicere) eas sea- 


cp. Sjm^I 

test. 4^H 

BOOK IV. xiii-xiv 
every animal is devoted to the best part of itself 
and engrossed in protecting- that alone, mid that 
every other species is solely cngag-ed in preserving 
the part that is respectively best in each ? But in 
what sense is one part the best, if nothing beside it 
is good at all ? While if on the contrary other 
things also are desirable, why does not the supremely 
desirable thuig consist in the attainment of all. or of 
the greatest possible number and the most important, 
of these things ? A Pheidias can start to make a statue 
from the beginning and carry it to completion, or he 
can take one roiigh-hewn by some one else and 
finish that. The latter case typifies the work ofButWMoni 
Wisdom. She did not create man herself, but took iSVt^em 
him over in the rough from Nature ; her business is !\*/'"j'i[j* " 
to finish the statue that Nature began, keeping her 

35 eyes on Nature meanwhile. What sort of thing 
then is man as rough-hewn by Nature ? and what is 
the function and the task of Wisdom ? what is it 
that needs to be consummated by her finishing 
touch ? If it is a creature consisting solely of a 
certain operation of the intellect, that is, reason, its 
highest good must be activity in accordance with 
virtue, since virtue is reason's consummation. If it 
is nothing but a body, the chief things will be health, 

36 freedom from pain, beauty and the rest. XIV. But 
as a matter of fact the creature whose Chief Good 
we arc seeking is man. Surely then our course is 
to inquire what Nature's handiwork has been in 
man — the whole man. All are agreed that the duty 
and function of Wisdom is entirely centred in the 
work of perfecting man ; but then some thinkers 
(for you must not imagine that I am tilting at the 
Stoics only) produce theories which place the Chief 

z3 339 

tentias afferunt ut summura bonuin in eo genere 
ponant quod sit extra nostram potestatem, taraquam 
de inaninio aliquo' loquantur, alii contra, quasi 
corpus nullum sit hominisj ita praeter animuni nihil 
curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque . 
inane nescio quid sit (neque enim 
legere) sed in quodam genere corporis, ut oe is 
quidem viilute una contentus sit sed appetat vacui- 
tatem doloris. Quamobrem utrique idem faciunt ut 
si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram tuerentur, 
aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem ample- 
xarentur, actionem relin que rent. Eorum enim om- 
nium, multa praetermittentium dum eligant aliquid 
quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia ; at vera iUa 
perfecta atque plena eorum qui, cum de hominis 
summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi 
neque corporis partem vacuam tutela reliquerunt. 
37 Vos aotem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes falemur, 
altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem 
tenet et quod eos qui sapientes sunt absolutos et 
perfectos putamus, aciem animomm nostrorum 
virtutis splendore praestringitis. In omni enim 
animante est summum aliqutd atque optimum, ut in 
equis, in canibus, quibus tamen et dolore vacare 
opus est et valere ; sic igitur in homine pert'ectio 
- ista in eo potissimura quod est optimum, id est, in 
virtute laudatur. Itaque mihi non satis videmini 
considerare quod iter sit naturae quaeque progressio. 
Non enim, quod facit in frugibus, ut, cum ad spicam 
perduxerit ab herba, reliiiquat et pro niliilo liabeat 
hcrliam, idem facit in homine cum eum ad rationis 



BOOK IV. xiv 

Good in the class of things entirely outside our con- 
tro], as thougli they were discussing some creature 
devoid of a mind ; while others on the contrary 
ignore everything but mind, just as if man had no 
body ; and that though even the mind is not an 
empty, impalpable something (a conception to 
me unintelligible), but in some sort corporeal, and 
therefore even the mind is not satisfied with virtue 
alone, but desires freedom from pain. In fact, with 
each school alike it is just as if they should ignore 
the left side of their bodies and protect the right, 
or, in the mind, like Erillus, recognize cognition but 
leave the practical faculty out of account. They pick 
and choose, pass over a great deal and fasten on a single 
aspect ; so that all their systems are one-sided. The 
full and perfect philosophy was that which, investi- 
gating the Chief Good of man, left no part either of 
37 his mind or body uncared-for. Whereas your friends, ' 
Cato, on the strength of the fact, which we all f, 
admit, that virtue is man's highest and supreme '' 
excellence and that the Wise Man is the perfect 
and consummate type of humanity, try to dazzle our 
mental vision with virtue's radiance. Every animal, 
for instance the horse, or the dog, has some supreme 
good quality, yet at the same time they require to 
have health and freedom from pain ; similarly there- 
fore in man that consummation you speak of attains 
its chief glory in what is his chief excellence, namely 
virtue. This being so, I feel you do not take suffi- a 
cient pains to study Nature's method of procedure, f. 
With the growing corn, no doubt, her way is to guide ° 
its development from blade to ear, and then discard 
the blade as of no value ; but she does not do thi 
same with man, when she has developed in him the 


he ^ 


habitum perduxit,'^ Semper enim ita. aESumit aliqnid 
S Lit ea quae prima dederit non deserat. Itaque 
sensibus rationem adiunxit et ratione elfecta. sensus 
non reliquit. Ut si cultura vitium, cuias hoc munus 
est ut elHciat ut vitis cum omnibus partlbus suis 
quam optime se habeat,- — sed sic Intellegamus (licet 
enim, ut vos quoque soletis, lingere aliquid docendi 
causa): si igitur ilia cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, 
cetera, credo, velit quae ad colendam vitem attine- 
bunt sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus 
praeferat statoatque niliil esse melius in vite quam 
se ; similiter sensus, cum uccessit ad naturam, tuetur 
illam quid em sed etiam se tuetur ; cum autem 
assumpta est ratio, tanto in dominatu local ur ut 
omnia ilia prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur. 
' 39 Itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione quibus 
prac-posita vitam omnem debet gubemare ; ut mirari 
satis istorum ' inconstantiam non possim. Naturalem 
enim appetitioneni, quam vocant opfii'iv, itemque 
ofEcium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt esse earum 
rerum quae secundum naturam sunt. Cum autem 
ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiiiunt 
omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut 
alia sumamus, alia espetamus, potius quam uno fine 
utrumque concluderent. _ 

) XV. "At enim [nam]^ dicitis virtutem non poe 

^perduxit Mdv. (cp. V, 41 caepimm 
' islorum Mdv. ; torum MSS. 
'nam of best MSS. Mdv. brackel: 
taitiTa, and iam dicetis. 


:), pErduxerit MSSi 
>: otIierMSS. vet 

BOOK IV. xiv-xv 

faculty of reason. For she continually superadds 

fresh faculties without abandoning her previous gifts. 

38 Thus she added to sensation reason, and after 
creating reason did not discard sensation. Suppose 
the art of viticulturej whose function is to bring the 
vine with all its parts into the most thriving con- 
dition — at least let us assume it to be so (for we 
may Invent an imaginary case, as you are fond of 
doing, for purposes of illustration) ; suppose then 
the art of viticulture were a faculty residing in the 
vine itself, this faculty would desire, doubtless, as 
before, every condition requisite for the health of 
the vine, but would rank itself above all the other 
parts of the vine, and would consider itself the 
noblest eltment in the vine's organism. Similarly 
when an animal organism has acquired the faculty 
of sensation, this faculty protects the organism, it is 
true, but also protects itself; Irat when reason has 
been superadded, this is placed in such a position of 
dominance that all the primary gifts of nature are 

39 placed under its protection. Accordingly Reason 
never abandons its task of safeguarding the earlier 
elements ; its business is by controlling these to 
steer the whole course of life ; so that I cannot 
sufficiently marvel at the inconsistency of your 
teachers. Natural desire, which they term horme, 
and also duty, and even virtue itself they reckon 
among tilings according to Nature. Yet when they 
want to arrive at the Supreme Good, they leap over all 
of these, and leave us two operations instead of one; 
some things we are to ' adopt,' others to ' desire ' ; 
instead of including both operations under a single 

4-0 XV. " But you protest that if other things than 

constitui, si ea quae extra virtutem sint ad lieate 
vivendum pertineant. Quod totum contra est; in- 
troduci euim virtus nullo modo potest, nisi omnia 
quae leget quaeque reiciet unam referentur ad 
summam. Nam si omnina nos^ neglegemus, in 
Aristonea vitia incidemus et peccata obliviscemurque 
quae virtu ti ipsi principiadederimus; si ea non neg- 
legeinus neque tamen ad Kiiem summi boni refere- 
mus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberiraus;* 
duamm enini vilarum nobis erunt instituta capienda. 
Facit enim ille duo seiuucta ultima bonoriun, quae 
ut essent vera coniungi debuemnt; nunc ita separan- 
tur ut diiuiicta sint, quo nihil potest esse perversius. 
41 Itaque contra est ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus 
nulla modo potest nisi ea quae sunt prima naturae 
ut ad summam pertinentia tenebit. Quaesita enim 
virtus est non quae relinqueret naturaro sed quae 
tueretur; at ilia ut vobis placet partem quandam 
tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis insti- 
tutio si loqueretur hoc diceret, primes suos quasi 
coeptus appetendi fuisse ut se conservaret in ea 
natura in qua ortus esset. Kondum autem explana- 
tum satis erat quid maxime natura vellet. Explanetur 
igitur. Quid ergo? aliud^ intellegeturnisi uti ne quae 
pars naturae neglegatur? In qua si nihil est praeter 

> nos; edd. conj. ea, Mdv. marks as corrupt, and conj. 
omnina omnia praeter aniaios nrglegtmiis. Perhaps omnina 
nostra corpora negfegemus. 

^abtrimus Cobet ('admodum probabililer' Mdv. J: 
aberrabimusUdv., MSS. 

^Qitid ergo? aliud zd. Quid ergo aiiiiJ Mdv. etc. 


BOOK IV. sv 
virtue go to make up happiness, virtue cannot be 
established. As a matter of fact it is entirely the 
other way about : it is impossible to find a, place for 
virtue, unless all the things that she chooses and h 
rejects are reckoned towards one sum-total of good. ^ 
For if we entirely ignore ourselves,' we shall fall into i' 
the mistakes and errors of Aristo, forgetting the , 
things that we assigned as the origins of virtue ' 
herself; if while not ignoring these things, we yet 
do not reckon them in the End or Chief Good, we 
shall be well on the road towards the extravagances 
of Erillus, since we shall have to adopt two ditFerent 
rules of life at once. Erillus sets up two separate 
ultimate Goods, which, supposing his view were 
true, he ought to have united in one; but as it is he 
makes them so separate as to be mutually exclusive 
alternatives, which issurely the extreme of perversity. 
41 Henee the truth is just the opposite of what you 
say; virtue is an absolute impossibility, vn/ess it' 
holds to the objects of the primary instincts as 
going to make up the sum of good. For we started 
to look for a virtue that should protect, not abandon, ' 
nature; whereas virtue as you conceive it protects a 
particular part of our nature but leaves the remainder 
in the lurch. Man's constitution itself, if it could 
speak, would declare that its earliest tentative 
movements of desire were aimed at preserving 
itself in the natural character with which it was 
born into the world. But at that stage the principal 
intention of nature had not yet been fully revealed. 
Well, suppose it revealed. Wliat then? will it be 
construed otherwise than as forbidding that any 
part of man's nature should be ignored? If man 
consistssolely of a reasoning faculty, let it be granted 

rationem, sil in una virtute finis bonorum ; sin est 
etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nenipe hoc 
effecerit ut ea quae ante explanation em tenebamus 
relinquamus. Ergo id est conveni enter naturae 

9 vivercj a natura disct'dere. Ut quidam philosophi, 
cum a sensibus profecti maiora quaedani et diviniora 
vidissent, sensus reliquerunt, sic istij eum ex appeti- 
tione rerum virtu tis pulchritudinem aspexissent, 
omnia quae praeter virtutem ipsam viderant abiece- 
runt, obliti naturam omnem appetendarum rerum 
ita late patere ut a principiis permanaret ad fines, 
neque Intel] egunt se rerum illarum pulclirariun 
atque admirabilium fundamentu subducere. 

3 XVI. Itaque mihi videutur omnes quidem illi 
errasse qui finem 'bonorum esse dixerunt boneste 
vivere, sed alius alio magis; Pyrrho scilicet maxime, 
qui virtute constituta nihil omninoquod appetendum 
sit relinquat; deiiide Aristo, qui nihil rehnquere 
non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus coouDotus 
sapiens appeteret aliquld, ' quodcumque ' in mentem 
iiicideret' et quodcumque tamquam occurreret.' Is 
hoc melior quam Pyrrho quod aliquod* genus appe- 
tendj dedit, deterior quam ceteri quod penitus a 
natura recessit. Stoici autem quod fineni bonorum 
in una virtute ponnnt, similes sunt illorum; quod 
autem principium offici quaerunt, melius quam 

' guodctimgu 

\vel\ al. Mdv. 


■ %j,; 

fss., r^S 


BOOK IV. xv-xvi 
that the End of Goods is contained in virtue alone ; 
but if lie hns a body as well, the revelation of our 
nature, on your showing, will actually have resulted 
in our relinquishing the things to which we held 
before that revelation took place. At this rate to 
live in harmony with nature' means to depart from 

12 nature. There have been philosophers who, after 
rising from sensation to tlie recognition of nobler 
and more spiritual faculties, thereupon threw the 
senses on one side. Similarly your friends, starting 
from the instinctive desires, came to behold virtue 
in all her beauty, and forthwith flung aside all they 
had ever seen besides virtue herself, forgetting that 
the whole instinct of appetition is so wide in its 
range that it spreads from the primary objects of 
desire right up to the ultiniate Ends, and not reuli/.- 
ing that they are undermining the very foundations 
of the graces which they so much admire. 

13 XVI. ' In my view, therefore, while all who have ThMrfort 
defined the End of Goods as the life of moral con- JJ^^S 
duct are in error, some are more wrong than others, ioiegood 
The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his daci[inct__ 
conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of ^^J^^^'"' 
desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who Pyn-hn, thoug 
did not venture to go so far us Pyrrho, but who iho'- prim* — 
introduced as the Wise Man's motives of desire ^^' ' 
'whatever chanced to enter his mind' and what- 
ever struck him.' Aristo was better than Pjrrho in 
so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse 
than the rest because he departed so utterly from 
nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of 
Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers 
already mentioned; but in trying to find a founda- 
tion for virtuous action they are an improvement 


g[int ad finem bono 
quodam modo sunt I 
enim occurrentia ' ri 

Pyrrho; qnod ea non 'occurrentia' fing^nt, vincnnt 
Aristoncm ; (]uod auteni ea quae ad naturam accom- 
modata et per .se assumenda esse dicunt non adiun- 
desciscunt a natura et 
dissimiles Aristonis. Die 
> quae comininiscebatur; 
hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea 
seiiingunt a finibus et summa bonorum; quae cum 
praeponunt' ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam 
videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quidquam ad 
beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt 

+4 Atque adhuc ea dixi, causa cur Zenoni non 

fuisset,' quamobrem a superiorum auctoritate dis- 
cederet ; nunc reliqua videanius, nisi aut ad haec, 
Cato, dicere aliquid vis aut nos iam longiores sumus." 
"Neutrum vero," inquit ille; "nam et a te perfid 
istam disputation em volo nee tua mlhi oratio loagii 
videri potest." "Optime," inquam; "quid enim 
mihi potest esse optatius quam cum Catone, omnium 

45 virtutum auctore, de virtutibus disputare? Sed pri- 
mum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram senten- 
tiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit id esse 
solum bouum honesteque vivere bonorum finem, 
communem fore vobis cum omnibus qui in una virtute 
constituunt finera bonorum; quodque dicitis infor- 
mari non posse virtutem si quidquam nisi quod 

' CO dixi, causa CMrZenani non/uissel {cuit (or cut E) MSS., 
MQller; Mdv. marks as corrupt, and suggests earn dixi 
causam (i.e. cam causaiii egi, sic disputavi, ut oslende- 
rem], ZsTH/ni Hon/Uisse gnamobrem — . Mdv, To rmerly con- 
jectured ea dixi, causam Zenoni nonfuisse. 

^7 BOOK JV. xvi 

upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary 
things that strike the mind ' they do better than 
Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as 
'suitable to nature' and 'to be adopted for their 
own sakes,' and then refusing to include them in 
the End of Goods, they desert nature and approxi- 
mate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented 
his vague things that strike the mind'; while the 
Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary 
objects of nature, yet allow no connection between 
these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making 
the primary objects preferred,' so as to admit a cer- 
tain principle of choice among things, they seem to 
be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to 
have anything to do with happiness, they again 
abandon nature. 

\'i So far what I have said was to show why Zeno 

had no grounds for seceding from the earlier autho- 
rities. Now let us turn our attention to the rest of 
my points, unless, Cato, you desire to say anything 
in reply to this, or unless we have gone on too long 
already." Neither is the case," he answered, 
since I am eager for you to finish your argu- 
ment, and no discourse of yours could seem to me 
long." Thank you very much," 1 rejoined; for 
what could 1 desire better than to discuss the sub- 
ject of virtue with that pattern of all the virtues 

?5 Cato? But first I would have you observe that the 
most important of all your doctrines, the head of 
the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good 
and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be 
shared with you by all those who make the End of 
Goods consist of virtue alone ; and your view that 
it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if 
349 - 

honestuin sit numeretur, idem dicetur ab Ulis quos 
modo nominavi. Milii autem aequiuB videbatur 
Zenonem cum Polemotie disceptantem, a quo quae 
essent principia naturae acceperat, a communibus 
initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret 
et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non, stantem 
cum lis qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona 
esse a nalura profecta, uti iisdem argumentis quibne 
illi uterentur iisdem que sententiis. 
46 XVH. Minime vero illud probo quod, cum 
docuistis ut vobis videmini solum lionum esse quod 
hoiiestum sit, turn rursum dicitls initiii proponi ne- 
ccsse esae upta et aecommodata naturae quorum eJt 
selectione virtus possit existere. Non enim in aele- 
ctione virtus ponenda eratj ut id ipsum quod erat 
bonorum ultimum aliud aliquid acquireret. Nam 
omnia quae sumenda quaeqoe legenda aut optanda 
sunt inesse debent in summa bonorum, ut is qui earn 
adeptus sit nihil praeterea desideret. Videsne ut 
quibus summa est in voluplate perspicuum sit quid 
lis faciendum sit aut non faciendum ? ut nemo dubi- 
tet eorum omnia officia quo spectare, quid sequi, 
quid fugere debeant ? Sit hoc ultimum bonorum 
quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim qute 
sint officia, quae actiones. Vobis autem, quibus nihil 
• 350 

^V BOOK IV. xvi-xvii 

anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will 
also be maintained by the philosophers whom 1 just 
now mentioned. To my mind it would have been 
fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose 
teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he 
had adopted] to have started from the fundamental 
tenets which they held in common, and to have 
marked the point where he first called a halt and 
where occasion for divergence arose ; not to take his 
stand with thinkers who did not even profess to JiOld 
that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived 
it, was based on natural uistinct, and employ the 
same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 
tS XVII. Another point to which I take great t 
exception is that, when you have proved, as yo 
think, that Moral Worth alone is good, you the- 
turn round and say that of course there must be n 
advantages adapted to our nature set before i 
starting point, in exercising choice among which 
advantages virtue may be able to come i 
tence. Now it was a mistake to make_virtue consist .^ 
in an act of choice,"fbr~this linplles that the very 
thing that iS"rtie"iiHiniate Good itself s'eeRs""to^ get 
something else. Surely the.suin^o f Goods must ] 
include everything worth ad iJEtjng, choosing or 
desirnig, so that he who has attained it may not 
want anything more. In the— case- ot those whose 
Glifff OtiWd" cnnsists in pleasure, notice how clear it is 
what things they are to do or not to do; no one can- 
be in doubt as to the proper scope of all their duties, 
what these most aim at and what avoid. Or grant 
the ultimate Good that I am now upholding, and it 
becomes clear at once what one's duties are and 
what actions are prescribed. But you, who have no 



estaliudpropoBitum nisi rectum atquehonestum,uiide 
officij unde agendi priticipium noscatur non reperietis. 

' Hoc igilur quaerentes' omnes, et ii qui quodcumque 
ill mentem veiiiat aut quodcuoique occurrat se sequi 
dicunt' et vos, ad naturam revertemini." Quibus 
natura iure respondent iioii esse verum aliunde finem 
beate vivendi, a se principia rei gerendae peti ; esse 
enini unam rationem qua et priucipia reruni ageii- 
darum et ultima bonorum continerentur, atque ut 
Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis niliil dif- 
ferre aliud ab alio nee esse res ullas praeter virtutes 
et vitia inter quas quidquam omnino interesset, sic 
errare Zenonem qui nulla in re nisi in virtute aut 
vitio* propensionem ne minimi quidem niomenti ad 
summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret et, cum 
ad beatam vitum nullum momentum cetera habe- 
rent, ad appetitionem tamen* rerum esse in iis 
momenta diceret ; quasi vero haec appetitio non ad 

i summi boni adeptionem perlineret! Quid antem 
minus consentaneum est quam quod aiunt cognito 
suuimo bono reverti se ad naturam ut ex ea petant 
agendi principium, id est oliici ? Non enim actionis 
aut offici ratio impellit ad ea quae secundum naturam 
sunt appetendaj sed ab iis et appetitio et actio com- 

XVIII. Nunc venio ad ilia tua brcvia, quae con- 
sectaria esse dicebaSj et primum illud, quo i 

' quaerentes Gorenz. Mdv. ; guaeritU MSS. 
'' diciint ed. ; dicentlA^S., Mdv. 
^ rwer/emini Hdv. with inr. MSS.; reuer/im 
^aufvilio some edil. bracket. 

" cclera kaberenl , , . tamen Mdv. witli Davis and 81 
Ea res haheret . . . aulem AISS. 


^m BOOK iV. xvii-x^iii 

other standard in view but abstract right and 
morality, will not be able to find a source and sturt- 

47 ing poiat for duty and for conduct, tn the search 
for this you will all of you have to return to nature, — 
both those who say that they follow whatever comes 
into their mind or whatever occurs to them, and you 
yourselves. Both will be met by Nature's verj- just 
reply that it is unfair that the standard of Happiness 
should be sought elsewhere while the springs of con- 
duct are derived from herself; that there is a single 
principle which must cover both the springs of 
action and the ultimate Goods; and that just as 
Aristo's doctrine has been quite discredited, that 
everything is absolutely indifferent and there is 
nothing whatever to choose between an3' things 
at all excepting virtues and vices, so Zeno was 
mistaken in saying that nothing else but virtue 
or vice affected even in the smallest degree the 
attainment of the Chief Good, and that although 
other things had no effect whatever upon happi- 
ness, they yet had some influence upon our de- 
sires; just as though desire, if you please, bore no 
relation whatever to the attainment of the Chief 

t8 Good ! But what can be more inconsistent than the 
procedure they profess, to ascertain the Chief Good 
first, and then to return to Nature, and demand from 
her the primary motive of conduct or of duty ? Con- 
siderations of conduct or duty do not supply the 
impulse to desire the things that are in accordance 
with nature ; it is these things which excite desire 
and give motives for conduct. 

XVIII. "I now come to those concise proofs of xheSioioiyiio- 
yours which you said were so conclusive. I will IreXJid'on 
start with one as concise as anything could he : 'fjs^p™^^' 
AA 853 


potest brevius: 'Bonum omne laudabile; 
autem omne honestum ; bonum iffitur 01 
stum.' O plumheum pugionem ! Quia 
primuin illud coiicesserit? Ciuo quidem 
nihil opus est secundo ; si enim omne bonum lauda- 

49 bile est, omne honestum est); quis igitur tibi istud 
dabit praeter Pyrrhonem, Aristonem eorumve simi- 
les? quos tu non probas. Aristoteles, Xenoeratea, 
tota ilia familia non dabit, quippe qui valetudinem, 
vires, divitias, gloriani, multa alia bona esse dicant, 
laudabilia non dicant. Et hi quidem ita non sola 
virtute finem bonornnj contineri putant, ut rebus 
tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant ; quid censes 
eos esse facturos. qui omnino virtutem a bonorum 
fine segregaverunt, Epicurumj Hieronjinum, illos 

50 etiam, si qui Carneadeum linem tueri volunt ? lam 
aut Callipho aut Diodorus quomodo poterunt tibi 
istud concedere, qui ad honestatem aliud adiungunt, 
quod ex eodem genere non sit ? Placet igitur tibi, 
Cato, cuna res sumpseris non eoncessas, ex illis effi- 
eere, quod velis ? lam ille sorites est/ quo nihil 
putatis esse vitiosius, quod bonum sit, id esse opta- 
bile; quod optabile, id expetendum; quod expe- 
tendum, id laudabile'; dein reliqui gradus, sed ego 
in hoc resisto ; eodem enim modo tibi nemo dabit, 
quod expetendum sit, id esse laudabile. Illud vero 

^ consectarium, sed in primis hebes, illoruiii 

'est inserted by Baites, Mdv. 

•Cp. ri 

n II, 48. 

BOOK rV. xviii 

Everytliuig good is praisewortliy ; but everything 
praiseworthy is honourable (moral'); therefore 
everytliing good is honourable (tuomi).' Wliat u 
dagger of lead ! Wliy, who will grant you your 
major premise ? (and if this be granted there is 
no need of the minor ; for if everything good is 
praiseworthy, then everything good is honourable). 

*9 Who, I say, will grant you this, except Fyrrho, 
Aristo and their fellows, whose doctrines you reject? 
Aristotle, Xenocrates and the whole of their follow- 
ing will not allow it; because they call health, 
strength, riches, fame and many other things good, 
but do not call them praiseworthy. And these, 
though holding that the End of Goods is not 
limited to virtue alone, yet rate virtue higher than 
all other things; Init what do you suppose will he 
the attitude of those who entirely dissociated virtue 
from the End of Gpods, Epicurus, Hieronymtis. 
and also of any supporters of the End of Canieades ? 

50 Or how will Callipho or Diodorus be able to grant 
your premise, who combine with Moral Worth 
another factor belonging to an entirely different 
category ? Are you then content, Cato, to take 
disputed premises for granted, and draw from these 
the conclusion you want ? And again, the following 
proof is a sorites, which according to you is a most 
fallacious form of reasoning; what is good is to be 
wished ; what is to be wished is desirable ; what is 
desirable is praiseworthy*; and so on through the 
remaining steps, but I call a halt at this one, for, just 
as before, no one will grant you that what is desira- 
ble is praiseworthy. And once again, here is an argu- 
ment which so far from being conclusive is stupid to a 
degree, though, of course, the Stoic leaders and not 
aa2 355 


scilicet, non tuum, 'g-loriatione digiiam esse beatam 

vitam, quod non possit sine honestate contingere, ut 

51 iure quisqnamglorietur.''' Dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo ; 
etiam magister eius et lota ilia gens et reliqui qui 
virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentea adiun- 
gunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo ; si 
enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantuinque 
praestat reliquis rebus tit dici vik possit, et beatus 
esse potent virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nee 
tamen illud tibi concedet, praeter virtutem nihil in 
bonis esse ducendum. Illi auteni quibus summum 
bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitatn 
beatam habere in quo possit iure gloriari; etsi illi 
quidem etiara. voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas. 

53 XIX. "Vides igitur te aut ea sumere quae non 
concedantur aut ea quae etiam concessa te nihil 
iuvent. Equidem in omnibus istis conclusion ibus 
hoc putarem philosophia nobisque dignum, et maxi~ 
me cum summum bonum quaere remus, vitam nostram, 
consilia, voluntates, non verba corrigi. Quis enim 
potest istis quae te ut ais delectant brevibus et 
«cutis auditis de sententia decedere? Nam cum 
esspectant et avent audire cur dolor malum non sit, 
dicunt illi asperum esse dolere, molestuni, odiosum, 
contra naturam, difficile toleratu, sed quia nulla sit 
- in dolore nee fraus nee improbitas nee malitia nee 

' vl — glorietiir Maniillus reji 


^ BOOK IV. sviii-xix 

yourself are responsible for thut : Happiness is a 
thing to lie proud of, whereas it cannot lie the case 
tliat anj'UDe sliould have good reason to be proud 

1 without Moral Worth.' The minor premise' Polemo 
wilt concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the 
whole of their clan, as well as all the other pliUoso- 
phers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet 
couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief 
Good ; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it 
is, and if it is almost inexpressibly superior to every- 
thing else, Polemo will be able to l>e liappy if 
endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all 
besides, and yet lie will not grant you that nothing 
except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on 
the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with 
virtue, will perhaps decline to grant that happiness 
contains any just ground for pride; although they, 
it is true, sometimes make out even pleasures to 
be things to be proud of. 

i XIX. So you see that you are either making lai 
assumptions which cannot be granted or ones which 5J|,*„ 
even if granted do you no good. For my own part, as p'^ 
regards all these Stoic syllogisms, I should have 
thought that to be worthy of philosophy and of 
ourselves, particularly when the subject of our 
inquiry is the Supreme Good, the argument ought 
to amend our lives, purposes and wills, not just 
correct our terminology. Would those concise epi- 
grams which you say give you so much pleasure 
make any man alter his opinions? Here are people all 
agog to' learn why pain is no evil ; and the Stoics tell 
them that though pain is irksome, annoying, hateful, 
unnatural and hard to bear, it is not an evil, because 
it involves no dishonesty, wickedness or malice, no 

culpa iiec turpitude aon esse illud malum. Haec 
qui audierit, ut ridere noii curet, discedet tumen 
nihilo firmior ad dolorem ferendum quam venerat. 
53 Tu autem negas fortem esse quemquam posse qui 
dolorem malum putet. Cur fortior sit si illud quod 
tute concedis asperum et vL\ ferendum putabit? Ex 
rebus enim timiditas, non ex vocabulis nuscitur. Et 
ais, si una littera commota sit, fore tota ut label disci- 
plina. Utrum igitur tibi litteram videor an totas 
paginas commovere? Ut enim sit apud illos, id 
quod est a te laudatum, ordo rerum conscrvatus et 

nter se apta et 

tamen persequi non debemus si a falsis principiis 
profecta congruunt ipsa sibi et a proposito non aber- 

5i rant. In prima igitur constitutione Zeno tuus a 
natura recessit, cumque summum bonum posuisset 
ill ingtni prai^stantia quaiii virtutem vocamus, nee 
qiiidquam aliud esse bonum dixisset nisi quod esset 
lionestuiD, nee virtutem posse constare si in ceteris 
rebus esset quidquam quod aliud alio melius esset 
aut peius, his prupositis tenuit prorsus consequentia. 
Recte dicis; negare non possum; sed ita falsa sunt 
ea quae consequuntur, ut ilia e quibus haec nata 

55 sunt vera esse non possint. Dofent enim nos, ut 
scis, dialectic!, si ea quae rem aliquam sequantur, 
falsa sint, falsam illam ipsam esse quam sequautur. 
Ita fit ilia conclusio non solum vera sed ita perspicua 
ut dialectic! ne rationem quidem reddi putent opor- 
tere: Si illud, hoc; non autem hoc; igitur ne illud 
quidem. Sic consequentibua vestris sublatis prima 

^■^ BOOK IV. xix 

tnorat blame or baseness. He who hears this may 
or may not want to laugh, but he will not go away any 

53 stronger to endure pain than he eame. You how- 
ever say that no one can be brave who thinks pain 
an evil. Why should he be braver for thinhing it 
what you yourself admit it to be, irksome and 
almost intolerable ? Timidity springs from facts, 
not from words. And you aver that if a single letter 
be altered, the whole system will totter. Well then, 
do you think I alter a letter or whole pages? Even 
allowing that the Stoics deserve the praise you gave 
them for the methodical arrangement and perfect 
logical connection (as you described it) of their 
system, still we are not bound to accept a chain of m 
reasoning because it is self-consistent and keeps to ^ 
the line laid down, if it starts from false premises, m 

5i Now your master Zeno deserted nature in framing ta 
Ills first principles ; he placed the supreme Good in °} 
that intellectual excellence which we term virtue, li' 
and declared that nothing but Moral Worth is good, 
and that virtue cannot be established if among the 
rest of things any one thing is better than any 
other; and he adhered to the logical conclusions 
from these premises. Quite true, I can't deny it. 
But the conclusions are so false tliat the premises 

55 from which they sprang cannot be true. For the 
logicians teach us, as you are aware, that if the 
conseijuences that follow from a proposition be 
false, the proposition from which those consequences 
follow must itself be false. Un this is based the 
following syllogism, which is not merely true, but so 
self-evident that the logicians assume it as axiomatic : 
If A is B, C is D; but C is not D; therefore A is 
not B. Tlius, if your conclusions are upset, your 

tolluntur. Quae sequuiitiir igitur? Omnes qui 
non sint sapientes aeque miseros esse ; siipjentes 
oiniies sumnie beatos ; recte facta omnia aequalin, 
omnia peceata paria ; — quae cutn magnifice primo dici 
viderentur, considerata minus probaliantur. Sensus 
enira cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa Veritas 
clamabat quodam modo non posse adduci ut inter 
eas res quas Zeno exaequaret nihil interesset. 
J XX. " Postea tuus ille Pocnulus (seis enira Citieos 
clientes tuos e Phoenica profectos), homo igitur 
acutus, eausam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba 
versare coepit; et primum vebus iis quas nos bonas 
dicimus concessit ut haberentur aestimabiles et ad 
naturam ac^commodatae^ &terique coepit sapienti, 
hoe est, summe beato commodius tamen esse si ea 
quoque habeat quae bona non audet appellare, 
naturae accommodata esse concedit ; negatque Plato- 
nem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa qua 
Dionysium : huic mori optimum esse 
r desperationem sapientiae, iUi propter spem 
; peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim 
nullo modo, propterea quod alia peceata plures, alia 
paueiores quasi iiumeros offici praeterirent ; iam 
insipientes alios ita esse ut nullo modo ad sapientiam 
possent pervenire, alios qui possent, si id egissent, 
57 sapientiam consequi. Hie loquebatur aliter atque 
omnes, sentiebat idem quod ceteri. Nee vero 

■Zeno came from Citium in Cyprus, said to have been 
the seat of a Phoenician colony ; and the Phoenicians were 
proverbially crafty. Cato superintended the reduction of 
Cyprus lo a Roman province, and Cicero in his Letters 
speaks of the island as nnder Cato's proteclion. 

BOOK IV. xix-xx 
premises are upset also. What then are your con- 
ctusiions? That those who are not wise are all 
equally wretched ; that the wise are all supremely 
happy; that all right actions are equal, 
on a par;^these dicta may have had an imposing 
sound at a first hearing, but upon examination they 
began to 'seem less convinoing. For comi 
the facts of nature, truth herself seemed to ery 
aloud that nothing should persuade them that there 
was actually no difference between the things which 
Zeno made out to lie equal. 

56 XX. " Subsequently your little Phoenician (for 
you are aware that your clients of Citium originally 
come from Phoenicia"), with the cunning of his race, 
on failing to make good his ease in defiance of 
Nature's protest, set about juggling with words. 
First he allowed the things that we in our school 
call goods to be considered valuable' and suited 
to nature,' and he began to admit that thoug-h a 
man were wise, that is supremely happy, it would 
yet be an advantage to him if he also possessed the 
things which he is not bold enough to call goods, 
but allows to be suited to nature.' He main- 
tains that Plato, even if he be not wise, is not in the 
same case as tlie tyrant Dionysius : Dionysius must 
despair of wisdom, and his best fate would be to die ; 
but Plato hasbopesof it, and had better live. Again, 
he allows that some sins are endurable, while 
others are unpardonable, because some sins transgress 
more and others fewer points of duty; moreover 
some fools are so foolish as to be utterly incapable of 
attaining wisdom, but others might conceivably by 

57 great effort attain to wisdom. In all this though his 
language was peculiar, his meaning was the same as 


: nesliiuanda ducebat ea quae ipse bona 
negaret esse quam ilti qui ea bona esse dicebant. 
Quid igitur voluit sibi qui ilia mutaverit? Saltern 
all quid de pondere delraxisset et paulo niinoris 
aestimavisset ea quam Peripatetici, ut sentire quo- 
que aliud, non solum djcere videretur. Quid? de 
ipsa beata vita, ad quam omnia referuntur, quae 
dicitis? Negatis earn esse quae expleta sit iis rebus 
omnibus quas natura desideret, totamque eam in 
una virtute ponitis. Cumque omnis controversia 
aut de re soleat aut de nomuie esse^ utraque earum 
nascitur si aut res ignoratur aut erratur in nomine. 
Quorum si neutrum est, opera danda est ut verbis 
utamur quam usitatissimis et quam maxime aptis, td 
58 eat rem declarantibus. Num igitur dubium est quin, 
si in re ipsa nihil peccatur a superioribus, verbis illi 
commodius utanturr Videaraus igitur sententias 
eorum ; turn ad verba redeamus. 

XXI. Dieunt appetitioneni animi nioveri cum 
aliquid ei secundum naturam esse videatur; omnia- 
que quae secundum naturam sint aestimatione 
aliqua digna, eaque pro eo quantum in quoque sit 
ponderia esse aestimanda; quaeque secundum natu- 
ram sint, partim nihil habere in aese eius appetitionis 
de qua saepe iam diximus, quae nee honesta nee 

^ BOOK IV. XX xxi 

that of everybody else. In fact he set n 

n the things he hiinself denied to be good than did 
those who said they were good. What then did 
he want by altering their names? He ouglit at 
least to have diminished their importance and to 
have set a slightly lower value on them than the 
Peripatetics, so as to make the difference appear to 
be one of meaning' and not merely of language. 
Again, what do you and your school say about 
happiness itself, the ultimate end and aim of all 
things? You will not have it to be the sum of all 
nature's requirements, but make it consist of virtue 
alone. Now all disputes usually turn either on 
facts or on names; ignorance of fact or error as to 
terms will cause one or the other form of dispute 
respectively. If neither source of difference is 
present, we must be careful to employ the terms 
most generally accepted and those most suitable, 
i that is, those that best describe the fact. Can we 
doubt that, if the older philosophers are not mis- 
taken on the point of fact, their terminology is the 
more convenient one? Let us then consider their 
opinions and return to the question of terminology 

XXI. Their statements are that appetition is The ant 
excited in the mind when something appears to it gtodm 
to be in accordance with nature ; and that all things '^" ^ 
that are in accordance with nature are worth some tuwd u 
valucj and are to be valued in proportion to the im- """"8° 
portance that they severally possess; and that of 
those things which are in accordance with nature, 
some excite of themselves none of that appetition 
of which we have often spoken already, and these 
are to be called neither honourable nor praiseworthy, 


laudabilia dicantur, partim quae voluptatem habeant 
in umni animante, sed in homine rationem etiam; 
ex en quae sint apta, ea honesta, ea pulclira, ea 
laudabilia, ilia autem superiora naturalia nomiiiantur, 
quae CDuiuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt 

.1!) et absolvunt. Omnium autem eorum commodorum 
quibus non illi plus tribuunt qui ilia bona esse dicunt 
quam Zeno qui negat, longe praestantissimum esse 
quod hoiiestum esset atque laudabile ; sed si duo 
honesta prop€»sita sint, alterum cum valetudine, 
alterum cum morbo, non esse dubium ad utrum 
eorum natura nos ipsa deductura sit; sed tamen 
tantam vim esse honestatis tantumque earn rebus 
omnibus praestare et exceJlereut null is nee suppliciis 
nee praemiis demoveri possit ex eo quod rectum 
esse decreverit ; omiiiaque quae dura, difficilia, 
adversa videantur, ea virtutibus iis quibus a natura 
essemus oraati obteri posse ; non facile ilia quidem, 
nee eontemnenda esse'' (quid enim esset in nrtnte 
tantum?), sed ut hoc iudicaremus, non esse in his 
partem maximam positam beate aut secos vivendi. 

60 Ad summam ea quae Zeuo aestimaiida et smnenda 
et apta. naturae esse dixit, eadem illi bona appellant; 

* non facile iUa quidem (sc. obtEri poas 
esse conj. Mdv., who prints with a mar 
MSS. nonfaciksillasquide --~."*-- 

Tiark of corruption the 
ntemnandas {quid etc.). 

■This confused piissage is conjecturally remedied bj 
W. M. L. Hulcliinson, de Fin. p. 133, who for in sesr sug- 
^esta in stirpe (cp. V, 1 □ stirpium naturas), and for iw/h- 
piatevt, valuniatem (cp. Tuse. IV, li). Lastly Ihe clause 
quae nee honesta nee laudabilia dicantur logically should 
come itnmediately afler guaeque secundum tiaturam sint. 
thoug-h Cicero may have carelessly misplaced it. The 

BOOK IV. xxi 

while some are thosu which are objects of pleasure 
in every living creature, but in man are objects of 
tlie reason also;^ those which are suitable in accord- 
ance with reason are called honourable, beautiful, 
praiseworthy ; but the former class are called natural, 
the class which coupled with things morally worthy 

J render happiness perfect and complete. They fur- 
ther hold that of all those advantages, which they 
who call tliem goods rate no more highly than does 
Zeno who says they are not goods, by far the most 
excellent is Moral Worth and what is praise- 
worthy; but if one is offered the choice between 
Moral Worth plus health and Moral Worth plus 
disease, there is no doubt to which of the two Nature 
herself will guide us ; though at the same time 
Moral Worth is so potent, and so overwhelmingly 
superior to all other things, that no penalties or 
rewards can induce it to swerve from what it has 
decided to be right; and all apparent hardships, 
difficulties and obstacles can be trodden under foot 
by the virtues with which nature has adorned us; 
not that these hardships are easily overcome or to 
be made light of (else where were the merit of 
virtue?), but so as to lead us to the verdict that 
these things are not the main factor in our happi- 

) ncss or the reverse. In fine, the ancients entitle 
the same things good' that Zeno pronounced 
valuable,' to be adopted,' and suited to nature'; 

which ihe Stoifs pronoi 

often spoken, but (i) h 
of rational phpjce).' 

ice neither moral nor praiseworthy, 
of the appclillon of which we have 
animais excite volition, and parli- 
the reason al^o (i.e. are the objects 


vitam autem beatam illi earn quae constaret ex iia 
rebus quas dixi, aut plurimis aut gravissimJs, Zeno 
autem quod suam, quod propriam' specietn hnbeat 
cur appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, bea- 
tam autem vilam earn solam quae cum virtute 

XXn. "Si de re diseeptari oportet, nulla mihi 
tecum, Cato, potest esse dissensio; nihil est enim de 
quo aliter tu sentias atque ego, modo commutatis 
verbis ipsas res conferamus. Nee hoc ille non vidit 
sed verborum magnificentia est et gloria delectatus; 
qui si ea quae dicit ita sentiret ut verba significant, 
quid inter euni et vel Pyrrhonem vel Aristoiiera 
interesset? Sin autem eos non probabat, quid attinuit 
cum lis quibuscum re concinebat verbis discrepare? 
6l Quid si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum 
auditores fuerunt et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum 
te, M. Cato, studios issimum philosopjiiae, iuGtissimuin 
virum, optimum iudicem, religioslssimum testem, 
audiremus, adniirati sumus quid esset cur nobis 
Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sen- 
tirent ea quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, 
nominibus utereiitur iis quae prima specie admirati- 
onem, re explicata risum moverent. Tu autem, si 
tibi ilia probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ilia 
tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne 
omnibus et Platoni ipsinescio quern ilium antepone- 
bas ? praesertim cum in re publica princeps « 

Baiter; Mdv.conj. quendampi 



3f the ^M 

and they call a life happy which comprises e 
the largest number or the most important of t 
things aforesaid: Zeno on the contrary calls nothing 
good but that which has a peculiar charm and 
attractiveness of its own, and no life happy but the 
life of virtue. 

XXll, ' If, Cato, the discussion is to turn on ^«lo'inuvsl 
facts, disagreement between me and yourself is out [^^"nVim- 
of the question : since your views and mine are the S^J'^t^'i".'' 
sanie in every particular, if only we compare thecicnis? 
actual substance alter making the necessary changes 
in terms. Zejio was not unaware of this, but he was 
beguiled by the pomp and circumstance of language ; 
had he really thought what he says, in the actual 
sense of the words he uses, what difference would 
there be between him and either Pyrrho or Aristo? 
If on the other hand he rejected Pyrrho and 
Aristo, what was the point of quarrelling about words 
with those with whom he agreed in substance ? 
[ What if the pupils of Plato were to come to life 
again, and their pupils again in succession, and were 
to address you in this fashion ? As we listened, 
Marcus Cato, to sn devoted a student of philosophy, so 
just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness 
as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce 
you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good 
and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo 
here, but who expressed those views in terms at first 
sight startling and upon examination ridiculous. If 
you accepted those views on their merits, why did 
you not hold them under their own terminology ? or 
if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer 
that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? 
especially when you aspired to play a leading part in 


velles ad eamque tuendam eura summa tua djgnitate 
maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. A' nobis 
enim ista quuesita, a nobis dcscripta, notata, prae- 
ccpta sunt, omniumque rerum pubHcarum rectionis 
genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et instituta ac 
mores civitatum peracripaimus. Eloquentiae vero, 
quae et prineipibus maximo ornamento est et qua 
te audimus valere plurimum, quantum tibi ex monu- 
mentis nostris addidisses I ' £a cum dixissent, quid 
62 tandem talibus viris responderes ? " Rogarem te," 
inquit, ut diceres pro me tu idem qui iUis orationem 
dictavisses, vel potius paulum loci mihi ut ils re- 
sponderem dares, nisi et te audire nunc mallem et 
isl^is tamen alio tem.pore responsurus essem, turn 
scilicet cum tibi." 

XXIII. "Atque si verum respondere velles, Cato, 
haec erant dicenda, non eos tibi non probatos, tautis 
ingeniis homines tantaque auctoritate, sed te anim- 
advertisse quas res illi propter antiquitatem parum 
vidissent, eas a Stoicis esse perspectas, eisdemque de 
rebus hos cum acutius disseruisse, tum scnsisse gravius 
et fortius, quippe qui primum valetudinem bonam 
expetendam negeiit esse, eligendam dicant, nee quia 
bonum sit vutere sed quia sit nonnihilo aestimandum 
(neque tamen pluris illis videtur, qui illud non dubi- 
tant bonum dicere;) hoc vero te ferre non [wtuisse, 
quod antiqui illi quasi barbati (ut nos de Dostris 
'A inserted by Lambinus, Mdv. 

to shave, ,^^^H 


the state, and we were the very persons to a 
equip you to protect tlie state with all the » 

_ eight of 

your high character. Why, it is we who invented 
political philusophy ; its classifications, its nomencla- 
ture, its practical rules are our creation ; on all the 
various forms of Roveniment, their stability, their 
revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of 
states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again 
is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in 
it yoUj we are told, are pre-eminent ; but how vastly 
you might have enriched your eloquence froni the 
records of our genius. ' What answer, pray, could you 
52 give to these words from such men as those ? " I 
would beg of you," replied Cato, to be my spokes- 
man also, as you have been their prompter in this 
harangue ; or rather I would ask you to grant me a 
moment's space in which to answer them, if it were 
not that for the present I prefer to listen to you, 
and also uitend to reply to your champions at another 
time, I mean when I reply to yourself." 

XXIII. "Well, Cato, if you wanted to answer Th=sioi«- 
truly, this is what you would have to say : that with accSacy™ 
all respect for the high authority of men so gifted, "^aniinsd. 
you had observed that the Stoics had discovered 
truths which they in those early days liad naturally 
failed to see ; the Stoics had discussed the same sub- 
jects with more insight and had arrived at bolder and 
more profound conclusions ; first, they said that good 
health is not desu-able but is worthy of selection, and 
that not because to be well is a good, but because 
it has some positive value (not that any greater 
value is attached to it by the older school who do 
not hesitate to call it a good) ; well then, you couldn't 
stand those bearded* old fogies (as we call our own 

solemus dicere) crediderint, eius qui honeste viveretj 
si idem etiam bene valeret, bene audiret, eopiosus 
esset, optabiliorem fore vitam melioremque et magis 
expetendam quam illius qui, aeque vir bonus, multis 
modis esset, ut Enni Alcnnaeo, 

eirciiinventua morbo, exsilio atque inopia.' 

6S Illi igitur antiqui non tain acute optabiliorem Ulam 
vitam putant, praestantiorem, beatiorem ; Stoici au- 
tem taiitummodo praeponendam in seligendo, non 
quo beatior ea vita sit, sed quod ad naturam accom- 
modatior ; et qui sapientes non sint, omnes aeque 
miseros esse. Stoici hoc videlicet videnint, Oloa 
autem id fugerat superiores,' homines sceleribus et 
parricidiis inquinatos nihilo miseriores esse qu^on eos 
qui, cum caste et integre vivereiit, nondum perfe- 

6t ctam illam supientiam essent consecuti. Atque hoe 
loco simUitudines eas quibus illi uti solent dissimilli' 
mas proferebas. Quis enim ignorat, si plures ex 
alto eraergere velint, propius fore eos qutdem ad 
respirandum, qui ad summam aquam iam appro- 
pinquent sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos 
qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere 
et progredi in virtute quominus miserrimus sit ante- 
quam ad earn pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil 
adiuvat Et quoniam catuli qui iam dispecturi sunt 
caeci aeque et ii qui modo nati, Platonem quoque 
necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, 
aeque caecum anlmo ac Phalarim fuisse, 

XXIV. Ista simijia non sunt, Cato, in quibos 

rabanlur; «^^B 

^M BOOK rV. xxiii-xxiv 

Roman ancestors) believing that a man 
morally, if he also had health, wealth and reputation, 
had a preferable, better, more desirable life than he 
who, though equally good, was, like Alci 

In divers ways beset 
With sickness, banishment and poverty. 

j3 Those men of old then, with their duller wits, think 
that the former life is more desirable, more excellent, 
more happy ; the Stoics on the other hand consider 
it merely to be preferred for choice, not because it is 
a happier life but because it is more adapted to 
nature. The Stoics we must suppose discerned a 
truth that had escaped their predecessors, namely 
that Itaen defiled by crimes and murders are no 
more miserable than those who though pious and 
upright in their lives have not yet attained ideal and 

i4 perfect wisdom. It was at this point that you brought ti 
forward those extremely false analogies which the '" 
Stoics are so fond of employing. For who cannot it 
see that if there are several people plunged in deep "' 
water and trying to get out, those already approach- 
ing the surface, though nearer to breatliing, will 
be no more able actually to breathe than those at 
the bottom ? You infer that improvement and 
progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from 
being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived 
at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. 
Again, since puppies on the point of opening their 
eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows 
that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of 
wisdom, was just as blind mentally as PhalarisI 

65 XXIV. '■ Really, Cato, there is no analogy between 
bb3 371 

quamvis multuni processeris, tamen illud in eadem 
causa est a quo abesse velis, donee evaseris. Nee 
enim ille respirat antequam emersit, et catuii aeque 
caeci priusquani dispeserunt ae si ita futiiri semper 
essent. Ilia sunt siniilia: hebes acies est cuipiam 
oeuloruTO, corpore alios languescit ' ; hi curatione ad- 

hibita levantur in dies ; 
videt ; his similes sunt 
levantur vitiis, levantur ■ 

Ti. Gracchui 

alet alter plus cotidie, alter 
nnnes qui virtuti student ; 
rroribus. Nisi forte censes 
n* befttiorem fuisse quam 
I publicam studuerit, 

filium, cum alter stabilin 

alter evertere. Nee tamen ille erat sapiens; quis 
enim hoe? aut quando? aut ubi? aut unde? sed 
quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute 

66 processerat. Confer^ avum tuum Drusum cum C 
Graccho, eius fere aequali. Quae hie rei publicae 
vulnera iniponebat, eadem ille sanabat. Si nihil est 
quod tam miseros faciat quam impietas et scelus, ut 
iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto 
suntj non est tamen aeque miser qui patriae consuht 
et is qui illam exstinctam cupJt. Levatio igitur vi- 
tiorum magna fit in' lis qui habent ad virtutem pro- 

67 gressionis aliquantum. Vestri autem proj^essionem 
ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri 

- negant. At quo utantur homines acuti argumento 
ad probandum operae pretium est considerare. 

• languescit Inf. MSS. ; nescil B E ; seaesrii Mdv. 
'nan inaerlcil by edd. 

• Con/i^am] MuHer; Conferam B E ; Oinfera->a aulem Inf. 
MSS.; Confirant [au/em} . . . aeguali? Mdv, 

• in E, om. B and olher MSS. 


^■^ BOOK tV. xxiv 

progress in virtue and cases such as you describe 
whicli however far one advances, the situation c 
wishes to escape from still remains the same until 
one has actually emerged froni it. The man does 
not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the 
puppies are as blind before they have opened their 
eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good 
analogies would be these : one man's eyesight is dint, 
another's general health is weak; apply remedies, 
and tliey get better day by day; every day the o 
is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with 
all who earnestly pursue virtue ; they get better, 
their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely 
you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius 
Gracchus was not happier than his son, wh 
devoted himself to the service of the state and the 
other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus 
was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or 
where, or how f Still he aspired to fame and honour, 
and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue. 

)6 Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Thoobvioui 
Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The vi^eaoeSp 
former strove to heal the wounds which the latter I'"*""'?'.' 
inflicted on the state. If there is nothing tliat makes 
men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that 
all wlio are foolish are miserable, as of course they 
are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not 
so miserable as one who- longs for its ruin. There- 
fore those who achieve definite progress towards 
virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices. 

57 Your teachers, however, while allowing progress 

towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is 

worth while to examine the argument on which these 

clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this : In 


Qunrum, in quit, artium suminae crescere posstmt, 
earum etiam contrariorum sumiiia poterit augeri; ad 
virtutis autem sunimam accedere nihil potest; ne 
vitia quidem igitur crescere poteriint, quae sunt vir- 
tutum contraria. Utrum igitur tandem perspicoisne 
dubiaaperiunturandubiisperspicuatolluntur? Atqui 
hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia aliis' esse maiora; illud 
dubium, ad id quod suinmum bonum dicitis ecquae- 
nam fieri possit accessio. Vos autem, cum perspicuis 
dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicoa conamini 
6S toUere. Itaque eadem^ ratione qua sum paulo ante 
usus haerebitis. Si enim propterea vitia alia aliis 
maiora non sunt quia ne ad finem quidem lionorum 
eum quern vos facitis quidquam potest accedere, 
quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, 
finis bonorum vobis niutandus est. Teneamus enim 
illud oecesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum 
sit, illud cuius id consequens sit non posse esse 

XXV. Quae est igitur causa istarumangustiarum? 
Gloriosa ostentatio in conslituendo sommo bono. 
Cum enim quod honestum sit id solum bonum esse 
confirmatur, tolHtur cura valetudinis, diligetitia rei 
familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendo- 
rum negotiorum, officia vitae ; ipsum denique illud 
honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum 
est; quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur 
a Chrysippo. Ex ea difficultate illae 'fallaciloquae,' 
69 ut ait AttiuSj 'maUtiae,' natae sunt Quod enim 

'alia aliis tumhinMS 
i^ eadeni B E. 


, Mdv.; 
; Itaqu 

i alia in aliis mSS. 
e rursus eadem Bail 

Bailer iid^H 

^r BOOK I^". xxiT-xxT 

Ae case of «rts or sciences «hkfa admit of advanee- 
ment. tbe opposite of those arts »ad sciences «ill also 
admit of advance: but virtue is absolute and incap- 
able of increase ; therefore the viees also. Itcing the 
opposite of the lirtues, are incapable of gradation. 
Pray tell me then, does a f^rtaiiity explain an un- 
certainty, or does an uncertainty disprove a cer- 
tainty r Now, that some vices are worse than others 
is certain ; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics 
conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. 
Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light 
on the uncertain, you endeavour to make tlie uncet^ 

S tain disprove the certain. Therefore you can be 
checkmated by the same argument as 1 employed 
just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be 
worse than another depends on the fact that the End 
of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of 
increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, 
since it is certain that the vices of all men are not 
equal. For we are bound to hold that if a ci 
is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be 

XXV. Now what has landed you in this intpaxtef TbiStolcsi 
Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing rij^"!,'^,^ 
your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good ?{|f''''""J| 
is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's 
health, the management of one's estate, participation ^ 
in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life ; 
nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which 
according to you is the be-all and the end -all 
of existence; objections that were urged most 
earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the 
difficulty that gave birth to those base conceits 

) deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. Wisdom had no 

sapientia pedem ubi poneret non habebat sublatis 
officiis omnibus, officia autem tcllebantur delectu 
orani et discrimine remoto, quae esse non^ poterant 
rebus omnibus sic exaequatis ut inter eas nihil 
interesset, ex his angustiis ista evascrunt deterlora 
quam Aristonis. Ilia tamen simplicia; vestra ver- 
suta. Roges enim Aristonem, bonane ei videantur 
haee, vacuitas doloris, divitiae, valetudo; neget. 
Quid? quae contraria sunt his malaue? Nihilo 
magis. Zcnonem roges; respondeat totidem verbis. 
Admirantes quaeramus ab utroque quonam modo 
vitam agere possimus si nihil interesse nostra pute- 
mus, valeamus aegrine simus, vacemus an cruciemur 
dolore, frigus, faniem propulsare possimus necne 
possimus. Vives, in quit Aristo, raagnifice atqiie 
praeclare; quod erit cumque visum ages; numquam 

70 angere, numquam cupies, numquam timebis. Quid 
Zeno ? Portenta haec esse dicit neque ea ratione ullo 
modo posse vivi ; se dicere " inter honestum et turpe 
nimium quantum, nescio quid tmmensum, inter 

71 celeras res nihil omnino interesse. Idem adhuc; 
audi reliqua et risum pontine si potes. Media ilia, 
inquit, inter quae nihil interest, tamen .eiusmodi 
sunt ut eorum alia eligenda sint, alia reicienda, alia 

neglegenda, hoc est ut eorum alia velis, alia 
ilia non cures.— At modo dixeras nihil in istis 

' non inserted by edd. 

*se iicere Mdv. ; sed dicere B, E ; aed differre other MSS. 

BOOK IV. xx^. 

ground to staDd on when desires were alwUshed; 
desires were abolish'ed when all choice atid distinc- 
tion was done away with ; distinction was impossible 
when all things were made absolutely equal and in- 
different ; and these perplexities resulted in your 
paradoxes, which are worse than those of Aristo. 
His were at all events frank and open, whereas yours 
are disingenuous. Ask Aristo whether he deems 
freedom from pain, riches, health to be goods, and 
he will answer No. Well, are their opposites bad ? 
No, likewise. Ask Zeno, and his answer would be 
identically the same. In our surprise we should 
inquire of each, how can we possibly conduct our 
lives if we think it makes no difference to us whetlier 
we are well or ill, free from pain or in torments of 
agony, safe against cold and hunger or exposed to 
them. O, says Aristo, you will get on splendidly, 
capitally; you will do exactly what seems good to 
you; you will never know sorrow, desire or fear. 

70 What is Zeno's answer ? This doctrine is a philo- 
sophical monstrosity, he tells ns, it renders life 
entirely impossible ; his view is that while between 
the moral and the base a vast, enormous gulf is 
fijied, between all other thiugs there is no difference 

71 whatever. So far this is the same as Aristo; but 
hear what follows, and restrain your laughter if you 
can. These intermediate things, says Zeno, which 
have no difference between them, are still of such a 
nature that some of them are to be selected and 
others rejected, while others again are to be entirely 
ignored ; that is, they are such that some you wish 
to have, others you wish not to have, and about others 
you do not care. — But you told us just now that 
there was no difference among them.' — And 1 say 


esse quod interesset.' — Et nunc idem dico,' inquiet, 
sed ad virtutes et ad vitia nihil iiiteresse.' 

i XXVI. Quis islrud, quaeso, nesciebnt? Verum 
audiamus.— Isla,' inquit, quae dixisti, valere, 
locupletem esse, non dolere, bona nou dico sed 
dicani Graece irpojjy/tti'a, l^tine autetn producta 
(sed praeposit^ aut praecipua wialo; sit' tolerabilius 
et moltius) ; ilia autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, 
non appello mala sed si libet reiectanea. Itaque 
ilia non dico me expetere sed legere, nee optare 
sed sumere, contraria autem non fiigere sed quasi 
seeemere.' Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Pla- 
tonis alumni? 5e omnia quae secundum naturam 
sint bona appellare, quae autem contra mala. Vi- 
desne igitur Zen on em tuum cum Aristone verbis 
consistere,' re di.ssidere; cum Aristotele et illis re 
consentire, verbis discrepare? Cur igitur cum de re 
conveniat non malumus usitate loqui? Aut doceat 
pmratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniani fore si 
illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, 
fortioremque in patiendo dolore si eum asperum et 
diflitiilem pcrpessu et* contra naturam esse quam si 

3 malum dixero, Facete M, Piso f'amiliaris noster et 
alia multa et hoc loco* Stoicos Irridebat. 'Quid 
eniin?' aiebat; bonum negas esse divitias, praeposi- 
tum esse dicis; quid adiuvas? avaritiamne minuis? 

Garenz, Miillei 

* Uco Mdv. « 


the same now,' he will reply, but I u 
ference in respect of virtue and vice.' 

78 XXVI. " Who, pray, did not know that? How- t 
ever, let us hear what he has to say, — 'The things ,, 
you mentioned,' he continues, iiealth, affluence, p 
freedom from pain, 1 do not call goods, but 1 will 
call them in Greek proigniena, that is in your lan- 
guage "brought forward" (though I will rather use 
preferred " or ' pre-eminent," as these sound 
smoother and mure acceptable) and on the other 
hand disease, poverty and pain I do not style evils, 
but, if you please, things rejected," Accordingly 
I do not speak of desiring" but selecting" these 
things, not of wishing" but adopting" them, and 
not of avoiding" their opposites but so to speak 
discarding" them.' What say Aristotle and the 
other pupils of Plato? That they call all things in 
accordance with nature good and all things contrary 
to nature bad. Do you see therefore that between 
your master Zeno and Aristo there is a verbal har- 
mony but a real difference ; whereas between him 
and Aristotle and the rest there is a real agreement 
and a verbal disagreenient ? Why, then, a3 we are 
agreed as to the fact, do we not prefer to employ 
the usual terminology? Or else let him prove that 
1 shall be readier to despise money if I believe it to 
be a thing preferred' than if 1 believe it to be a 
good, and braver to endure pain if I say it is irk- 
some and hard to bear and contrary to nature, than 

?3 if I cull it an evil. Our friend Marcus Piso was 
often witty, but never more so than when he ridi- 
culed the Stoics on this score. What?' lie said. 
You tell us wealth is not good but you say it is 
preferred"; how does that help matters? do you 

Quomodo? Si verbum sequimur, prinium longius 
verbum praepositum quam bonum." — Niiiil ad rem ! ' 
— Ne sit sane; at eerte gravius. Nam bonum ex 
quo appellatum sit, nescio ; praepositum ex eo credoj 
quod praeponatur aliis: id mihi magnum videtur.' 
Itaque dicebat plus tribui divitiis a Zenone qui eas 
in praepositis poneret quam ab Aristotele qui bonum 
esse divitiaa fateretur sed neque magmim bonum et 
prae rectis honestisque contemneiidum ac despici- 
endum nee magno opere expetendum ; omninoque 
de istis omnibus verbis a Zenone mutatis ita disputa- 
but, et quae bona negarentur esse ab eo et quae 
mala, ilia laetioribus nominibus appellari ab eo quam 
a nobis, haec tristioribus. Piso igitur hoc modo, vir 
optimus tuique, ut scis, amantissimus ; nos paucis ad 
haec additis finem faciamus aliquando ; longum est 
enim ad omnia respoadere quae a te dicta sunt. 
1 XXVII. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestigiis et 
regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae 
quidem ut omnia quae ubique sint sapientis esse 
dicatis. Solum praeterea forraosum, solum liberum, 
solum civem; stultos omnia contraria, quos etiam 
insanos esse vultis. Haec irnpaSo^a illi, nos admirs- 
bilia dicamus. Quid autem habent admirationis 
cum prope accesseriaf Conferam tecum quam cui 

crted by Md' 

im quam cuiqi^^ 


■^ BOOK IV. xxvi-xxvii 

diminish avarice? In what way? If it is a question 
of words, to begin with ' preferred" is a longer 
word than good." '^ That is no matter.' — 
Granted, l>y all means; hut it is certainly 
impressive. For I do not know the derivation of 
good," whereas "preferred" I suppose 
placed before" other things; this implies to my 
mind something very important.' Accordingly he 
would maintain that Zeno gives more importance to 
wealth, by classing it as preferred,' than did 
Aristotle, who admitted wealth to be a good, yet 
not a great good, but one to be thought lightly of 
and despised in comparison with uprightness and 
Moral Worth, and not to be greatly desired; and 
on Zeno's innovations in terminology generally he 
would declare that the names he actually gave 
to the things which he denied to be good or evil 
were pleasanter and gloomier respectively than the 
names by which we call them. So said Piso, an 
excellent man and, as you know, a devoted friend 
to yourself. For my part, let me add a few words 
more and then finally conclude. For it would be a 
long task to reply to all your arguments. 

i XXVII. The same verbal legerdemain supplies t 
you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, |[ 
riches BO vast that you declare that everything the " 
world contains is the property of the Wise Man. h 
He alone, too, you say, is beautiful, he alone a free 
man and a citi/en ; while the foolish are the 
opposite of all these, and according to you insane 
into the bargain. The Stoics call these paraduxa, 
as we might say startling truths.' But what is 
there so startling about them viewed at close 
quarters? 1 will eonsult you as to the meaning you 




verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia 
peceata paria dicitis, Non ego tecum iam ita ioca- 
bor ut iisdem liis de rebus cum L. Murenam te 
accusante defenderem. Apud imperitos turn ilia 
dicta sunt; aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc 

73 agendum est subtilius. Peceata paria. — Quonam 
modo? — Quia nee honesto quidquam honestius nee 
turpi turpius. — Perge porro, nam de isto magna dis- 
sensio est ; ilia argumenta propria videamus cur 
omnia sint paria peceata. — Ut, inquit, fidibus plu- 
ribus, si nulla earum ita eontenta nervis sit ut con- 
centum servare possit, omnes aeque ineontentae 
sint, sie peceata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; 
paria sunt igitur.— Hie ambiguo ludimur. Aeqoe 
enim contingit omnibus fidibus ut ineontentae sint; 
illud non continuo ut aeque ineontentae. CoUatio 
igitur ista te nihil iuvat ; nee enim, omnes avaritias 
si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur ut etiam 

76 aequas esse dieamus. Ecce aliud simile djsaimile : 
ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat si palearuui 
navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat qui 
parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat. — Hoc non 
videre, cuius generis onus navis veliat, id ad guber- 
natoris artem nihil pertinere 1 itaque aurum pale- 
amne portet, ad bene aut ad male guberoandum 
nihil interesse; at quid inter parentem et servulum 

sinl paria peceata B, E. Mdv.j peceata sint paria inf. 


• See the remarkable passage in ClCi 

a's Pro AfJ^^^ 

HOOK IV. Kxvii 
attach to eacli term ; there shall be no dispute. 
You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I 
won't jest with you now, as 1 did on the same sub- 
jects when you were prosecuting and I defending 
Lucius Murena." On that occasion I was addressing 
a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had 
to play to the gallery h httle ; but now I must reason 

75 more closely. Transgressions are equal.- — How so, 
pray? — Because nothing can be better than good or 
baser than base. — Explain further, for there is much 
disagreement on this point ; let us have your special 
arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal, 
^Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres 
not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are 
equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, 
since all are departures from rule, all are equally 
departures from rule ; therefore all are equal. — 
Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the 
lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow 
that all are equally out of tune. So your com- 
parison does not help you ; for it does not follow 
that because we pronounce every case of avarice 
equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce 

76 them all to be equal. Here is another of these 
false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, com- 
mits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with 
a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with 
gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he 
beats his parent or his slave without due cause. — 
Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has 
nothing to do with the skill of the navigator I so 
that whether he carries gold or straw makes no dif- 
ference as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas 
the distinction between a parent and a mere slave 


intersit intellegi et potest et debet. Ergo in (fuber- 
nando nihil, in officio plurimum interest quo in penere 
peccetur. Et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est 
navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in 
palea. Omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam 
esse earn quae communis appellatur prudentia, 
quam omnes qui cuique artifieio praesunt debent 
habere. Ita ne hoc quidem modo paria^ peccata 

7 XXVIII. "Urguent tamen et nihil remittunt, 
Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum imbecillitatis et 
inconstantiae est, haec autein vitia in omnibus stultis 
aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. 
Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque 
magna esse vitia eteademimbecillitate et inconstantia 
L. Tubulum fuissc qua ilium cuius is condemnatus 
est rogatione P. Scaevolum ; et quasi nihil inter res 
quoque ipsas in quibus peccatur intersit, ut, quo 
hae maiores minoresve sint, eo quae peccentur in 

i his rebus aut maiora sint aut minora! Itaque (ivn 
enim concludatur oratio) hoc uno vitio maxime mil^ 
premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duaa 
contrarias sententias obtinere. Quid enim est tarn 
repugnans quam eundem dicere quod honestum sit 
solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum 
ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura profectam? 
Ita cum ea volunt retinere quae superiori sententiae 
■e Mdv. 

guicuigue MSS., MuIIlt) n 
ne hue quidem modo fian'a 
io /mria guidem MSS., Mdv 


MUlleri w^^l 

BOOK IV. xxTii-xxvui 
is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. 
Hence the nature of the object upon which the 
ofience is committed, which in navigation makes no 
difference, in conduct makes all the diBerence, 
Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of 
the ship is due to negligence, the ofience is greater 
with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For 
the virtue known generally as prudence is an attri- 
bute as we hold of all the arts, and every master 
craftsman in any branch of art ought to possess it. 
Hence this proof also of the equality of transgres- 
sion breaks down. 

77 XXVIII. However, they press the matter, and 
will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, 
iaaproof of weakness and instability of character; but 
all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; 
therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though 
it were admitted that all foolish people possess an 
equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was 
exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who 
brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though 
there were no difference also between the respective 
circumstances in which the transgressions are com- 
mitted, so that the magnitude of the transgression 
varies in proportion to the importance of the cir- 

^8 cumstances! And therefore (since my discourse 
must now conclude) this is the one chief defect ' 
under which your friends the Stoics seem to me to 
labour,^they think they can maintain two contrary 
opinions at once. How can you have a greater 
inconsistency than for the same person to say both 
that Moral Worth is the sole good and that we have 
a natural instinct to seek the things conducive to 
life ? Thus in their desire to retain ideas consonant 
cc 385 


conveninnt. in Aiistonem incidont: cum id fugiunt, 
re eadem deftDduDt quae Peripatetici, terlMi tenent 
mordicns. Quae rarsus dum sibi evelli ex ordine 
noluat.' iiorridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et 

} oratione et moribus. Quam illonun tristitiam atque 
asperitateiD fagiens Panaetius nee acerbitatem 
sententianim nee disserendi spinas probsvit, fiiitqae 
in altero gencre mitior, in altera illustiior, semperque 
habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocrateoi, 
Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsiu3 scripta de- 
clarant. Quos quidem tibi studiose et dlligenter 

3 tractandos itiagna opere censeo. Sed quoniam et 
advesperascit et milii ad villain revertendum est, 
nunc quidem hactenus; verum hoc idem faciamns 
saepe." Nos vero," inquit Llle; nam quid pos- 
sumus facere melius? Et hanc quidem primam 
exigam a te operam, ut audias me quae a te dicta sunt 
refellentem. Sed memento te quae nos sentiamus 
omnia probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi 
autem vestrorum nihil probari." Scrupulum, in- 
quam, abeunti; sed videbimus." Quae cum essent 
dicta, discessimus. 

MSS., Mdv. (explain 
ilanuiius ; perhxp^ orationi 
\alunt inf. MSS.; iWiin/ B, E, 

ig "exordini 


^^ BOOK IV. xxviii 

with the former doctrine they are landed in the 
position of Aristo; and when they try to eseape from 
this they adopt what is in reality the position of the 
Peripatetics, though still clinging' tooth and nail to 
their own terminology. Unwilling again to take 
the next step and weed out this terminology, tUey 
end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, 
full of asperities of style and even of manners. 

79 Panaetius strove hard to avoid this uncouth and re- 
pellant development of Stoicism, censuring alike the 
harshness of its doctrines and the crabbedness of 
its logic. In doctrine he was mellower, and in 
style more lucid. Plato, Aiistotle, Xenocrates, 
Theophrastus and Dicearchus were constantly on 
his lips, as his writings show; and these authors I 
strongly advise you to take up for your most careful 

SO study. But evening is closing in, and I must be 
getting home. So enough for the present ; but I hope 
we may often renew this conversation." Indeed 
we will," he replied; what better occupation could 
we have ? and the first favour I shall ask of you is 
to listen to my refutation of what you have said. 
But bear in memory that whereas you really accept 
all of our opinions save for the difference of termin- 
ology, I on the contrary do not accept any of the 
tenets of your school." A parting shot indeed!" 
said I ; ' but we shall see." And with these words 
I took my leave. 



conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt ; cum id fugiunt, 
n defeiidunt quae Peripatetici, verbn tenetit 
mordicus. Quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine 
nolunt," Iiorridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et 

79 oratione et moribus. Quam illorum tristitiam atque 
asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nee acerbitatem 
fiententiarum nee disserendi spinas probavit, iuitque 
in altero gcnere mitior, in altero illustrior, semperquc 
liabuit in ore Platouem, Aristotelem, Xenocratenij 
The ophras turn, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius seripta de- 
clarant. Qitos quideni tibi studiose et diligenter 

80 tractandos magno opere censeo. Sed quoniam et 
advesperascit et milii ad villam revertendum est, 

2 quidem hactenus; veroni Iioc idem facianius 
saepe." Nos vero," inquit ille; nam quid pos- 
melius? Et banc quidem primam 
exigam a te operam, ut audias me quae a tt dicta sunt 
refellentem. Sed memento te quae nos sentiatnus 
i probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi 
autem vestrorum nihil probari." Scrupulum, in- 
quam, abeunti; sed videbimus." Quae cum essent 
dicta, discessimus. 

ling ' 

eMSS., Mdv. {expli 
viLius; perhaps ci--a/w«f. 
(mf. MSS.; voimi/B, E, 



^m BOOK IV. xxviii 

with the former doctrine they are landed in the 
position of Aristo ; and when they try to escape from 
this they adopt what is in reality the position of tlie 
Peripatetics, though still cUnging tooth and nail to 
their own terminology. Unwilling again to take 
the next step and weed out this tenninologyj tliey 
end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, 
full of asperities of style and even of manners. 

79 Panaelius strove liard to avoid tins uneoutli and re- 
pellant development of Stoicism, censurinjf alike the 
harshness of its doctrines and the crabbedness of 
its logic. In doctrine he was mellower, and in 
style more lucid. Plato, Aristotle, Xenoc rates, 
Theophrastus and Dicearehus were constantly on 
his lips, as his writings show ; and these authors I 
strongly advise you to take up for your most careful 

SO study. But evening is closing in, and I must be 
getting home. So enough for the present; but 1 hope 
we may oilen renew this conversation." Indeed 
we will," he replied ; what better occupation could 
we have? and the first favour 1 shall ask of you is 
to listen to my refutation of what you have said. 
But bear in memory that whereas you really accept 
all of our opinions save for the difference of termin- 
ology, I on the contrary do not accept any of the 
tenets of your school." ' A parting shot indeed!" 
said I; 'but we shall see." And with these words 
I took my leave. 


conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiimt, 
re eadem defendunt quae Peripatetic!, verba tenent 
mordicus. Quue rursua dum sibi evelli es ordiiie' 
nolunt,' horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et 

79 oratione et moribus. Quam ittorum tristitiam atque 
asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nee acerbitatem 
sententiarum nee dissereiidi spinas probavit, fuitque 
in altero genere milior, in nltero illustriorj semperque 
habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, 
Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta de- 
clarant. QiKis quidem tibi studiose et diligenter 

80 tractandoa niagno opere censeo. Sed quoniam et 
advesperaacit et mihi ad villam revertendum est, 
nunc quidem hactenus; verura hoc idem faciamns 
saepe." "Nos vero," inquit ille; "nam quid poB- 
suraus facere melius ? Et hane quidem primam 
eKigaiD a te operam, ut audias me quae a t£ dicta sunt 
refellentem. Sed memento te quae nos sentiamus 
omnia probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi 
autem vestrorum nihil probari." "Scrupulum, in- 
quam, abeunti; sed videbimus," Quae cum essent 
dicta, discessimus. 

>arc!int MSS., Mdv. (explaining'. 
( Manul ius j perliHps oratione. 
' nolunl inf. MSS. ; volunt B, E. 


BOOK IV. xxTiii 

with the former doctrine they are landed in the 
positicm of Aristo ; and when they tiy to escape frtan 
this they adopt what is in reality the position of the 
Peripatetics^ though stiU chnginfT tooth and nail to 
their own terminology. Unwilling again to take 
the next step and weed oat this tenninology« they 
end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, 
full of asperities of style and even of manners. 

'9 Panaetius strove hard to avoid this uncouth and re- 
pellant development of Stoicism^ censuring alike the 
harshness of its doctrines and the crabbedness of 
its logic. In doctrine he was mellower, and in 
style more lucid. Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates» 
Theophrastus and Dicearchus were constantly on 
his lips, as his writings show; and these authors I 
strongly advise you to take up for your most careful 

10 study. But evening is closing in, and I must be 
getting home. So enough for the present ; but I hope 
we may often renew this conversation." Indeed 
we will,** he replied; "what better occupation could 
we have? and the first favour I shall ask of you is 
to listen to my refutation of what you have said. 
But bear in memory that whereas you really accept 
all of our opinions save for the difference of termin- 
o^ogy, I on the contrary do not accept any of the 
tenets of your school.'* "A parting shot indeed!" 
said I; "but we shall see.*' And with these words 
I took my leave. 

cc2 387 
















I. • Cum audissem Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam,^ 
cum M. Pisone in eo g3mMiasio quod Ptolemaeum 
vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius 
Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, 
amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambula- 
tionem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, 
maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis 
vacuus esset. Itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. 
Inde vario sermone sex ilia a Dipylo stadia confeci- 
mus. Cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine 
causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea quam volue- 
ramus. Tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc," inquit, 

datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca 
videamus in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperi- 
mus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur quam si 
quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scri- 
ptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. 
Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepi- 
mus primum hie disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi 
propinqui hortuli non memoriam solum mihi afferunt 
sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Hie 
Speusippus, hie Xenocrates, hie eius auditor Polemo ; 

^ soleba?n Mdv. ; solcbat MSS. 



Li. My Dear Bhdtub, — Once I had been attending Bk. i 
rleeture'of Aatioclms, as I was in the habit ofo,,']J^ 
aoing, with Marcus Piso, in tile building called the ^'n 
School of Ptolemy ; niid with us were my brother Sctm 
Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom ' 
I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. 
We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the 
Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet 
and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly 
at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, 
Piso's lodgings, and starting out conversed on various 
subjects while we covered the three-quarters of a 
mile from the Dipylou Gate. When we reached the 
walks of the Academy, which are sn deservedly fa- 
mous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had 
2 hoped. Thereupon Piso remarked : " Wliether it is PhOo 
a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but ^^ 
one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing '^"'^ 
the places that tradition records to have befln the 
favourite resort of men of note in former days, than 
by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. 
My own feelings at the present moment are a case 
in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philoso- 
pher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding 
discussions in this place ; and indeed his garden 
close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but 
seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This 

Ethe haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of 
ocrates" pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the 



cuius i!t« ipsa sessio fiiit quam videmus. Equidmi 
etiain curiam nostram (Hostiliam dico, nou huiic □O' 
vam, quae minor milii esse vidctur posteaquam est 
maior) solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonein, Lae- 
lium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare ; tanta 
vis admoTiitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa en 
lis memoriae ducta sit disciplina." 
J Tum Quintus: "Est plane, Piso, Qt dicis," inquit 
"Nam me ipsum hue modo venientem convertebat 
ad sese Colaneus ille locus, cuius incola Sophocles 
ob oculos versabatur, quern scis quam admirer quam- 
que eo delecter. Me quidem ad altiorem n 
Ocdipodis hue venientis et illo mollis! 
quaenam essent haec ipsa loca requirentis species 
quaedam commovit, inaniter scilicet, aed commovit 

Turn Pomponius: 'At ego, qucm vos ut deditum 
Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum 
Phaedro, quern unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri 
hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, sed veteris pro- 
verbi admonitu vivorum memini'; nee tamcn Epi- 
curi licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non 
modo in tabulis nostri familiares sed etiam in poculiG 
et ill anulis habent." 

" The aenale-house, ascribed by tradition to King Tullus 
Hostilius, was enlarjfcd by Sulla a year or two before the 
date af the dialogue. 

" Presumablj' L. Piso Frugi, the ' Man of Worth/ 

"Greek Mnemonics or memorla lechnica, said lo have 
been invented by the poet Simonldes, cp. II, 104, scenis 10 
have been based on visual memory ; it arranged the subjects 
to be remembered in riroi, loci. The art was associated 
with Inventio as a branch of Rhetoric, cp. IV, 10. 

BOOK V. i 

very seat we see over there. For my own part 
even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean 
the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, 
which seems to me to be smaller since its enlarge- 
ment}' used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, 
Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather;'' such 
powers of suggestion do places possess. Ko won- 
der the scientific training of the memory is based 
upon locality."' 
i Perfectly true, Piso." rejoined Quintus. I my- 

self on the way here just now noticed yonder village 
of Colonus, and it brought to my imagination Sopho- 
cles who resided there, and who is as you know my 
great admiration and delight, indeed my memory 
took me further back ; for I had a vision of Oedipus, 
advancing towards this very spot and asking in tliose - 
most tender verses,'* What place is this ? ' — a mere 
fancy no doubt, yet still it affected me strongly." 

For my part," said Pomponius, you are fond of 
attacking me as a follower of Epicurus, and I do 
spend much of ray time with Phaedrus, who as you 
know is my dearest friend, in Epicurus's Gardens' 
which we passed just now ; but I obey the old saw : ' 
I 'think of those that are alive." Still I could not 
forget Epicurus, even if I wanted ; the members of 
our body not only have pictures of him, but even 
have his likeness on their drinking-cups and rings." 

•J Sophocles Oedipus Colon 

,s. t f.! 

2r AvSpQv w6'\0' ; 

IS a sort of college to hia ,sue- 

ccurs in Fctronius 43 and 75, 


conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, 
re eadem defendunt quae Peripatetic!, verba tenent 
mordicas. Quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine 
nolunt," horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et 

79 oratione et moribus. Quam illorum tristitiam atque 
asperitatetn fugiens Patiaetius nee acerbitatem 
Sententiarum nee disserendi spinas probavit, fuitque 
in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior, seniperquc 
habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, 
Tlieophrastuni, Dicaearcliuni, ut ipsius scripta de- 
clarant. Quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter 

80 tractandos magno opere censeo. Sed quoniam et 
advesperaseit et milii ad villan) revertendum est, 
nunc quidem liactenus ; verum hoc idem faciamus 
saepe." "Nos vero," inquit ilte; "nam quid pos- 
sumus facere melius? Et hanc quidem primam 
exigam a te operani, ut audias me quae a te dicta sunt 
refellentem. Sed memento te quae nos sentiamus 
omnia probare, nisi quad verbis aliter utamur, mihi 
autem vestrorum nihil prolMtri." Scrupulum, in- 
quam, abeunti; sed videbimus." Quae cum essent 
dicta, discessimus. 

' ardine MSS., Mdv. (explaining ' 
V Manutius ; perhaps oratione. 
" nolunt inf. MSS. ; volunf B, E. 




BOOK V. ii 

V II. "AsforourfriendPomponius.'linterposed, I 
believe he is joking ; and no doubt he is a licensed 
wit, for he has su taken root in Athens that he is 
ahsost an Athenian ; in fact I expect he will get 
the surname of Atticus!' But I, Piso, agree with 
you ; it is a common esperience that places do 
strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our 
ideas of famous men. You remember how I onee 
came with you to Metnpontum,and would not go to 
the house where we were to stay until I had seen the 
abode of Pythagoras and the very place where he 
breathed his last. All over Athens, I know, there 
are many reminders of eminent men in the actual 
places where they lived ; but at the present moment 
it is that hall over there wliich appeals to me ; for 
not long ago'' it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I 
see him now (for his portrait is well known), and I 
can imagine that the very place where he used tu sit 
misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of 
tliat mighty intellect." 

5 "Well, then," said Piso, "as we all have some 
association that appeals to us, what is it that interests 
our young friend Lucius ? Does he enjoy visiting the 
sjiot where Demosthenes and Aescliines used to fight 
their battles } For we are ail mainly influenced by 
our own particular study." 

Praydon'taskme," answered Lucius with ablush; 
I have actually made a pilgrimage down to the Bay 
of Phalerum, where they say Demosthenes used to 
practise declaiming on the beach, to learn to pitch 
hia voice so as to overcome an uproar. Also only just 
now I turned off the road a little way on the right, 
to visit the tomb of Pericles. Though in fact there 

BOOK V. ii-iii 
is no end to it in this city; wherever you go you 
tread historic ground." 

6 Well, Cicero," said Piso, these enthusiasms 
befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy 
the example of the great. If tiiey only stimulate 
antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. 
But we all of us exhort you — and 1 hope it is a a 
of spurring a willing steed — to resolve to imitate 
your heroes as well as to know about them." He 
is practising your precepts already, Piso," said I, 

as you are aware; but all the same thank you for 
encouraging him." Well," said Piso, with his usual 
amiability, let us all join forces to promote the lad's 
improvement; and especially let us try to make him 
spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as 
to follow the example of yourself for whom he has 
such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for 
the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius," 
he asked, do you need our urging, or have you a na- 
tural leaning ofyour own towards philosophy? You are 
keeping Antiochus's lectures, ajid seem to me to be a 
pretty attentive listener." I try to be," replied Lucius 
with a. timid or rather a modest air ; but have you 
heard any lectures on Cameades lately? He attracts 
me immensely ; but Antiochus calls me in the other 
direction ; and there is no other lecturer to go to." 

7 HI. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be alto- b 
gether easy, while our friend here " (meaning me) " 

is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the J,^ 
present New Academy for the Old, which includes, A 
as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who ^ 
bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, " 
Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early 
Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, 

Dmon U. lbs 
'ly Acadeniici 
i PeripBtaUo. 


dixerim principem philosophorum. Ad eos igitur 
converte te, quaeso. Ex eoruin enim scriptis ct 
institutis cum omnis doctriiia liberalis, omiiis historia, 
omiiis sermo etegans sumi potest, turn varietas est 
tajita artium ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam 
rem illustriorem satis omatus possit accedere. Ab 
his oratores, ab his imperatores ac renim publicarum 
principes exstiterunt. Ut ad minora veniam, mathe- 
matici, poetae, musici, niedici denique ex hac tam- 
quam omnium artificum officina profecti aunt." 
i Atque ego; Scis me," inquam, istud idem sentire, 
Piso, sed'a te opportune facta mentio est; studet 
enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris 
quam commemoras Academiae dc finibus bonorum 
Peripateticorumque sententia. Censemus autem 
faeiilime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam 
Neapolitanum multos aimovhabueris apud te et 
complures ium menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex 
Antiocho videamus exquirere." Et ille ridens: 
'Age, age," inquit, '(satis enim scite me nostri 
sermonis principium esse voliiisti), exponamus adu- 
lescenti si quae forte possumos. Dat enim id nobis 
solitude, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem, 
me in Academia taraquam philo^ophum disputaturiim. 
Sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestns sim." 
Mihi," inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi?" Turn, 
Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se yelle dixissent, 
Piso exorsus est ; cuius oratio attende quaeso, Bni 

artificum B, E, Miiller 

le quaeso, Brt^^^_ 
inf. M5S. Mdv^^l 

BOOK \'. Ui 
if Plato be escepted, 1 atinost thick deser\-es to W 
called the prince of philosophers. Do jou then 
join them. I beg of you. From their writings and 
teachings can be leamt the whole of libeml culture, 
of history and of style; moreover they include such 
s variety of sciences, that without the equipment 
that they give no one t^an be adequately prepared 
to embark on any of the higher careers. They have 
produced orators, generals and Statesmen. To come 
to the less distinguished professions, this factory of 
experts in all the sciences has turned out nijithcma- 
8 ticians,poels,musiciansaudphysiciaus," "Vouknow 
that I agree with you about that, Piso," I rcplifd; 

but you have raised the point most opportujiely ; 
for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine 
of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the 
Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. 
We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest 
ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your 
household for many years, and also we know you 
have been studying this very subject uncicr Anti- 
ochus for several months at Athens." ' Here goes, 
then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have craftily 
arranged so that our discussion shall start with me), 
let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If 
an oracle had foretold that I should find myself dis- 
coursing in the Academy like a philosopher. I should 
not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to the 
place being so deserted. Only don't let me Itore the 
rest of you while I am obliging our young friend-" 

What, bore me?" said'I. ' Why, it is I who asked 

you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius 

having declared that they wished it too, Piso began, 

And I wiU ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider 



satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sentestiam, 
quani tibi qui fratrera eius Aristum frequenter audi- 
eris maiiime proliatam existiixio. 

IV. Sic est igitur locutus. Quantus omatus in 
Peripateticoruin disciplina sit, satis est a me, ut 
brevissime potuit, paulo ante dietum. Sed est forms 
eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex : una 
pars est naturae, disserendi altera, viveiidi tertia. 
Natura sic ab ils investigata est ut nulla pars caelo, 
mari, terra (ut poetice loquar) praetermissa ait. 
Quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo 
modo probabili argu men- 
math ematicorum ratione 
materiam ex rebus per se 
investigatis ad rerum occultanim cognitionem attu- 

10 lerunt. Persecutus est Aristoteles animantium om- 
nium ortus, victus, figuras, Tlieophrastus autem 
stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum quae e terra 
gignerentur causas atque rationes ; qua ex cognitione 
facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. 
Disserendique ab iisdem non dialectice solum sed 
etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita; ab Aristote- 
leque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem 
dicendi exercilatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia 
semper, sicut Arceailas, diceret, et tamen ut in om- 
nibus rebus quidquid ex utraque parte dici posset 

1 ] espromeret. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi 
praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab iisdem non 

locuti essent, ut multa 
tatione sed etiam 
conclude rent. 


BOOK V. iii-iv 

whether you think his discourse a satis&ctory sum- 
mary of the doctrine of Antiochus^ which I believe to 
be the system which you most approve^ as you have 
often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 

IV. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: About & Pr«UinJA«fj 
the educational value of the Peripatetic system I i^S!£2tlu?i§ 
have said enough^ in the briefest possible way, a few fSsS^^^' 
moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most PUJofopbr; 
other systems, is threefold : one part deals with sS^^cic; Eit 
nature, the second with discourse, and the third ***^ ^<^tkM, 
with conduct Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics 
have investigated so thoroughly that no region in 
sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been 
passed aver. Nay more, in treating of the origin of 
creatimi and the constitatian of the universe they 
have estaUished much of their doctrine not merely 
by probaUe aigumenU but by conclusive mathe- 
matical demoi]«tiatioii,applylngaquaatity of material 
derived hotn Ucts that they have themselves in- 
vestigated to the discovery of other £u^ beyond the 

reach of ohservatioii. Aristotle gave a complete 
acoomtt of the birth, nutrition Mod structure of all 
living creatures, Tbeophrastus of tht natural history 
of plants and the causes Mod constitittion of vege- 
table orgMMnsnm in fgenead; vad the knowledge thus 
attainrd fanKtafed the investigation of the nnost 
ofascnre <|Ofstfamu In Logie their teachings include 
the rales of rbetorie as well as of dialeetic: and Aiis- 
totle tlietr fousder set on foot the praetjtoe of ajigu- 
ing pro and oontm upon every Ufpk:^ not like 
Arcealas, ahrajs eontrorertuog every propositkon, 
bvt ^eitmfg out all tlie possible aigvnkents on either 

1 side m ererj wihQ/wt. The third dii-iskn of philo- 
*floplqr ntrertiipates dKe rules of human ireI]4>eiDg; 

phrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodam 
fortiuiae datur; quod si ita se habeat, non possit 
beatam vitam praestare sapientia. Haec mihi vide- 
tur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio quam 
virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. Quare teneamus 
Aristotelem et eios filium Nicomachum, cuius accu- 
rate scripti de moribus libri dicuiitur ill! quidem 
esse Aristoteb, sed non video cur non potuerit patri 
situilis esse filius. Theopbrustum tamen adhibeamus 
ad pleraque, duni modo plus in virtutc teneamus 

IS quam ille tenuit fimiitatis et roboris. Simus igitur 
contenti his. Namque borum poster! meliores illi 
quidem, mea sententia, quam reliquarum pbilosophi 
disci plinarum, sed ita degenerant ut ipsi ex se nati 
esse videantur. Primum Theophrasti, Strato, pbysi- 
cum se voluit ; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova 
pleraque, et perpauca de moribus. Huius, Lyco, 
oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior. Concinnus 
deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea quae desi- 
deratur a niagno pbilosopho gravitas in eo non 
fuit; scripts sane et multa et polita, sed nescio 
quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non liabet. 

1 4 Praetereo multos, in bis doctum hominem et sua- 

vcm, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum 
appellem nescio; sununum enim bonum exposuit 
vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dis- 

sArislotle's principal work on Elhics is entitled The Ni- 
chamachean Elhirs, lo distinguish il from two other l realise» 
ascribed to him, the Eudemian Elhics and the Magna 
Moralia. The title may imply that Ihe book was dedicated 
to, or possiblv that it was edited by, Nichomacbus; but 
hardly, pace Cicero, that it was written by him, since he 
died in battle while still a youth, Il seems cerlain thai 
Cicero had never read, or had rorgotten, thi^ book, for he 
entirely ignores ita distinctive doctrines. Cp. IV is n. 


book On Happinea, in which a very considerable 
amount of importance is assigned to fortune ; for 
if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guar- 
antee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, 
if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be 
adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence 
we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nico- 
machus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics 
are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see 
why the son should not have been capable of emu- 
lating the father.* Still, we may use Theophrastus 
on most points, so long as we maintain a larger 
element of strength and solidity in virtue than he 

\3 did. Let us then limit ourselves to these authori- : 
ties. Their successors are indeed in my opinion Sr 
superior to the philosophers of any other school, but 
are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might 
imagine them to have been their own fathers. To 
begin with, Theophrastus 's pupil Strato set up to be 
a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this de< 
partment, he is nevertheless for the most part an in- 
novator ; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His 
successor Lyco lias a copious style, but his matter is 
somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished 
and graceful, but has not the authority that we 
expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, 
it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is some- 
how lacking in weight. 

14 ' I pass over a number of writers, including the 
learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I 
know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic 
at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom 
from pain: and to hold a dilferent view of the 
Chief Good is to hold a different system of phUo- 

sentit, de tota pbilosbphiae ratione dissentit. Crito- 
laus imitari voluit antiques ; et quidem est gravitate 
proximus et redundat oratio; ac tamen ne^ is quidem 
ill patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, 
adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatein doloris. Hie 
quoque suus est, de summoque bono dissentiens diei 
vere Peripateticus nou potest. Antiquorum autem 
seiitentiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi 
diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli fuisse et 
Polemonis docet. 

1 5 VI. Facit igitur Lucius noster prudenter qui 
audire de sumnio bono potissimuni vetit; hoc enim 
constitute in philosophia constituta sunt omnia. 
Nam ceteris in rebus sive praetermisauui sive igno- 
ratum est quidpiam, non plus incommudi est quam 
quanti qiiaeque earum reniin est in quibus negle- 
ctum est aliquid ; sutnmuni autem boniim si ignore- 
tur, Vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est; ex quo 
tantus error consequitur ut quein in portum se 
recipiant scire non possint. Cognitis autem rerum 
finibus, cum intellegitur quid sit et bonorum extre- 
mum et malorum, invents vitae via est conforma- 

1 6 tioque omnium officiorum, inventum igitur, quo 
quidque referatur; ex quo, id quod omnes expc- 
tunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. 

Quod quoniam in quo sit magna disseiiBio est, 
Carneadia nobis adliibenda divisio est, qua noster 

' ne added by i^dd. 
MSS. i cum exigituT (i.e. CKaminaVur) Mdv, 

BOOK V. v-vi 
Sophy altogether. Critulaus professed to imitate 
the aticieats; and he does in fact come nearest 
to them in weight, while his stjie is copious to a 
degree; all the same, even he is not true to his 
Eincestral principles. Diodorus, his pupil, couples 
with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too 
stands by himself; differing aliout the Chief Good 
he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our 
master Antiochos seems to me to adhere most seni- Aoiiochmhas 
pulously to the doctrine of the ancients, wliich J,^^!^ " ""^ 
according to his teaching was common to Aristotle 
qpd to Polemo, 

15 VI. Our young friend Lucius is therefore well a. ThEfintpric 
advised in desiring most of all to hear about the Jh= chirf Good 
Chief Good; for when you iiave settled that point in °'^|iJ*J'J|^, 
a system of philosophy, you have settled everything, uutmcb. 
■On any other topic, some degree of incompleteness 

or uncertainty causes no more mischief than is pro- 
portionate to the importance of the particular topic 
on which the neglect has occurred; but uncertainty 
as to the Chief Good necessarily involves uncertainty 
as to the principles of conduct, and this must carry 
men so far out of their course that they cannot 
know what harbour to steer for. On the other hand 
when we have ascertained the Ends of things, 
knowing the ultimate Good and ultimate Evil, we 
have discovered a map of life, a chart of all the 

1 6 duties; and therefore have discovered a standard to 
which each action may be referred ; and from this 
we can discover and construct that rule of happiness 
which all desire. 

Now there is great difference of opinion as to Cs 
what constitutes the ultimate End. Let us therefore aii poisbis et 
adopt the classificaUon of Carneades, which our ""^™^- 

ipsam in se versari, 
aliud quod propositun 
medicina valetudinis. 

Antiochus libenter uti solet. Itle igitur vidit n 
modo quot fuisseiit adliuc philosophoru 
bono sed quot omnino esse possent seutentiae. 
Negabat igitur ullam esse artem quae ipsa a se 
prolicisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est quod 
arte comprehenditur. Nihil opus est exemplis hoc 
facere longius; est enim perspicuum nullam artem 
cd esse aliud artem ipsam, 
sit arti ; quoniam igitur, ut 
navigationis gubernatio, sic 
Vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est earn quoque 

1 7 ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. Consti- 
tit autem fere inter omnes, id, in quo prudentia 
versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accom- 
modatum naturae esse oportere et tale ut ipsum per 
se invitaret et allieeret appetitunn animi, quem op/i^r 
Uraeci vocant. Quid autem sit quod ita moveat 
itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, 
deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum 
exquiritur, omnis dissensio. Totius enim quaestionis 
eius quae liabetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, 
cum quaeritur in his quid sit extremum, quid ulti- 
mum, fons reperiendus est in quo sint prima invita- 
menta naturae ; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite 
de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. 

1 8 VII. Voluptatis alii primum uppetitum putant et 
primam depulsionem doloris; vacuitatem doloris alii 


BOOK V. vi-vii 
teacher Atitioclius is very fond of employing. Car- 
neades passed in review all the opinions as to the 
Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by 
philosophers hithei'to, but that it was possible to 
hold. He then pointed out that no science or art 
can start wholly from itself; it must always have 
subject-matter which is outside itself. There is no 
need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it 
is evident that no art is occupied with itself ; the art 
is distinct from the subject with which it deals; 
since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and 
navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence 
or Practical. Wisdom is. the art of conduct, it follows 
that Prudence also must take its b~eihg aiid origm 

17 from" soineEliing, Now practically all have agreed 
that the subject with which Prudence is occupied 
AtiA the end which it desires to attain is iKiiInil to 
Be somethilig intimately adapted to o'lir nattire^;"it 
must be capable of directly arousing and awakening 
an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormc. 
But what it is that at the (irst moment of our es* 
istcnce excites in our nature this impulse of desire, 
— as to this there is no agreement. It is at this 
point that all the difference of opinion among stu- 
dents of the ethical problem arises. Of' the whole 
inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the 
question which among them is ultimate and final, 
the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest 
instincts of nature; discover these and you have the 
source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate 
as to the Chief Good and Evil. 

1 8 VU. " One school holds that our earhest desire is 
for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; 
another thinks that freedom iVom pain is the earliest 


The poujble ol 

appctitloii or 

frewm fi«n 
paiD, (ill) UiF 

censent primum ascitam et primum declinatum do- 
lorem ; ab iis iilij quae prima secundum naturam 
nominant proficiscuntur. in quibus nuineraiit iiicolu- 
mitatem conservationemque omnium partium, vale- 
tudinem, sensus iiitegros, doloris vacuitatem, vires, 
pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum si- 
milia Riint prima in animis, quasi virtutum igniculi 
et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid sit quo 
primum natura moyeatur vel ad appetenduna vel ad 
repcllendum nee quidquam omnino praeter haee 
tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut 
fufipeiidi aut sequendi ad eorum aliqnid referri, ut 
illu prudeiitia quttm artem vitae esse diximus in 
earum triura rerum aliqua versetur a qua totius vitae 
ducat exordium. 
) Ex eo autem quod statuerit esse quo primum 

natura moveatur, exsistet recti etiam ratio atque 
houesti, quae cum aliqoo uno ex tribus illis congru- 
ere possit, ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia' 
voluptatis causa etiamsi earn non eousequare, aut 
non dolendi etiamsi id assequi nequeas, aut eorum 
quae secundum naturam sunt adipiseendi etiamsi 
nihil, consequarc. Its fit ut quanta differentia est in 
principiis naturaUbus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum 
malorumque dissimilitudo.^ — Alii rursum iisdem a 
principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem 

brackets, ^^^H 

BOOK V. vii 
thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided ; 
others again start from what they term the primary 
objects in accordance with nature, among which they 
reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of 
the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, 
strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which 
are the primary intellectual escellences which are 
the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must 
be one or other of these three sets of things which 
iirst excites our nature to feel desire or repulsi< 
nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three 
things. It follows therefore that every right act 
of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these 
objects, and that consequently one of these three 
must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we 
spoke of as the art of life ; from one of the three 
Prudence derives the initial motive of the wliole of 

) Now, from whicliever Prudence decides to be Tha End mnsi 

the object of the primary natural impulses, will arbe J^^pi,^?^ | 
a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may ite iitiimneni 
correspond with one or other of tlie three objects tiues: "^ 
aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in 
aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one 
may not succeed in attaining it ; or at absence of 
pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at 
getting the things in accordance with nature, even 
though one does not attain any of them. Hence 
there is a divergence between the different concep- 
tions as to the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely 
equivalent to the difference of opinion as to tlie 
primary natural objects. — Others again starting from 
the same primary objects will make the sole stan- 
dard of right action the actual attainment of plea- 

But ad noR dolendum aut od prima ilia secundum 
naturam obtinenda. 

" Expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono senten- 
tiis, trium proximaruni hi principes: Toluptatis Ari- 
stippus, not! dolendi Hieronj'nius, fruendi rebus iis 
quas primas secundum naturam esse dmmus Carne- 
ades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor dlsserendi 
causa fuit Superiores tres erant quae esse possent; 
quaruin est una sola defensa eaque vehenienter. 
Nam voluptatis causa facere omnia cum, etiamsi nihil 
consequamur,tamen ipsuin illud consilium itafaciendi 
per se expetendum et honestum etsolam bonum sit, 
nemo dixit. Ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam 
per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit nisi 
etiam evitare posset. At vero facere omnia ut adi- 
piscamur quae secundum naturam sunt etiamsi ea 
non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per 
se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt. 

1 VIII. Sex igitur hae sunt simplices de summa 
bonorum malonimque sententiae, duae sine patrono, 
quattuor defensae. lunctae autem et duplices ex- 
positiones aummi boni tres omnino fiierunt, nee vero 
plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potue- 
runt. Nam aut voluptas adiun^ potest ad honesta- 
tera, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris 
vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, 
quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticosnominamus. 

"This is obviously incorrect; for formal com pit ten ess, 
Carneades ought lo have made six composite Ends, b; 
combining Morality witU the pursuit of each of Llie three 
primary objects of desire as well as with their attainmtnt; 
but no douiit at this point he fell the unreality of his scheme 
and drew back, since Morality, according lo Aristippus, 
Epicurus and the Sloics -nias the pursuit of pleasure, free- 
dom from pain, and the natural goods respectively. 


BOOK V. vii-viii 
EQre, freedom from pain, or the primary things in 
accordance with nature, respectively, 

D Thus we have now set forth six views as to the (c 

Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter ^^ 
three are : of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from ": 
pain, Hieronymus ; of the enjoyment of what we 
have called the primary things in accordance with 
nature, Carneades, — that is, he did not originate 
this view but he upheld it for polemical purposes. 
The three former were possible views, but only one 
of them has been actually maintained, though that 
with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to 
be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere 
intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccess- 
ful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only 
good. Nor yet has anyone held that tlie effort to 
avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's 
being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that H 
morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain 
the things in accordance with nature, and that this 
endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole 
thing desirable and the sole good, is actually main- 
tained by the Stoics. 

1 VZII. "These then are the sii simple views about or 
the End of Goods and Evib; two of them without a ™ 
champion, and four actually upheld. Of composite ?p 
or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there vi 
have been three in alt ; nor were more than three 
possible, if you examine the nature of the case 
closely.' There is the combination of Morality with 
pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; 
with freedom from pain, by Diodonis ; or with the 
primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as 
we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics. 


Sed quoniam non possunt omnia siinu) dici, haec 

in praesentia not» esse debebunt, voluptatem semo- 

vendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam ap- 

parebit, nati sumus. De vacuitate doloris eadem fere 

23 did solent quae de voluptate.' Nee vero alia sunt 
quaerenda contra Cameadiam illam sentetttiam ; quo- 
cumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur ut 
id vacet hnnestate, nee officia nee virtutes in ea ratione 
nee amicitiaecotistare possunt Coniunctioautemeum 
honestate vel voUiptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum 
honestutn quod ampiecti vult id efRcit turpe. Ad eas 
enim res referre quae a^as, quarum una si quis malo 
careat in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur 
in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem 
splendorem honestatis, ne dicani inquinantis. Hestant 
Stoici, qui, cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia 
transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti aunt. 
"Hos contra singulos dici est melius; sed nunc 
quod a^mus; de ilHs cum volemus. 

23 Dcmocritiautemseeuritas, quae est animitranquii- 

litas,^ quam appellavit' fi&viiiav, eo separanda fiiit ab 
hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea 
est ipsa beata vita; quaerimus auten) non quae sit 
sed unde sit. lam explosae eieetaeque sententiae 
Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli, quod in hunc orbem 

'After voluplate, MSS. add: Qaoniam igitur rt de 
volvptate cum Torguefo et de konestater in qua una omnt 
boiium ponetelur, aim Cataite est disputalum, primtim, 
quae contra vutuplatem ditia sunt, tadem fere cadu»! 
contra vacuifatem doloris. Edd. reject (his rererence to 
the two earlier dialogues as an interpolation, since they are 
supposed to lake place at a, lalerdate than (he present oiw. 

^ Iranguillitas Muller,- tranquilUtas tanquam B E i \$^ 
juoro] Iranq. Mdv. " 

' appellavit inf. MSS., Mfjller; appellant B,E, UdttM 

BOOK V. viii ^H 

But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our BejMiiBg mch 
position at once ; so for the present we need only ii'v^™ni5^e 
notice that pleasuremust be discarded, on the ground '° ''«Ei^ P'"- 
that, as will be shown later, we are intended by gf pain, or do 
nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is tue.os'weu'ai" 
open to practically the same objections as picture. '^f'^j"'™Y'" 
iS Nor need we look for other arguments to refiite the an under the 
opinion of Cumeades; for any conceivable account "^"^^^^^l" 
of the Chief Good which does not include the factor 't''V^^''i''' 
of Morul Worth gives a system under which there ud Poipatetici 
is no room either for duty, virtue or iriendsiiip. Ji^'toHhcSioit 
Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either '«■. vti. Vifun 
of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the goods- 
very morality that it aims at supporting. For to 
uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which 
declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, 
wliile the other is a thing concerned with tlie most 
frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, 
all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the 
Stoics, who took over their whole system from the 
Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the )Mme 
ideas under other names. 

The best way to deal with these diiferent schools 
would be to refute each separately; but for the present 
we must keep to the business in hand ; we will dis- 
cuss these other schools at our leisure. 
i ' The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is 
the Chief Good of Demoeritus, eul/iumia as he calls it, 
has had to be excluded from this discussion, because 
this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in 
question; and we are inquiring not what happim 
is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited 
and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and EriUus 
cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, 



q^uem circmnscripsimus incidere non possunt, a 
bendae omnino non fuerunt. Nam cum omnis haec 
quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et 
malonun ab eo proficiscatur quod disimus naturae 
esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per 
se primum appetatur, hoc totum et il tollunt qui in 
rebus iis in quibus nihil aut honestum aut turpe sit 
negant esse ullam causam cur aliud alii anteponatur 
nee inter eas res quidquam omnino putant interesse, 
et Erillua, si ita sensit, niliil esse bonum praeter 
scientiam, omnem consili capiendi causam inven- 
tion emque offici sustulit. 

Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum, cum praeter- 
ea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat ne- 
cesse est. Igitur instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoid 
utuntuT, hinc capiamus exordium. 
I IX. ' Omne animal se ipsum diligit, ac simul est 
ortum " id agit ut se conservet, quod hie ei primus ad 
omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se 
ut conservet atque ita sit atfectum ut optime secun- 
dum naturam afTectum esse possit. Hanc initio in- 
stitutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum- 
modo se tueatur qualecumque sit ; sed nee quid sit 
nee quid possit nee quid ipsius natura sit intelleKit 
Cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quidque' 
se attingat ad seque pertinent perspicere coepit, tum 
sensim incipit progredi seseque ognoscere et intelle- 

' Igitur: 

i fiiid^uid MSS., Mdv. 



BOOK V. \ 

and so we have not been concerned to consider them 
at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends 
or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evila must 
begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted 
and suited to nature and which is the earliest object 
of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done 
away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere 
of things which contain no element of Moral Worth 
or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing 
should be preferred to any other, and who consider 
these things to be absolutely indifferent ; and Erillus 
also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but 
knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action 
and every clue to riglit conduct. 

'Thus we have eliminated the views of all the 
other philosophers; and no other view is possible, 
therefore this doctrine of tile Ancients must hold 
good. Let us then follow the practice of the old 
philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics and mike 
this our starting-point, 
t IX. Every living creature loves itself and from 
the moment of birth strives to secure its own preser- 
vation ; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it 
by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct 
for self-preservation arid for the maintenance of 
itself in the best condition possible to it in accord- 
Mice with its nature. At the outset this tendency 
is vague and uncertain, so tliat it merely aims at pro- 
tecting itself whatever its character may be ; it does 
notunderatanditselfnorits own capacities and nature. 
When, however, it has grown a little older, and has 
begun to notice the measure in which different 
things affect and concern itself, it now gradually 
commences to make progress. Self-consciousness 

EE 417 


gere quam ob causam habeat eum quern diximus 
animi appetitum, coeptatque et ea quae naturae sentit 
apta appetere et propulsare contraria. Ergo omni 
animali illud quod appetit posltum est in eo quod 
naturae est acconimodatunj. Ita finis bonorum 
exsistit, secunduni naturam vivere sic afTeetum ut 
optinie affici possit ad naturamque accomntodatissime. 

3 Quoniaiu autem sua euiusque animantis natura est, 
necesse est finem qiioque omniuni hunc esse lit natura 
expleatur (nihil enim prohibet quaedara esse et inter 
se animalibus reliquis et eum bestiis homini conunu- 
nia, quoniam omnium est natura communis). Bed 
extrema ilia et sumnia quae quaerimus inter anima- 
lium genera distincta et dispertita sint et sua cuique 
propria et ad id apta quod cuiusque natura desideret. 

S Quare ctim dicimus omnibus animalibus extremvuD 
esse secundum uaturam vivere, non ita accipiendum 
est quasi dicaraus ununi esse omnium extremura ; 
sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune 
esse ut in aligua scientia versentur, scientlnm autem 
suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium 
omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse 
diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud 
homini, et taineninomnibussummacoinniunis,etqui* 
n in animalibus sed etiam in rebus 

BOOK V. ix 
dawns, and the creature begins to understand the 
reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition 
aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things wtiich it 
perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel 
their opposites. Every living creature therefore 
finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to 
its nature. Thus arises the End of Goods, namely 
toJiECjn accordance withnature and in that condi- 
tion which is the best and moat suited to nature 

25 thjrtris~possible. At the-same-tiiHe- evety animal has 
its own nature ; -and consequently, whQe for all alitfc 
the End consists in the satisfaction of that nature 
(for there is no reason why certain things should 
not i>e common to all the lower animals, and also| 
to the lower animals and man, since all have a cora-l 
mon nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objectsj 
that we are investigating must be differentiated andl 
distributed among the different kinds of animals,! 
each kind having its own peculiar to itself and 
adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 

26 Hence when we say that the-End-o£all__living crea- 
tureslsTrolive in accordance with naturcj this must 
not be construed as ineahing that all have one 

_jind the same End ; but just as it is correct to say 
that all the arts and sciences have the common 
characteristic of occupying themselves with some 
branch of knowledge, while each art has its own 
particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so 
all animals have the common End of living accord- 
ing to nature, but their natures are diverse, ao that 
one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, 
another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in 
all the Supreme Ejid is common, and that not only 
in animals but also in all those things upon which 
ee2 419 


omnibus iis quus natura alit, auget, tuetur ; in quibus 
vidimus ca quae ^ignuntur e terra multa quodam 
niodo efficere ipsa sibi per se quae ad viveiiduni cre- 
scendumque valeant, ut suo^ genere perv-eniant ad 
extremum; ut am 1 ceat una comprehensione ononia 
complecti no dui» tai temque dicere oranem naturani 
esse servatricem s i dque habere propositum quasi 
finem et extremun se ut c stodiat quara in optimo 
sui generis statu t nece ';e sit omnium rcrum quae 
natitra vigeant s n len esse finera, non eundem. Ex 
quo intellegi debet hotnini id esse ill bonis ultimum, 
secundum iiaturam vivere, quod ita iiiterpretemur, 
vivere ex bominis natura undique perfecta et nihil 
27 requirente. Haee igitur nobis ejtpHcanda sunt ; sed 
si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. Huius enim aetati 
nunc' haec primum fortasse audientis servive debe- 
mus." Ita prorsus," inquam ; ' etsi ea quidem 
quae adhuc disisti quamvis ad aetatem rccte isto 
niodo dicerentur." 

X. Expo sita igitur," inquit, terminatione rerum 
expetendarura, cur ista se res ita habeat ut diid 
deinceps demonstrandum est, Quaniobrem ordia- 
mur ab eo quod primum posui, quod idem respse 
primum est, ut inteiiegamus omne animal se ipsura 
diligere. Quod quamquam dubitationem non habet 
(est enim intixum in ipsa natura comprehenditurque' 
suis cuiusque sensibus, sic ut contra si quis dicere 

' ut suo Mdv. ; el sua MSS. i Miiller conj. iit in sua. 
^mtaH nunc . . audifntis (conj. Mdv.) MGIler ; attati tl 

BOOK V. ix-x 
nature bestows nourishment, increase and protec- 
tion. Among these things we notice that plants 
can, iua sense, perform on their own behalf a n 
ber of actions conducive to their life and growth, so 
that they may attain their End after their kind. So 
that finally we may embrace all animate existence in 
one broad generali nation, and say without hesitation, 
that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it 
the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best pos- 
sible condition after its kind ; and that consequently 
all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, 
but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, 
that the ultimate Good of man is life in aecordai 
with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life 
in accordance with human nature developed to its 
S7 ftill perfection and supplied with all its needs. This, h 
then, is the theory that we have to expound ; but if it ^ 
requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive >" 
it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first di 
time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and 
we must make allowance for his youth." ' Very 
true," said I ; albeit the style of your discourse so 
far has been suited to hearers of any age." 

X. Well then," he resumed, having explained a 
what the principle is which determines what tilings "" 
are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is 
as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the posi- 
tion which I laid down first and which isalso first in the 
order of reality : let us understand that every living 
creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of 
no doubt, for indeed it is a fiindamental fact of nature, 
and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the 
evidence of bis senses, so much so that did anyone 
choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing ; 

velit non audiatur), tamen ne quid praetermittamns 

28 rationes quoque cur hoc ita sit afferendas puto. Etsi 
qui potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod Hnimal 
quodseoderit? Res enim concurrent contrariae. Nam 
cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad sc trahere coeperit 
Qonsulto quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum 
id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod 
fieri non potest. Necesseque est si quis ipse sibi 
inimicus est eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona 
contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere et quae 
fugienda appetere ; quae sine dubio vitae est eversio. 
Neque eniin, si aonnulli rcperiuntur qui aut laqueos 
aut alia exitia quaeraat, aut' ille apud Terentium, 
qui decrevit tautisper se minus iniuriae suo nato 
facere (ut ait ipse) dtim tiat miser,' inimicus ipse sibi 

29 putandus est. Sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupidi- 
tate ; iracundia etiam oiulti efferuntur et, cum in 
inala scientes irruunt, turn se optime sibi consulere 
arbitrantur. Itaque dicunt nee dubitant : 

Mihi sic est usus; tibi ut opus est facto, face.' 
Qui ipsi sibi ' bellum indixissent, crucian dies, noetes 
torqueri velJent, nee vero sese ipsi accusarent ob earn 
causam quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicercnt; 
eorum enim est liaec querela qui sibi can sunt sese- 
que diligunt. Quare, quotienscumque dicetur male 

.- aul ut M.SS. ; aut [ut] Mdv, 

' ipsi sibi MSS., tdd.; qvi ipsi s 

i. Perhaps Qui si ipsi sibi ed. 


■ Terence tieautontitnorumenos (The Self- 
b From the sanie play, 1. So. 


nevertheless^ so that no step may be omitted^ I sup- 
pose I ought also to give reasons to show why it is 

28 so. Yet how can you form any intelligible conc«p- for (i) to des 
tion of an animal that should hate itself? The thing fs"Jcontai<S 
is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being tion in terms 
its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke 

of will deliberately set about drawing to itself some- 
thing harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this 
for its own sake ; therefore the animal will both 
hate and love itself at the same time, which is im- 
possible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows 
that he will think good evil and evil good ; that he 
will avoid things that are desirable and seek things 
that ought to be avoided ; but this undeniably would 
mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few 
people may be found who attempt to end their lives 
with a halter or by other means ; but these, or the 
character of Terence* who (in his own words) re- 
solved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made 
less the wrong he did his son/ are not to be put down 

29 as haters of themselves. The motive with some is 
grief, with others passion ; many are rendered insane 
by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, 
fancying all the time that what they do is for their 
own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all 
sincerity : 

It is my way ; do you do as it suits you.*** 


Men who had really declared war against themselves 
would court days of torment and nights of anguish, 
nor would they reproach themselves for having 
done so and say that they had been misguided and 
imprudent : such lamentations show that they love 
and care for themselves. It follows that whenever 



quis de se niercri sibique inimicus esse atque hostis, 

vitam dfnique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse 
eiifSmodi oausam ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi 

) quemque esse carum. Nee vero id satis est, nemi- 
Dem esse qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intelle- 
geiidum est, neniinem esse qui quomodo se habeat 
nihil sua censeat interesse. ToUetur enim appetitus 
animi si, ut in iis rebus inter quas nihil interest 
neutram in partem propensiores sum us, item in 
nobismet ipsis quemadmodiim affecti siraus nihil 
nostra arbitrabimiu- interesse. 

XI, ' Atque ctiam illud si qui die ere vclit, perab- 
surdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque ut ea vis 
ipsum qui sese diligat. Hoc cum in amicitiis, cum 
in olfidis, cum in vlrtutibus dicitiir, quomodocumqoe 
dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest : in 
nobismet ipsis autem ne intellegi quidem ut' 
propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter 
voiuptattm, noE amemus ; propter nos enim illara, 

1 non propter earn nosmet ipsos diligimus. Quain- 
quam quid est quod magis perspicuum sit quam * non 
niodo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer 
earum esse f quis est enim aut quotus quisque cui 
niors cum appropinquet non 

refugiat timido sanguen atque exalbescat metu"? 
Etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae 

' Kg, ut, quam inserted by edJ. 

L IV, 6z. 

e passage of Enniua's AUtnaeon 


BOOK V. x-xi 
it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and 


is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of 
life, you may be sure that there is really an ex- 
planation which would justify the inference, even 
from such a case as this, that every man loves him- (u) nor is any- 

30 self. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists to hte own^ 
who hates himself; we must also realize that no- ^*^i 
body exists who thinks it makes no difference to him 
what his own condition is. For it will be destructive 
of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of 
our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to 
us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality 
which is our attitude towards the things that are 
really indifferent. 

XI. It would also be utterly absurd if any- (m) love of ot 
one desired to maintain that, though the fact of *„ j^^g*;ijj 
self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really self-love; 
directed towards some other object and not towards 
the person himself who feels it. When this is said 
of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether 
correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning ; but 
in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to 
say that we love ourselves for the sake of something 
else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we 
do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but 

5 1 pleasure for the sake of ourselves. Yet what fact is (iv) sdf-iove 
more self-evident than that every man not merely of deathj ««n 
loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed ? ^«^ ^^^^ 
For who is there, what percentage of mankind, 

Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale 
with fear,'* 

at the approach of death ? No doubt it is a fault to 



tam valde perhorrescere (quod item^ est reprehen- 
dendum in dolore) ; sed quia fere sic afficiuntur 
omnes^ satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam ab- 
horrere ; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt ut iure 
etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est 
haec ipsa nimia in qUibusdam futura non fuisse nisi 
quaedam essent modica natura. Nee vero dico 
eorum metum mortis qui, quia privari se vitae bonis 
arbitrentur aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines 
extimescant aut si^ metuant ne cum dolore morian- 
tur, idcirco mortem fugiant ; in parvis enim saepe 
qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes 
minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, extimescunt. Quin 
etiam ferae,* inquit Pacuvius, 
quibus abest ad praecavendum intellegendi astutia/ 
32 iniecto terrore mortis horrescunt/ Quis autem de 
ipso sapiente aliter existimat quin, etiam cum decre- 
verit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque 
ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? Maxime autem 
in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum 
et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur ut vivant, et 
angantur appropinquatione mortis confecti homines 
senectute, et ea perferant quae Philoctetam videmus 
in fabulis ; qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis dolori- 
bus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio ; configebat 
tardus celeres, stans volantes,* ut apud Attium est, 

' item : Mdv. conj. idem, 
^si: Miiller conj. quia, 


BOOK V. xi 
recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being 
(and the same timidity in regard to pain is blai 
worthy) ; but the fact that practically everybody has 
this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks 
from destruction ; and the more some people act thus 
— as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree — the 
more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not 
have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a cer- 
tain moderate degree of such timidity nutural. I am 
not referring to the fear of death felt by those who 
shun death because they believe it means the loss of 
the good things of life, or because they are afraid 
of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest 
death may be painful : for very often young children, 
who do not thinli of any of these things, are terribly 
frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall 
from a height Even ' wild creatures," says Pacuvius, 

when seized with fear of death, bristle with 

I horror.' Who does not suppose that the Wise Man in 
himself, even when he has resolved that he must '" 
die, will yet be affected at parting from his friends 
and quitting the very light of day ? The strength 
of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is 
extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg 
their bread in order that they may live, and men 
broken with age sufiFer anguish at the approach of 
death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes 
in the play; who though racked with intolerable 
pains, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling; 

Slow he pierced the swift i 
Lshot them on the wing/ 

ith I 

, standi! 


pennarumque contentu corpori tegumetita faciebat. 

33 De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium lo- 
quor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura 
sit ? Sive enini, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior 
aliqun causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive 
hoc ita fit fortuito, videmus ea quae terra gignit 
eorticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit 
animalibuE sensuum distributione et quadam com- 
pactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquain 
assentior lis qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si 
natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo 
utquidehocdissentiunt existiment quod velint acvel 
hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, ho- 
minem dicere me ; nihil enim hoc differt. Nam prius 
a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum 
rerum quae sibi conducant amittere. lure igitiir 
gravissimi philosopbi initium summi buni a natura 
petiverunl et ilium appetitum rerum ad naturam 
accommodatarum ingeueratum putavenint omnibus, 
quia continetur^ ea commendatione naturae qua se 
ipsi diligunt. 

34 XII. Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis 
apeilum est sibi quemque natura esse canim, quae 
sit hominis natura. Id est enim de quo quaerimus. 
Atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque 
constare, cum primae sint aninii partes, sceundac 

I ^DSiiV B. E, Mdv. ! fiossinl inf. MSS. 

''quia conlinelur sujigesied by Mdv.. who prints guia 
ctmfintnlHT ; g-ui ronlinentur MSS. ; qui conliiiehir Sch5- 

^M BOOK V. xi-xii 

as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to M the b» 

.'!3 make himself garments. But do 1 speak of the "b^^nn' 
human race or of animals generally, when the nature «nini»'»Mt 
of trees and plants is almost the same ? For whether 
it be, as very learned men have thought^ that this 
capaeity has been engendered in them by some 
higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result 
of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure 
by means of their bark and roots that support and 
protection whieli animals derive from the distribu- 
tion of the sensory organs and irom the well-knit 
framework of the limbs. On this mattei* I agree, it 
is true, with those who hold that all these things 
are regulated by nature, because if nature were to 
neglect them her own existence would be impossible ; 
yet 1 allow those who think otlierwise on this point 
to hold what view they please : whenever 1 men- 
tion 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, 
understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no 
difference. For the individual can no more lose the 
instinct to seek the things that are good for him 
than he can divest himself of hia own personality. 
The wisest authorities have therefore been right in 
Jinding the Imsis of the Chief Good in nature, and in 
holding that this instinctive desire for things suited 
to our nature is innate in all men, because it is 
founded on that natural attraction which makes 
them love themselves. 

:ii XII. "Having made it sufficiently clear that r, 
every one by nature loves himself, we must next ™ 
examine what is the nature of man. For it i."! human 
nature that is the object of our investigation. Now 
it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, 
although the parts of the mind hold the first place 


corporis. Deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figu- 
ratum corpus ut excellat aliis, animumque ita coiisti- 
tutum ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat prae- 
stantiam mentis cui tota hominis natura pareat, in 
qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis 
et scientiae virtutumque omnium. Nam quae corpo- 
ris sunt ea nee auctoritatem cum animi partibus 
comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. 
Itaque ab his ordiamur. 
35 Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et 

forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit apparet, 
neque est dubium quin irons, oculi, aures et reliquae 
partes quales propriae sint hominis intellegatur ; sed 
certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus 
ususque habere, ut nee absit quid eorum nee aegrum 
debilitatumve sit. Id enim natura desiderat. Est 
autem etiam actio quaedam corporis quae motus et 
status naturae congruentes tenet ; in quibus si 
peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam ac 
motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur 
quis aut non ante sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et 
hominem exuens ex homine naturam odisse videatur. 
Quamobrem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fracti- 
que motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium 

esse Solent, contra naturam sunt, ut etiamsi animi 

BOOK V. xii 

and those of the body the second. Next we further 
observe both that man's body is of a structure sur- 
passing that of other animals^ and that his mind is so 
constituted as not only to be equipped with senses 
but also to possess the predominant factor of intel- 
lect, which commands the obedience of the whole 
of man's nature, being endowed with the marvellous 
faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of 
all the virtues. For the attributes of the body are 
not comparable in importance with the parts of the 
mind ; and moreover they are easier to understand. 
We will therefore begin with them. 

It is manifest how well the parts of our body. The bodv: its 
and its entire figure, form and stature are adapted |^es?DdS^ 
to our nature ; and that special conformation of the by its parts, 
brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate 
to man, can be recognized without hesitation by the 
understanding; but of course it is necessary that 
these organs should be healthy and vigorous and 
possessed of their natural motions and uses ; no part 
must be lacking and none must be diseased or en- 
feebled. This is a requirement of nature. Again, 
our body also possesses a faculty of action which 
keeps its motions and postures in harmony with 
nature; and any error in these, due to distortion 
or deformity or abnormality of movement or pos- 
ture, — for example, if a man were to walk on his 
hands, or backwards instead of forwards, — would 
make a man appear alienated from himself, as 
if he had stripped off his proper humanity and 
hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in 
sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such 
as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are 
contrary to nature, and though really arising from a 


vitio id eveniat tamen in corpore mutari hominis 
S6 natura videatur. Itaque e contrario moderati aequa- 
bilesqiie habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apli 
esse ad naturam videntur. 

Ift o animus non esse solum sed etiam cuius- 

dau modi debet esse, ut et omnes partes suas habeat 
n olun et de virtutibus nulla desit. Atque iii 
n bu t sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat 
q o n nu suo sensus qiiisque munere fungatur in 
1 u eleriter expediteque percipiendis quae 
b t nt seiisibus, XIII. Animi autem et eius 
animi p t quae princeps est quaeque mtns nomi- 
natu [ 1 s sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, 
n m mi quae ingenerantur suapte uatura ap- 

p llaiit tfque non voluntariae, alterum ' earum quae 
in lu tate positae magis proprio nomine appellari 
solent, quarum est escellens in animoruin laude prae- 
stantia. Prioris generis est docilitas, meuioria; quae 
fere omnia appellantur uno ingeni nombie, easque 
virtutes qui babent ingeniosi vocantur. Alterum 
autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum 
quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, tem- 
perantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas generis 

J7 " Et summatim quidera haec erant de corpore ani- 
moque dicenda, quibus quasi informatuin est quid 
hominis natura pustulct ; ex quo perspicuum est, 
quoniam ipsi a nobis diligumur omnjaque e 

ilnf. MSS.,Mdv,; 

; et in aniini^^ 


BOOK V. xii-xiii 

defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perver- 
»6 sion of man's nature. And so, on the contrary, a 
controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and 
movement of the body have the appearance of being 
in harmony with nature. 

Turning now to the mind, this must not only The Sense& 
exist, but also be of a certain character; it must 
have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. 
The senses also possess their several virtues or excel- 
lences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of 
their several functions of swiftly and readily per- 
ceiving the objects presented to them. XIII. The The mind, aadi 
mind, on the other hand, and that dominant part of f^*i^n?te!vi2. 
the mind which is called the intellect, possess many "?*«^ctu^ 
excellences . or virtues, but these are of two main pending on vol 
classes ; one class consists of those excellences which vSum!* ' ™°" 
are the result of our natural endowments and which 
are called non- volitional ; and the other of those 
which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 
virtues * in the more special sense ; and the latter are 
the pre-eminent glory and distinction of the mind. 
To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; 
and practically all the excellences of this class are 
included under one name of talent,* and their 
possessors are spoken of as talented.* The other 
class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, 
which we speak of as dependent on volition, for 
instance. Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, 
and the others of the same kind. 
7 Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that Sdf-iovc com- 

it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. S^^tion of ai 
It has indicated in outline what the requirements t*»ese excel- 


of man's nature are ; and it has clearly shown 

that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our 

FF 433 


et in corpore perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa 
cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum 
momenta maxima. Nam cui proposita sit conservatio 
sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse, 
carioresque quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo 
genere laudabiles. Ea enim vita expetitur quae sit 
animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque sum- 
mum bonum poni necesse est, quando quidem id tale 
esse debet ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. 
Quo cognito dubitari non potest quin, cum ipsi 
homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes 
quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum quae 
sunt in utriusque motu et statu sua caritate colantur 
38 et per se ipsae appetantur. Quibus expositis facilis 
est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris 
quae plurimum habent dignitatis, ut optimae cuius- 
que partis quae ^ per se expetatur virtus sit expetenda 
maxime. Ita fiet ut animi virtus corporis virtuti 
anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vin- 
cant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie vir- 
tutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea 
quod*ex ratione gignuntur qua nihil est in homine 
divinius. Etenim omnium rerum quas et creat na- 
tura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt aut non*"^ 
multo secus, earum summum bonum in corpore est; 
ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum 
illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. XIV. Sunt 

' Perhaps quae maxime per se ed, 
* non inserted by edd. 


KOOK V. xiu 
attributes both of mind and body to be perfect, 
oar mind and body are themselves dear to us for 
their own sakes, and are of the highest importance 
for our general well-being. For he who aims at the 
preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affec- 
tion for the parts of himself also, and the more so, 
the more perfect and admirable in their own kind 
they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped 
with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life 
must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must 
necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desir- 
able. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, 
as men feel an affection towards themselves for their 
own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of 
tile body and mind, and of those faculties which arc 
displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are 
esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired 
38 for their own sake. From these explanations, itavtdMym 
may readily be inferred that the most desirable of l^r^ingtoni' 
our attributes arc those possessed of the highest JS^lJ^o, 
intrinsic worth ; so that the most desirable excel- mani 
lences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, 
which are desirable for their own sake. The result 
will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher 
than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues 
of the mind will surpass the non- volitional ; the 
former, indeed, are the virtues' specially so called, 
and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, 
the most divine element in man. For the inanimate 
or nearly inanimate creatures that are under nature's 
charge, all of them have their supreme good in the 
body; hence it has been cleverly said,as I think, about 
the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this 
animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad, 
ffS 435 

autem bestiae qu&edam in quibus inest aliquid simile 
virtutia, ut in leonibus. ut in canthtis. ut^ in equis, 
in quibus non rorporum solum ut in suibus sed etiam 
animoriitn aliqaa ex parte motiis quosdani videmus. 
In hoamie autem somma omnis animi est et in animo 
rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio 
deiiiiitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam 

yfl Earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio 

quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium ; 
itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus, arboremque 
et novellam et vetnlam et vigere el senescere ; ei 
quo non est alienum ut animantibiis sic illis et apts 
quaedam ad naturam putare et aliena, earumquc 
augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, 
quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae cirpum- 
tura ferat eo possint ire ; ut ipsae vites si loqui possint 
ita se tractandas tucndasque esse fateantur. Et nunc 
quidem quod earn tuetuFj «t de vite xwtissimum 
loquar, est id extrinsecus ; in ipsa enim parum magna 
vis inest ut quam optime se liabere possit si nulla 

iO cultiira adhibeatur. At vero si ad vitem sensus ac- 
Cfsserit, ut appetitura quendam habeat et per se 
ipsa moveatur, quid facturam putas? An ea quae 
per vinitorem antea consequebatur per se ipsa cura- 

'u/ inserted by edd. 


e and the doclrii 


w) are Stoic tends foisted on the Peri- 


BOOK V. siv 
XIV. But lh«re are some animals which possess 
something resembling' virtue, for example, h 
dogs and horses ; in these we observe not only bodily 
movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of 
mental activity also. In man, however, the Supreme 
End appertains entirely to the mind, and to the 
rational part of the mind, which is the 
virtue ; and virtue is defined as the perfection of 
reason,' a doctrine which the Peripatetics think can- 
not be expounded too often. 

39 Plants also have a development and progress to but 
maturity that is not unlike that of animals ; hence ^\ 
we speak of a vine as living and dying, or of a tree ^_ 
as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; 
consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with ' 
them as with animals certain things are suited and 
certiain other things foreign to their nature ; and 
that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster- 
mother, the science and art of husbandry, which 
trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, 
enabling them to follow the course that nature pre- 
scribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, 
would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of 
treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, 
the power that tends the vine, to take that parti- 
cular instance, is something outside of it ; for the 
vine does not possess force enough in itself to be 
able to attain its highest possible development with- 

40 out the aid of cultivation. But suppose the vine to 
receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some 
degree of appetition and power of movement; then 
what do you think it will do ? Will it not endeavour 
to provide for itself the benefits which it previously 
obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do 


ihar» with 

bit? Sed videsne accessuram ei curam ut sensus 
quoque suos eonimque omnem appetitum et si qua 
sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? Sic ad ilia quae 
semper habuit iunget ea quae postea nccesserint, 
nee eundem fiiiem habebit quern cultor eius habebat, 
sed volet secundum cam naturam quae postea eiadiun- 
cta erit* vivere. Ita similis erit ei finis boni atque 
antea fuerat, neque idem tamen ; non enim iam stirpis 
bonum quacret sed animalis. Quid si non sensus 
modo ei datus sit verum etiam animus hominis? non 
necesse est et ilia pristiiia manere ut tuenda slnt et 
haec multo esse cariora quae accesserint, animique 
optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque ex- 
pletione naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum 
longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? Sic 
exatitit^ extremum omnium appetendonim atque 
ductum a prima commendatione naturae multis 
grsdibus ascendit ut ad sumroum perveniret, quod 
cutnulatur es integrltate corporis et ex mentis rutione 
I XV. "Cum igitur ea sit quam exposui forma na- 
turae, si ut initio dixi simul atque ortus esset se 
quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset quae vis et 
totius esset naturae et partium singularum, continue 
videret quid esset hoc quod quaerimuB, omnium 
rerum quas expetimus summuni et ultinium, nee 
ulia in re peccare posset. Nunc vero a prime quidem 
mirabiliter occulta natura est nee perspici nee 


»/ MSS., edd.: Mdv. augge 

er; sil MSS.; «^ Mdv. 

t Mdv. i lie tt, sicque, sUgue MSS. 

BOOK V. xiv-xv 

you mark how it will further be concerned to pro- 
tect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive 
instincts^ and any additional organs it may have 
developed? Thus with the properties that it always 
possessed it will combine those subsequently added 
to it, and it will not have the same End as the hus- 
bandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in 
accordance with that nature which it has subsequently 
acquired. And so its End or Goodwill be similar to, but 
not the same as, what it was before ; it will no longer 
seek the Grood of a plant, but that of an animal. Sup- 
pose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely 
sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result 
that while its former properties remain objects of 
its care, these added properties will be far more dear 
to it, and that the best part of the mind will be the 
dearest of all?» Will it not find its End or Chief 
Good in this crowning development of its nature, 
inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away 
the highest faculties that exist ? Thus there has Man't End ti 
emerged the final term of the series of objects of SJhoS bSSig' 
desire; thus guided by the primary attraction of 
nature it has risen by many stages till it has reached 
the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily in- 
tegrity combined with the full development of the 
mental faculty of reason. 

XV. The plan of our nature being then that Man attains < 
which I have explained, if, as I said at the outset, ^wiedge^i 
every man as soon as he is bom could know himself ****°*'^*"' 
and could appreciate the powers of his nature as a 
whole and of its several parts, he would at once per- 
ceive what is this thing that we seek, the highest and 
last of the objects of our desires, and he would be in- 
capable of error in anjrthing. But as it is, our nature 



cognosci potest ; progredienlibus autem aetatibus 
sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cogiioscimus. 
Itaque prima ilia coiiimendatio quae a natura nostri 
facta est nobis ineerta et obscura est, primusque 
appetituE ille animi tan turn agit ot salvi atque 
integri esse possinius; cum autem dispicere ooepi- 
mus,^ et sentire quid simus et quid ab^ animaatibus 
ceteris difieramus, turn ea seqtii ineipimus ud quae 
42 Dati sumus. Quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, 
quae primo in quo loco natae sunt ex eo se non 
commovent; deindc sno quaeque appetitu niovetur; 
serpcre anguiculos, nare anaticulas, evoliire menilas, 
cornibus uti videmus boves, nepas aculeis, suam 
denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. 
Quae similitude in genere etiam humuno apparet, 
Farvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino 
sine aniino sint; cum autem pauium lirmitatis acces- 
sit,^ et animo utuntur et sensibus, conitanturque 
sese ut erigant, et manibus utuntur, et eos agno- 
seunt a quibus educantur; deinde aequalibus dele- 
ctantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque 
se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur, 
deque eo quod ipsis superat aliis gratificari volimt] 
animadvertuntque ea quae domi fiunt curiosius, 
incipiuntque commcntari aliquid et discere, et eorum 
quos vident volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque 
rebus cum aequalibus decertant si vicerunt efTerunt 
se laetitia, victi debilitantur aniniosque demittunt; 

' cocpimus Mdv. wUh some MSS. (cp. 42 arcessil), coeptri- 
mm B, E. 
'aS added by edd. 

inf. MSS. . 


«^f^ I 


at the beginning is curiously hidden from us« and we 
cannot fully realize or understand it ; yet as we grow 
older we gradually or I should say tardily come, as it 
were, to know ourselves. Accordingly, the earliest 
feeling of attraction which nature has created in us 
towards ourselves is vague and obscure, and the 
earliest instinct of appetition only strives to secure 
our safety and freedom from injury. When, however, 
discernment dawns and we begin to perceive what 
we are and how we differ from the rest of living 
creatures, we then commence to pursue the objects 
4-2 for which we are intended by nature. Some re- 
semblance to this process we observe in the lower 
animals. At first they do not move from the place 
where they were born. Then they begin to move, 
under the influence of their several instincts of 
appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings 
swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, 
scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own 
nature as its guide to life. A similar process is 
clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born 
lie as if absolutely inanimate; when they have 
acquired some small degree of strength, they exer- 
cise their mind and their senses; they strive to 
stand erect, they use their hands, they recogni/.e 
their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society 
of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they 
take part in games and love to hear stories; they 
desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty 
to others ; they take a keen interest in what g«(!s on 
in the household; they begin to reflect and to learn, 
and want to know the names of the people they 
see ; in competition with their companions they are 
elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by 



43 quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum 
enim natura sic generata vis hominis ut b 
virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque 
causam parvi virtu turn simulacris quarum in se 
habent semina sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim 
prima elements naturae, quibus auctis virtutis quasi 
germen ' efficitur. Nam cum ita nati factique simus 
ut et agendi aliquid et ditigendi aliquos et liberali- 
tatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contine- 
remus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitndinem 
aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, 
noTi sjncf causa eas quas dixi in pueris virtutum quasi 
scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosopbi ratio 
debet, ut earn quasi deum ducem subsequens ad 
naturae perveniat extremum. Nam ut saepe iam 
disi in iufirmft aetate irabecillaque mente vis uaturae 
quasi per caliginem cernitur ; cum autem progrediens 
confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem naturae 
vira, sed ita ut progredi possit longius, per se sit 
tantum inchoata. 

44. XVI. Intrandum igitur est in rerura naturam et 
penitus quid ea postulet pervidendom ; aliter enim 
nosmet ipsos nosse non possiimus. Quod praeceptum 
quia maius erat quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco 
assignatum est deo. lubet igitur nos Pytbiu3 Apollo 
noscere nosmet ipsos ; cognitio autem haec est u na 
nostri ut vim corporis animique norimus sequai 
que earn vitam quae rebus iis ' perfruatur. 




. §46 and IV, 28. 
l,E; rebus ifisis inf. MSS. ; [rebus] 

a Mdv. J /c 

BOOK V. xv-xvi 

defeat. For every stage of this development there 
^3 must be supposed to be a reason. It is that human (but the germ 
capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears ^^^^ 
designed to achieve every kind of virtue ; hence ^ ^®i^5^* 
children, without instruction, are actuated by sem- 
blances of the virtues, of which they possess in them- 
selves the seeds, for those are primary elements of 
our nature, which seeds sprout and blossom into 
virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to 
contain within us the primary instincts of activity, of 
affection, of liberality and of gratitude ; we are also 
gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, 
prudence and courage, and averse from their oppo- 
sites; hence we see the reason why we observe in 
children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, 
from which the philosopher's torch of reason must 
be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine 
guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have 
repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity 
and intellectual weakness the powers of our nature 
are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind 
grows older and stronger it leanis to know the 
capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this 
nature is susceptible of further development and has 
by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 
\f XVI. We must therefore penetrate into the To know our- 
nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly whole o?natun 
its requirements ; otherwise we cannot know our- must be studie- 
selves. That precept was too high for man's dis- 
cernment, and was therefore ascribed to a god. It 
is therefore the Pythian Apollo who bids us* know 
ourselves' ; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to 
know the powers of body and of mind, and to follow 
the path of life that gives us their full realization. 


"Quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuil, 
lit eaquae dixi quam perfectissimanaturahaberemus, 
confitendum est, cum id adepti sinius quod appctitum 
sit, in eo quasi in ultimo consistere naturam alque 
id esse summum bonum ; quod certe universum sua 
sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quo- 
niam ante demon stratum estetiamsingulaseius partes 
esse per se expeteiidas. 

i ' In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis 
praetermissara a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud 
Icmpus ea quaestio differatur. Utrum enim sit volu- 
ptas in iis rebus quas primas secundum naturam esse 
dbdmus necne sit, ad id quod agimus nihil interest. 
Si enim, ut mllii quidem videtur, non explet bona 
naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem 
est in ea quod quidam volunt, nihil impedit hane 
nostram compreliensionem summi buni ; quae enim 
constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas acces- 
serit, unum aliquod aecesserit commodum corporis 
ueque earn constitutionem summi boni quae est pro- 
posita mutaverit. 

J XVII. Et udlinc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio 
est ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione 
naturae. Nunc autem aliud ium argumentandi se- 
quamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus sed 
quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in 
animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe' 
'' sutnmc edd.j suni'ma MSS. 


BOOK V. xvi-xvii 


Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire The perfectioi 
was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their siins thwfa 
fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, the chief Goo< 
when we have attained the object of our desire, our 
nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and 
this constitutes our Chief Good ; and that this End 
as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and 
for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the 
several parts of it also have already been proved to 
be desirable for themselves. 

If however anyone thinks that our enumeration (it is immater 
of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the ^ or i&votS- 
omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to S"^^ "* £|^ 
another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one good.) 
of the objects we have called the primary things in 
accordance with nature makes no difference for our 
present inquiry. If, as I hpld, pleasure adds nothing 
to the sum-total of nature's goods, it has rightly been 
omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess 
the property that some assign to it, this fact does 
not impair the general outline we have just given of 
the Chief Good ; since if to the primary objects of 
nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, 
this only adds one more to the list of bodily advan- 
tages, and does not alter the interpretation of the 
Chief Good which has been propounded. 

XVII. So far as our argument has proceeded (B) The perfec 
hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary t?^^%^il\ 
attractions of nature. But from this point on let us man's natare 
adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show its own sake. 
that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the 
fact that each part of our nature, both mental and 
bodily, possesses its own peculiar energy goes to prove 
that the activity of our several parts * is pre-eminently 



nostra sponte moveamur. Atque ut a corpore ordiar, 
videsne ut si quae in membris prava aut debilitata 
aut imminuta sint occultent homines ? ut etiam con- 
tendant et elaborent, si effieere possint, ut aut non 
appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum ap- 
pareatj multosque etiam dolores curationis causa 
perferant ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non 
maior verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen 
species ad naturam revertatur ? Etenim cum omnes 
natura totos se expetendos putent, nee id ob aliam 
rem sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partes 
propter se expeti quod universum propter se expe- 
47 tatur. Quid ? in motu et in statu corporis nihil inest 
quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? 
quemadmodum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, 
qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus 
quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? 
Nonne odio multos dignos putamus qui quodam 
motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum 
contempsisse ? Et quoniam haec deducuntur de 
corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam 
ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur ? Nam si pravita- 
tem imminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam 
putamus, cur non etiam, ac fortasse magis, propter 
se formae dignitatem sequamur ? Et si turpitudinem 
fugimus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pul- 
chritudinem non sequamur ? Atque etiam vale- 
tudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter 
utilitatem solum sed etiani ipsas propter se ex- 

BOOK V. xvii 

spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice The body: 
how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed and hc^o^^ 
limb ? They actually take great pains and trouble ^^jjj^^*^®^^ 
to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, 
or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible ; 
they even undergo painful courses of treatment in 
order to restore the natural appearance of their 
limbs, even though the actual use of them will not 
only not be improved but- will even be diminished. 
In fact, since every man instinctively thinks thjat he 
himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and 
this not for the sake of anything else but for his own 
sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a 
whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing 
are desired for their own sakes. Again, is there 
nothing in the movements and postures of the body 
which Nature herself judges to be of importance ? A 
man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular 
cast of features and expression ? is there nothing in 
these things that we consider worthy or unworthy 
of a free man ? Do we not often think people 
deserving of dislike, who by some movement or 
posture appear to have violated a law or principle of 
nature ? And since people try to get rid of these 
defects of bearing, why should not even beauty 
have a good claim to be considered as desirable 
for its own sake ? For if we think imperfection or 
mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their 
own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps 
still greater reason pursue dignity of form for its 
own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily 
movement and posture, why should we not pursue 
beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom 
from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility 


pet emus. Qiioniam eniin natura suis omnibus 
e.xpleri partilius vult, hunp statuni corporis per se 
ipsiim pxpetit qui est maxime e natiira, quae tota 
perturbatur si aut aegruni corpus est aitt dolet aul 
caret viribus. 

48 XVIII, Videamus aiiimi partes, quarum est con- 
spectus illustrior; quae quo sunt e^fcelsiores, eo dant 
clariora indicia naturae. Tantus est igitur iunutus in 
nobis cognitionis amor et seientiae ut nemo dubitare 
possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo eniolu< 
mento invitata rapiatur. Videmusne ut pueri ne ver- 
lieribus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendis- 
que deterreantur ? ut pulsi reciirrant? ut aliquid scire 
se gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, 
ludis atque eiusmodi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque 
rem vel famem et sitim perferant? Quid vero? qui 
ingenuis stiidiis atque artibus delectaiitur, nonne 
videmus eos nee valetudinis nee rei famitiiiris habere 
rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia 
captos et cum curis et laboribus compensare 

49 eani quam ex discendo capiant voluptatem? Mihi 
qtiideni Humerus huiusmodi quiddam vidisse videtur 
in lis quae de Sirenum caiitibus finxerit.' Neque 
enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam 
et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae qui prae- 
tervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, 
ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate ad- 

^Jinxerit inf. MSS.; others finxil (perliaps nglitly Mdv.); 

BOOK V. xvii-xvui 

but also for their own sakes. For since our nature 
aims at the full development of all its parts, she 
desires for its own sake that state of body which is 
most in accordance with himself; because she is 
thrown into utter disorder if the body is. diseased or 
in pain or weak. 
i8 XVIII. Let us consider the parts of the mind, The mind: (i) 
which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, facu^yTknow 
the more unmistakable indications of nature do ledge attractiv 

apart from 

they afford. So great is our innate love of learning its utiuty: 
and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that 
man's nature is strongly attracted to these things 
even without the lure of any profit. Do we 
notice how children cannot be deterred even by 
punishment from studying and inquiring into the 
world around them ? Drive them away, and back 
they come. They delight in knowing things ; they 
are eager to impart their knowledge to others ; 
pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them 
spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger 
and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, 
take persons who delight in the liberal arts and 
studies ; do we not see them careless of health or 
business, patiently enduring any inconvenience 
when under the spell of learning and of science, 
and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the 
^9 pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge ? For 
my part I believe Homer had something of this sort 
in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the 
Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of 
their voices or the novelty and diversity of their 
songs, but their professions of knowledge that used 
to attract the passing voyagers ; it was the passion 
for learning that kept m^n rooted to the Sirens* 
GO 449 


haerescerent. Ita enim invitant Ulixem (nam verti, 
ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum) : 

O decus Argolicum, quin puppim flectis, Ulixes, 
Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus ? 
Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula 

Quin prius astiterit vocum dulcedine captus^ 
Post, variis avido satiatus pectore musis, 
Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. 
Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, 
Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, 
Omniaque e latis rerum vestigia terns. 

Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse si canti- 
unculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur ; scientiam 
pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido 
patria esse^ cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire 
cuiuscumquemodi sint cupere curiosorum, duci vero 
maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem sci- 
entiae summorum virorum est putandum. 
50 XIX. Quem enim ardorem studi censetis fuisse in 
Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit 
attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse senserit ! 
quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus 
in musicis ! quo studio Aristophanem putamus aeta- 
tem in litteris duxisse I Quid de Pythagora, quid 
de Platone aut de Democrito loquar? a quibus 
propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras 
esse peragratas. Quae qui non vident^ nihil um- 
quam magnum ac^ cognitione dignum amavenint 

^ esse most MSS. omit. 

^ magnum ac Bremius, Mdv. ; magna MSS. 

* Odyssey, 12, 184 IF. 

BOOK V. xviii-xix 

rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses 
(for I have translated this among other passages of 
Homer) : 

Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark 
And listen to our music. Never yet 
Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed 
His course, enchanted by our voices sweet. 
And having filled his soul with harmony, 
Went on his homeward way a wiser man. 
We know the direful strife and clash of war 
That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, 
And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls.* 

Homer was aware that his story would not sound plau- 
sible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was 
the charm of mere melody ! It is knowledge that the 
Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom 
held this dearer than his home. An itch for miscel- 
laneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a 
mere dilettante ; but it must be deemed the mark 
of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation 
of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 

XIX. What an ardour for study, think you, pos- 
sessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram 
he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even 
of the capture of his native city ! What genius do 
we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of 
music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Ari- 
stophanes devoted to literature ! Why should I speak 
of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus ? For they, 
we are told, in their passion for learning travelled 
through the remotest parts of the earth ! Those 
who are blind to these facts have never been en- 
amoured of some high and worthy study. And 
oo2 451 

Atque hoc loco qui propter animi voluptates coli 
dicunt ea studia quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco 
esse ea propter se expetenda quod nulla utilitate 
obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia etiamsi 

51 incommodatura sit gaudeant. Sed quid attinet de 
rebus tarn apertis plura requirere ? Ipsi enim quae- 
ramus a nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque 
rerum caelestium eorumque omnium quae naturae 
obscuritate occultantur cognitiones quemadmodum 
nos moveant, et quid historia delectet quam solemus 
persequi usque ad extremum, praetermissa repeti- 
mus, inchoata persequimur. Nee' vero sum nescius 
esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. 
Quid cum fictas fabulas e quibus utilitas nulla elici 

52 potest cum voluptate legimus ? Quidr cum volumus 
nomina eorum qui quid gesserint nota nobis esse, 
parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime neces- 
saria ? Quid quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe 
rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur 
historia ? maximeque eos videre possumus res gestas 
audire et legere velle qui a spe gerendi absunt con- 
fecti senectute. Quocirca intellegi necesse est in 
ipsis rebus quae discuntur et cognoscuntur invita- 
menta inesse quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque 

53 moveamur. Ac ve teres quidem philosophi in beato- 

rum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, 

BOOK V. xix 
those who in this conaexiou allege that the studies 
I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental 
pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be 
desirable for their own sake by the very fact that 
the mind feels delight in them when no bait of 
advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the 
mere possession of knowledge even though it is 
likely to he a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 

51 But what is the point of inquiring further into 
matters so obvious i Let us ask ourselves the ques- 
tion, what feelings are produced in us hy the motions 
of the stars and by contemplating tile ileavenly 
bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms 
of nature ; what pleasure we derive from books on 
history, which we are so fond of perusing to the very 
last page, turning back to parts we have omitted, 
and pushing on to the end when we have once he- 
gun. Not that I am unaware that history js useful 
as well as entertaining. But what of our reading 

52 fiction, from which no utUity can he extracted? What 
of our eagerness to learn the names of people who 
have doue something notable, their parentage, birth- 
place, and many quite unimportant details beside? 
What of the delight that is taken in history by men 
of the humblest station, who have no expectation of 
participating in public life, even mere artisans ? Also 
we may notice that the persons most eager to hear 
and read of public affairs are those who arc debarred 
by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking 
part in them. Hence we are forced to infer tliat 
the objects of study and knowledge contain in them- 
selves the allurements that entice us to study and to 

53 learning. The old philosophers picture what the life 
of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and 



quos cura omni liberates, nullum necessarium vitae 
cultum aut paratum requirentes, nihil aliud acturos 
putant nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo 
in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non 
solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus 
sed etiam levamentum miseriarum ; itaque multi 
cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, 
multi in custodia, multi in exsilio dolorem suum 

54 doetrinae studiis levarunt. Prineeps huius civitatis 
Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, 
ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. 
Qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te horta- 
mur excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa 
praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum 
aliquem suum quo erat orbatus ; sed animi cultus 
ille erat ei -quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. Equi- 
dem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis 
capto, saepe audiebam cum se lucis magis quam utili- 
tatis desiderio moveri diceret. Somnum denique 
nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quan- 
dam laboris afFerret, contra naturam putaremus 
datum ; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit om- 
nem ; itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret 
aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile 
pateremur, qui etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendi- 
que causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere 

5 5 XX. " Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua 
minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime scilicet 

BOOK V. xix-xx 

imag^e them released from all anxiety, needing none 
of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, and 
with nothing else to do but to spend their whole time 
upon study and research in the science of nature. We on 
the other hand see in such studies not only the amuse- 
ment of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of 
misfortune ; hence the numbers of men who when they 

, had £sillen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or 
when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their 

)4 sorrow with the pursuit of learning. Demetrius of 
Phalerum, the ruler of this city, when unjustly 
banished from his country, repaired to the court of 
King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the 
very system of philosophy which we are recommend- 
ing to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed 
the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a 
number of excellent treatises, not for any practical 
use in his own case, for from this he was debarred ; 
but he found a sort of food for his intellectual tastes 
in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently 
heard the blind ex-praetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufi- 
dius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more 
than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the 
gift of sleep : did it hot bring us repose for our bodies 
and an antidote to labour, we should think it a viola- 
tion of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely 
suspends our activity ; so that if our nature did not 
require repose or could obtain it in some other man- 
ner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even 
as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost 
to the point of doing violence to nature, in the in- 
terests of business or of study. 

5 XX. " Even more striking, and in fact absolutely (U) the moral 
obvious and convincing natural indications are not Sf Swity^ 

455 universaL 

ill bomine sed in omni animali, nt appetat animus 
agere semper aliquki neqiie iilla condicione quietem 
senipiternam possit pati. Facile est hoc cernere in 
pi'imis puerorum aetatulis. Quamijuam enini vereor 
ne niniius in hoc genere videar, tamen omaes veteres 
philof^ophi, maxiiue nostri, ad incuuabul» accedunt, 
quod^ ill pueritia facillime se arbitrentur naturae 
voluntatem posse eogiioscere. Videmus igitur ut 
conquiescere ne infantes quidem possiut; cum vero 
paulum protesserunt, lusionibus vel laboriosis dele- 
ctantuTj ut ne verberibus (juideni deterreri possint. 
Eaque cupiditus agendi aliquid adulescit una cum 
aetatibus. Itaque ne si iucundissimis quidem nos 
soniniis usuros putemus, End^mionis sonmum nobis 
velimus dari, idque si accidat mortis instar putemus. 

56 Quin etiam inertissimos homines, nescio qua singu- 
lari nequitia praeditos, videmus tamen et corpore et 
animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur 
necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerete quem- 
piam ludum aut sermon em aliquem require re, cumque 
non habeant ingeuuas ex doctrinaoblectationes, circu- 
losaliquos et sessiunculas consectari. Ne bestiae qui- 
dem quas delectationis causa conoludimus, cum copio- 
sius alantur quam si essent liberae, faeile patiuntur 
sese contineri, motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi 

57 tributos requirunt, Itaque ut quisqiie optime natus 
institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita si gerendis 
negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. 


. arhlt. 

ren«.r inf. MSS., Mullerj 

r- . . orbilriml«r B, E, Mdv. 


. MSS. 

, Mdv.i gui» Ht B, gkin ie 



wanting^ more particularly no doubt in man, but 
also in every living creature, of the presence of a 
positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual re- 
pose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact 
that may be readily detected in children of the 
tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay un- 
due stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the 
older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more 
than others, go to the nursery, because they believe 
that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in 
childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of 
keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced 
age delight in games involving considerable exertion, 
from which not even fear of punishment can restrain 
them. And this passion for activity grows as they 
grow older. The prospect of the most delightful 
dreams would not reconcile us to falling asleep for 
ever: Endymion's fate we should consider an exact 

56 image of death. Observe the least energetic among 
men : even in a notorious idler both mind and body 
are constantly in motion ; set him free from unavoid- 
able occupations, and he calls for a dice-board, goes 
off to some sport, or looks for somebody to chat with, 
seeking at the club or at some trivial social gather- 
ing a substitute for higher and more intellectual 
amusements. Even the wild animals that we keep in 
cages for our entertainment find their captivity irk- 
some, although they are better fed than if they were 
at large ; they miss their natural birthright of free and 

)7 untranmielled movement. Hence the abler and 
more accomplished a man is, the less he would care 
to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in 
affairs, although allowed to consume an unlimited 
supply of pleasures. Men of ability either choose 


Nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt^ aut qui 
altiore animo sunt capessunt rem publicam honoribus 
imperiisque adipiscendis, aut totos se ad studia do- 
ctrinae conferunt ; qua in vita tantum abest ut volu- 
ptates consectentur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigi- 
lias perferunt, optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis 
divina ducenda est, ingeni et mentis acie fruuntur, 
nee voluptatem requirentes nee fugientes laborem; 
nee vero intermittunt aut admirationem earum rerum 
quae sunt ab antiquis repertae aut investigationem 
novarum; quo studio cum satiari non possint,^ om- 
nium ceterarum rerum obliti nihil abiectum, nihil 
humile cogitant; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, 
ut eos etiam qui sibi alios proposuerunt fines bonorum, 
quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus 
quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere 
58 XXI. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum 
esse natos. Actionum autem genera plura, ut ob- 
scurentur etiam maioribus minora, maximae autem 
sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis quorum 
nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque 
rerum caelestium et earum quas a natura occultatas 
et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publi- 
carum administratio aut administrandi scientia, turn 
prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio, reliquaeque 
virtutes et actiones virtntibus congruentes, quae uno 
verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus ; ad quorum 
^ possint Ernesti, Miiller ; possunt MSS., Mdv. 

a A reference to the Epicureans' interest in natural 
science, illustrated by Lucretius. 


BOOK V. xx-xxi 

a life of private activity, or, if of loftier ambition, 
aspire to a public career of political or military office, 
or else they devote themselves entirely to study and 
learning; and the devotees of learning are so far 
from making pleasure their aim, that they actually 
endure care, anxiety and loss of sleep, and in the 
exercise of the noblest part of man's nature, the 
divine element within us (for so we must consider 
the keen edge of the intellect and the reason), they 
ask for no pleasure and avoid no toil; they are 
ceaselessly occupied in marvelling at the discoveries 
of the ancients or in pursuing new researches of their 
own; insatiable in their appetite for study, they 
forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or 
mean thought. So potent is the spell of these pur- 
suits, that even those who profess to follow other 
Ends of Goods, defined by utility or pleasure, may 
yet be seen to spend their whole lives in investigating 
and unfolding the processes of nature.* 
>8 XXI. It is therefore at all events manifest that The virtues .- 
we are designed by nature for activity. Activities pJl^^^s"" 
are of various kinds, so much so that the more im- instincts by 
portant actually eclipse the less ; but the most developed by 
important are, first (according to my own view and ^®**^- 
that of those with whose system we are now occu- 
pied) the contemplation and the study of the 
heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of 
nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate ; 
secondly, the practice and the theory of politics ; 
thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, 
Bravery and Justice, with the remaining virtues and 
the activities consonant therewith, all of which we 
may sum up under the single term of Morality ; 
towards the knowledge and practice of which, when 



et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa 
praeeunte deducimur. Omnium enim rerum prin- 
cipia parva sunt^ sed suis progressionibus usa augen- 
tur ; nee sine causa ; in primo enim ortu inest 
teneritas ae moUitia quaedam, ut nee res videre 
optimas nee agere possint. Virtutis enim beataeque 
vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen 
apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint 
intellegantur. Praeelare enim Plato: Beatum cui 
etiam in senectute contigerit ut sapientiam verasque 
opiniones assequi possit ! * Quare quoniam de primis 
naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus 

59 consequentibusque videamus. Natura igitur corpus 
quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit ut alia in 
primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate finge- 
ret, neque sane multum adiumentis externis et 
adventiciis uteretur ; animum autem reliquis rebus 
ita perfecit ut corpus ; sensibus enim ornavit ad res 
percipiendas idoneis ut nihil aut non multum adiu- 
mento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent ^ ; quod 
autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum 
est, id deseruit. Etsi dedit talem mentem quae 
omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine 
doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi 
instituit docere, et induxit in ea quae inerant 
tamquam elementa virtutis. Sed virtutem ipsam 

60 inchoavit ; nihil amplius. Itaque nostrum est (quod 
nostrum dico, artis est) ad ea principia quae accepi- 

^ indigerent Bremi ; indigeret Mdv. with MSS. 

a Plato, Laws 653A. 

BOOK V. xxi 

we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by 
nature's own guidance. All things are small in their 
first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass 
through their regular stages of progress. And there 
is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of 
birth we possess a certain weakness and softness 
which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. 
The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things 
most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later 
still comes a fiiU understanding of their nature. 
' Happy the man/ Plato well says, who even in old 
age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom 
and true opinions.** Therefore since enough has 
been said about the primary goods of nature, let us 
now consider the more important things that follow 

>9 later. In generating arid developing the human 
body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts 
perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it 
grew up, without making much use of external and 
artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed 
with Its remaining faculties in the same perfection as 
the body, equipping it with senses already adapted 
to their function of perception and requiring little or 
no assistance of any kind to complete their develop- 
ment; but the highest and noblest part of man's 
nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an 
intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and im- 
planted in it at birth and without instruction 
embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the 
foundation of its education, and introducing it to the 
elements of virtue, if I may so call them, which it 
already possessed. But of virtue itself she merely 

50 gave the germ and no more. Therefore it rests 
with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our 



mus consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id quod 
volumus efFectum ; quod quidem pluris est haud 
paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam 
aut sensus aut corporis ea quae diximus, quibus 
tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio ut vix 
cogitari possit quid intersit. Itaque omnis honos^ 
omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad 
eas actiones quae virtuti consentaneae sunt refertur, 
eaque omnia quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita 
geruntur uno nomine honesta dieuntur. 

Quorum omnium quae sint notitiaequaeque signi- 
ficentur rerum^ vocabulis quaeque cuiusque vis et 

61 natura sit mox videbimus ; XXII. hoc autem loco 
tantum explicemus, haec honesta quae dico, praeter- 
quam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus^ praeterea suapte 
natura per se esse expetenda. Indicant pueri, in 
quibus ut in speculis natura cemitur. Quanta studia 
decertantium sunt ! quanta ipsa certamina ! ut illi 
efFeruntur laetitia cum vicerunt ! ut pudet victos ! ut 
se accusari nolunt I quam cupiunt laudari ! quos illi 
labores non ^ perferunt ut aequalium principes' sint ! 
quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae 
referendae gratiae cupiditas ! Atque ea in optima 
quaque indole maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta 
quae intellegimus a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 

62 Sed haec in pueris ; expressa vero in iis aetatibus 
quae iam confirmatae sunt. Quis est tam dissimilis 

^ significentur rerum inf. MSS., Mdv. ; significent rerum, 
B, £ ; Mdv. conj. significentur eorum ; Davis quibusque 
significentur [rerum], 

* non bracketed by Mdv. 

a Viz. § 67. 

BOOK V. xxi-xxu 

science), in addition to the elementary principles 
bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical develop- 
ments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is 
much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable 
than either the senses or the endowments of the 
body above alluded to ; since those are surpassed 
in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless 
perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, 
all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed towards 
virtue and towards the actions in harmony with 
virtue, and all such properties and processes of the 
mind are entitled by the single name of Moral 

" The connotation of all these conceptions and the ^°^^*^®!j!JJ 
signification of the terms that denote them, and their proved from {, 
several values and natures we shall study shortly^; ^dren"*^'°^ 

)1 XXII. for the present let us merely explain that this 
Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, 
not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsi- 
cally and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by 
children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. 
How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce 
their contests and competitions ! what exultation 
they feel when they win, and what shame when 
they are beaten ! How they dislike blame ! how they 
covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to 
stand first among their companions ! how good their 
memory is for those who have shown them kindness, 
and how eager they are to repay it! And these 
traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in 
which the moral excellences, as we understand them, 

l2 are already roughly outlined by nature. But this (^) pop^^^ 
belongs to childhood ; the picture is filled in at the 
age when the character is fully formed. Who is 



homini qui non moveatur et ofFensione turpitudinis 
et comprobatione honestatis ? quis est qui non oderit 
libidinosam^ protervam adulescentiam ? quis contra in 
ilia aetate pudorem^ constantiam^ etiamsi sua nihil 
intersit, non tamen diligat ? quis Pullum Numitorium 
Fregellanum proditorem, quamquam rei publicae no- 
strae profuit, non odit? quis huius^ urbis conserva- 
torem Codrum, quis Erechthei filias non maxime 
laudat ? cui Tubuli nomen odio non est ? quis Aristi- 
dem non mortuum diligit ? An obliviscimur quanto 
opere in audiendo in^ legendoque moveamur cum 
pie^ cum amice^ cum magno animo aliquid factum 
6S cognoscimus ? Quid loquor de nobis qui ad laudem 
et ad decus nati, suscepti, instituti sumus? qui 
clamores vulgi atque imperitorum excitantur in the- 
atris, cum ilia dicuntur : 

Ego sum Orestes, 

contraque ab altero : 

Immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes ! 

Cum autem etiam^ exitus ab utroque datur contur- 
bato errantique regi : 

Ambo ergo una necarier precamur, 

quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus 
maximis? Nemo est igitur quin hanc afFectionem 
animi probet atque laudet qua non modo utilitas 
nulla quaeritur sed contra utilitatem etiam conserva- 
64 tur fides. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae 
verum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem 

* huitis inserted by MuUer, sug-g-ested by Mdv. 
^tn Mdv. brackets. 

a Cf. II, 79, note. 

BOOK V. xxii 

so unlike a human being as to feel no repulsion at 
baseness and no approval for goodness? Who is 
there that does not hate a youth spent in debauchery 
and wantonness? Who on the contrary would not 
esteem modesty and orderliness in the young, even 
though he has no personal concern in them ? 
Who does not hate the traitor Pullus Numitorius of 
Fregellae, although he did a service to our country ? 
Who does not praise and extol Codrus, the preserver 
of this city, or honour the daughters of Erechtheus ? 
or loathe the very name of Tubulus ? or love the 
memory of Aristides? Do we forget the strong 
emotion that we feel when we hear or read of some 
6S deed of piety, of friendship or of magnanimity ? But 
I need not speak of ourselves, whose birth, breeding 
and education point us towards glory and towards 
honour ; think of the uneducated multitude, — what 
a tempest of applause rings through the theatre at 
the words : 

I am Orestes, 

and at the rejoinder : 

No, no, *tis I, I say, I am Orestes. 

And then when each offers a solution to the king in 
his confusion and perplexity : 

Then prithee slay us both ; we'll die together : 

as often as this scene* is acted, does it ever fail to 
arouse the greatest enthusiasm ? This proves that all 
men without exception approve and applaud the dis- 
position that not only seeks no advantage for itself, 
but is loyal and true even to its own disadvantage. 
5* These high examples crowd the pages not only of 
romance but also of history, and especially the history 
HH 465 


maxime nostrae. Nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda 
• optimum virum delegimus ; nos tutores regibus misi- 
mus ; nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita 
voverunt ; nostri consules regem inimicissimum 
moenibus iam appropinquantem monuerunt a veneno 
ut caveret ; nostra in re publica et quae per vim 
oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa 
est et qui filiam interficeret ne stupraretur ; quae 
quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est 
quin intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore 
ductos immemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque 
cum ea laudemus nulla alia re nisi honestate duel ? 

XXIII. Quibus rebus breviter expositis (nee 
enim sum copiam quam potui, quia dubitatio in .re 
nulla erat, persecutus), sed his rebus concluditur 
profecto et virtutes onmes et honestum illud quod 
ex iis oritur et in illis haeret per se esse expetendum. 
65 In omni autem honesto de quo loquimur nihil est 
tam illustre nee quod latius pateat quam coniunctio 
inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas 
et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis 
humani; quae nata a primo satu^ quod a procreatori- 
bus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe 
coniungitur^ serpit sensim foras^ cognationibus pri- 
mum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicini- 

a Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, chosen,*in obedience to 
an oracle, as man of blameless life, to receive \he iinage of 
Pyl^ele, which was brought from Phrygia to Rome 204 B.C. 

^ M. Aemilius Lepldus administered Egypt, on the death 
of King Ptolemy Epiphanes, 181 B.C., as guardian of his 

c The Decii, cp. II, 61. 

<^C. Fabricius artd Q. Aemilius Papius, 278 B.C., warned 
Pyrrhus that his physician had offered to poison him. 

e Lucretia, cp. II, 66. ' Virgin|us, ibfd, 


BOOK V. xnii-)(xiii 
of our own country. It was we who chose our most 
virtuous citizen' to receive the sacred emblems from 
Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes;'' our 
generals' sacrificed their lives to save their country ; 
our consuls'* warned the king who was their bitterest 
foe, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his 
guard against poison ; in our commonwealth was 
found the lady' who expiatt-d her outraged honour 
by a self-sought death, and the father' who killed 
his daughter to save her from slinme. Who is there 
who cannot see that all these deeds and countless 
others besides were done by men who were inspired 
by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all 
thought of interest, and are praised by us from no 
other consideration but that of Moral Worth ? 

XXIII. "The considerations thus briefly set «"t l?^,*^"^' 
(for I have not aimed at such a fiiU account as I ^d eitemal 
might have given, since the matter admitted of no e«pdi. ^_ 
uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the ^^M 

undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the ^^M 

Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres || 

> in them, are intrinsically desirable. But in thd jusiiceiiHina- 
whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there ^i^^^'ijSdH' 
is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than «1=1«'. 
the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance 
and partnership of interests and that actual affection 
which exists between man and man, which, coming 
into existence immediately upon our btrth, owing to . 
the fact that children are loved by their parents and 
the family as a whole, is bound together by tlie ties 
of marriage and parenthood^ gradually spreads its 
influence beyond the home, first by blood relation- 
ships, then by connections through marriage, later by 
friendshipB,afterwards by the bondsof neighbourhood, 
hh2 *67 

tatibus^ turn civibus et iis qui publice socii atque 
amici sunt^ deinde totius complexu gentis humanae ; 
quae animi afFectio suum cuique tribuens atque banc 
quam dico societatem coniunctionis humanae muni- 
fice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiun- 
ctae pietas, bonitas^ liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, 
quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. Atque haec ita 
iustitiae propria sunt ut sint virtutum reliquarum 

66 communia. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata 
sit ut habeat quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque 
populare, quod Graeci ttoXitikov vocant, quidquid 
aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam 
exposui caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, 
vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras 
virtutes, sic illas expetet. Servari enim iustitia nisi 
a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. Qualis est 
igitur omnis haec quam dico conspiratio consensus- 
que virtutum,-- tale est illud ipsum honestum ; quando 
quidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta 
virtute ; quibus rebus vita consentiens virtutibusque 
respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae 
congruens existimari potest. 

67 ^' Atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum 

tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. 

Nam cum ita copulatae connexaeque sint ut omnes 

omnium participes sint.. nee alia ab alia possit se- 

parari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, 

BOOK V. xxiii 

then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, 

and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. 

sentiment^ assigning each his own and main- \ 

.ySg^lllt' gcilerosity and equity that human soli- j 

ity and alliance of which I speak^ is termed / 

Jdstic^^ connected with it are dutiful affection, I 

idness^ liberality, good-will, courtesy and the 

other graces of the same kind. And while these 

belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors 

36 shared by the remaining virtues. For human nature 

is so xQQstitutsd. .at_birth as to possess an innate 

Greek jw&^tfaatl -Conseqi ^ntly ^B T the aciious of A 
every virtue will be in harmony ^«- htiniiiii'T . ' 
nffnrti on nnd^liclarity TTiave "described, and Justice * 
in turn will diSuselt»*«geiu:y through the other vir- 
tues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. 1' or 
only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. 
Therefore the qualities of this general union and 
combination of the virtues of which I am speaking 
belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid ; inasmuch 
as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous 
action ; and life in harmony with these and in accord- 
ance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, 
consistent, and in agreement with nature. 
)7 *^At the same time this complex of interfused although they 
virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its ^hed '^^ 
separate parts by philosophers. For although the thcoreUcaUy. 
virtues are so closely united that each participates 
in every other and none can be separated from any 
other, yet on the other hand each has its own special 
function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and 
dangers. Temperance in forgoing pleasures. Pru- 
dence in the choice of goods and evils. Justice in 



ut fortitude in laboribus periculisque cematur, tem- 
perantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus^ prudentia 
in delectu bononim et malorum^ iustitia in suo cuique 
tribuendo. Quando igitur inest in oinni virtute 
cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens 
atque complectens^ exsistit illud^ ut amici^ ut fratres^ 
ut propinqui, ut affines^ ut cives, ut omnes denique 
(quoniam unam societatem liominum esse volumus) 
propter se expetendi sint. Atqui eorum nihil est 
eius generis ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. 

68 Ita fit ut duo genera propter se expetendorum re- 
periantur^ unum quod est in iis in quibus completur 
illud extremum^ quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; 
haec autem quae sunt extrinseeus, id est quae neque 
in animo insunt neque in corpore, ut amici^ ut paren- 
tes^ ut liberie ut propinqui^ ut ipsa patria^ sunt ilia 
quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere quo 
ilia non sunt. Nee vero umquam summum bonum 
assequi quisquam posset si omnia illa^ quae sunt extra 
quamquam expetenda, sununo bono continerentur. 

69 XXIV. Quomodo igitur, inquies, verum esse 
poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amici- 
tiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo 
bono non continentur ? Hac videlicet ratione, quod 
ea quae externa sunt iis tuemur officiis quae oriuntiu* 
a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. Nam et amici cultus 
et parentis ei qui officio fungitur in eo ipso prodest 
quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt 
orta a ^ virtutibus. Quae quidem sapientes sequuntur 
utentes tamquam^ duce natura ; non perfecti autem 

1 a inserted by Lambinus, Mdv. 

^ utentes tamquam Mdv. brackets ; utentes sequuntur 
tamquam MSS.; Mdv. conj. videntes sequuntur duce natura 
earn viam. 


BOOK V. xxiii-xxiv 

giving each his due. As then each virtue contains «Jn^JdlTo^ 
an element not merely self-regarding, which em- men; which j 
braces other men and makes them its end, there external ro« 
resiilts a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, Sws°bufm 
kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all f.^}f°i^, 
human beings (since our belief is that all mankind 
are united in one society) are things desirable for 
their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is 
such as to form part of the End and Ultimate Good. 

68 Hence it results that we find two classes of things 
desirable for their own sakes ; one class consists of 
those things which constitute the Ultimate Good 
aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body ; the latter 
set, which are external goods, that is, goods that 
belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as 
friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country 
itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not 
included in the same class as the former. Indeed, 
no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those 
goods, which though desirable are external to us, 
formed part of the Chief Good. 

69 XXIV. How then, you will object, can it be although to c 
true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if others is a°pa 
friendships and relationships and the other external °^ virtue. 
goods are not part of the Chief Good ? The answer 

is that it is in this way : we maintain these external 
goods by those acts of duty which spring from tha 
particular class of virtue connected with each. For 
example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents 
benefits the doer from the very fact that such per- 
for man ce of duty is a right action, and right actions 
take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, Love of honoi 
under nature's guidance, make right action their virtue. 
aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet 



homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti 
excitaniur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem hone- 
statis et similitudinem. Quod si ipsam honestatem 
undique perfectam atque absolutam, rem unam prae- 
clarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus 
viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tanto 

70 opere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur? Quem 
enim deditum voluptatibus, quem cupiditatum in- 
cendiis inflanmiatum in iis potiendis quae acerrime 
concupivissettanta laetitia perfundiarbitramur quanta 
aut superiorem Africanum Hannibale victo aut poste- 
rior em Carthagine e versa ? Quem Tiberina descensio 
festo illo die tanto gaudio afFecit quanto L. Paulum, 
cum regem Persem captum adduceret, eodem flumine 

7 1 invectio ? Age nunc, Luci noster, exstrue animo altitu- 
dinem excellentiamque virtutum ; iam non dubitatis 
quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque 
viventes semper sint beati ; qui omnes motus fortunae 
mutationesque rerum et temporum leves et imbecillos 
fore intellegant si in virtutis certamen venerint. Ilia 
enim quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata com- 
plent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita ut sine 
illis"possit beata vita exsistere. Ita enim parvae et 
exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum ut, quemad- 
modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum 

72 splendore ne cernantur quidem. Atque hoc ut vera 
dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista 
corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla 
esse dicere ; qui enim sic disputant, obliti mihi 

a The festival of Fors Fortuna, June 24, described by 
Ovid Fasti, 6, 774. 


BOOK V. xxiv 

endowed with noble characters often respond to the 
stimulus of honour, which has some show and sem- \ 
blance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully \ 
discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection ■ 
and completeness, the one thing of all others most ; 
splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would 
they be, if they take such a delight in the mere ; 

70 shadow and reputation of it? What devotee of plea- 
sure, though consumed by most glowing passions, 
can be supposed to feel such transports of rapture ' 
in winning the objects of his keenest desires, as were 
felt by the elder Africanus upon the defeat of 
Hannibal, or by the younger at the overthrow of 
Carthage ? Who ever experienced so much delight 
from the voyage down the Tiber on the day of the 
festival^ as Lucius Paulus felt when he sailed up 

the river leading King Perses captive in his train ? Virtue alone 

71 Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagina- boSygooS* 
tion the lofty and towering structure of the vir- S^Se^^tol 
tues ; then you will feel no doubt that those who 

- achieve them, guiding themselves by magnanimity 
and uprightness, are always happy ; realizing as they 
do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and 
flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and 
feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The 

• things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form 
a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is 
possible without them. For those supplementary 
goods are so small and slight that in the full radiance 
of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in 

72 sunlight. Yet true though it is that these bodily 
advantages are of but slight importance for happi- 
ness, to say that they are of no importance is too 
sweeping ; those who maintain this appear to me to 



videntur quae ipsi fecerint^ principia naturae. Tri- 
buendum est igitur his aliquid^ dum modo quantum 
tribuendum sit intellegas. Est enim^ philosophi non- 
tarn gloriosa quam vera quaerentis nee pro nihilo 
putare ea quae secundum naturam illi ipsi gloriosi 
esse fateantur,* et videre tantam vim virtutis tan- 
tamque ut ita dicam auctoritatem honestatis esse* ut 
reliqua non ilia quidem nulla sed ita parva sint ut 
nulla esse videantur. Haec est nee omnia spementis 
praeter virtutem et virtutem ipsam suis laudibus 
amplificantis oratio ; denique haec est undique com- 
pleta et perfecta explicatio summi boni. 

Hinc ceteri particulas arripere conati suam 
quisque videri voluit afferre sententiam. XXV. 
73 Saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est 
laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus 
Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, 
nee rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. Multa 
dicta sunt ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despi- 
ciendis rebus humanis ; hoc unum Aristo tenuit : 
praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam 
aut fugiendam aut expetendam. Positum est a 
nostris in iis esse rebus quae secundum naturam 
assent non dolere ; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum 
esse dixit. At vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus^ 
cum alter voluptatem adamasset^ alter vacuitatem 

^fecerint Lambinus, Mdv.; egerint MSS.; iecerint Gifa- 

^enim Davis, Mdv.; tamen MSS. 

^fateantur (conj. Mdv.) Miiller; fatentur E, Mdv.; fate- 
bantur B and inf. MSS. 

* esse inserted by Mdv. 


BOOK V. xxiv-xxv 

have forf?otten those first principles of nature which 
they have themselves established. Some weight 
then must be given to bodily goods provided one 
understands what is the proper amount of weight. 
The genuine philosopher^ who aims at truth and not 
ostentation, while refusing on the one hand to deny 
all value to the things which even those high- 
sounding teachers themselves admit to be in ac- 
cordance with nature, will on the other hand realize 
that virtue is so potent. Moral Worth invested so to 
speak with such authority, that all those other goods, 
though not worthless, are so small as to appear 
worthless. This is the language that a man will 
hold who while not despising all else but virtue yet 
extols virtue herself with her own proper praises ; in 
short, this is the full, finished and complete account 
of the Chief Grood. 

" From this system all the other schools have en- (d) This the 
deavoured to appropriate fragments, which each has S^^Sk 
JS hoped may pass for original. XXV. Aristotle and ^ve borrow* 
Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge the s^cs ha 
for its own sake ; Erillus, captivated by this single ShSe.^^ " 
tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief 
Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in 
itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising 
proudly superior to human fortunes ; Aristo singled 
out this one point, and declared that nothing but 
vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. 
Our school included freedom from pain among 
the things in accordance with nature ; Hieronymus 
made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other 
hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having 
fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with 
freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense 



doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a 

74 nostris laudata maxime. Quin etiam ipsi voluptarii 
devertieula quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos 
dies voluptatemque dumtaxat primo expeti dicunt/ 
deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam 
effici, qua impulsi multa faciant^ nuUam quaerentes 
voluptatem. Stoici restant. Ei quidem non unam 
aliquam aut alteram rem^ a nobis^ sed totam ad se 
nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. Atque ut 
re^iqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa com- 
mutant^ sic illi ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur 
nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. Ita re- 
linquitur sola haec diseiplina digna studiosis ingenu- 
arum artium^ digna eruditis^ digna claris viris^ digna 
principibus, digna regibus.'* 

75 Quae cum dixisset paulumque institisset^ Quid 
est?" inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in 
vestris auribus commentatus?** Et ego; Tu vero," 
inquam^ Piso^ ut saepe alias^ sic hodie ita nosse ista 
visus es ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non 
multum Graeeis supplicandum putarem. Quod qui- 
dem eo probavi magis quia memini Staseam Neapo- 
litanum, doetorem ilium tuum, nobilem sane Peripa- 
tetieum, aliquanto ista secus dieere solitum, assen- 
tientem iis qui multum in fortuna seeunda aut 
adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis pone- 
rent. ' ' Est ut dicis,' * inquit ; sed haec ab Antiocho, 
familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius 

^ quaerunt , . habent . . dicunt Lambinus, Miiller ; quae- 
rant , . ha bean t * . dicant MSS., Mdv., with mark of cor- 
ruption ; quaerunt, ut . . habeant . . dicant Davis. 

'^faciantT. Bentley, Muller; /«««n/MSS., Mdv. 

' rem inserted by T. Bentley, Mdv. 



with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled 

74 above all else. Even the votaries of pleasure take 
refuge in evasions : the name of virtue is on their 
lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is 
only at first the object of desire, and that later habit 
produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a 
motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at 
all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have 
conveyed from us not some one or other item, but 
our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular 
practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen 
goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our 
opinions as their own, have changed the names, 
which are the marks of things. Our system there- 
fore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the 
student of the liberal arts, of men of learning, of 
men of eminence, rank, and power." 

75 After these words he paused, and then added: 
How now? Do you judge me to have used my 

opportunity well.»* Does the sketch I have given 
satisfy my audience?** Why, Piso,** I replied, 
you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, 
on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not 
think we should have to rely much upon the aid of 
the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities 
of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to 
be convinced by you because I remember that your 
great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of 
unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat 
different account of your system, agreeing with 
those who attached great importance to good and 
bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils.** That 
is true,'* said he ; but our friend Antiochus is a far 
better and far more uncompromising exponent of the 



quam a Stasea dicebantur. Quamquam ego iion 
quaero quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni 
nostro, quern discipulum eupio a te abdueere.** 

76 XXVI. Turn Lucius : Mihi vero ista valde pro- 
bata sunt, quod item fratri puto.'* Turn mihi Piso: 

Quid ergo?" inquit; dasne adulescenti veniam? 
an eum discere ea mavis quae cum plane perdidi- 
cerit nihil sciat?" Ego vero isti,** inquam, per- 
mitto; sed nonne meministi licere mihi ista probare 
quae sunt a te dicta ? Quis enim potest ea quae pro- 
babilia videantur ei^ non probare?** An vero," 
inquit, quisquam potest probare quod perceptum, 
quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet?" 

Non est ista,** inquam, Piso, magna dissensio. 
Nihil est enim aliud quamobrem mihi percipi nihil 
posse videatur nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur 
a Stoicis ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale 
verum quale falsum esse non possit. Itaque haec 
cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. 
Sed haec omittamus ; habent enim et bene longam 

77 et satis litigiosam disputationem ; illud mihi a te 
nimium festinanter dictum videtur, sapientes omnes 
esse semper beatos. Nescio quomodo praetervolavit 
oratio. Quod nisi ita efficitur, quae Theophrastus 
de fortuna, de dolore, de cruciatu corporis dixit, cum 
quibus coniungi vitam beatam nuUo modo posse 

^ et MSS,, edd.; ea two inf. MSS.; perhRps potest quae 
probabilia sibi videantur ea ed. 

* A reference to the scepticism of the New Academy of 
Arcesilas and Carn^ades; their doctrines, that certainty was 
unattainable and that reasonable probability was a suffi- 
cient guide for life, are avowed by Cicero in the following 


BOOK V. xxv-xxvi 

system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't 
want to know how far I succeeded in convincing 
you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here ; 
I want to kidnap your pupil from you.'* 

76 XXVI. To this Lucius replied: "Oh, I am quite 5. Charge of i 
convinced by what you have said, and I think my bunted («?6-i 
brother is so too." " How now?" said Piso to me, ^yS^ 

Has the young man your consent? or would you jJJ^^^Je^rim 
rather he should study a system which, when he is pies of the Ne 
perfect in it, will end in his knowing nothing?"*. 

Oh, I leave him his liberty," said I ; but don't 
you remember that it is quite open to me to approve 
the doctrines you have stated? Since who can 
refrain from approving statements that appear to 
him probable?" But," said he, can anyone 
approve that of which he has not full perception, 
comprehension and knowledge?" There is no 
great need to quarrel about that, Piso," I rejoined. 

The only thing that makes me deny the possibility 
of perception is the Stoics' definition of that term ; 
they maintain that nothing can be perceived except 
a true presentation having such a character as no 
false presentation can possess. Here then 1 have a 
quarrel with the Stoics, but certainly none with the 
Peripatetics. However let us drop this question, 
for it involves a very long and somewhat contentious 

77 debate. It is the doctrine that the Wise Man is ^ut is it con- 
always and invariably happy that I would challenge "^Jf°*^ ^L^, 
as too hurriedly touched upon by you. Your form part of t 
discourse somehow skimmed past this point. But si^dent for^ 
unless this doctrine is proved, I am afraid that happiness? 
the truth will lie with Theophrastus, who held that 
inisfortune, sorrow and bodiljr unguish were incom- 



putavit, vereor ne vera sint. Nam illud vehementer 
repugnat, eundem beatum esse et multis malis op- 
pressum. Haec quomodo eonveniant non sane in- 
tellego." Utrum igitur tibi," inquit, non placet 
virtutisne esse tantam vim ut ad beate vivendum se 
ipsa eontenta sit^ an^ si id probas^ fieri ita posse negas 
ut ii qui virtutis compotes sint etiam quibusdam 
malis afFecti beati sint?" Ego vero volo in virtute 
vim esse quam maximam; sed quanta sit alias^ nunc 
tantum possitne esse tanta^ si quidquam extra virtu- 

78 tem habeatur in bonis." Atqui/* inquit, si Stoicis 
concedis ut virtus sola si assit vitam efficiat beatam^ 
concedis etiam Peripateticis. Quae enim mala illi 
non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et 
reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos 
mala dicimus sed exigua et paene minima. Quare 
si potest esse beatus is qui est in asperis reiciendis- 
que rebus, potest is quoque esse qui est in parvis 
malis." Et ego : Piso, inquam, si est quisquam qui 
acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es 
profecto tu. Quare attende, quaeso. Nam adhuc, 
meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis." 
"istic sum," inquit, exspectoque quid ad id quod 
quaerebam respondeas. 

79 XXVII. Respondebo me non quaerere," inquam, 
"hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid 
constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat." 

' Quo," inquit, modo?" Quia cum a Zenone," 


BOOK V. xxvi-xxvii 

patible with happiness. F<h- that a man can be at 
once happy and overwhekned with evils is violently 
repugnant to comnKm sense. How happiness and 
misfortune can go together I entirely £ul to under- 
stand." Which position then do you question ? " 
he replied ; that virtue is so potent that she need 
not look outside herself for happiness ? or, if you 
accept this^ do you deny that the virtuous can be 
happy even when afflicted by certain evils ? " Oh, I 
would rate the potency of virtue as high as possible ; 
but let US defer the question of her exact degree of 
greatness; the only pcnnt is now, could she be so 
great as she is, if anything outside virtue be classed 
as a good?" ' Yet," said he, ^^ if you concede 

8 as a good? " Yet," said he, if you concede to the Piso: Yes, virtue 
Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce ^ hTppiS^^ 
happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics, external evu» an 

■w-K-n m A 1 1 11 .1 intignificant. 

What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, 
but admit to be irksome, detrimental, ' to be rejected,' 
and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, 
though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a 
man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances 
that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be 
happy when surrounded by trifling evils." Piso," I 
rejoined, you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer 
to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. 
Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, 
^ough perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the 
point of my question." ^'l am all attention," he 
replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 

XXVII. " My reply will be,"' said I, " that I am not ^1«««: But ij^ 
at the present asking what result virtue can produce, «vUs, can Virtw 
but what is a consistent and what a self-contradic- I^J^JjJ? 
tory account of it." How do you mean ? " said he. 
** Why," I said, " first Zeno enunciates the lofty and 
ic 481 


inquam, hoc magnifice tainquam ex oraculo editur: 
' Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa content» est,' 
Quare?" inquit; respondet; Quia nisi quod hone- 
stum est nullum est aliud bonum.' Non quaero iam 
verumne sit ; illud dico, ea quae dicat praeclare inter 

) se cohaerere. Dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper 
beatum esse sapientem ; quod quidem solet ebullire " 
Donnumquam ; quern quidem cum sumDiis doloribus 
conficiatur, ait dicturum: Quam suave est I quam 
nihil euro!' Non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum 
aberret^ in natura boni; illud urgueam, non intel- 
Icgere eum quid sibi dicendura sit cum dolorem sum- 
mum malum esse dixerit. Eadem nunc mea adver- 
sum te oratio est. Dicis eadem omnia et bona et 
mala quae quidem^ dicunt ii qui numquam philoso- 
phum pictum ut dicitur viderunt, valetudinem, vires, 
staturam, formam, integritatem unguieulorura om- 
nium bona,^ deformitatem, morbum, debilitatem 

t mala. Iam ilia externa parce tu quidem ; sed haec 
cum corporis bona sint, eorum conficientiu certe in 
bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquos, divitias, 
honores, opes. Contra hoc attende me nihil dicere; 
illud dicere/ si ista mala sunt in quae potest incidere 
sapienSj sapientem esse non satis esse ad beate vi- 
vendum." Imrao vero," inquit, ad beatissime 
vivendum parum est, ad beate satis." Animad- 
verti," inquam, te isto niodo paulo ante ponerc, et 
scto ab Antioclio iiostro dici sic solere ; sed quid 

^ abeml iiaUer t AabeatMSS,; aica/ (' tarn lunge a nobis 

^ iiidem Mdv. brackets. 

'Asnn inserted by LambiiiU! , 

«iWiirfrficrre inserted by Mdv. 




BOOK V. xxvii 

oracular utterance. Virtue need not look outside 
herself for happiness'; Why?' says some one. 
Because,* he answers, nothing else is good but 
what is morally good/ I am not now asking whether 
this is true ; what I say is that Zeno's statements are 

to admirably logical and consistent. Suppose Epicurus 
to say the same thing, that the Wise Man is always 
happy, — for he is fond of ranting like this now and 
then, and indeed tells us that when the Wise Man is 
suffering torments of pain, he will say How pleasant 
this is! how little I mind!' — Well, I should not join 
issue with the man as to why he goes so far astray 
about the nature of the Good ; what I should insist 
is that he does not understand what is the necessary 
corollary of his own avowal that pain is the supreme 
evil. I take the same line now against you. As to 
what is good and what is evil, your account agrees 
entirely with that of those who have never set eyes 
on a philosopher, even in a picture, as the saying is : 
you call health, strength, height, beauty, soundness 
of every part from top to toe, goods, and ugliness, 

)1 disease and weakness evils. As for external goods, 
you were, it is true, cautious ; but since these bodily 
excellences are goods, you will doubtless reckon as 
goods the things productive of them, namely friends, 
children, relations, riches, rank and power. Mark 
that against this I say nothing; what I say is, if mis- 
fortunes which a Wise Man may encounter are as you 
say evils, to be wise is not enough for happiness. ' ' Say Piso : Yes, 
rather," said he, *^not enough for supreme happiness, the^eat^t 
but it is enough for happiness." " I noticed," I happiness. 
replied, you made that distinction a little time Cicero: How 
ago, and I am aware that our master Antiochus is ^i^^^ 
fond of saying the same ; but what can be more un- J^ppine»? 
ii2 483 


minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nee 
satis beatum? Quod autem satis est^ eo quidquid 
accessit^ nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; 

82 igitur^ nemo beato beatior.** Ergo,** inquit, tibi 
Q. Metellus, qui tres filios consules vidit, e quibus 
unum etiam et censore^l et triumphantem, quartum 
autem praetorem, eosque salvos reliquit et tres filias 
nuptas, cum ipse consul, censor, augur fuisset et 
triumphasset, ut sapiens ^erit, nonne beatior quam, 
ut item sapiens fuerit, qui in potestate hostium vi- 
giliis et inedia necatus est, Regulus?" 

83 XXVIII. Quid me istud,** inquam, rogas? 
Stoicos roga.** Quid igitur,*' inquit, eos respon- 
suros putas ? ** Nihilo beatiorem esse Metellum 
quam Regulum." * Inde igitur,** inquit, ^ordien- 
dum est.** Tamen a proposito,** inquam, aberra- 
mus. Non enim quaero quid verum sed quid cuique 
dicendum sit. Utinam quidem dicerent alium alio 
beatiorem ! iam ruinas videres. In virtute enim sola 
et in ipso honesto cum sit bonum positum cumque 
nee virtus ut placet illis nee honestum crescat, idq)ie 
bonum solum sit quo qui potiatur necesse est beatus 
sit, cum augeri id non possit in quo uno positum est 
beatum esse, qui potest esse quisquam alius alio 
beatior ? Videsne ut haec concinant ? Et hercule 
(fatendum est enim quod sentio) mirabilis est apud 
illos contextus rerum. Respondent extrema primis, 

^ accessit Miiller (cf. IV, 37 perduxtt) ; accesserit MSS , 
'^igitur Miiller; et MSS., Mdv. who marks as corrupt 


BOOK V. xxvii-xxviii 

satisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not 
happy enough? Any addition to what is enough 
makes too much ; now no one has too much happi- 
ness; therefore no one can be happier than happy." 

Then in your view/* he said, was not Quintus piso: it is 
Metellus> who saw three sons consuls, and one of Jhere are?**' 
these made censor and celebrating a triumph as 
well, and a fourth praetor, and who left his four sons 
alive and well and three daughters married, having 
himself been consul, censor and augur and having had 
a triumph, — supposing him to have been a Wise Man, 
was he not happier than Regulus, who died a cap- 
tive in the hands of the enemy, from starvation and 
want of sleep, allowing him also to have been a 
Wise Man?"^^ 

XXVIII. Why," said I, do you ask that ques- Cicero: But it 
tion of me? Ask the Stoics." "What answer io say thatl^o 
then," he said, '"do you think they would give?" S'way^h^ppy. 
"That Metellus is no happier than Regulus." unless with the 
"Well then," said he, "let us start from that." pa^uo^be ^°^ 
"Still," said 1, * we are wandering-from our subject. *° ®^**- 
For I am not inquiring what is true, but what each 
school ought consistently to say. I only wish they 
said that there were degrees of happiness ! then you 
would see a collapse ! For since the Good consists 
solely in virtue and in actual Moral Worth, and 
neither virtue nor Moral Worth, as they hold, ad- 
mits of increase, and since that alone is good 
which necessarily makes its possessor happy, when 
that which alone constitutes happiness does not 
allow of increase, how can anyone possibly be hap- 
pier than anyone else ? Do you see how logical this 
is ? And in fact (for I must admit what I really 
think) their system is a marvellously consistent whole. 



media utrisque^ omnia omnibus ; quid sequatur^ quid 
repugnet, vident. Ut in geometria, prima si dede- 
ris^ danda sunt omnia. Concede nihil esse bonum 
nisi quod honestum sit ; eoncedendum est in virtute 
positam esse^ vitam beatam. Vide rursus retro. 
Dato hoc, dandum est illud. Quod vestri non item. 
84 Tria genera bonorum ' : proclivi currit oratio. Venit 
ad extremum ; haeret in salebra ; cupit enim dicere 
nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. Honesta 
oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere/ 
inquit. Non potes, nisi retexueris ilia. Paupertas 
si malum est, mendicus esse beatus nemo potest 
quamvis sit sapiens. At Zeno eum non beatum mo- 
do sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. Dolere malum 
est ; in crucem qui agitur beatus esse non potest. 
Bonum liberi ; misera orbitas ; bonum patria ; mi- 
serum exsilium ; bonum valetudo ; miser morbus ; 
bonum integritas corporis ; misera debilitas ; bonum 
incolumis acies ; misera caecitas. Quae si potest 
singula consolando levare, uni versa quomodo sustine- 
bit ? Sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo 
afFectus, exsul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo ; quern 
hunc appellas, Zeno? ^Beatum/ inquit. Etiam 
beatissimum ? Quippe,' inquiet, cum tam ^ docu- 

* esse inserted by Mdv. 

^cutn tam inf. MSS., edd.; cum B, £; cum . . non magis 
habere Baiter. 


BOOK V. xxviii 

The conclusions agree with the first principles^ the 
middle steps with both, in fact every part with every 
other. They understand what inference follows from 
and what contradicts a given premise. It is like 
geometry : grant* the premises and you must grant 
everything. Admit that there is no good but Moral 
Worth, and you are bound to admit that happiness 
consists in virtue. Or again conversely: given the 
J4 latter, you must grant the former. Your school are 
not so logical. Three classes of goods': your ex- 
position runs smoothly on. It comes to its conclu- 
sion, and now it sticks at a rough place ; for it wants 
to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite 
of happiness. That is the moral style, the style 
of Socrates, and of Plato too. ^I dare assert it,' 
cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast 
the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an 
evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you 
like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was 
not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil : 
then a man sentenced to crucifixion cannot be 
happy. Children are a good : then childlessness is 
miserable ; one's country is a good : then exile is 
miserable ; health is a good : then the sick man is mise- 
rable ; soundness of body is a good : then infirmity 
is miserable ; good eyesight is a good : then blind- 
ness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's conso- 
lations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly ; 
but how will he enable us to endure them all at 
once ? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, 
afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute 
and tortured on the rack ; what is your name, Zeno, 
for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely 
happy man as well? lo be sure,' he will reply, 


erim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, 

85 in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum/ Tibi hoc incredi- 
bile quod beatissimum ; quid? tuum credibile? Si 
enim ad populum me vocas^ eum qui ita sit affectus 

beatum esse numquam probabis ; si ad prudentes^ 
alterum fortasse dubitabunt^ sitne tantum in virtute 
ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint; 
alterum non dubitabunt^ quin et Stoici convenientia 
sibi dicant et vos repugnantia. ^Tbeophrasti igitur/ 
inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita?* Tamen 
aberramus a proposito^ et ne longius, prorsus^ inquam, 

86 Piso, si ista mala sunt^ placet." **Nonne igitur," 
inquit^ tibi yidentur mala ? " Id quaeris^" inquam^ 
"in quo utrum respondero verses te hue atque illuc 
necesse est." Quo tandem modo?" inquit. Quia 
si mala sunt^ is qui erit in iis beatus non erit ; si mala 
non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum." Et 
ille ndens : Video/' inquit^ quid agas ; ne disci- 
pulum abducam times." Tu vero," inquam, ducas 
licet si sequetur ; erit enim mecum si tecum erit." 

XXIX. Audi igitur," inquit, "Luci; tecum enim 

mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philo- 

sophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita 

comparanda ; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi 

BOOK V. xxviii-xxix 

because I have proved that happiness no more 
admits of degrees than does virtue^ in which happi- 

J5 ness itself consists/ To you the statement that he is 
supremely happy is incredible; but what of your 
own view ? is it credible ? Call me before a jury of 
ordinary people, ^md you will never persuade them 
that the man so afflicted is happy ; refer the case to 
the learned, and it is possible that on one of the two 
counts they will be doubtful about their verdict, 
whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous 
will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris : but on 
the other, they will find without hesitation that the 
Stoic doctrine is consistent and yours self-contradic- 
tory. Ah,' says the Academic, then you agree 
with Theophrastus in his great work On Happiness ? * 
However, we are wandering from the subject ; and 
to cut the matter short, Piso," I said, " I do fully 

16 agree with Theophrastus, if misfortunes, as you say, 
are evils." " Then don't you think they are evils? " 
he said. To that question," said I, whichever 
reply I make, you will be bound to shift and shuffle." 
" How so exactly?" he asked. Because," I replied, 
if they are evils, the man who suffers from them 
will not be happy ; and on the other hand if they 
are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic 
svstem." I see what you are at," cried he smiling; 
you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil. ' ' Oh ,* ' 
said I, ' you are welcome to convert him if he wants 
to be converted ; for if he is in your fold, he will be 

ff Piso: No; 

m mme. an pwioso- 

XXIX. '' Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, for I gjl^d hlppine^ 
must address myself to you. The whole importance in wisdom. The 
of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attain- pj^^tyli 
ment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happi- preferable •; 

*^*^ ' '^'^ It IS only a ques 

489 tion of terms; 


87 omnes sumus. Hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. 
Quare hoc videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio 
philosophorum dare. Pollicetur certe. Nisi enim 
id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit ut a sacer- 
dotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet ? cur 
post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pytha- 
goreos^ Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem Locros, ut, 
cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagore- 
orum disciplinam eaque quae Socrates repudiabat 
addisceret ? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustra- 
vit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones 
barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit ? cur 
haec eadem Democritus ? qui (vere falsone, quaerere 
nolumus"^) dicitur se oculis privasse ; certe, ut quam 
minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patri- 
monium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid 
quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam ? Quam si etiam 
in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex ilia investi- 
gatione naturae consequi volebat bono ut esset animo ; ' 
id enim ille summum bonum evOvfiiav et saepe 
ddafiPiav appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 

88 Sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita; 

pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc de 

virtute quidem dicta. Post enim haec in hac urbe 

primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deihde in hunc 

locum delata sunt, nee dubitatum quin in virtute 
' quaerere nolumus MuUer ; quaereremus, 


87 ness possesses us all. On this your brother and I 
are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is 
this, can the system of the philosophers give us 
happiness ? It certainly professes to do so. Were 
it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to 
learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian 
priests ? Why did he later visit Archytas at Taren- 
tum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Ti- 
maeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to 
his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean 
system and to extend his studies into those branches 
which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras 
himself scour Egjrpt and visit the Persian magi ? why 
did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian 
lands and sail across those many seas? Why did 
Democritus do the same ? It is related of the latter 
(whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to 
inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight ; and 
it is certain that in order that his mind should be 
distracted as little as possible from reflection, he 
neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncul- 
tivated, engrossed in the search for what else but 
happiness ? Even if he supposed happiness to consist 
in knowledge, still he designed that his study of 
natural philosophy should procure him peace of mind ; 
since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which 
he entitles eutkumia, or often athamhia, that is free- 

88 dom from alarm. But what he said on the subject, 
however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing 
touches ; for indeed about virtue he said very little, 
and that not clearly expressed. For it was later 
that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens 
by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study 
was transferred to the place where we now are ; and 



omms Qt bene sic etuun beate Threndi spes ponere- 
tor. Quae coin Zeno didknsset a nostris, nt in 
actionibus praescribi solet, de eadem re fecit ^ alio 
MODo. Hoc tn nunc in illo probas. Scilicet vocabnlis 
remm mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille efiugit, nos 
effiigere non possmnus! Ille Metelli vitam negat 
beatiorem quam R^nli, praeponendam tamen ; nee 
magis ezpetendam, sed magis somendam ; et^ si <^itio 
esset^ eligendam Metelli, Regali reiciendam; ego, 
quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beati- 
orem banc appello, nee olio minimo' momento plus 
89 ei vitae tribuo quam StoicL Quid interest, nisi quod 
ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova 
quaerunt quibus idem dicant? Ita quemadmodum 
in senatu semper est aliquis qui interpretem postulet, 
sic isti nobis ciun interprete audiendi sunt. Bcmum 
appello quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra, 
malum ; nee ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in 
foro, domi ; in schola desinis. Quid ergo ? aliter 
homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere ? 
Quanti quidque sit, aliter docti et indocti ; sed cum 
constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit, — si 
homines essent, usitate loquerentur ;-^-dum res ma- 
neant, verba fingant arbitratu suo. 

' FECIT edd. bracket. 

^minimo inf. MSS., Mdv. ; omnino B, E. 

*Tbis preamble seems to have guarded the plaintiflT 
against being non-suited on a plea of chose jugke^ in case 
that having failed in his suit he chose to bring it in again 
under a different ^rmu/a. 

bi.e. when an audience was given to Greek-speaking 

BOOK V. xxix 

no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct 
and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt 
this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 
the same matter in another manner^' as the common 
preamble * to an indictment has it. You now approve 
of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can 
change the names of things and be acquitted of in- 
consistency, but we cannot ! He denies that the life 
of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet 
calls it preferable ' ; not more desirable, but more 
worthy of adoption ' ; and given the choice, that of 
Metellus is to be selected' and that of Regulus 
rejected. ' Whereas the life he called preferable ' and 
more worthy to be selected ' I term happier, though I 
do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to 
89 that life than do the Stcncs. What is the difference 
except that I apply familiar terms to familiar things, 
whereas they invent new names to express the same 
meaning ? Thus just as in the senate there is always 
some one who demands an interpreter,^ so we must 
use an interpreter when we give audience to jout 
school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature 
good and what is contrary to nature bad ; nor am I 
alone in this : you, Chrysippus, do so too in business I 
and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the .' 
lecture-room. What then? do you think philo- 
sophers should speak a different language from 
ordinary human beings ? The learned and the un- 
learned may differ as to the values of things ; but 
when the learned are agreed what each thing's value 
is, — if they were human beings, they would adopt the 
recognized form of expression; but so long as the 
actual things remain, let them coin new words at 
their pleasure. 



90 XXX. * Sed venio ad inconstantiae crimen^ ne sae- 
pius dicas me aberrare ; quam tu ponis in verbis^ ego 
positam in re putabam. Si satis erit hoc perceptum^ in 
quo adiutores Stoicos optimos habemus^ tantam vim 
esse virtutis ut omnia si ex altera parte ponantur ne 
appareant quidem^ cum Smnia quae illi commoda 
certe dicunt esse et sumenda et eligenda et prae- 
posita (quae ita definiunt ut satis magno aestimanda 
sint), haec igitur cum ego tot nominibus a Stoicis 
appellata^ partim novis et commenticiis ut ista pro- 
ducta' et reducta/ partim idem significantibus 
(quid enim interest^ expetas an eligas ? mihi quidem 
etiam lautius videtur quod eligitur et ad quod de- 
lectus adhibetur), sed^ cum ego ista omnia bona 
dixero^ tantum refert quam magna dicam ; cum ex- 
petenda^ quam valde. Sin autem nee expetenda 
ego magis quam tu eligenda^ nee ilia pluris aesti- 
manda ego qui bona^ quam tu qui producta appellas^ 
omnia ista necesse est obscurari nee apparere et in 

91 virtutis tamquam in solis radios incurrere. At. enim 

qua in vita est aliquid mali^ ea beata esse non potest 

Ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris si 

avenam uspiam videris^ nee mercatura quaestuosa si 


90 XXX. But I come to the charge of inconsis- we assign m 
tency, or you will say I digress too often. You SSeraais by 
make inconsistency a matter of words, but I imagined ?g^^3^®" 
it to be a question of fact. Only let it be clearly 
grasped, and in this we have the Stoics as our 
strongest supporters, that such is the power of virtue 

that all other things, if ranged on the opposite 
side to it, are absolutely imperceptible in com- 
parison; then, as for all the things wl^ich they 
admit to be advantageous and to be adopted' 
and selected' and preferred' (terms which they 
define so as to mean possessed of considerable value), 
when I style these things, which receive so many 
names from the Stoics, some new and original, like 
your words promoted ' and * degraded,' some iden- 
tical in meaning (for what difference is there between 
desiring' a thing and ' selecting ' it? to my ear 
there is a more sumptuous sound about a thing 
that is selected, and to which choice is applied), 
— however when I call all these things good, the 
only thing that matters js, how good do I mean; 
when I call them desirable, the only question is, 
how desirable ? But if on the other hand I do not 
think them more to be desired* than you to be 
selected,' and if I who call them good do not deem 
them more valuable than you who call them pro- 
moted,' all these external things will necessarily be 
eclipsed and rendered imperceptible by the side of 
virtue ; to encounter its radiance is like meeting the, 

91 rays of the sun. But you will say that a life which if you say t 
contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate ^f mcSd" 
a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if evil, we rep] 
you can spy a single stalk of wild oat anywhere judged byTt 
among it ; a business is not profitable if among ^^^^f**° 



in maximis lucris paulum aliquid damni contraxerit. 
An hoc usquequaque^ aliter in vita? et non ex 
maxima parte de tota indicabis ? an dubium est quin 
virtus ita maximam partem obtineat in rebus huma- 
nis ut reliquas obruat? Audebo igitur cetera quae 
secundum naturam sint bona app^Uare nee fraudare 
sue vetere nomine potius quam aliquod^ novum ex- 
quirere ; virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera 
92 librae lance ponere. * Terram, mihi crede, ea lanx 
et maria deprimet. Semper enim ex eo quod maxi- 
mas partes continet latissimeque funditur tota res 
appellatur. Dicimus aliquem hilare vivere ; ergo 
si semel tristior elFectus est hilara vita amissa est? 
At hoc in eo M. Crasso^ quem semel ait in vita 
risisse Lucilius^ non contigit, ut ea re minus dyeXaurros, 
ut ait idem^ vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem 
appellabant. Nihil acciderat ei quod noUet nisi 
quod anulum quo delectabatur in man abiecerat. 
Ergo infelix una molestia'f felix rursus cum is ipse 
anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? lUe 
vero si insipiens (quod certe; quoniam tyrannus), 
numquam beatus; si sapiens^ ne turn quidem miser 
cum ab^Oroete praetore Darei in crucem actus est. 
'At multis malis afFectus/ Quis negat? sed ea mala 

virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. 

^potius quam aliquod Lambinus, MuIIer; quam aliquid 
(aliquam B, ^) potius MSS., Mdv. with mark of corruption, 
suggesting reque aliquid potius. 

a i.e. 'unsmiling.* 

l> The story is told by Herodotus, 3.40 foil. 

^i.e. on the supposition that he was a Wise Man. 



enormous profits it suffers a single loss. Does one 
principle hold good in everything else^ but another 
in conduct? Will you not judge of the whole by 
the largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue 
occupies so large a part in human affairs that it 
eclipses every other factor ? Well then, I shall make 
bold to call the other things in accordance with 
nature goods/ and not cheat them of their old 
name, rather than excogitate some new one ; but I 
shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite 
scale of the balance. Believe me, that scale will virtue out- 

weighs all else 

weigh down the earth and the seas. It is a uni- 
versal rule that any whole takes its name from its 
most predominant and preponderant part. We 
say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if he is 
once in rather low spirits, has he therefore lost 
his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule 
was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according 
to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that one 
exception did not prevent his being called agelastos^ 
as LuciHus has it. Polycrates of Samos was called 
the fortunate.' Not a single untoward circum- 
stance had ever befallen him, except that he had 
thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea.** Did 
that single annoyance then make him unfortunate ? 
and did he become fortunate again when the#very 
same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Poly- 
crates, if he was foolish (which he certainly was, 
since he was a tyrant), was never happy ; if wise, he 
was not miserable even when crucified by Oroetes, 
the satrap of Darius. But,' you say, many evils 
befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were 
eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue.*^ 

KK 497 


9S XXXL ^^ An ne hoc qiddeiD Perqatelicis cob- 
crais^ at difamt otnnium bonomiii Tiromm, id crt 
wa:pientiaBiy cmmbos Tirtntibos cnutomm, TitJB 
omnibas partflms plus habere semper bom qaam 
mall? Quis hoc dicit? Stoici scOicet. Minime; sed 
isti ipsi qui roloptate et dolore omnia m eliuniu r, 
Domie clamant sapienti pins semper adesse quod 
relit qoam qood m^t? Com tantom igitar in virtnte 
ponant ii qui fatentur se virtotis cansa, nia eaTolnpla- 
tem faeeret,^ ne mannm quidem versoios fiiisse, quid 
£acere nos oportet qui qoamvis minimam praestan- 
tiam animi omnibas bonis ooiporis anteire dicamns 
at ea ne in eonspecta qaidem relinqaantor? Qois 
est enim qui hoc cadere in sapientem dicere aadeat, 
at si fieri possit virtotem in perpetaom abiciat at 
dolore omni liberetor? Qois nostnun dixerit (qaos 
non pudet ea quae Stoici aspera dicant mala dicereX 
melius esse turpiter aliquid £acere cam volaptate 

94 qoam honeste cum dolore? NoIhs Heradeotes Ule 
Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis pro- 
pter oculorom dolorem. Quasi vero hoc didicisset a 
2^none^ non dolere cum doleret! Iliad audierat 
nee tamen didicerat^ malum illud non esse quia tarpe 
non essety et esse* ferendum viro. Hie si Peripa- 
teticus fuisset^ permansisset^ credo^ in sententia, qui 
dolorem malum dicant esse^ de asperitate autem eius 
fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem^ quae StoicL Et 

"^faceret Mikkelsen, Mfiller; acciret inf. MSS., Mdv. with 
mark of corruption ; voluptate maceret B, E. 
^esse Manutiuf, Mdv., esset MSS. 


BOOK V. xxxi 


►3 XXXI. Or do you even refuse to let the Peripa- Even the 
tetics say that every part of the life of all good^ that hSd^TSie 
is of all wise men^ men whom every virtue decks, ^j^l^^SoI 
always comprises more good than evil? Who does of what he 
say this? The Stoics, you suppose? Not at all; 
but the very people who measure all things by 
pleasure and pain, do not they cry aloud that the 
Wise Man always has more of what he likes than of 
what he dislikes ? When therefore so much importance 
is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they 
would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it 
did not produce pleasure, what are we to do, who 
say that the smallest amount you like to mention 
of mental excellence surpasses all the goods of the 
body, and renders them completely imperceptible? 
For who is there who would venture to say that it 
would become the Wise Man to discard virtue for 
ever (were this possible) for the sake of securing 
absolute freedom from pain? Who of our school 
(which is not ashamed to call evils what the Stoics 
term annoyances ') was ever known to say that it is 
better to commit a pleasant sin than to do the pain- 

H ftil right? In our view Dionysius of Heraclea was in not denying 
wrong to secede from the Stoics because of a malady fSipatcSci»m i 
of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him S^c^.^^^ 
that to feel pain was not painful! What he had^ 
heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that 
pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and 
that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius 
been a Peripatetic, I believe he would never have 
changed his opinions ; the Peripatetics say that pain 
is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoy- 
ance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the 
same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend 
kk2 499 



quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo perti- 
nacior^ tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis; is 
cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque homi- 
nem Charmides Epicureus^ perfamilians et tristis 
exiret. Mane, quaeso,' inquit, Charmide noster; 
nihil illinc hue pervenit/ Ostendit pedes et pectus. 
Ac tamen hie mallet non dolere. 

95 XXXII. Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae UlA 
videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem 
quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, 
ubi virtus sit resque magnae et summe laudabiles 
virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, 
tamen labor possit, possit molestia, non dubitem 
dicere omnes sapientes semper esse beatos, sed tamen 
fieri posse ut sit alius alio beatior." "Atqui iste 
locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus," 
inquam ; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Cicero- 

96 nem sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit." Tum 
Quintus: Mihi quidem," inquit, satis hoc confir- 
matum videtur, laetorque eam^ philosophiam, cuius 
antea supellectilem pluris aestimabam quam posses- 
siones reliquarum (ita mihi dives videbatur ut ab ea 
petere possem quidquid in studiis nostris concupis- 
sem), banc igitur laetor etiam acutiorem r^pertam 
quam ceteras, quod quidam ei deesse dicebant." 

* Non quam nostram quidem," inquit Pomponius 

iocans; ' sed mehercule pergrata mihi fuit' oratio 

tua. Quae enim dici Latine posse non arbitrabar, 

^ Epicureus Mdv. ; Epicurus B, E ; Epicuri inf. MSS. 
' laetorque earn Davis, Mdv. ; laetor quidem MSS. 
^fuit inserted by Mdv. 


BOOK V. xxxi-xxxii 

Arcesilas^ though he was rather too dogmatic in 
debate^ was still one of us; for he was a pupil of 
Polemo. When Polemo was racked with the tor- 
ments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend^ 
the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was depart- 
ing in distress. ' Stay. I beg of you, friend Char- 
mides,' cried Polemo ; no pain from here has got to 
there' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet 
Polemo would have preferred not to feel pain. 

XXXII. This then is our system which you «• Conclusion, 
think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the 
celestial and divine excellence of virtue, excellence 
so great that where virtue and the mighty and most 
glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there 
misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and i 
annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every 
Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible ; 
for one to be happier than another." Well, Piso," j 
said I, that is a position which you will find needs 
a great deal of defending ; and if you can hold to it, 
you are welcome to convert not only my cousin 
Cicero, but also myself." For my part," remarked 
Quintus, I think the position has been satisfac- 
torily defended, and I am delighted that the philo- 
sophy whose household gear I previously thought 
more precious than the landed estates of the other 
schools (I deemed her so rich that I might go to her 
for all that I coveted in our studies), I rejoice, I say, 
that this philosophy has been found to be actually 
subtler than the rest, — a quality in which she was 
said by some to be deficient." Not subtler than 
ours at all events," said Pomponius playfully; but 
I protest I was most delighted by your discourse. 
You have expressed ideas that I thought it impos- 



ea dicta sunt a te^ nee minus plane, quam dicuntur 
a Graeeis, verbis aptis.^ Sed tempus est, si videtor; 
et recta quidem ad me." Quod cum ille dixisset et 
satis disputatum videretur^in oppidum ad Pomponium 
perreximus omnes. 

^verbis aptis Miiller brackets with Baiter. 


BOOK V. xxxii 

sible to express in Latin^ and you have expressed 
them as lucidly as do the Greeks, and in apt lan- 
guage. But our time is up^ if you please; let us 
make straight for my quarters." At these words^ as 
it was felt there had been enough discussion^ we all 
proceeded to the town to Pomponius's house. 




Academy (the Platonic School of 
philosophy), pp. xxiii/; ii, 2; v, 1 

Academy, the 01d(i.e. before Arcesilas's 
headship), ii, 34; iv, 5; v, 7 

Academy, the New (Le. from Arcesilas 
onwarc^), ii, 43; v, 7, 76n 

Adiaphoron, in, 53 

Aeschines (Athenian orator), v, 5 

Airanius (writer of Roman hustorical 
tragedies, b. c 150 b.c.), i, 7 

AMcanus; see Scipio 

Agelastos, v, 92 

Agesilans (King of Sparta 308-360 B.C., 
panegyrized in Xenophon's Agtsi- 
laus)t n, 116 

Albudus, Titus, i, 8 

Alexander the Great (King of Mace- 
don, 336-323 B.C.), II, 116 

Animals created for man, ni, 67; 
pleasure and pain not sole motives 
of, n, 100 ; in captivity, v, 56 

Antiochns (restorer of the "Old" 
Academy, d. 68 b.c), p« xxiv; v, 1, 
6jf, 14, 75, 81 

Antipater (head of Stoic School c. 44 

B.C.), I, 6 

Apeirta, i, 21 

Apoproigmena, p. xxi; in 15, 51 

Appetitio, prima, appetitus pr.; s«« 

Prima naturae 
Arcesilas (f oimder of Second or New 

Academy; c. 315-240 b.c.), p. xxiii; 

11.2; V, 87 
Arcmlochus (Greek l3nric poet, e. 720- 

676 B.C.), n, 115 
Archimedes (<^ Sjrracuse, most famous 

of ancient mathematidaiis, b. 287 

B.C.), V, 50 
Archylas (of Tarentum, philosopher 

and mathematician, fl. 400 b.c.), 

II, 45 ;v, 87 
Arion (Pythagcurean philosopher), v, 

Aristides (Athenian general and states- 
man, called " The Just," d. e. 470 

B.C.), II, 116 

Aristippus (hedonistic philosopher of 

Cyrene, b. c 428 B.C.), p. xvi; i, 22; 

II, 18#, 34/, 39, 41; v,20 
Aristo (of Ceos, head of Peripatetic 

School, e. 224 b.c), hi, 50; iv, 40, 

43, 47, 49, 60, 68/; v, 13 

Aristo (of Chios, a heterodox Stoic, 
fl. c. 260 B.C.), II, 35, 43; m, 11; iv, 
40; v, 23, 73 

Aristophanes (of Byzantium, scholar, 
b. c. 260 B.C., head erf Alexandrian 
library, editor of Homer, Plato, 
etc.), V, 50 

Aristotle (384-322 b.c), p. vii; i, 6, 7; 
II, 17, 19, 34r, 40, 106; in, 10; iv, 8; 
v, 7, 11/, 78 ^ style, i, 14. See Peri- 

Anstoxenus (of Tarentum, pupil of 
Aristotie, pnilosopber and musician, 
fl. 320 B.C.), V, 50 

Aristus (philosopher of " C«d " Aca- 
demy, brotiier of Antiochus), ▼, 8 


Athens, philosophical and literary 
associations of, v, 2ff 

Athos, Mount (promontory of Mace- 
donia; traces of Xerxes' canal still 
visible), n, 112 

AtiUus (Roman dramatists. 200 B.C.), 

Atoms, 1, 17ff 

Atticus, Htus Pomponius (friend and 
correspondent of Qcero), i, 16; ii, 
67; V, 1, 3, 96; origin of surname, 

Attius,(Roman tragic poet, b. 170 b.c), 

Aufidius, Gnaeus (Roman statesman 
and historian, praetcn: 103 b.c), v, 

Axia; see Value 

BarbcUi^ iv, 62 

BUwumatOj in, 69 

Brutus, Lucius Junius (consul 509 
B.C.), II, 66 

Brutus, Marcus Junius (the tyranni- 
cide), 1, 1; III, 1; V, 1,8 

Brutus, Marcus Junius (judscansult, 
father of the preceding), i, 12 

Caecilius Statins (Roman writer of 
comedies c. 200 B.C.), i, 4; n, 13; 
Caepio, Gnaeus (consul), ii, 54 
Caepio (half-brother of Cato), m^ 8 
Calatinus, A. Atilius (cos. 258 and 254 
B.c. during first Punic War; buried 



outside the Porta Capena at Rome), 
n, 117 

Callipho (probably a disdple of Epi- 
curus), n, 19, 34/; iv, 50; v, 21, 73 

Canonic, p. xiv; i, 22, 63 

Cameades (head of the Academy, 
visited Rome 156 b.c), p. xxiii; ii, 
35, 38, 42, 59; iii, 41; iv, 49; v, 4, 
0, 20. Caumeades' classification of 
ethical theories, v, 16# 

Catalinarian conspiracy, the, ii, 62, 

Cato, M. (95-48 b.c), -spokesman of 
Stoicism in Bks. m and nr. 

Cato, M. Pordus, the Censor (284-179 

B.C.), V, 2 

Causation, 1, 18, '19 

Ceramicus (suburb of Athens), i, 89 

Charmides, v, 94 

Children show natural impulses, x, 80; 
II, 33 ; ra, 16 ; v, 42/, 48, 55, 61 

Chremes (the title-part of Terence's 
Saf-Tormentor), i, 3; v, 28/ 

Chrysippus (third head and " second 
founder " of the Stoic School, 280- 
207 B.C.), I, 6, 89; n, 43/; iv, 7, 

Cicero, Lucius (cousin of Marcus), v, 

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, adherent of 
" New " Academy, v, 76; pp. vmff 

Cicero, Quintus (br. of Marcus), v, 1 

Circeii (a town of Latium), xv, 7 

Citium, IV, 56 

Claudius, Appius (consul and decemvir 
451 B.C.), n, 66 

Cleanthes (second head of Stoic 
Sdiool), IV, 7 

Codrus (last of the legendary Kings of 
Athens, fell disguised as a common 
soldier in battle against the 
Heraclidae because of an oracle 
that the side whose leader was 
killed should win), v, 62 

Cognition, modes of, iii, 83 

Colonus, V, 8 

Commendatio, prima {su prima na- 
turae), n, 35 

Condliationes, primae naturae {ses 
prima naturae), iii, 22 

Conscience, i, 51 

Consectaria, iii, 26; iv, 49 

Corinthian bronzes, n, 23 

" Cosmopolitanism," Stoic, in, 64, 69; 
IV, 7 

Courage, i, 49 


Crantor (Academic philosopher, fl. 

300 B.C.), v, 7 
Crassus, Marcus, called agelastos, v, 92 
Crassus, Marcus (son of the former), 

sumamed Dives), ii, 57 
Crassus, Marcus (son of Dives; tiie 

triumvir, fell in Parthia 58 B.C.), 

HI, 75 
Criterion of truth, p. xviii; i, 80, 68/; 

V, 76 
Critolaus (successor of Aristo as head 

of Peripatetic School; envoy to 

Rome 155 B.C.), v, 14 
Croesus (King of L3rdia), in, 76 
Cumanum, i ,14 
Curia Hostilia, v, 2 

Curius, Ifanius Dentatus (thrice con- 
sul, conqueror of Pjrrrhus 274 B.C.), 

C3mics and Stoics compared, p* xxii 
Cyrenaics (the School of Aristippus), 

I, 23, 89; XI, 39/, 114 
Cyrus, King of Persia, in, 76 
Cyrus (the Younger, fell in battle 

against his brother Artazerzes, 

King of Persia, 400 B.C. ; the hecoof 

Xenophon's Anabasis and CyrO' 

paedcia), xi, 116 

DamoQ, II, 79n 

Darius (King of Persia 521-485 b.c.), 

Dedi, the, n, 60; v, 64n 

Dedinatio atomorum, x, 19/ 

Definition, ix, 4/ 

Demetrius of Phalerum (ruler of 
Athens under Cassander, banished 
on liberation of Athens by Deme- 
trius Poliorcetes, 807 b.c.), v, 54 

Democritus (Greek philosopher; foun- 
der, with nis master Leucippus, of 
atomism; c. 460-861 b.c.), x, 17#: 
ix, 102; IV, 18; V, 50, 87 

Democritus, Ethics of, v, 28 

Demosthenes (the Athenian orator, d. 
822 B.C.), V, 5 

Desires, i, 48/ 

Desires classified, i, 45 ; n, 26/ 

Dialectic (see also Lo^), x^ 17/ 

Dicaearchus (pupil of Anstotle), iv, 

Dinomachus (a philosopher associated 
here and Tusc. v, 80, with Callipho), 


Diodonis (head of Peripatetic School, 

d. c. lao B.C.), II, 19, 84/; iv, 60; 

V, 14, 21, 73 
Diogenes (head of Stoic School: visited 

Rome 156 b.c), i, 6 ; ii, 24 ; 
Dion3rsius of Heradea (a ^dple of 

Zeno who became a Cyrenaic), v, 

Dicmysius, (tyrant of Syracuse, visited 

by Plato), II, 79n; iv, 56 
Dipylon (dty-gate of Athens to 

N.W.)» V, 1 
Division' i,'22; n, 26/ 
Drusus, Bi. Livius (tribune 122 b.c., 

opponent of Gains Gracchus), iv, 66 
Duty, Stoic doctrine of, in, 16 
DusckristtinuUa, in, 69 

Echecrates (Pythagorean philosopher), 

Effectio, III, 24, 45 

Effectus, III, 32 

Egyptian science, v, 87 

Eidola, I, 21 

End, the definition of, i, 42; ii, 6 

Endymion (in the Greek myth, a 
youth eternally asleep, beloved by 
the Moon), v, 55 

Ennius (Roman tragic and epic poet), 
239-169 B.C.), I, 4, 17; ii, 41, 106; 
IV, 62; v, 81 

Ei>aminondas (Theban general and 
statesman, d. 362 b.c), ii, 62, 67, 

Epicurean School, i, 65; ii, 12, 101; 

EpicuFeanism,'attacked, i, 13-26; di- 
vergences of doctrine, i, 31, Mff; 
11,^; ethics exx>ounded, p. xvi; i, 
29; ethics refuted, ii; logic, p. ziv; 
1,22, 63; II, 26, 30; phsrsics, p. xv; 
1, 17j(r, 63/; IV, 13 ; motives forstudy- 
ing, IV, 9, 13 

Epicurus (342-279 B.C.), i and ii, 
passim; v, 80; birthday kept by his 
sdiool, II, 101; claimed title of 
Sapiens, ii, 7; debt to Democritus, 
1, 18if; friendships, i, 65; n, 80, 96; 
maxims, ii, 20; quoted, i, 57. 63, 68; 
II, 84, 96, 100; unlearned, i, 20, 26, 
71/; portraits of, v, 3; will, ii, 96fif 

Epigennimatikon, in, 32 

Erechtheus (legendary King of Athens, 

who in obedience to an orade sacri- 
ficed his youngest daughter to secure 
victory in a war, and the rest of 
whose daughters killed themsdves), 

Erillus (of Carthage, a heterodox 
Stoic, disdple of iSeno), ii, 35, 43; 
IV, 36, 40; V, 23, 73 

Ethics, the Peripatetic, v, llff 

Ethics, the Nicomachean, v, 12 

Euchrlstemata, in, -69 

Eukairia, in, 45 

Euripides (Attic tragedian, 480-406 
B.C.)» i> 4, 5; 11,105 

Euthumia, v, 23, 87 

Expetenda, iv, 19 

Fabricius, Gains, v, 64n 

Finibus,de, meaning of title, p* vii; 

date of composition, p. x; sources 

of, p. xiii; text of, p- xxv; MSS. of, 

p. xxvi 
Fors Fortuna (goddess of fortune), t, 

Fortune does not touch the Wise, i, 

Friendship, i, 65#; n, 78j(5r; in, 70 ^ 

Gallonius, Publius, n, 24, 90 

Gallus, Quintus Fadius, n, 55 

Gloriatio, in, 28 

Gods, Stoic view of, in, 66/ 

Good, the Chief, views as to, classified, 
in, 30/ 

Good defined, n, 5 ; in, 33 

Goods, external, in, 41#; iv, 29#, 68/ 

Gorgias (the Sophist, came to Athens 
427 B.C.), II, 2 

Gracchus, (1) Tiberius, tribune 187 
B.C., twice consul: (2) Tiberius, 
tribune, 133; and (3) Gains, tribune, 
128, agrarian reformers, sons of (1), 
nr, 65/ 

Hannibal (Carthaginian invader o^ 

Italy 218 b.c), nr, 22 
Happiness, Epicurean rule of, i, 57#; 

Stoic and Peripatetic views of, in, 

Hellespont (the Dardanelles, bridged 

with boats by Xerxes), ii, 112 
Heroditus (philosopher of Ephesus, fl. 

510 B.C.), II, 16 



Herctiles, u, 118 

Henxiarchiis (succeeded Epicurus as 
head of schooi), n, 96, 101 

Hieronymus (heterodox pupil of Aris- 
totie), II, 8, 16; 19, 32, 35, 41; iv, 
49 ;t, 14, 20, 78 

Hhrius, ii, 60n 

History, charm of, v, 61/ 

Homer, i, 7; n, 115, 116; v, 49 

HomologiOf in, 21 

Honestum, i, 61; ii, 37/, 45, 48 {su 

HaaesiY the best policy, x, 52 

Hormi, see Prima naturae 

Hortensius Hortalus, Q. (Cicero's rival 
as an orator, 114-50 b.c.)> i, 2 

Hortensius (Cicero's, an Introduction 
to Philosophy, extant only in frag- 
ments), I, 2 

H3rmettus, mountain in Attica fa- 
mous for its honey), ii, 112, 

HymniSf ii, 22 

Imagines, i, 21 
Inane, x, 17, 21 
Indifferent things, in, 50# 
Initia naturae; see Prima naturae 
Instinct of new-bom animals {see 

Prima naturae), i, 30; ii, 31, 33/ 
Institutio, IV, 32 
Intention, Morality depends on, iii, 

Interrogatiuncula, i, 39; iv, 7 
Inventio, iv, 10 

Justice, i, 50; v, 65/ 

Kakia, in, 40 
KataletsiSf p. xviii; in, 17 
KeUMkon, p. xxi; ni, 20 
Katorthdmata; see Recta 
KatorthSsis, in, 45 
" Know thyself," ii, 16; v, 44 
Knowledge, love of, instinctive, v, 48 
Kuriai doxai, n, 20 

Laelius, C. (Roman statesman, friend 
of Sdpio A£ricanus Minor, cons. 
140 B.C.), II, 24, 59; iv, 23 

Lanuvium (city of Latium), n, 63 

Laudabile, ni, 27 ; iv, 49 

Leonidas (Spartan King, d. 480 B.C.)» 
II. 62, 97 


Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius, v. 64n 

Licinius (perhaps Pordus Licintu^ a 
critic a little senior to Cicero), i, 5 

Locri (Greek colony in S. Italy), v, 87 

Logic, Epicurean, x, 22, 03; n, 26, 80; 
Stoic, i, 63; ni, 72; iv, 8; Peripa- 
tetic, y, 10 

Lucilius (foimder of Roman saiura\ 
148-103 B.C.), I, 7, 9; n, 15, 23, 24/ 

Lucretia (wife of Lucius Tarquinius 
Collatinus), n, 66; t, 64n 

Lucretius (Roman poet 95-65 B.C.), ii, 

Lucullus (Roman millionaire con- 
queror of Mithridates), iii, 8 

Lucullus (son of the above and nephew 
and ward of Cato, feltat PhiUppi on 
the Republican side 42 B.C.), in, 

Lyco (fourth head of Peripatetic 

School), v, 13 
Lycurgus (founder of the Spartan 
constitution), n, 67 

Magi, the Persian, v, 87 

Magister populi, in, 75 

Manilius, Manius (cos. 149 B.C., jurist), 

Manlius; see Torqnatus 

Mantinea, battle of (362 B.C.), ii, 96 

Marius, Gains (157-87 b.c, conqueror 
of Jugurtha, and of the German and 
Celtic invaders; in the dvil wars 
proscribed by SuHa and arrested in 
the marshes of the Liris), n, 105 

Media, in, 58/; and see, Indifferent 

Memory,, control of, i, 57; xi, 104/ 

Memory, training of, v, 2 

Menander (writer of Attic comedy) 
342-291 B.C.), I, 4, 7 

Metapontum (an old Greek city in the 
South of Italy), v, 4 

Metelhis, Quintus Macedonicus (con- 
sul 143 B.C.), V, 82 

Metrodoms (pupil of Epicurus), x, 25; 
II, 7, 92, 96, 101 

Miltiades (Athenian general, defeated 
Persians at Marathon 490 b.c.), ii, 

Mnesvchus (head of Stoic School, 
teacher of Antiochus), i, 

Moral Worth, Morality; see Honestum 

Murena, T. (cos. 63, defended by 
Cicero on charge of l^ibery), xv, 74 


Natural Philosophy; see Physics 
Naturalia; see I%ma naturae 
Nature, Life in accordance with, pp. 

XX, xxii; iv, llff 
Nicomachus, v, 12 
Numantia (in Spain, chief town of 

Celtiberians), u, 54 

Octavius, Gnaeus, ii, 03 

Oedipus, V, 3 

Officia, p. xxi; iii, 20#, 58 ff 

ofioKoyla, iii, 21 

Ophelema, in, 33, 69 

Orata («saurata, a fish; nickname of 

C. Seigius, a gourmet), ii, 70 
Orestes (friend of Pylades in Greek 

legends), i, 65; ii, 79; v, 63 
hpixiix see Prima naturae 
Oroetes, v, 92 

Pacuvius (Roman tragic poet, 220- 
c. 130 B.C.)» X, i9; n, 79; v, 31, 63 

Pain; see Pleasure and pain 

Pain, absence of, the greatest pleasure, 

Pain, absence of as " Static ** pleasure, 
n, 9, 16 

Pain, short if strong, light if long, i, 
40; n, 22 

Panaetius (head of Stoic School), ISO- 
Ill B.C.), I, 6; II, 24; iv, 23, 79 

Papius, Quintus Aemilius, v, 64n 

ParadoxUf iv, 74 

Passions, not natural, ni, 35 

Po^Aos; 111,35 

Paubis; see Perses 

F^ucaens, Sextus (propraetor in 
Sicily 75 B.C. when Cicero was 
quaestor), ii, 58 

Perception, Stoic doctrine of, v, 76 

Pericles (Athenian statesman, d. 429 

B C') V 5 

Peripatetics (the Scho(d of Aristotle), 
n, 84; in, 41; iv, 5; v, 7; system 
reviewed, v, 9/; divergences on 
Etiiics, V, 12; decline of, v, 13; in- 
cluded in the CM Academy, v, 7 

Peripatetics and Academic Ethics 
identified, v, 14; 21; expounded, v, 
24/; misrepicsented, v, 38n 

Perses (last King of Macedonia, con- 
quered by L. Aemilius Paulus 168 

B.C.) V 71 

Persians' frugal diet, ii, 92 

Persius, i, 7 

Phaedrus (Epicurean philosopher, 

teacher of Cicero), i, 16 ; v, 3 
Phalaris (cruel tynmt of Acragas, 550 

B.C.), IV, 64; V, 85 
Phalerum (a harbour of Athens), 

Pheidias (Greek senator 490-432 b.c.), 

II, 115; rv, 34 
Philanthropia, m, 63 
Philip (King of Macedon 359-336 B.C.), 

II, 116 
Philo, pp. viii, xxiii 
Philoctetes (Greek hero bitten by 

snake on voyage to Troy and ma- 
rooned on isle of Lemnos; the hero 

of tragedies by Sophocles and 

Attius), II, 94; V, 32 
Philodemus (Epicurean philosopher, 

taught at Rome in Qcero's day), ii 

Philosophy, its three parts, iv, 4 
Phintias, ii, 79n 
Physics, Epicurean, i, 17#, 63/; iv, 3; 

Peripatetic, iv, 18; v, 9/; Stoic, in, 

73; IV, 11 
Pindar (Greek lyric poet, b. c. 523 

• B.cJ, n, 115 

^ a.rugi (cos. 183 B.C., opponent of 
Gains Gracchus and author of 
first law against extortion in the 
provinces), ii, 90; v, 2 

Piso Marcus (consul 61 B.C., spokes- 
man of s^^tem of Antiochus in 
Bk. V), IV, 73; v, passim. 

Plato (Athenian philosopher, 428-847 
B.C.), II, 2, 15, 45, 52, 92, 102n; 
IV, 21, 56, 79; v, 2, 7, 50, 58, 84, 

Pleasure defined, n, 6, 8; absence of 
pain the greatest, i, Z7ff, 56; ii, 8ff; 
Epicurean, calculati<m of, i, 82#; 
mental and bodily, i, 55; n, 13, 107/; 
mental. Stoic view of, in, 33; per- 
ceived directly, i, 80; u, 36; pri- 
mary instinct for, i, 80 ; sensual, a 
ftmdamental good, ii, 29, 64, 68: 
" sUtic " and ** kinetic " confused 
by Epicurus, ii, 9, 16; Peripatetic 
and Academic, view of, v, 45 

Pleasure and pain not sole motives, 
I, 2Sff; II, 109/; the ultimate gooa 
and evil, i, 29#, 40#; n, 7 

Pleasure and virtue, i, 57# 

Plotius, Gaius, ii, 58 

PoiHika, in, 55 



Polemo (head of the Academy 316-273 

B.C.), II, 34, 35/; iv, 3, 45, 51, 61; 

V, 2, 7, U, 94 
Politics, Stoic, III, 68; iv, 7, 9 
Politics, Peripatetic, nr, 66; v, 11 
Polyaenus (geometrician, friend of 

Epicurus), 1, 19 
Polydeitus (Greek sculptor, fl. 469' 

412 B.C.). 11, 115 
Polycrates (tyrant of Samos, d. 522 

B.C.), V, 92 
Pompeius, Quintus (cons. 141 b.c.), ii> 

Pompeius (Gnaeus Magnus, the trium- 

vii^, 11,67 
Pomponius; see Atticus 
Posidonius (Stoic philosopher, pupil of 

Panaetius and friend of Cicero), i, 6 
Postumius, n, 60 
" Preferred " things, iii, 51^; iv, 19 

Prima naturae, iii, 21, 30; rd irpwra 

Karh <p6<nv, the earliest objects 
which nature prompts a new-bom 
animal to seek, or the instincts 
to seek such objects (the two 
senses not always distinguished) 
also rendered by naturalia, iii, 61 ; . 
prima naturalia, ii, 34; prima 
siecundum naturam, v, 18, 19, 45; 
prima natura data, xi, 34; initia 
naturae, ii, 38; in, 22; prima 
naturae conciliationes, in, 22 (cf . in 
prima commendatio naturae, ii, 35, 
40); principia naturae, in, 22, 23; 
prima or principia a natura data, 
II, 34; IV, 18; prmcipia naturaUa, ii, 
85 ; 111,17 ; prima ex natura appetitio, 
IV, 25; naturalis appetitio, iv, 39; 
quam vocant itpfJ-'flv^ in, 23; v, 17; 
primus appetituSfV, 24; re quae pri- 
mae appetuntur, in, 17; prima 
ascita natura, in, 17 ; prima naturae 
commoda, v, 58 ; prima invitamenta 
naturae, v, 17 

Principia naturae, naturalia= prima 
naturae, which sm; in a broader 
senses prima constitatio naturae, v, 

Proegtnena, p« xxi; ni, 15, 61/; iv, 72 

Probability, v, 76 

Progress, Stoic doctrine of, iv, 67 

Ptolemalum, v, 1 

Ptolemy (the first, sumamed Soter, 
King of Egypt 325-285 B.C.), v, 54 

Pullus Numitorius, Quintus (Volscian 


general, betrayed Fregellae to the 

Romans 328 B.C.), v, 62 
Pylades, ii, 79 
Pyrrho (of Elis, founder of Sceptic 

School), p. xiii; n, 36, 43; m, 11, 12; 

iv,43, 49, 61;v, 23 
Pyrrhus (King of Epirus, 818-273 B.C.), 

II, 61;v, 64n 
Pythagoras (an early Greek philoso- 

pher), v, 4, 50, 87 

Recta, recte facta, Karopdibfiara, p. 

xxi; in, 24, 45, 59 
Regulus, Marcus (invaded Africa in 

first Punic War, 256 b.c.), ii, 66; 

v 82 88 
" Reflected " things, in, 61# 
Republica, de (Cicero's treatise, extant 

m fragments), n, 69 
Rhetoric compared with Dialectic, n, 

Rhetoric, Peripatetic, nr, 6; v, 10 
Ruf us, Publius Sextilius, n, 65 
Rutilius, I, 7 

Sapiet%s\su Wise Man 

Sardanapalus, ii, 106 

Scaevola Mucius, i, 8 

Scaevola, Publius (jurist, pontifex 

maximus B.c. 181), x, 12; ii, 54; nr, 

Scepticism, v, 76; in the Academy,' 

ui, 32 
Scipio, Publius Cornelius Nasica, v, 

Scipio (Publius ComeUus Africanus 

Major, the conqueror of Hannibal, 

202 B.C.), n, 56, 106; XV, 22; v, 70 
Scipio (Publius Africanus Minor, con- 
queror of Carthage, 146 b.c.), x, 7; 

XV, 23; V, 70 
Sdpiones, in, 37 

Self-love, primary instinct, nx, 26 
Self-preservation the universal pri- 

mary impulse, v, 24 
Senses, sow and infallible source of 

knowledge, i, 80, 64; pronounce 

pleasure good, x, 30; xx, 86 
Simonides (Greek lyric poet, inventor 

of mnemonics, b. 666 b.c.), xx, 104; 

V, 2n 
Sirens, the, v, 49 
Siro (Epicurean philosopher, taught 

at Rome, c. 50 b.c.). ix, 119 


Socrates (Athenian philosopher 460- 
399 B.C.), II, 1/, 90; v, 84, 87, 88 

Solon (Athenian reformer, c, 595 b.c.)> 
u, 67; III, 76 

Sophists (Greek professors of higher 
education in 5th and 4th cent. 3.0.)» 

Sophocles, 1, 5 ; V, 3 

Sorites (Gr. sbtoSj a heap: a train of 
argument consisting of a series of 
syUogisms, eaph proving a premise 
of the next, but with the interme- 
diate conclusions not expressed), iv, 

Speusippus (successor of Plato as 
head of the Academy), iv, 3 ; v, 2, 7 

Stasea (Peripatetic philosopher of 
Naples, resided with Piso), v, 8, 75 

Stoicism, Ethics iii, \^ff\ Logic, p. 
xviii; i, 63; iii, 72; p. xx; iv, 8/; 
Physics, p. xix ; IV, 11 ; Politics, iv, 7 ; 
terminology novel, in, Zff\ v, 22; 
and Peripateticism, real difference 
between asserted, in, 41#; denied, 
IV, 8/; V, 22, 74; its Chief Good der 
fined, V, 20; inconsistency of, iv, 68, 

Strato (third head of Peripatetic 
School) V, 13 

Suicide, 1, 49; III, 60/ 

Sulla (Roman dictator, d. 78 B.C.), in, 

Sumenda, iv, 19 

Syracusan luxury, n, 92 

Tali, in, 54 

Tarentum (Greek colony in S. Italy), 

Tarquinius (Superbus, the last king of 
Rome, banished 510 B.C.), in, 75 

Tdika^ in, 55 

TOos^ p. vii; I, 42; in, 26 

Temperance, i, 47 

Terence (P. Terentius Afer, Roman 
writer of comedy, c. 190-159 b.c.), i, 
3. 4; n, 14; V, 29/ 

Thconista (wife of Leonteus of Lamp- 
sacus, and like her husband , a pupil 
of Epicurus, one of whose ethical dis- 
courses was in the form of a lauda- 
tion of her), II, 67 

Themistocles (Athenian general, de- 
feated Persians at Salamis 480 b.c.), 
n, 67, 104/, 116 

Theophrastus (successor of Aristotle 

as head of Peripatetic School), 
I, 6. 14; IV, 3, 79; v, 11/, 54, 73, 77, 

Thermopylae, battle of (490 b.c.), ii, 

Theseus (King of Athens and friend 
of Peinthous in Greek legends), i, 

Thorius, Lucius, ii, 63/, 70 

Title of de Finibus, p. vii 

Timaeus (Pythagorean philosopher), v, 

Topics; see Inventio 

Torquatus, Titus Manlius Imperiosus 
(won surname of Torquatus 361 
B.C.), 1, 23, 34/; n, 60, 72/, 105 

Torquatus, T. Mainlius (consul 65 
B.C.), I, 24, 34/ 

Torquatus, Aulus (friend of Cicero, 
in exile as a Pompeian), ii, 72 

Torquatus, Lucius Manlius (praetor 
49 B.C., see n, 74; fell fighting on 
Pompeian side in Africa); spokes- 
man for Epicureanism, i, 13-end; ii 

Trabea (Roman comic dramatist, fl. 
130 B.C.), n, 13 

Triarius, Gains (Pompeian, fell in 
battle), interlocutor, i, 13-end; n, 

Tubero, Q. (praetor 123 b.c.), iv, 23 

Tubulus, Lucius (praetor 142 b.c.), n, 

Tusculum, Cicero's villa at, in, 7 

Ulysses v, 49 

Vacuum, i, 17, 21 

Value, Stoic doctrine of, n, 20, 34 

Verginius, Lucius, ii, 66; v, 64n 

Veseris, battle of the (near Mt. Vesu- 
vius, 340 B.C., final conquest of the 
Latins), i, 23 

Virtue based on pleasure, i, i2ff 

Virtue and Reason, v, 36 

Virtues, " volimtary " and " involun- 
tary," V, 36 

Voconian law, n, 55 

Wisdom, absolute, in, 48 
Wisdom brings peace of mind, i, 43/ 
Wise Man alone happy, i, 61/; ii 86/; 

always happv, i, 62; in, 42; iv, 31; 

V, 77//; displays love of life, v. 32; 

Epicurus a, ii, 7; iv, 3; liinits his 

desires, i, 44, 58/; the Stoic, in, 75/; 

IV, 7, 21/ 
Wise Men, the Seven, ii, 7; in, 73, 76 



Xenocrates (third head of the Aca- Zeno (fbnnder of Stoic School, c. 300 

demy), iv, 8, 4«, 79; v, 2, 7 B.C.), ii, 17, 35; ni, 15#; iv, 3, 7, 9, 

Xeaophon, ii, 92; and see AgesilaiiB 13, 10,44; his birtlqdace, xv,M 

and Cyrus Zeno (Epicurean ptulosopbex, con* 

Xerxes (King (rf Persia, invaded temporary of Goen)), i, 16 

Greece 480 B.C.), n, 112 Zeuzis (Greek painter, b. c 450 b.c.) , 

II, 115 





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